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NATIONAL STATE OR AN UNDEFINED FORMATION? - CASE STUDY OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA – PRESPA AGREEMENT, FROM NATIONAL TO ARTIFICIAL STATE

Oliver Andonov¹, Jana Kukeska²

ABSTRACT

Contemporary global trends in the world become so irrepressible, undefined and even violent for small states and peoples. This is not just an ordinary, politically motivated attitude, or a conclusion derived under unfavorable circumstances, but it represents a theoretically-based feeling of losing the national state and the perception of the traditional paradigm of "the idea of statehood and nation" towards something so-called "new" but predominantly undefined. At the same time, it is not about an undefined social system, but about the changes of constitutional and political system within a single historical cycle through various violent and subtle methods, resulting in a change of its national character, thus creating a pseudo-state with an amorphous mass of population. Due to the fact that the authors think it is an experiment on a global level, aiming at identity changes of states and nations and the process of creating an amorphous group of human entities based on the "walling of the Babylonian Tower" principle, this paper represents comparative analysis of documents which on the example of the Republic of Macedonia led to a fundamental change of the state and national identity of the Macedonian nation and of the Macedonian state. In this paper we analyze the part of the so-called "Prespa Agreement", part of the good neighbor agreement between Macedonia and Bulgaria, the Bulgaria Policy Strategy towards Macedonia in 2008, and finally, we analyze the Constitutional Amendments 33 to 36 which were adopted on 11 January 2019 in the Macedonian Parliament despite the referendum held on 30 September 2018. Majority of Macedonia's citizens refused to declare acceptance of the so-called "Prespa Treaty" with Greece, the consequences of which are these constitutional amendments. The authors' research attitude is that the case of the Republic of Macedonia and its Macedonian nation is just one example how in the future the model could be used towards other nations and states worldwide in creation of anational states and amorphous masses of population, certainly with one single goal, to manage socially incompatible collectivities easier, at least at the level of the ethnic community, promoting the "freedom" of the individuals with no coherency or affiliation.

Key words: nation, national state, undefined formation, amorphous mass, strategy

Introduction

The paper presents an analysis of the political destabilization of a country, the Balkan region and anachronistic phenomena in the European Union

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contemporary politics. It deals with the long-implemented strategy for breaking a state and a nation, in this case: the Macedonian nation and the Macedonian state, based on the strategic principles of Greece and Bulgaria, which are primarily based back in the 19th century.

The present conditions point out to the abuse of the NATO and EU membership position by Greece in order to achieve its own national interests which are completely contrary with the modern civilization achievements and the European values as well. Additionally, many viewed the situation as the stronger state was “bullying” the weaker one. (Manzinger, 2000) From this perspective and approximately two years after the Constitutional changes in the Republic of Macedonia (which did not exclusively refer to the country name change), we may believe that Greece itself becomes aware of its wrongdoing and worthlessness of this dispute, opened by the Konstantin Mitsotakis' administration in the early 1990s. According to the former Greek Foreign Minister Kotsias: "this dispute was completely unnecessary and exhausting for Greece and Greece found a satisfactory way out of it." That the dispute opened the Pandora Box on the Balkans is confirmed by another statement of Mr. Kotsias accusing Bulgaria for becoming a destabilizing factor in the Balkans, for blocking the Macedonia's EU membership talks, citing the provisions of the Prespa Agreement on the right to use the adjective "Macedonian". (Damceska, 2020)

It is a matter of fact that through the Prespa Agreement (PA) and the Greek pressures within the Balkan geopolitical framework (in view of Macedonia as an interspace between the Russian and the United States influence), agreement between Macedonia and Greece was reached for Macedonia's NATO membership and stabilization of the South Wing. This Agreement is by itself in conflict with jus cogens norms of international law and enters in legal matters that belong *stricto sensu* in the domain of the domestic jurisdiction of the other party. (Janey, 2019)

One of the Prespa Agreement's crucial parameters was the attempt to tackle the ‘elephant in the room’ of the name dispute, i.e. the identity and the heritage. (Armakolas, Petkovski, 2019) However, this agreement is greatly unfavorable for Macedonia demonstrable from today's perspectives in the relations with Bulgaria trying to copy Greece in its attitude towards Macedonia. In addition, instead of resolving a dispute, the PA is likely to grow into an additional source of regional destabilization (Vankovska, 2020) thus will continue to cause long-term instability in the Balkans.

In this manner, the Prespa Agreement has proved its capacity to evoke prolonged destabilization instead of pacification and de-escalation of the conflicts in the Balkans, especially of the ethnopolitical conflicts. Unfortunately, Bulgaria has tried to export this conflicting capacity to the EU, in light of the new negotiating framework, which was blocked by the Czech Republic and Slovakia as they determined it is a destabilizing long-term factor not only for the EU enlargement but also for the relations among the EU member states .

In this paper we will try to present how the constitutional changes in Macedonia were made, over a bilateral agreement signed illegally and unconstitutionally by the Macedonian Foreign Affairs Minister along with a judicial and political pressures on several Macedonian MP's after the failed referendum in the country. This process of name change followed by a political violence as well, will have visible aftereffect for Macedonia, the region, but also in more global terms.

1 Brief analysis of the so-called Prespa Agreement

Final Agreement for the settlement of the differences as described in the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 817 (1993) and 845 (1993), the termination of the Interim Accord of 1995, and the establishment of a Strategic Partnership between the Parties is the full and official name of the so-called “Prespa Agreement”.³ (Final agreement for the settlement..., 2018) The agreement’s text is explosive, having been crafted to fundamentally confirm and consolidate a radical ‘otherness’ of the two parties involved (that is, Greece and Macedonia), encompassing their populations and histories. (Rohdewald, 2018) Therefore, this Agreement is an inexhaustible source for analysis and study of a bilateral agreement visibly asymmetric because the first party (Greece) has rights and the second party (unnamed in the Agreement) has obligations. Regardless of the fact that Greece was the stronger party in this dispute, primarily due to its established international position as an EU and NATO member, Macedonia could have achieved a much better agreement, especially in terms of the sensitive identity issues.

It should be noted that this agreement in its formal legal status has a crucial flaw that is contrary to the Macedonian Constitution. Namely, "International agreements are concluded in the name of the Republic of Macedonia by the President of the Republic of Macedonia"⁴ and afterwards are ratified by the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia.⁵ The government or individual ministers, even with an authorization, are not entitled to sign such agreements. For this reason, this "Prespa Agreement" is legally invalid and opens the possibility for its annulment as against the Constitution. We are faced both with “negotiorum gestio” act as well with an ultra vires act, because (the Macedonian signatory) Mr.

³ For full text of the Agreement, please see: <https://vlada.mk/sites/default/files/dokumenti/spogodba-en.pdf>

⁴ article 119 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. Please see https://www.sobranie.mk/the-constitution-of-the-republic-of-macedonia-ns_article-constitution-of-the-republic-of-north-macedonia.nspix

⁵ article 68 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. Please see https://www.sobranie.mk/the-constitution-of-the-republic-of-macedonia-ns_article-constitution-of-the-republic-of-north-macedonia.nspix

Nikola Dimitrov has overstepped his mandate, and has violated the Constitutional and legal prerogatives. (Siljanovska, 2018)

Seen through the prism of international law, such an act of concluding the Prespa Agreement is not in accordance with the norms of articles 7 and 8 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, in the matter of "jurisdiction to conclude an international agreement" and "its subsequent confirmation if concluded without the consent of the state" (Nikodinovska, 2018) According to article 7 (a) a person is considered as representing a State for the purpose of adopting or authenticating the text of a treaty or for the purpose of expressing the consent of the State to be bound by a treaty if he produces appropriate full powers⁶ and in case a person cannot be considered as authorized to represent a State, according to article 8 of the Convention, for that purpose the act relating to the conclusion of a treaty is without legal effect unless afterwards confirmed by that State.

We will now focus on the material shortcomings in the text and make a brief analysis solely on the disputed articles. They are undoubtedly contrary to the United Nations Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights, and at the same time do not close the famous dispute but create a long-term conflict capacity between Macedonia and Greece, but also in the region.

At the very beginning, in the Preamble of the Agreement, the contracting parties are defined as: The First Party, the Hellenic Republic (the "First Party") and the Second Party, which was admitted to the United Nations in accordance with the United Nations General Assembly resolution 47/225 of 8 April/1993 (the "Second Party"). Although both parties are recognized international entities with equal contracting status, it is noticeable that the First party is a superior contracting entity and the Second Party is unnamed thus have a subordinate contracting status. Furthermore, the Constitution of Macedonia is violated because the then constitutional name of the state is not mentioned. Such a situation can also be seen as suppression / ignoring the state continuity between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of North Macedonia. (Kjulavkova, 2020)

In Part 1, article 3, paragraph 3, under a) it is stipulated that "The official name of the Second Party shall be the "Republic of North Macedonia which shall be the constitutional name of the Second Party and shall be used erga omnes." According to this erga omnes nature of the name change, it will be used both internationally and bilaterally, so that the 140 or more countries that had previously recognized the name (Republic of) Macedonia will also have to adopt (Republic of) North Macedonia. (Gjorgioska, 2020)

Any analysis on the naming of States inescapably starts from the admission that the choice of a name is a core manifestation of State sovereignty or as has been eloquently put 'un refuge de la souveraineté', and a linchpin of a people's right to self-determination. (Pergantis, 2019) In a sense, a State's name is a matter

⁶https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf

of domestic jurisdiction, where the non-interference principle is applicable. (Zaikos, 2010)

This is where the problem pertaining to the use of the adjective for belonging "Macedonian" begins, and the same is manifested in regards with the recent Bulgaria's claims to Macedonia. In the same article, in paragraph d) is stipulated that "the terms "Macedonia" and "Macedonian" have the meaning given under Article 7 of this Agreement." and accepted to be deprived of the right to be named as Macedonia, against the will of the majority of citizens, agreed to redefine the existing 1945 identity registered in the UN documents (according to the identity card of the Republic of Macedonia, its language was Macedonian without any restrictive additions, and the people - Macedonian). (Zaikos, 2010)

Articles 7 and 8 of the Prespa Agreement are especially interesting for analysis. They refer to the use of the terms "Macedonia" and "Macedonian", as well as the use of symbols (primarily the "Vergina sun" or the "Kutlesh Star", which was the symbol formerly displayed on its former national flag of Macedonia after its independence), but above all it is a model for restricting the use of historical symbols, which were used in Macedonia from antiquity to present day even within the Christian cultural tradition, such as church ornaments or symbols or coats of arms of Macedonia. Long is the list of scientific arguments proving that antiquity is not an exclusive Greek cultural heritage, but a common civilization gain. Neither Ancient Macedonia is Greek and may be subject of international bargaining.

The Prespa Agreement is set exclusively towards the ancient historical and cultural heritage (it denies the elementary right of Macedonia and the Macedonian people to any, albeit symbolic, identity) referencing, identification, and even study of the history of the ancient Macedonians and ancient Macedonia. The scientific truth about such a policy of decree is irrelevant, and Greece is, a priori, authorized to appropriate the ancient Macedonian identity, regardless of existing or new objective indicators. (Zaikos, 2010)

Despite its ancient name and self-presentation, Modern Greece is not an old nation. (Liakos, 2007) The Greek national state was born as the result of a separatist war, which, in the second decade of the nineteenth century, carved the territory from the Ottoman Empire. (Liakos, 2007)

In a disputed procedure, representatives of the Republic of Macedonia accepted a revision of the ethno-national narrative, and thus of the cultural and national history of the Macedonians. (Kjulavkova, 2020) Namely, (in Article 7) they agreed with the ban on Macedonia and the Macedonians to refer, in any situation, to a history older than the one related to the Slavic character of the Macedonian language, people, history and culture, and they also agreed with the cultural policy that challenged the existence of the Macedonian people (ethnic Macedonians) and the Macedonian nation (all citizens of Macedonia), i.e. they have accepted not only a revision and reduction of the Macedonian identity, but also its negation and

substitution with the category "citizens of Northern Macedonia". (Kjulavkova, 2020)

As a result, two years after the Prespa Agreement the adjective "Macedonian" is officially deleted from all national institutions, such as Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts; Macedonian Theater, Macedonian Ballet Macedonian Television, Macedonian Radio, etc.

2 Review of the Constitutional amendments No. 33-36 of the Republic of Macedonia Constitution

In this part of the paper we will focus on a more detailed analysis of the Constitutional amendments which were an "obligation" for the Republic of Macedonia arisen from the signed Prespa Agreement. These Amendments are directly related to the redefinition of the national state of Macedonia and the Macedonian people. In addition, these Constitutional Amendments are a historical anti-process regarding the anti-fascist struggle of the Macedonian people and the creation of the Macedonian state as a modern European state. What message is sent by overthrowing the ASNOM anti-fascist foundations of the Macedonian statehood is yet to be determined?

2.1 Amandman 33

1. In the Constitution, the words "Republic of Macedonia" shall be replaced with the words "Republic of North Macedonia", and the word "Macedonia" shall be replaced with the words "North Macedonia", except in Article 36 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia.⁷

Everywhere in the text, the Republic of Macedonia is replaced with Republic of North Macedonia, which means a complete change of the name of the country. The Republic of Macedonia, especially its basic denominator, "Macedonia", derives back in the history. A reminder of the social order (Republic) is not important, because according to the highest constitutive act there will be a new state called "North Macedonia" and it will be a bearer of a new nation (according to the state principle), which builds a new identity and history in 2019.

Therefore, the following questions arise:

- Were they Macedonians so far and who are they?
- Who (which entity-ethnic community, which common history, culture, language and tradition) creates this new nation?

⁷https://www.sobranie.mk/the-constitution-of-the-republic-of-macedonia-ns_article-constitution-of-the-republic-of-north-macedonia.nspx

- It is not a question of whether they will, but to what extent will the neighbors sequester a part or parts of the history of the Macedonian people?
- What will be the consequences for the perseverance of the Macedonian people in future and can there be retrograde processes in relation to the death of the nation?
- What will be the further demands of the Macedonia's neighbors, especially with respect to the use of instruments and mechanisms in the process of negotiations for Macedonia's full EU membership?

These are not hypothetical questions, but essential scientific questions that need to be answered, although some of them can only be in the form of assumptions, and their empirical verifiability will only be possible in future terms depending on the political thresholds in Macedonia and regional influences.

2.2 Amandman 34

In the Preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia (...) the words “the decisions of the ASNOM” shall be replaced with the words “the legal decisions cited in the Proclamation of the First Session of the ASNOM to the Macedonian people about the said session of the ASNOM”, the words “which expressed the will to create an independent sovereign state and the Ohrid Framework Agreement” shall be added after the word “year”, and the words “have decided to“ shall be deleted.⁸

Erasing the decisions of ASNOM has immediate effect toward the history and state decline i.e. the legal continuity of the Macedonian state and the historical proof of the Macedonian people statehood.

The entry: "Proclamation of the First Session of the ASNOM to the Macedonian people " instead of "the decisions of the ASNOM" represents a historical generalization and relativization of the Macedonian nation-state in a historical moment. This is due to the fact that the proclamation of the people is evident for the purpose of acquainting oneself with important historical events, and not for the legal and constitutional confirmation of the statehood. The proclamation does not mention the key legal acts that the Macedonian state and the Macedonian nation establish with their postulates as documents that are not permanently binding, such as:

- ASNOM as the highest legislative body and representative body of state power of the DEMOCRATIC (REPUBLIC) OF MACEDONIA, or its successor
- the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia.
- Macedonian language as the only official language in the Macedonian state and its entire territory (introduction to abolition of the Macedonian language)

⁸https://www.sobranie.mk/the-constitution-of-the-republic-of-macedonia-ns_article-constitution-of-the-republic-of-north-macedonia.nspix

- Respect for the People's Liberation Army (abandonment of the anti-fascist struggle) and renunciation of the anti-fascism ideology as a historical, cultural and democratic benefit for the Macedonian people

- Declaring Ilinden a national state holiday of the Macedonian state (it is disputable whether this will lead to abolition of Ilinden (and its celebration) which presents a foundation of the Macedonian state, statehood and symbols of the national struggle of the Macedonian people for independence)

By avoiding ASNOM's decisions with the constitutional changes, the tendencies to "unite the entire Macedonian people" have been essentially erased, as a new nation (North Macedonia) is being created, while denying the "Rights to full freedom and equality of all nationalities in Macedonia" and therefore:

- It is the entry of the Ohrid Agreement into the preamble to stir up the undefined statehood and "bi-nationality", as an artificial pseudo-state creation

- Why the word "decided" is deleted from the Preamble? It is a lexical, semantic, legal and historical issue claiming that the Macedonian people and all minorities have not decided to establish the Republic of Macedonia, but it is being resolved by someone else. This creates a new nation and state without the continuity of history; composed of an amorphous mass without collective memory — history, culture, religion, language, tradition.

Authors believe that this amendment will have a further impact on the Macedonian peoples' redefinition in a new, artificially created country without foundation.

2.3 Amendment 35

1. The Republic shall respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the neighbouring states.

2. This amendment shall supplement Article 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia.⁹

A completely unnecessary amendment which serves to defocus the public. Namely, in the current Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, Article 34, Amendment I.1, clearly states that "The Republic of Macedonia has no territorial pretensions towards any neighboring state." The question is whether the neighboring countries of the Republic of Macedonia have such guarantees in their constitutions in the Republic of Macedonia? This argument is certainly in the direction of building mutual trust and reciprocity in the mutual relations of states.

⁹https://www.sobranie.mk/the-constitution-of-the-republic-of-macedonia-ns_article-constitution-of-the-republic-of-north-macedonia.nspx

2.4 Amandman 36

1. The Republic shall protect, guarantee and foster the characteristics and the historical and cultural heritage of the Macedonian people.

The Republic shall protect the rights and interests of its nationals living or staying abroad.

The Republic shall provide for the diaspora of the Macedonian people and of part of the Albanian people, Turkish people, Vlach people, Serbian people, Roma people, Bosniak people and others and shall foster and promote the ties with the fatherland.

In doing so, the Republic shall not interfere with the sovereign rights of other states and with their internal affairs.¹⁰

2. This amendment shall replace Article 49 of and Amendment II to the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia.

Hereby, the Republic waives its protection for the rights and status of Macedonians in neighboring countries as well as the Macedonian emigrants as regulated by Article 49, paragraph 1.

New provisions include flocculus and study provisions such as:

1. The Republic shall protect, guarantee and foster the characteristics and the historical and cultural heritage of the Macedonian people. (This is unnecessarily included in Article 49, which refers to the protection of the Macedonian people living in the Republic of Macedonia, because the Constitution itself protects its citizens, including Macedonians (which is obviously only between itself and Macedonia). That makes the constitution a mess filled with nebulae. Namely, Macedonia should guarantee the ethnic, cultural and linguistic identity of minorities living within its borders, and the Macedonian people in their nation-state should not be guaranteed collective and national rights. It is the misconception that troubles the Macedonian people because while the amendment provides for minority protection living within the country, same rights are not guaranteed in neighboring countries where there is a Macedonian minority.

2. In paragraph 2 of the Amendment 36, the Republic shall protect the rights and interests of its nationals living or staying abroad. Why is this provision required when according to the international law, the right of a state to afford protection to its citizens whilst they are abroad is a universally accepted canon of international law. (Sen, 1965)

¹⁰https://www.sobranie.mk/the-constitution-of-the-republic-of-macedonia-ns_article-constitution-of-the-republic-of-north-macedonia.nsp

3. Paragraph 3 „The Republic shall provide for the diaspora of the Macedonian people" provokes two logical questions:

- First: What care is to be taken, for a better life, for health, for property...? Or, that the Republic should protect the rights of Macedonians living abroad?

- Second: which Macedonians will be protected? Those who have been citizens of neighboring countries for generations, and Macedonians by gender? Or those who call themselves Macedonians, and their domicile state does not recognize them as such? Or for everyone, because according to amendments 33 and 34, there will be no Macedonian nation but Citizens of North Macedonia.

4. Given these changes and the constitutional renunciation of the Macedonian people in neighboring countries and the reduction of the level of protection for citizens living abroad, it is clear why the "citizenship of Macedonians / citizens of North Macedonia" is used - in accordance with the Prespa Agreement.

Therefore, according to the logical way of thinking, several other important questions arise:

- The state renounces Macedonians and Macedonian citizens in neighboring countries

- In the explanatory memorandum of the amendment there is no significant need for change of the Constitution even for the purpose of improvement of human rights and freedoms and development of the Republic of Macedonia. However, everywhere it is mentioned the: "implementation of the Agreement with Greece for accession to the EU and NATO".

- Finally: The present Macedonian government has shown complete unity and ignorance of the foundations of international law, diplomacy and international relations, and is already perceived in the international arena as a fickle and uncertain partner.

Conclusion

The famous Prespa Agreement has far-reaching consequences for Macedonia and its nation. From a nation state belonging to the Macedonian people, the country is gradually becoming an undefined state entity. When the foundation of the state has been violated, i.e. the functioning of the Macedonian people as the „leading“ part of the Macedonian nation and state (composed of other peoples as minorities), there is a tendency to define the population according to the ethnicity in a so called ethnic communities." Starting from the exact scientific determination of the "nation", the "ethnic community" (Weaver, Buzan, Kelstrup, Lamaitre, 2003), and thus of the people (or the majority of people), we may conclude that the Republic of Macedonia is making a shift from a nation state towards an undefined state formation.

In such a dramatic geopolitical constellation it was reasonable to expect that the negative and appropriative policies towards the Macedonian people, their

national and cultural history and their language would expand and radicalize. These consequences are visible only two years after the constitutional changes, in the Bulgaria's attitude towards Macedonia and its blackmailing intonation in order to thwart the EU integration proces if the country does not accept the Bulgarian standing that the Macedonian identity is an artificial (Yugoslav) construction dated back in 1945.

Unfortunately, the international community is reserved and ignorant to defend the universal principles and rights inherent to the modern civilized world.

At the end, instead of being a final solution to the long lasting naming issue between Macedonia and Greece, the Prespa Agreement, which is highly controversial, both in terms of internal and international law, has further complicated the identity dilemma and imposed the burden of concessions solely on the Macedonian side.

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EMERGENCY ENERGY SUPPLY AS PART OF THE CIVIL PROTECTION SYSTEM

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ABSTRACT

The main topic of the paper is a security-legal view of the emergency supply of electricity, gas and heat to the population during a crisis situation in Slovak republic and a view of cooperation between public administration, crisis management and civil protection authorities and other entities involved in providing emergency supplies to the population during a crisis situation.

Key words: *emergency supply, civil protection, crisis management, population protection*

Introduction

The basic content and activities of civil protection of the population in the Slovak Republic include emergency supply, which is a measure of emergency survival in cases of crisis situations. In many publications published in the field of crisis management, civil protection or civil protection, the emergency energy supply is only mentioned, while its deeper explanation of the implementation of the measures themselves is not often done in textbooks. In our paper, in addition to clarifying the implementation of these measures, we try to point out the usability of this knowledge by students of the study program security services in public administration, at the Academy of the Police Force in Bratislava, where students from the 3rd year of bachelor's study have the opportunity to specialize in "civil protection". Emergency energy supply is closely linked to energy security issues. The professional literature in the Czech Republic and Slovakia agrees that we understand the emergency supply of electricity, gas and heat. All three types of emergency supply can be mutually conditioned, as some methods of emergency heat supply also require an uninterrupted supply of natural gas or electricity. Of the emergency survival measures, the emergency energy supply is different in many respects from the emergency supply of food or drinking water. Except in the case of an emergency supply of electricity, the emergency supply of gas or heat is different depending on whether family houses or apartment buildings need civil protection assistance. However, we can divide emergency energy supply measures into measures that are implemented by normal market players in accordance with the law (for example, restrictive heating curves or restrictive levels of emergency gas supply) and measures that are improvised, using civil

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protection materials and supplies and state material reserves. Although these measures are simple, they are sufficient to fulfill the essence of emergency energy security (generators, blankets, heaters, etc.).

1 Emergency supply of electricity

One of the basic measures to protect the population is the emergency supply of electricity. Without electricity, some other energy supply would not work, such as supply of drinking water or supply of heat. Many devices, tools or information and communication systems that use components of the integrated rescue system, work thanks to electricity. Any failure or accident in the electricity network which interrupts the production, transmission or distribution of electricity, affects not only the crisis management system but also the overall social system. Many of the measures of population protection rely in principle on electricity, and it is therefore not surprising that one of the basic measures to protect the population is the emergency supply of electricity, which we classify as emergency survival measures. The emergency supply of electricity is carried out in particular by restrictive measures. Prior to the adoption of restrictive measures, a state of emergency must be declared, except in cases where there is a risk of system breakdown or system breakdown, in which case it is possible to declare an emergency situation immediately after the adoption of restrictive measures. The state of emergency is declared and revoked by the transmission system operator - the Slovak Electricity Transmission System (SEPS, Plc.), The state of emergency is declared and revoked by means of public mass media (similarly to the declaration of an emergency situation in the sense of the Civil Protection Act) and by means of dispatch control. After declaring a state of emergency, the Slovak Electricity and Transmission System immediately notify the declaration (or appeal) of the state of emergency to the Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic. In addition to declaring a state of emergency, the Slovak Electricity Transmission System also declare restrictive measures in the defined territory (or in some part of the defined territory). Restrictive measures are announced at the request of the distribution system operator (Západoslovenská distribučná, Plc., Stredoslovenská distribučná, Plc. and Východoslovenská distribučná, Plc.). Distribution system operator is responsible for the damage caused by the announcement of restrictive measures. Pursuant to the Energy Act, each participant in the electricity market is obliged to submit to restrictive measures in the electricity sector during their preparation and implementation and measures aimed at eliminating the state of emergency in the electricity sector. The method of implementing the restriction measures is regulated in the consumption reduction plan, in the emergency shutdown plan and in the frequency plan. First of all, it is necessary to imagine the basic legal regulation in this area and that is the Decree of the Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic No. 416/2012 Coll. laying down details on the procedure for applying restrictive measures in the event

of an emergency and on measures aimed at eliminating the emergency situation in the electricity sector and details on the procedure for declaring a crisis situation and its level, on declaring restrictive measures in the gas sector for individual categories of gas customers, crisis management and on the method of determining restrictive measures in the gas sector and measures aimed at eliminating the crisis situation. The consumption reduction plan is one of the restrictive measures that apply in the event of a shortage of electricity in the transmission and distribution system, if it is not possible to ensure its sufficiency, while the conditions for its activation must be met. The consumption limitation plan shall specify the limitation of electricity consumption by customers on the basis of limiting consumption levels of electrical power, of which there are six. Restrictive consumption levels of electrical power can also be applied simultaneously, while the amount of electrical power is determined (and updated annually) by the dispatching of the transmission system operator (of course in cooperation with the distribution system entities). A safety minimum is specified for customers who are subject to restrictive consumption levels. By safety minimum we mean the lowest value of the consumed power, at which the lives and health of persons are not endangered and there is no damage to production technological equipment. The value of the consumed power is reduced to the safety minimum only at the fifth and sixth limiting consumption stage. The transmission system operator may issue operating instructions specifying how to implement the restrictive measures in accordance with the consumption reduction plan, in cooperation with distribution system operators and customers directly connected to the transmission system.

Restrictive consumption levels of electrical power can also be applied simultaneously, while the amount of electrical power is determined (and updated annually) by the dispatching of the transmission system operator (of course in cooperation with the distribution system entities). A safety minimum is specified for customers who are subject to restrictive consumption levels. By safety minimum we mean the lowest value of the consumed power, at which the lives and health of persons are not endangered and there is no damage to production technological equipment. The value of the consumed power is reduced to the safety minimum only at the fifth and sixth limiting consumption stage. The transmission system operator may issue operating instructions specifying how to implement the restrictive measures in accordance with the consumption reduction plan, in cooperation with distribution system operators and customers directly connected to the transmission system. Restrictive consumption levels apply to all customers with the exception of: medical facilities included in the public minimum network of healthcare providers, ambulances, pharmacies or dispensaries of medical devices, for defense infrastructure facilities, for airports or aeronautical ground facilities, for facilities or facilities of the Government of the Slovak Republic, Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic, Ministry of Justice of the Slovak Republic, Police Force, Fire and Rescue Service and

Mountain Rescue Service, for communication and information infrastructure facilities of the integrated rescue system, for nuclear facilities and facilities listed in the economic mobilization crisis plan and for critical infrastructure or an element of European Critical Infrastructure. Restrictive consumption levels are announced and revoked by the dispatching of the Slovak Electricity Transmission System.

Another of the restrictive measures, and at the same time one of the measures of the emergency supply of electricity to the population, is the emergency shutdown plan. The emergency shutdown plan is applied by the transmission system operator (SEPS, Plc.) And distribution system operators (distribution companies) in the event of a sudden significant imbalance in the system and in the elimination of failures in the transmission system or distribution system by interrupting the transmission and distribution of electricity to customers. The interruption of electricity supply to the customers shall be performed by the dispatching of the transmission system operator or dispatching of the distribution system operators by switching off the designated outlets in very high voltage and high voltage substations according to the relevant emergency shutdown stage with possible cyclic alternation of these outlets. The transmission system operator issued operating instructions No. 835 - 1, which specified the method of implementation of restrictive measures according to the emergency shutdown plan. Emergency switch-off stages are stages 21 to 30, starting with stage 21, in which sections of very high voltage and high voltage power equipment are switched off in such a range that the consumption limitation does not exceed 2.5% of the annual maximum load of the relevant distribution system. The following emergency shutdown stages gradually include the total value of the power of the shutdown equipment of the customers (which was caused by the previous stage) increased by the value of 2.5% of the annual maximum load of the relevant distribution system. The emergency shutdown plan is also developed by local distribution systems, which are mostly shut down as a whole, while the total shutdown according to some emergency plans of the distribution system is performed exactly as during maintenance or repair.

1.1 Emergency power supply by operators

The frequency plan is the last of the ways of implementing restrictive measures in the power industry in times of crisis, as well as one of the ways of emergency security of electricity supply in the protection of the population. Frequency trip plans are part of frequency plans and are created and executed because the system frequency is a global parameter and the main criterion that signals a state of emergency in the power industry. The frequency plan shall be implemented by the transmission system operator and the distribution system operator in such a way that it intervenes in a timely manner to reduce major system failures and to return and maintain system frequency after system failures at

values where the technical equipment of electricity generators is not endangered. The normal frequency band in the system, the frequency range is in the range of 49.8 Hz to 50.2 Hz. Activation of the frequency plan begins when a lower frequency in the system is reached, ie 49.8 Hz, or when a higher frequency in the system is reached, namely 50.2 Hz. The specification of the implementation of restrictive measures under the frequency shutdown plan is re-arranged in the operating instructions issued by the transmission system operator (of course, it must cooperate with distribution system operators, customers and electricity generators directly connected to the transmission system and comply with).

In the case of a frequency cut-off plan, in the event of a decrease in frequency to 49 Hz or less, dispatching of the transmission system operator, dispatching of distribution system operators, electricity generators and electricity customers connected to the affected part of the system shall immediately use all available technical means to balance the power balance and return frequency to the normal frequency band. The frequency shutdown plan is implemented in accordance with Commission Regulation (EU) No. 2017/2167 - a Policy on Emergency and Restoration, which is based on the fact that the 1st stage of the frequency tripping plan must be activated first at a frequency of 49.2 Hz and at the latest at a frequency of 49 Hz, while it must be a relief of at least 5% of the total load electricity system. Each additional stage of the frequency cut-off plan should be reduced by a minimum of 5% of the total load on the electricity system and a maximum of 10% of the total load on the electricity system. In the process of lightening the electricity system, it is necessary to observe the distribution of consumers according to importance, as well as not to allow the frequency to fall below the set limit value. The limiting requirement for the frequency relief system is that the frequency does not fall below 48 Hz and do not exceed 51 Hz during the fault. Based on computational analyzes, it was determined in the Electricity System of the Slovak Republic to implement a frequency switching plan in 6 frequency levels, namely:

- First stage of the frequency switching plan SR: 49.0 Hz,
- Second stage of frequency switching plan SR: 48.8 Hz,
- Third stage of the frequency switching plan SR: 48.6 Hz,
- Fourth stage of the frequency switching plan SR: 48.4 Hz,
- Fifth stage of the SR frequency cut-out plan: 48.2 Hz,
- Sixth stage of the frequency switching plan SR: 48.0 Hz.

1.2 Emergency power supply by a generator

Emergency power supply using an electric power supply unit. An electric source unit (electric generator) is also referred to as a diesel generator, it is an electrical device that converts mechanical work, using the physical phenomenon of electromagnetism, into electrical voltage. An important part of generators is operating power, voltage regulation and the difference between copper single-

phase and three-phase power plants. Operating power is given in kilovoltamperes [kVA], which can be converted to kilowatts [kW]. A simple tool for the needs of population protection is to remember that with a single-phase generator, $1 \text{ kVA} = 1 \text{ kW}$, but with a three-phase generator, it is necessary to take into account that $1 \text{ kVA} = 0.8 \text{ kW}$. However, the choice of a generator with an operating output depends on the type of appliances connected to the generator and on the need to use it for the purposes of protecting the population. However, it is always better to secure an electric power supply unit with a very large power reserve. For measuring technology, small machines, welders or lamps, a single-phase electric power supply unit will suffice, for larger machines, for example high-pressure cleaners, saws of larger machines, a three-phase electric power supply unit is required. Electricity generating units can be obtained from the Administration of State Material Reserves of the Slovak republic for the solution of the emergency supply of electricity, as they are located in the emergency reserves of the Administration of State Material Reserves of the Slovak republic. The state material reserves themselves are created for the protection of the economy and for the solution of the crisis situation, extraordinary event, III. degree of flood activity, state of emergency in energy, food security of the state, for the needs of the armed forces or requirements arising from the international obligations of the Slovak Republic. Electricity generating units are in emergency stocks, while emergency stocks represent state reserves intended for immediate and free assistance in saving the lives, health and property of the population affected by a crisis, emergency or III. degree of flood activity to provide for his basic necessities, for the rescue services of the integrated rescue system or for the provision of humanitarian aid. Emergency stocks are understood as repayable and non-repayable, while all generators are considered returnable emergency stocks. Based on a quantitative and qualitative analysis in 2018, the Administration of State Material Reserves of the Slovak republic stated that emergency survival measures (provision of basic necessities in need, where we also advise emergency security of electricity) are possible for a maximum of 5,000 inhabitants (through selected commodities from material The base of emergency stocks, where we also recommend electric power generators, is currently trying to increase the state of emergency stocks from 2016, which would ensure the survival of 10,000 inhabitants.

Possible procedure for emergency power supply using a generator based on the set parameters, it is appropriate to know the basics of what is actually electricity and on what principle the generator works, that it converts mechanical energy into electrical energy. A student of crisis management and an employee who is part of the forces of crisis management, or manages the forces of crisis management - must in principle know the answer to the question - what activities I will need to use the generators in emergency power supply. In our conditions, it is practically impossible to imagine providing through the state to every household and to every building or place an electric power supply unit. Such a

principle of mass would be ideal, but in the conditions of the Slovak Republic unrealistic and uneconomical. So before we proceed to the answer to what generator to use in emergency supply, it is necessary to solve the question - where do we need the generators everywhere? The unequivocal, first-rate answer might be: Well, where we need electricity. Especially in critical infrastructure facilities. As we do not have a sufficient number of generators to secure every building, flat and object (see the current state of emergency stocks of the State Material Reserves Administration by 2020), it is necessary to categorize buildings and persons who need emergency electricity supply. In our study, we can use as inspiration the work of Martin Hromada and Tomáš Frölich, who focused on the categorization and prioritization of objects needed to restore electricity supplies, although they themselves focused this scientific work on ensuring the renewal of electricity supply through distribution networks. Therefore, we can use the results of their work to obtain a more specific answer to the question "Who needs to provide electricity with priority from generators?" For this activity we can use a thought experiment in which we create a model of a fictional small town (respectively a large village). The setting of priorities will clearly depend on the values of society, the importance of the facility for crisis management and emergency survival of the population and the provision of basic needs, including a certain degree of urgency to ensure this need. First of all, it is necessary to realize that the basis is the protection of life (5), health (3) and only later, the tertiary priority is the protection of property (1), while the protection of life and health itself can be specified to protect human life and health and animal life and health. The second premise is the degree of urgency to protect the life, health and property of the population (urgent - 5, very urgent - 4, urgent - 3, less urgent - 2, non-urgent - 1). Proposed procedure for emergency power supply: 1. Occurrence of the event - voltage-free electricity system - impossibility to restore the emergency supply through restrictive measures. 2. The emergence of a requirement for emergency power supply. 3. Determining the real number of generators for the needs of crisis management. 4. Categorization of objects and persons who need to be emergency supplied with electricity - according to the type of crisis situation. 5. Selection of a suitable generator with regard to the planned connection of equipment and appliances. 6. Discharge of suitable fuel to the generator, including its provision. 7. Distribution of generators with distribution of fuels (petrol, diesel) to them. 8. Communication with the applicant. 9. Return of the generator after fulfilling its purpose of emergency power supply. 10. Evaluation of the procedure, course and overall implementation of the emergency power supply - detection of deficiencies. 11. Evaluation of conclusions. Preparation of the same types of generators for further use or reassessment of the need for the given types of generators and procurement of other types.

2 Emergency gas supply

The announcement and revocation of restrictive measures shall be notified in the public mass media and by means of dispatch control. Restriction of gas consumption according to restrictive consumption levels is applied by the gas dispatching for the consumption points of the customer independent of the outside air temperature. The basic offtake stage is offtake stage 3, determined by the daily amount of the customer's gas in m^3 , according to which the gas withdrawal is carried out without restriction. Sampling stage number 3 is not yet a restrictive sampling stage, they are only removed on the basis of it. The principle of restrictive consumption levels is to reduce the contractually agreed amount of gas. The limiting consumption levels are from 3 to 9, while if it reaches level 10, it is no longer a restrictive consumption level but an emergency consumption level. In the case of an emergency supply stage, there is zero gas consumption and after its declaration, the gas supply is interrupted for all customers. With consumption stages 4 to 7, although the amount of natural gas is reduced below the contractually agreed quantity, the amount of natural gas is still above the safety minimum. With restrictive sampling stage 8, the amount of gas drops to a safety minimum. To a safety minimum, the customer reduces the amount if it ensures state security, the activities of constitutional bodies, the production of daily food for the population other than the production of alcohol and tobacco products, processing of perishable food, operation of livestock with the risk of death of livestock, production or storage of life and health of hazardous substances and mixtures requiring special safety conditions, heat production for household customers, essential needs for the operation of medical facilities, electricity generation, transmission network operation, processing, storage and distribution of crude oil and petroleum products, operation of waterworks or wastewater treatment plants, operation of sanitation or the operation of the crematorium. In the case of restrictive consumption stage 9, the gas consumption is reduced to zero gas consumption, while this stage differs from the emergency consumption stage mainly in that if it is not possible to terminate gas consumption immediately without damaging the production equipment, the gas customer can propose a time schedule sampling, justify this schedule by objectively verifiable evidence. Restrictive measures such as emergency gas supply measures shall be implemented by applying:

- restrictive offtake levels for offtake points of a customer with a contractually agreed annual quantity of natural gas for a period of 12 consecutive months above 641.4 MWh or above 60,000 m^3 ,
- limiting heating curves for customer consumption points with a contractually agreed annual amount of natural gas for a period of 12 consecutive months above 641.4 MWh or above 60,000 m^3 ,
- Emergency sampling stage.

3 Emergency heat supply

Restriction of gas supplies by means of restrictive heating curves is a measure that concerns customers for whom 50% or more of the annual gas consumption depends on the outside air temperature. The limiting heating curves are derived from the basic heating curve, which is understood as the first heating curve and represents a reduction in the daily gas consumption compared to the basic heating curve. The basic heating curve represents the daily consumption values in m^3 at the customer's consumption point depending on the daily air temperature. The second heating curve and the third sampling curve determine the reduced daily gas consumption in relation to the basic heating curve as follows: - for the second and third heating curves: 100% of gas supplies for customers with a contractually agreed quantity of natural gas at the point of consumption of up to 4,000 MWh or up to 374,181 m^3 , for medical facilities and for thermal energy facilities providing heating for medical facilities; - for the second heating curve: not more than 90% of gas supplies for thermal energy installations providing heating for dwellings and for school buildings, for the third heating curve: not more than 80% of supplies; - for the second heating curve: not more than 85% of gas supplies to other customers, for the third heating curve: not more than 70% of supplies. The state of emergency in thermal energy in accordance with the Act on Thermal Energy is declared and revoked for the territory of the region or its parts by the district office in the seat of the region and for the territory of the municipality by the municipality. An integral part of the declaration of a state of emergency in thermal energy is also the declaration of the scope of restrictive measures on heat consumption and the scope of obligations of permit holders and other natural persons and legal entities to eliminate the state of emergency. The coordination of measures is ensured at the regional level, the district office at the seat of the region and the municipality on the territory of the municipality. The district office in the seat of the region, as well as the municipality, have the obligation to inform the Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic, the relevant fire brigades, the Ministry of Health and the relevant health authorities in the event of a declaration of a state of emergency in thermal energy. The municipality has the possibility to issue orders for material performance to natural persons or legal entities and for personal acts of natural persons in connection with the declaration of a state of emergency in thermal energy, while material performance in this case means material means provided in connection with the declaration of a state of emergency in thermal energy, necessary to eliminate the causes and consequences associated with the reduction or interruption of heat supply or the decommissioning of the heating system. The method and scope of the supply restriction are regulated by control stages in the range of 0 to 5.

Conclusion

In the case of emergency energy supply (electricity, gas, heat), we can observe individual penetrations in the organization of individual measures. For each measure, at least the cooperation between the public administration and the crisis management bodies is important. Penetrations and similarities can be seen in the fact that, for the most part, all emergency supply measures are based on the principle of "lowering the current standard (current volume of supply)". Only to a very small extent do these measures focus on the situation where energy needs to be secured in an emergency in a place where the possibility of their transport has disappeared, in places where it is necessary to go the way of "increasing energy in a small and limited area". We therefore perceive a significant legislative and conceptual deficit in how to secure local energy supplies until the pre-crisis situation is restored. In this case, we are talking about the need to create the necessary legislation and to clearly define the roles of public administration (crisis management and civil protection) in emergency energy supply. As can be seen, the differences in the basics of each measure can be observed, especially in the area of how to provide individual types of energy. For example, the nature of the gas, heating and energy sectors is already quite different. Although it is always a penetration that the system involves operators, producers, distributors, consumers, for example, the district heating sector is much more specific and local than the gas and electricity sectors, although all three are considered to be network industries. In the case of emergency heat supply, it is also a peculiarity that the management and management of the state of emergency is largely on the shoulders of municipalities and district offices in the region, on the other hand, the position of crisis management and civil protection bodies in the electricity or gas system is only marginal. A peculiarity compared to other measures is that their solution is directly under the competence of the Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic.

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INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION FROM A SECURITY PERSPECTIVE

Martina Bolečeková¹

ABSTRACT

At present, international migration is one of the most frequently discussed topics. The paper presents the anchoring of international migration as a “security issue” from the theoretical point of view, and at the same time, based on systematization of migration flows and analysis of current migration trends, it focuses on identifying the types of migration that currently pose the greatest security challenges.

Key words: international migration, security, challenges

Introduction

International migration is associated with security quite often and in various contexts. It is not uncommon for international migration to be perceived and presented as a security risk and security threat. The link between migration and security is an area that needs to be explored, taking into account a large number of factors. In the following text, we present the possible interactions of migration on security and vice versa, focusing on those aspects that we believe are crucial to the relationship between migration and security.

1 Theoretical framework

Within traditional approaches to the study of international relations and security, international migration as a security issue has been in background. However, the state-centric position in the migration-security relationship, based on the traditional realistic theory of international relations, in some cases acknowledges that non-state actors – migrants in our case – may pose a threat to state autonomy, sovereignty and territorial integrity, with the potential to cause disagreements or even conflicts between states. The most common side effects of international migration with the potential to cause such destabilization are: border violations; burden in the field of health, education, social system, housing; health risks; crime escalation; rising domestic labour force unemployment due to more competition and wage deflation; threats to the language, culture and social values of the host societies; as well as cross-border issues, in particular trafficking in human beings and terrorism (Thomson, 2013).

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International migration has been seen explicitly as a security issue within security studies since the 1980s, especially in connection with the so-called “new security agenda” that broadens and deepens the understanding of security and security threats². For migration issues, the horizontal distinction of the narrower (mostly military) and a broader understanding of security (understanding the security environment as a cross-sectoral environment) is essential. In the vertical sense, in addition to the state, the objects of security studies are also the individual and society, supranational entities, or humanity as a whole. At present, the liberal revision of the security agenda has prevailed (Lasicová, 2006), which is based on relations between the needs of the state, groups and the individual. It is therefore necessary to examine the link between migration and security at least on two basic levels – as a link between migration and national security, but also in connection to human security.

The first important mention, and at the same time the most cited definition of human security, was presented in the 1994 UNDP *Human Development Report*. This approach to national and international security puts human beings at the forefront. The basic subjects are primarily individuals and its goal is to protect people from the “traditional” – military as well as “non-traditional” threats, e.g. poverty. Shifting the security agenda “*beyond state security*” does not mean replacing it, but involves complementing and building on it. At the heart of this approach is the understanding that a lack of human security can undermine peace and stability within and between states; and also that excessive efforts to secure the state can have a negative impact on the security or well-being of the people. The state remains the “*central provider of security*” but state security may not be enough for the security and well-being of the people (Gregoratti, 2018).

Another, in our opinion very important feature of the security agenda of the 21st century, also essential for migration and security nexus, is that the boundaries between “internal” and “external” are blurred: “*Internal and external policy, including security, is closely linked*” (Lasicová, 2006, pg. 8).

2 International migration as a security challenge for the state

The basic issue that, in our view, needs to be addressed when examining the relationship between international migration and security is the issue of the reference object. As mentioned above, in the traditional understanding of security, the answer to the question of who or what is a reference object is unequivocal – it is the state. According to Adamson, international migration poses a challenge in

² In the 80s of the 20th century, the so-called *Copenhagen school*, associated with the names Ole Wæver or Barry Buzan, had been formatted. The particular importance of the *Copenhagen School* in the analysis of the migration-security relationship is related to the division of security into sectors: military/state, political, societal, economic and environmental (with migration issues primarily in the societal sector); as well as the introduction of the concept of securitization.

two broad dimensions of state sovereignty: in relation to the ability to control cross-border movements³ (*interdependence sovereignty*) and in relation to “domestic” or internal sovereignty (the level of effective control that the state exercises within its borders). In addition to regulating the entry of persons into the territory, the state also decides on another important issue, namely who will belong to its citizens. According to the quoted author, “*Globalization produces a situation that resembles a cat-and-mouse game between migration pressures and state control over borders.*” (Adamson, 2006, pg. 178) The author claims that if the migratory pressure on states increases without states adapting, then these states will actually find themselves in danger. However, as so far, many countries have been able to respond to pressures, mainly through technology, e.g. using biometric entry technologies and technologies to detect illegal border crossings, but still building physical barriers to movement, accompanied by various tools to improve police and judicial cooperation, including the exchange of information. Of course, this is associated with spending considerable funds, so border control is very problematic for some countries. As the protection of the borders of “weaker” states is also in the interest of “stronger” states, “stronger” states provide “weaker” states with various forms of assistance in border protection – financial, technical or development assistance.

It should also be pointed out that migration flows do not only head to the “rich countries of the North”, they run not only in the South-North direction, but also in the South-South and North-North directions. In addition, migration processes affect not only the destination countries of migrants, but also the countries of origin, resp. transit countries. As an example, we can mention the outflow of the population in working age and skilled labour (brain drain), which among others contributes to the deepening of differences in the international system, especially between the so-called “rich” and “poor” countries. On the other hand, it is necessary to point out the benefits of emigration for developing countries, e.g. in the form of an inflow of financial resources from remittances. If countries of origin are able to use capital inflows for development, it can contribute to their economic growth.

Many experts point out that in discussions on migration and national security, more attention is paid to risks to the security of developed countries (countries receiving migrants) than to the security of developing countries (either as receiving countries or as sending or transit countries). Migration management poses a much greater security challenge for poorer countries than for developed countries (Wohlfeld, 2014). Zapata-Barrero and Gabrielli therefore propose to extend the security-migration narrative to a multidimensional framework that

³ States are interested in controlling their state borders for several reasons, e.g. to maintain control over their population, restrict access to the labour market or public goods, or maintain international security. The inability to control state borders is characteristic for weak and failing states.

takes into account the security aspects of destination countries, countries of origin, transit countries as well as migrants themselves (Zapata-Barrero, Gabrielli, 2017).

2.1 Identifying challenges

Security challenges can be related to all types of migration, and at the same time they can be identified across security sectors (for more details see Bolečková, 2019). Some types of migration, resp. categories of migrants, however, may (and usually do) cause more security concerns than others⁴. Also as a result of the above-mentioned negative phenomena associated with international migration flows, migration has been increasingly securitized in recent years. In the following section, we will focus on selected security challenges related to migration, namely those which currently resonate most significantly in the literature, but also in public debates.

Most experts agree that primarily illegal migration, resp. irregular migration⁵, must be considered the security problem for the state. One of the reasons for perceiving migration as a security threat is the increase in the number of irregular migrants⁶. The increase in the number of irregular migrants is attributed, on the one hand, to the general increase in mobility as a result of globalization and progress in transport and communications; but at the same time to the increasing restrictions on opportunities to migrate legally. Another reasons are the mismatch between supply and demand for work; and also the fact that mass migration is often the result of gross violations of human rights and conflicts (Wohlfeld, 2014, pg. 67).

However, more than the increasing numbers of irregular immigrants, it is the lack of information about who is coming and for what purpose, which

⁴ Messina, who distinguishes between labor migration, secondary migration (family reunification), forced migration (or humanitarian migration, which includes asylum applicants and refugees) and irregular migration; argues that there are different attitudes to the defined migration flows when examining the relationship between securitization and migration. While labor migration is perceived relatively positively; secondary migration is generally perceived as having serious consequences for the social cohesion of a host society; humanitarian migration is increasingly monitored with suspicion and irregular migration is perceived as the security threat. (Messina, 2017)

⁵ Irregular migration is defined as migration that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit or receiving states (IOM, 2018). Although illegal and irregular migration can be considered synonymous in terms of content, we find different designations of this phenomenon among different authors and institutions: most often illegal migration, irregular migration, also undocumented migration, unauthorized migration or clandestine migration. Although the terms “irregular migration” and “irregular migrant” are not yet generally accepted, both the International Organization for Migration and the European Union prefer the use of the terms irregular migration and irregular migrant.

⁶ Divinsky estimated that out of the total number of international migrants in the world in 2015 (according to the UN 244 million), the share of illegal migrants was about 15%, which is in absolute numbers about 40 million persons (Divinsky, 2016).

significantly contributes to the perception of irregular migration as being dangerous for the state. At the heart of the perception of irregular migration as a security threat is its link (whether perceived, or real) to terrorism, organized crime and health risks. Although most experts agree that the direct link between migration and terrorism or threats to public health cannot be clearly confirmed, migration is nevertheless perceived as a threat to national security, which generally results in policies to combat this threat in the form of restrictions, which may have a negative impact on the human security of migrants (Koser, 2011).

Very closely related to the irregular migration is also the problem of the *organized crime*. Probably the most obvious link between migration and organized crime is in the area of smuggling and trafficking in human beings, with organized criminal networks being able to operate even on global scale.

Various transnational criminal networks, which can also use migrants to achieve their goals, can affect the national security of states in several ways. In particular, they have a negative impact on the safety of victims of their illegal activities, but they can also cause destabilization at national and international levels. Especially in the so-called weak and failing states, the inflow of financial resources resulting from the activities of international criminal networks can have a very negative impact on the state's ability to maintain sovereignty over parts of the territory. In case the criminal network succeeds to take over and perform any of the important functions of the state, it can cause a serious security problem.

According to Adamson, migratory flows can cause internal conflicts directly (Adamson, 2006). The impact of migratory flows on the emergence of internal conflicts is linked to the existence of diasporas which can be used to finance political fights, including armed conflicts. Thanks to new technologies, migrants can now remain in connection with their countries of origin more intensively.

Similar dynamics is present in the case of refugees and violent conflicts – refugees can also be used as a basis for political mobilization. In addition, humanitarian aid aimed at helping refugees can (indirectly) support violent conflicts by providing material assistance to militants who are connected to refugee camps. However, it is necessary to emphasize that migratory flows do not act in isolation, but supplement other factors.

These realities present various possibilities of using migration and migrants in order to commit crime or cause destabilization within countries, regions, even globally. In the fight against international crime, international cooperation is essential. Not only to preserve national and international security, but also in the interests of the protection of trafficked persons and migrants.

However, the security aspects of international migration are currently perceived primarily through the prism of *international terrorism*. In the case of terrorist attacks, attention is almost automatically focused on migrants and refugees (Nail, 2016).

Although the direct link between migration and terrorist attacks has not been clearly proven (Bartko, 2019), we acknowledge that international migration flows serve as a tool for terrorist organizations in carrying out their activities and promoting their goals. It must be borne in mind that, just as states view immigration primarily from an economic perspective, internationally operating terrorist organizations approach migration from a strategic point of view – using all elements of immigration systems to gain access to destination countries. In particular, they use the following two methods: either enter a state with the specific purpose of committing a terrorist attack, or use already existing groups (terrorist cells) in target states that are activated at a certain point to commit an attack (Adamson, 2006). Terrorist groups are also gaining so-called foreign fighters, e.g. from European countries, who are persuaded to move to the Middle East and convert to Islam, train them, and then let them travel back to their home countries to engage in terrorist activities (Kennedy, Homant, and Barnes, 2008).

Schmid comprehensively examined the relationship between migration and terrorism, focusing on the following areas (Schmid, 2016):

- State terrorism as main cause of migration
- State failure as cause of terrorism and migration
- Non-state terrorism as cause of migration
- (Civil) War as major cause of terrorism and migration
- Refugee camps and diasporas as causes (and targets) of terrorism
- Migrants as terrorists – Terrorists as migrants
- Counter-Terrorist operations as cause of forced migration.

It is clear from the above mentioned, that the correlations between migration and terrorism also have several forms and layers, so we consider it accurate to avoid generalization and examine and evaluate each situation individually.

States use various tools to combat international terrorism. In this context, there is another risk in the relationship between migration and security linked to international terrorism, and that is that states will react disproportionately strictly. Measures introduced to increase safety can have a negative impact on selected groups of people, e.g. Muslims (in the form of detention, increased control, etc.); but also to all persons staying/coming to/passing through the territory of states that introduce security measures, which may harm their human rights.

3 International migration as a security challenge for the individual

The new security agenda adds as an important reference object also an individual – human being; and thus attention is no longer paid only to the security of the state, but also to human security. Undoubtedly, the main reason is the growing number of migrants leaving their homes for saving their lives; endangering their lives during transit and even increasing numbers of those who

do not survive the journey or fall into the hands of traffickers. These examples clearly document that in the context of migration, it is necessary not only to discuss security challenges linked to the state. But the debate on the relationship between migration and security still tends, as mentioned above, to focus more on various aspects of national security, the core of which is mainly border protection, as well as (potential) migration threats to the population of receiving states.

The issue of the reference object is important, especially because it predetermines “settings” of migration policies that have an impact on all stakeholders. As mentioned above, the perception of migration as a security issue in relation to national security is usually accompanied by the adoption of restrictive policies. However, such an approach also affects the safety of migrants – human security. They are thus indirectly forced to use more dangerous routes, smugglers or even traffickers, or their access to safe countries is restricted by such measures. Toppuli also points to the economic aspect of the issue: *“States are powerless in the management of migratory flows, especially in terms of legal framework, and consequently securitization remains the only option left to cope with the situation. But such a process is not economically costly, it is costly for the lives of migrants, their rights and fundamental freedoms. Because globally there is not anybody that imposes this framework, states tend to choose the easier option, with less financial costs.”* (Toppuli, 2016, pg. 91)

In addition to the impact on migrants’ security, the public is also affected, and restrictive policies tend to encourage anti-immigration sentiments, which may in turn have a negative impact on migrants’ human security. Several experts agree that the threat to the security of irregular migrants far outweighs the threat to national security that these irregular migrants may pose (Wohlfeld, 2014). On the other hand, the significant economic, social or cultural benefits of migrants for receiving countries, as well as the significant financial flows resulting from remittances for countries of origin, are often neglected or marginalized.

Conclusion

The paradigm of human security on the one hand and national security on the other offer specific analytical approaches to examine the impacts of international migration flows. It is clear from the text that these two approaches, combined with a different understanding of the reference object, are often perceived as disharmonious, in the sense that if we protect and strengthen national security (especially against the risks associated with irregular migration), this inevitably reduces human security (especially the security of irregular migrants); but if we protect and strengthen the security of migrants, the security of the state will suffer. The problem, then, is how to make these two approaches complementary, and how to formulate an effective security policy of the state, which will at the same time strengthen the human security of migrants.

However, in the discussions related to international migration as a security challenge from the point of view of various reference objects, we also identified one compliance: the problem of trafficking in human beings is perceived as an undesirable phenomenon from both – national and human security perspectives.

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THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ARMED FORCES MODERNISATION AFTER THE RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN CONFLICT*

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ABSTRACT

Russian Federation is implementing massive military equipment modernisation programs in order to bring Russian all branches of the Federation Armed Forces from Soviet era robust but obsolete massive forces to new modern military force. Wide scale military modernisation projects have been adopted in all Russian Federation Armed Forces including Ground Forces, Aerospace Forces and Naval Forces. Despite stagnating economy and even not optimistic demographic development, respective military branches modernisation became priority for the Russian Federation during last 12 years. The Russian Federation defence industrial complex is highly involved in modernisation programs and based on its strong strategic position in Russia coming from the Soviet era legacy plays crucial role in it. The objective of the research was to find out, based on available open sources information analysis, how Russia introduced new modern equipment gradually modernizing and developing its Armed Forces in the main branches presented by Ground Forces, Aerospace Forces and Naval Forces in order to meet new modern military capabilities. Despite legacy of the Soviet Union era obsolete equipment operated and inherited by the Russian Federation Armed Forces significant military armament modernisation projects were implemented and ongoing by the Russian military industrial complex in order to introduce national military modernisation “New Look” reform adopted in 2010 into practice.

Key words: *Russian Federation, Armed Forces, military, defence, modernisation, equipment.*

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Introduction

Relative to 2008, after Russian-Georgian conflict the Russian Federation Armed Forces (RF AF) is smaller in size nowadays. It has less manpower and deploys a smaller number of armoured fighting vehicles, aircraft, ships, and ammunition than it did 12 years ago or even during Soviet Union times. To compensate for this, Russia has worked hard in order to increase efficiency and combat readiness of the RF AF including wide scale military equipment modernisation programs implementation trying to transform all RF AF branches into modern, well equipped and military capable forces according latest military capabilities standards. Significant development based on lesson learned approach has been made including structural changes and mass re-equipment of all branches with new and modernized weapons. Now, Russia must master its new capabilities. Even though Russia's Defence spending and pace of procurement of new armaments has slowed, the overall capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces will continue to grow as Russia makes more efficient use of available resources.

But, without knowledge of RF AF status and their latest key military equipment development and modernisation, which is priority for RF, we cannot gain any real picture about military capabilities.

Before any possible early conclusion we solved scientific problem of Russia's national Armed Forces modernisation, we try to determine how military modernisation plans based on the "State Armament Program" were implemented into Russian Federation Ground Forces, Aerospace Forces and Naval Forces. For this reason, we used the method of comparison in the research, which is of great importance in clarifying the processes of modernisation, development and dynamics of the researched problem and the regularities of its development. In addition, qualitative methods of available information analysis and synthesis based on latest conflicts in Georgia, Syria and Ukraine were used in this scientific research.

1 Russian federation Ground Forces modernisation

The war with Georgia showed that Soviet era land equipment was critically worn out and did not meet the requirements of modern warfare. Since that time, the RF Ground Forces have received thousands of new and modernized units of armoured combat vehicles and weapons.

Despite this, the armament of Russia's Ground Forces is not significantly different than it was during the conflict in Georgia. The sheer size of the Ground Forces makes it resistant to large scale change. Even updates to uniforms required several years of effort. Replacing heavy equipment was further complicated by the fact that the Ground Forces were not made a priority in the 2010-2020 State

Armament Program. As a result, by the end of 2017, only 42% of their equipment was new or modernized⁴ the lowest percentage among all military branches.

The new procured armoured vehicles cannot truly be called modern. *T-72B3* tanks, *BMP3* infantry fighting vehicles, *BTR-82AM* armoured personnel carriers and self-propelled howitzer *MSTA-S* are modernized versions of Soviet era equipment. Their purchase is a temporary solution because new platforms of armoured vehicles are being tested and they are far from mass production. But even once these systems are ready for mass production, complete rearmament will take many years, both for financial and manufacturing capacity reasons.

Even the modernization of Russia's most significant weapon, main battle tanks, was severely limited for economic reasons. The upgraded *T-72B3*, implemented in 2011, did not receive radically increased protection or firepower capabilities relative to the baseline *T-72B* model. Analysis of their performance in combat in Syria and Ukraine showed that this new modification was lacking in key areas. In 2016, Russia began using an advanced *T-72B3(M)* model, which included much better protection from cumulative ammunition strikes and additional removable armour for urban environments. (Tanks *T-72B3* With Additional Protection..., 2017) The protection of the *T-90A* tank used in Syria was also deemed insufficient, necessitating replacement with the newest *T-90M*, which is equipped with better armour. The first battalion of these new tanks was employed in the Ground Forces in 2018. (Upgraded *T-90M* Tank to Enter..., 2018)

The RF MoD signed a contract to supply two battalions with experimental *Armata* main battle tanks and one battalion with heavy *T-15 BMPs*, built on the *Armata* chassis, for a trial operation. Testing of about 100 vehicles was planned no earlier than 2020 and should determine whether these new armoured vehicles will be fully deployed. (The Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation..., 2018) Other new systems, including an infantry fighting vehicle, armoured personnel carrier, and self-propelled artillery system, were also in their trial phases.

Artillery, however, has changed more significantly than other Ground Forces weapons since the Georgia war. Suppression of the enemy with superior firepower remains a preferred tactic of the Russian Ground Forces. Because of this, Russia deploys substantially more artillery with its units than does the United States or other NATO countries. (Boston, Massicot, 2017)

Artillery reform aimed to expand the zone of control for Russian units by increasing artillery firepower range relative to foreign armies. To achieve this goal, the old *122 mm BM21 Grad MRLS* models previously deployed with motor

⁴Interview With Colonel-General Oleg Salyukov, Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces, *Izvestia*, October 1, 2017, <https://iz.ru/651606/oleg-saliukov/sukhoputnye-voiska-vykhodiat-na-novyi-uroven>.

rifle divisions and brigades were replaced with *122 mm Tornado-G MRLS* systems, which have a much longer range (40 km versus 20km). A long-range, *220mm Uragan MLRS* was also added. It has a range of over 90 km and is compatible with a variety of ammunition, including cluster and homing munitions. This ammunition trend will continue with the procurement of the *152 mm self-propelled Koalition* howitzers.

The experience from Syria and Ukraine demonstrated that 122 mm and 152 mm artillery is not powerful enough to destroy well-fortified positions and reinforced concrete buildings. Therefore, Russia is actively reviving heavy, 203 mm artillery and 240 mm mortars. The latter is often used in exercises with *Smelchak* laser guided mines. They are chosen not for their range, but for their firepower. Heavy guided artillery munition gives tactical commanders the capability to precisely strike individual buildings from a long range, which is especially important for urban combat.

In Georgia, Russian regimental and brigade commanders lacked the intelligence capabilities to reconnoitre and direct artillery fire at long distances. Light and simple drones, capable of monitoring artillery for its full range of up to 120 km, are now included in brigades. Additionally, target coordinates can be obtained from external sources using new automatic control systems. Thus, even basic combat structures can put these new long-range and high-power artillery capabilities to good use.

All artillery exercises are now conducted with UAVs that monitor the results of artillery fire in real time. In addition, an automated system for adjusting artillery fire from drones is being tested. Russian military theorists consider the use of drones a way to significantly save on ammunition, as well as a means to win counterbattery artillery duels.

“*Krasnopol*” is a prototype UAV with a laser target designator for guided artillery shells that was successfully tested in the fall of 2017 in Syria. It was used to target stationary and mobile targets, field fortifications, and individual buildings in urban areas. This is an extremely promising direction for the development of Russian artillery, capable of further increasing its lethality.

A serious enhancement of the Ground Forces’ capabilities resulted from their re-equipment with new short-range ballistic missiles. In the conflict with Georgia, 20-30 old *Tochka-U* missiles were used, and nearly all were equipped with cassette warheads because of their low accuracy. The replacement of these old missiles, which only have a range of 120 km, is almost finished. By the end of 2018, all 12 deployed brigades of operational-tactical missiles were fully rearmed with the new ballistic *Iskander-M* missiles, which possess a range of 500 km. (448th Missile Brigade in Kursk..., 2016) With much better accuracy, four times the range, and twice the number of ready to launch missiles in each brigade, this represents a radical improvement in the capabilities of the Russian Missile Forces.

Moreover, a new and unexpected addition to missile brigades is the *Iskander-K* model equipped with ground-based *R-500 (9M728)* cruise missiles. According to the Russian military, these missiles, although closely resembling the sea-based *Kalibr*, possess a heavier and more powerful warhead, but have a smaller range of under 500 km. The United States, however, believes that Russia has developed and deployed another cruise missile, designated the *9M729*, that could be an extended-range variation on the *Iskander-K*. (Pifer, Meies, 2018) If this missile has a range of over 500 km, as the United States believes, it is in violation of the 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Treaty. (Gordon, 2017)

Whatever the real range, the introduction of cruise missiles into the missile brigades makes missile troops more flexible and versatile. For the first time in the post-Soviet period, Ground Forces have received long range weapons capable of delivering non-nuclear precision strikes of up to 500 km against key enemy targets. This means the *Iskander* can reach targets of strategic importance in the enemy's rear area. It is also almost impossible to defend effectively against combined attack by advanced ballistic and cruise missiles. (Kube, 2017)

Plans following the war with Georgia to unite the airborne troops, marines, and Spetsnaz units into a separate "*Mobile Forces*" entity were never implemented. However, airborne troops are increasingly becoming light ground troops. They have grown in numbers and have received additional armoured vehicles, including tanks. The naval infantry has also received armoured vehicles and tank companies. On their basis, a future expeditionary infantry core will be formed, capable of operating outside the country. (In Russia, There Will Be..., 2018)

Yet, it remains difficult to move these "*Mobile Forces*." The air transport fleet has not grown, nor has the number of amphibious ships. Thus, strategic manoeuvring by Russia's new, heavier troops is possible only by ground based methods.

Despite all shortcomings, the Ground Forces have some new capabilities including:

- permanent readiness of most of the forces,
- more lethal artillery,
- improved missile troops with ballistic and cruise missiles,
- better operational and strategic level mobility.

2 Russian federation Aerospace Forces modernisation

In Georgia, the Russian Air Force was burdened by the obsolescence of its planes, helicopters, tactics, and weapons. For the entire duration of the conflict, Russian aircraft used only unguided weapons, with the exception of a few anti-radar missiles. Due to poor training and a shortage of pilots, flight instructors were sent out on combat sorties.

Aviation and Ground Forces conducted effectively separate campaigns, and coordination of actions between them sometimes took up to a day. There were cases of “*friendly fire*” on Russian ground troops by aircraft and followed by retaliation. The Russian Air Forces lost six planes in five days. All of this meant that Russia’s substantial numerical advantage had not been transformed into battlefield results.

This experience led the RF MoD to emphasize air force modernization. Operations in Syria demonstrated how radical these changes were. In a dramatic structural reform, Russia’s Air Forces, Army Aviation helicopters, long-range Air Defence, and Space Forces have been combined to form the new Russian Aerospace Forces. The Aerospace Forces are responsible for all aircraft, anti-missile Defence, military space satellite launches, and, indeed, the maintenance of the RF MoD’s entire satellite constellation. In addition, procurement changes have enabled Russia to update an entire generation of aircraft and equip forces with new models of precision weapons.⁵

The RF Air Force and Air Defence received the biggest share of funding in the 2010-2020 RF State Armament Program. This made it possible to update aircraft inventory by purchasing new airplanes and helicopters, rather than simply upgrading the old ones. With the influx of funds, the Russian Defence industry was able to quickly ramp up production of new aircraft and helicopters after signing contracts with the RF MoD.

In total, Russia’s Air Forces received almost 500 new combat aircraft and more than 500 new helicopters. In addition, a few hundred older airplanes were modernized. The average share of new and modernized weapons in the Aerospace Forces reached 72.8 % (72% in the Air Force, 68% in Air Defence Forces, and 81% in Space Forces), making this branch of forces the most advanced in the Russian military. (Gavrilov, 2017)

The top priority was the purchase of new fighters. The principal innovation of *Su-30M*, *Su-35S*, *MiG-29SMT* models was multifunctionality. Fighters in the 2008 air force were inherited from the USSR and could not be used for effective strikes against ground targets, but the new generation of fighters and bombers used in Syria were widely employed for ground strikes with unguided and precision weapons, including anti-ship missiles.

The improvement of fighter capabilities for air superiority was closely connected with the increased purchases of modern *R-77-1* medium range air-to-air missiles with active radar homing. These missiles will significantly increase the capabilities of Russian fighters in beyond visual range air combat. The RF Aerospace forces purchased and received 200 units in 2016-2017 assigned for Russian planes in Syria. (Majumdar, 2017)

⁵ *Aerospace Forces*, Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, <http://eng.mil.ru/en/structure/forces/aerospace.htm>.

In 2008, Russia's strategic long-range aviation comprised more than 100 heavy bombers, but they had little utility in Georgia. Strategic bombers simply did not possess non-nuclear precision weapons. Thus, only denuclearized *Tu-22M3*s were sent to the theatre to strike targets with free fall bombs from low altitudes. They targeted a military airbase, army bases, and a railway station defended by Georgian troops. Yet the bombers proved to be vulnerable even to a weak Georgian Air Defence. One *Tu-22M3* was shot down.

Over the past decade, the capabilities of strategic aviation have grown significantly. This has included the modernization of dozens of aircraft, which are now equipped with new non-nuclear guided weapons, X-555 cruise missiles, and a more accurate low observable X-101. Moreover, while it still lacks guided weapons, the *Tu-22M3* has been modernized, and its new computerized *Gefest sights* enable the delivery of more accurate strikes by unguided bombs from higher altitudes.

Russia tested its entire strategic aviation arsenal in Syria, including the nuclear-capable *Tupolev Tu-160* and *Tu-95MS* strategic bombers. These launched 66 cruise missiles against targets in Syria, the first use in combat of both missiles and airplanes. These missile attacks were primarily intended for testing missiles in combat conditions and assessing their real effectiveness. Strikes were carried out typically by one or two bombers with only a few missiles used per sortie. Unexpectedly, most strategic aviation sorties in Syria were carried out by the *Tu-22M3*.

The Air Forces relocated one squadron of 12 bombers to Mozdok airfield in the Russian Caucasus in November 2015 and carried out flights from the base during the most kinetic periods of the conflict. In total, these seemingly obsolete bombers carried out more than 140 sorties,⁶ using unguided bombs weighing 250 and 500 kilograms, as in Georgia.

Tu-22M3 continues to be the most common type of long-range aviation aircraft used by the Russian military, mainly because it is cheaper to use than larger strategic missile carriers. After the use of *Tu-22M3*s in Syria, the RF MoD decided to extend the life of these aircraft by upgrading and equipping them with new cruise missiles. (Ramm, 2017) The *Tu-22M3* will also be able to carry the newest hypersonic *Kinzhal* missiles. (New Trials of Kinzhal Hypersonic..., 2018) These new weapons will greatly increase the combat capabilities of long-range aviation in conventional non-nuclear conflicts without increasing the number of airplanes.

While in the process of purchasing new aircraft, much less attention was given by the RF MoD to high precision weapons for aviation. The main armament of Russian aviation consists of unguided “*dumb*” bombs and various cluster munitions. Although the RF MoD never disclosed how many smart weapons were used, the author estimates that the ratio of guided to unguided systems used by

⁶Calculated by author from Russian Ministry of Defence press-releases.

Russia in Syria is likely somewhere between that of U.S. Air Forces in Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in 1991 and that of allied forces against Yugoslavia in 1999.⁷

According to media reports, development and procurement of smart ammunition became one of the top priorities in the new State Armament Program for 2018-2027, and this should improve the situation significantly. (Russian State Armaments Program..., 2017)

Russian air Defence was minimally active in the conflict with Georgia, but the air Defence inventory has also been substantially updated. Aerospace Forces received a total of 44 battalions of new *S-400* anti-aircraft missile systems, allowing them to rearm 18 regiments and one training unit. (SAM *S-400* in the Russian Armed Forces, 2017) The new short-range complexes *Pantsir-S* were also adopted, as well as *Tor-M2* and *Buk-M3* complexes.

The Air Forces use an advanced multilayer air Defence system to protect Russian bases in Syria, including short-range *Pantsir-S* and *Tor-M2* complexes that successfully intercepted dozens of targets, from small drones to *Grad* missiles. (Russian Air Defence *Pantsir-S1*..., 2017) This became their first baptism by fire. The problem of protecting troops and objects from attacks by hostile drones is one of the most difficult challenges for modern Armed Forces. Russia's real-world experience in Syria gives it certain advantages in understanding and responding to this problem.

Part of the reform aimed to increase the space capabilities of the Aerospace Forces, and they now also control the military satellite constellation. At the time of the war with Georgia, Russia did not have a single active optical reconnaissance satellite in the Earth's orbit, after the last Soviet satellite failed in the early 2000's. However, the new army command and control system demanded better satellite communications, a fully functioning GLONASS satellite navigation system, and potent satellite reconnaissance.

Thus, by the end of 2017, at least 85 Russian military satellites were in orbit, most of them used for communication purposes: (The Satellite Database..., 2017)

- 43 – communication,
- 27 – navigation,
- 10 - Earth observation,
- 5 – other.

The Aerospace Forces used more than 10 remote sensing satellites from the first days of military operations in Syria. (General Staff of the Russian Federation, 2015) Most of them, including two high definition *Persona* satellites, are optical. Additionally, two more civilian high-resolution *Resource-P* satellites are under state control and available for potential military use. Moreover, four less efficient

⁷Estimate.

civilian *Canopus-B* remote sensing satellites are also in orbit. All of them can transfer data to the ground through high-speed radio channels. The time from the order of high-definition pictures to their acquisition has been reduced dramatically to just hours under the best conditions, a completely new and very useful capability for the RF AF.

The restoration of the *GLONASS* satellite constellation is among the most important recent achievements of the Aerospace Forces. 24 operational satellites in orbit are necessary for Russia's *NAVSTAR* GPS to be fully available around the globe. At the time of the war with Georgia, only 13 satellites were operational, and they served for no military purpose. A fully functional constellation was in place by December 8, 2011. During the intervention in Syria, there were only a few brief interruptions in service, with a minimum of 21 working satellites always in orbit. (General Staff of the Russian Federation, 2015)

Comparing the results of military operations in Georgia and Syria, we can see that a fully functioning satellite navigation system allows Russia to use more precision weapons.

Without a doubt, this is one of the key capabilities Russia has acquired in recent years. All new long-range air, sea, and land-based cruise missiles, ballistic missiles of small and intercontinental range, drones, and command and control systems rely on it.

Thus, the key new capabilities for the Aerospace Forces are:

- hundreds of new aircraft,
- non-nuclear cruise missiles,
- a new generation of precision weapons for tactical aviation,
- functioning communication and navigation satellite constellation.

3 Russian federation Naval Forces modernisation

Almost the entire Russian Black Sea Fleet, including small antisubmarine corvettes and even minesweepers, was involved in the conflict with Georgia. The only sea skirmish with small Georgian ships ended without results, but the surprise landing of Russian paratroopers by three large amphibious assault ships on Abkhazia's beach had a major effect on the strategic situation on the ground.

Despite this, the Russian Navy proved of little value for supporting ground operations. Despite its impressive numbers, it was useless to the Ground Forces except for small scale tactical assault landing or, perhaps, for creating an air defence "umbrella" in the coastal regions. This might be among the reasons the navy was prioritized in the State Armament Program for 2010-2020 with 25% of all expenses allocated to fleet modernization. This included plans for the construction of 24 submarines, 16 of them nuclear, and 54 large surface ships over 10 years.

However, the shipbuilding industry proved unprepared to fulfil such a large order on time. As of May 2018, the ambitious plan remains largely unfulfilled.

The navy has received only 10 submarines, 4 of them nuclear, and 16 surface ships (4 frigates, 4 corvettes, and 8 small rocket and artillery ships). There were no indications that by 2020 there would be major improvements or that the rest of planned ships would be completed. Plans for the modernization and overhaul of combat ships were also unsuccessful. (Shepovalenko, 2018)

Repair delays and the decommissioning of old ships has meant that in the 12 years that have passed since the war with Georgia, the capabilities of the Russian oceangoing, Bluewater Navy have only decreased. During this time, Russia has not received a single new surface combatant of destroyer class or larger. Frigates are the biggest combat ships in the new State Armament Program for 2018-2027.

The navy has played a large role in Syria. From October 2015 to January 2018, navy ships carried out more than 100 cruise missile strikes against ground targets, some of them from up to 1,500 km away. (Gavrilenko, 2018) The launches were initiated from both the Mediterranean Sea and the Caspian Sea, a substantial distance from the zone of combat operations.

But the slow pace of naval upgrades means that most of the major Russian surface combatants are legacy ships lacking weapons capable of delivering strikes far from the coast. All strikes were made from a small number of new corvettes and frigates armed with cruise missiles. For the first time in a combat situation, these missiles were also launched by *Project 636.3* small, diesel submarines. As of mid-2018, the Russian Navy had only 17 ships and submarines armed with *Kalibr* cruise missiles, with a total of 148 deployed missiles.

Thus, the only major improvements since 2008 are the deployment of small ships capable of launching ground attack strikes and the *Kalibr* anti-ship cruise missile. Never before have small Russian corvettes (small rocket ship in the Russian classification) or diesel submarines possessed such a long-range weapon (up to 2000 km).

These low noises and low-cost diesel submarines, with a powerful combination of torpedoes and cruise missiles, are very effective in the coastal regions of Russia. The Black Sea Fleet has already received six *Project 636.3* (Improved *Kilo*) submarines, and Russia plans to build six more for the Pacific Fleet.

This preference for small ships and submarines indicates an unspoken gradual transformation of the Russian fleet from oceangoing “blue-water” ambitions to acceptance of a more realistic coastal “green-water” navy. The current State Armament Program (until 2027) focuses on small ships and is more realistic in this regard than its predecessor. It includes an order to build more than two dozen additional light missile corvettes in a few years for all navy fleets. (Karakurts, 2017) At the same time, plans for large combat units, the size of a destroyer or larger, have been postponed for the period after 2035 (Russia Will Abandon Aircraft..., 2018) according to the Shipbuilding Strategy published in 2018.

As in other branches of the Armed Forces, expenditures for navy training and exercises have significantly increased. If the number of large ships of the Russian Navy has not increased since the war with Georgia, the existing ones have become more active and visible. From 2012 to 2018, the total number of days spent at sea by navy ships has doubled and the average duration of deployment for ships and submarines has increased by one third. (Gavrilenko, 2018) Russia is also “*showing the flag*” with ship visits to foreign ports.

Naval aviation deserves a separate discussion. By 2008, it had degraded to a completely helpless state and further weakened in the years that followed. In 2012, almost all strike aviation regiments were transferred from the navy to the Aerospace Forces. The fleet lost all its long-range *Tu-22M3s* with anti-ship missiles, which had previously been used to attack naval targets, including carrier battle groups.

In 2014, following a change of the Defence minister and the beginning of conflict in Ukraine, the concept of fleet aviation changed again. New aviation regiments were formed, and Russia began to procure new aircraft and helicopters. But there are no plans to return *Tu-22M3s* to the navy.

For the only Russian aircraft carrier, a second carrier regiment was created. The first 279th Naval Air Regiment is equipped with roughly 15 *Su-33* heavy fighters. These have not been produced in quite some time and remain outdated, despite some modernizations. From 2013 to 2015, the newly formed 100th Naval Air Regiment received 20 new *MiG-29K* naval fighters and four more in the *MiG-29KUB* two-seat training configuration.

In the fall of 2016, the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov was deployed to the shores of Syria. The Kuznetsov’s air wing consisted of all three types of Russian deck fighters from both regiments. However, this deployment was something of a disappointment. The *Su-33* could use only unguided and cluster munitions. For the few new *MiG-29Ks*, dispatch to Syria was more a trial exercise than a true combat deployment, though they were equipped with *KAB-500Kr* guided bombs. This was the first time that Russia’s deck aviation was able to deliver precision strikes on the ground, albeit from a short distance. In total, only 154 sorties from the deck of the aircraft carrier were made, and one *Su-33* and one *MiG-29KUB* were lost in air accidents.

The State Armament Program for 2010-2020 allocated significant resources to enhancing Russia’s fleet and deck aircraft. However, deployment in Syria has not confirmed the effectiveness of Russian carrier aviation. The 2018-2027 program is not so generous. It does not budget for the construction of new aircraft carriers. The small, non-nuclear Admiral Kuznetsov will remain the only carrier at the disposal of the Russian navy for the foreseeable future.

The only bright spot for carrier aviation from its deployment was the new *MiG-29K* fighters. After the Kuznetsov undertakes an overhaul in 2021, these fighters will be more combat ready and will form the backbone of the air wing. With the help of their wide array of guided air-to-ground and air-to-surface

weapons, the Admiral Kuznetsov will get some real strike power. An important decision was made to equip coast-based navy aviation with new multipurpose fighters and drones. Plans call for the procurement of 50 *Su-30SM* by 2020 for the Black and Baltic Fleets. (Russian Navy Naval Aviation..., 2015) They will be used for both fighter and attack regiments.

The Crimea-based 43rd Assault Regiment has already begun training with anti-ship *X-35* missiles. Equipped with these missiles, which have a range up to 260 km, fighters can to some extent replace the regiments of the *Tu-22M3* lost by the navy. Naval *Su-30SMs* were actively used in Syria and successfully sunk a practice target of a decommissioned Syrian destroyer. (Melnikov, 2018) The navy is second only to the army in its stock of unmanned aerial vehicles. Within each fleet, coastal battalions possess medium and short-range *Forpost* and *Orlan-10* UAVs. With their help, fleets will be better able to detect land and sea targets and adjust artillery and missile fire from ships. A ship-launched *Katran* rotary-wing (UAV) is under development. (Novichkov, 2018) A series of naval exercises using drones started in 2017, (With a Wide Range of..., 2017) but even before that, Naval drones were actively used in Syria to support aerospace force operations. When the development of heavy reconnaissance drones of the MALE class is completed, they will be used by the fleet to monitor the seas and detect ground targets. To summarize, the key new capabilities for the modern Russian fleet are:

- non-nuclear long-range cruise missiles capable of attacking land targets,
- multifunctional small corvettes and diesel submarines,
- supersonic anti-ship missiles,
- multifunctional fighters with precision strike capabilities.

Conclusion

Quantitative changes look impressive. Over the past five years, the share of modern weapons in the Armed Forces has quadrupled to almost 59%. (Collegium of the Ministry of Defence, 2017) When considering the share of new and modernized equipment in different branches, it becomes clear which of them the priority of modernization. An official plan to achieve a figure of 70 % new and modernized equipment for troops by 2020 seemed possible, but inequalities between branches will continue to exist. RF MoD Sergei Shoigu stated that RF tested 300 different weapon systems in Syria and some of them (12) were consequently abandoned.

Even with all the positive changes of the past decade, there are areas in which Russia still lacks key military capabilities. Perhaps most importantly, it remains substantially limited in its ability to project force over long distances.

Certainly, Russia's navy cannot deliver this capability for long ranges. Russia faces a gap when it comes to amphibious assault ships. After the misadventures with France's *Mistral project*, the sale of which was blocked after

the start of the Ukraine crisis, there is no replacement or plan B. The *Ivan Gren*-class of landing ships will not solve the problem. It is vastly inferior to *Mistrals*. Moreover, its slow pace of construction means that Russia will not even be able to replace its current fleet of landing crafts, which is worn out from Syria.

Nor is strategic airlift sufficient. Plans to restart production of *Ilyushin Il-76* transport planes have faced heavy delays. Moreover, there is no replacement for the strategic *Antonov An-124* and *An-22* military transports in sight since the breakdown of relations with Ukraine. The shortage of the Antonov is especially damaging to Russia's capability to move heavy military equipment such as tanks and long-range air Defence systems.

Russia's ability to project force is further limited also by a shortage of tanker aircraft. Their number has not increased in a decade and is sufficient for neither tactical nor long range aviation. Russia also does not possess heavy reconnaissance or strike drones able to operate on distances of more than a few hundred kilometres. Finally, Russia lacks a sizeable number of overseas military bases, which might otherwise mitigate this deficiency of power projection tools.

These air and maritime logistics gaps will severely limit the expeditionary capabilities of the Russian military in regions that do not have land links to mainland Russian territory. As a result, Russian capacity to project force into the far abroad remains extremely limited and will not grow significantly in the near future. Russian forces remain inferior in all quantitative indicators not only to the NATO bloc but also to China.

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SOME ASPECTS OF KEY AREAS DEVELOPMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ARMED FORCES

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ABSTRACT

Russian Federation has been trying to avoid the fatal mistake made in 1980s when the Soviet Union continued to spend massively on defence in times of economic decline. Russian Federation spent about 4% of its GDP on defence, roughly 1/3 of its state budget is spend on military, internal security, special services and border guards, what presented huge burden for country with stagnating economy. Beside general military equipment modernisation through selected critical military areas reform implementation and technological inovation stated in the “*New Look*” reform in 2010 Russia was trying to reduce military capabilities gaps between dominant world military powers. The objective of the research is to find out, based on available open sources information analysis, how Russia introduced lesson learned form the latest conflicts gradually developing its Armed Forces in such specific areas like personnel, command and control reform and unmanned and robotic vehicles intruduction into Russian Federation Armed Forces. Despite the negative consequences of economical embargoes applied on Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, military capabilities development were crutially important in order to promote its national interests over the world even massive post Soviet Union military capabilities are still present and predominant.

Key words: *Russian Federation, Armed Forces, military, capabilities, reform, personnel command, control, gap*

Introduction

At least the last two conflicts in which Russia drew on the capabilities of the full range of its Armed Forces (Georgia in 2008 and Syria in 2015) clearly illustrates the changes that have occurred in the Russian army over the past years after Cold War.

While the conflict with Georgia lasted only five days, Russia used its full conventional capabilities in it, including long-range bombers and short-range ballistic missiles. The Russian Navy also carried out a landing operation. Several airborne battalions were airlifted from thousands of kilometres away and up to

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30,000 Russian troops were involved in the operation. This number had exceeded the small contingent deployed in Syria, which has remained below 10,000 members of the Russian Federation Armed Forces (RF AF). Victory over Georgia was quick and decisive, but the opponent was very weak. Moreover, the operation revealed problems in the RF AF so the subsequent key reforms were long, turbulent, painful and sometimes inconsistent.

The conflict in Syria provided a natural opportunity to analyse the success of these reform efforts, identifying what new capabilities the RF AF have acquired in the past decade as well as where these reforms fall short.

Besides its own RF AF reform and comprehensive approach towards RF AF military capabilities development there are RF national security interests in neighbouring countries which requires security assistance including financial support and expenditures in order to follow national security interests after the Soviet Union collapsed.

The dynamics of the security assistance including military assistance provided by the RF to neighbouring countries namely Abkhazia (ABK), Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Moldova, Tadzhikistan and South Ossetia⁴ is constant in order to prevent adversaries to get closer to RF borders and to keep them as far as possible from the strategic depth of the RF territory. Before ruling any court on the solved scientific problem of Russia's national interests in, we try to determine how military capabilities based on the “*New Look*” reform implementation coincides with national objects and national defense. For this reason, we used the method of comparison in the research, which is of great importance in clarifying the processes of change, development and dynamics of the researched problem and the regularities of its development. In addition, qualitative methods of information analysis and synthesis were used, which are used at all stages as well as at all stages of scientific research

1 Russian federation Armed Forces personnel reform

Reforms undertaken after the war with Georgia prioritized a reduction in the total number of personnel in the Russian Armed Forces, as well as the share of officers in it. Russia aimed to abandon a Soviet style army with a large number of understaffed “skeleton” military units for a smaller but more mobile army which theoretically remains at a high level of permanent readiness.

Central to these reforms was the challenge of personnel fill. In 2007 to 2008, the term of conscript service in the Russian army was reduced from two years to one. Most contracted (professional) soldiers were concentrated in the elite military units of the Airborne Forces and the permanent readiness units based in the North Caucasus. Despite laws explicitly prohibiting sending conscripts into

⁴ <https://sputnik-ossetia.ru/analytics/20191213/9756909/Perevooruzhenie-OGV-v-Abkhazii-novye-tehnika-i-vozmozhnosti.html>

combat, some ended up on the front lines in Georgia in 2008. (Bakunin, Chizov, 2008) Even in the North Caucasus Military District, this was the best manned district after the wars in Chechnya, conscripts constituted a majority in many combat units. But the Georgian conflict's brevity and success meant there was no concomitant societal outrage.

According to initial plans for the “*New Look*” reform, Russia planned to reduce the proportion of contract soldiers threefold, to 5% of the total by 2010. Aside from its other benefits, this was expected to substantially reduce military personnel costs. (Gaidai, 2011) But with a shortened term of conscript service and a limited pool to draw on, the RF MoD proved unable to draft enough conscripts to staff even the reduced army. As a result, in 2012, instead of a planned million-person force, RF fielded fewer than 800,000 military personnel. This demonstrated that without a substantial increase in the number of contract personnel, the Armed Forces could not be fully staffed. (Nikolsky, 2012) Plans to save on personnel costs in this way were abandoned, and from 2012 onwards, the number of contract soldiers in the army began to grow steadily. The new long term target was building a force with a ratio of five contract soldiers to every four conscripts, based on 420,000-450,000 of the former. By early 2015, for the first time, the number of contract soldiers exceeded the number of conscripts, (Ministry of Defence, 2014) which could be considered an important watershed in the history of the modern RF AF. Starting from 2017, for the first time in Russian history, all sergeant positions were manned by contract soldiers. (Report by the Minister of Defence..., 2017)

Table 1. Changes in military personnel structure

Military category	Year 2008	Year 2017
Conscripts	450 000	276 000
Contract soldiers	180 000	384 000
Warrant Officers	142 000	55 000
Officers	355 000	217 000
Max number (Plan)	1 130 000	1 013 628

Source: Own processing

This means that typical “*sergeant*”⁵ roles in Russian Armed Forces in section of commanders, deputy platoon commanders, armored fighting vehicle commanders, and special vehicles driver operators (In Western Military District..., 2016) are manned by better prepared more experienced personnel. Conscripts are used in basic combat roles, such as a rifleman or a machine gunner, (Gerasimov, 2017) and in support units.

⁵ Noncommissioned ranks in the Russian Armed Forces do not translate directly into U.S. counterparts. Russian “sergeants” correspond to most but not all U.S. noncommissioned officer (NCO) roles. There is not a “corporal” rank.

This significant increase in the number of contract soldiers allowed Russia to avoid using conscripts in the operation to annex Crimea and in eastern Ukraine. Conscripts were not sent to Syria, either. This means that Russia is now able to conduct small and medium-scale military operations, including expeditionary, solely using military professionals. They are more experienced and effective and better disciplined. Furthermore, professional military casualties are expected to result in less public anger than conscript casualties.

Noncommissioned officers (NCO's) reform is an especially fundamental change compared to previous decades, when even in the elite military units of Special Forces and airborne troops many NCOs were ordinary conscripts. A new, professional NCO corps is intended to preserve military traditions and be the backbone of a more professional army. Such an approach is promising, but the transition is only in its third year, and the results are not yet clear.

Moreover, the principle of mixed manning presents its own problems, the largest of which is unequal levels of training. For example, as of now, out of any three battalions in each regiment or brigade of the Ground Forces, only two are staffed by contract soldiers and ready for immediate action at best. (Gerasimov, 2017) One of the goals of the "*New Look*" reform was to make the military units fully combat ready. However, full professionalization is not on the horizon.

Maintaining a level of about 400,000 contract soldiers is another serious challenge for the RF MoD. After the war with Georgia and at the beginning of the reform effort, the salaries of contract soldiers were quite competitive, allowing the army to attract hundreds of thousands of young people. In 2012, the salary of a contract soldier at the rank of private was 25% higher than the average salary in Russia. But budgetary constraints in the years that followed meant that army personnel salaries did not grow proportionally with national averages, and military service became less attractive.

Since January 1, 2018, the salaries of contract soldiers and officers have been increased by 4 %. The same increase was promised for 2019 and 2020. (Military Salaries Will Be Indexed..., 2017) However, this raise remains below official projected inflation figures. Today, the career of a professional soldier looks less attractive even for those from poorer, rural regions. Inadequate wages also reduce the quality of applicants, creating serious doubt that government plans to achieve 499,200 contract soldiers by 2020 were realistic. (Report by the Defence Ministry..., 2017)

Russia aims to further reduce the number of conscripts to 150,000 people (a reduction of 30%) by 2020-2021. (Kozak, 2017) However, if it is unable to attract enough contract soldiers, the shortage will likely be compensated for by keeping conscript numbers at close to previous levels. Russia is currently at the bottom of a "*demographic pit*." This means that a historically low number of young men only about 600,000 reach conscript age every year. But drafting just 200,000-250,000 of them has proven feasible. (The Ministry of Defence Announced..., 2017) A large proportion of conscripts will reduce the overall quality of military

personnel but will allow the Russian army to maintain staffing at the current level of about 95%.

The quality of personnel has increased not only through professionalization, but also thanks to an improved training system for officers and soldiers. Since 2013, large scale surprise inspections, complex two sided tactical exercises, and major sports like army competition events such as “*Tank Biathlon*” and “*Air Darts*” have made the Russian Armed Forces much more “*fit*” and prepared for real deployment. Ammunition consumption in exercises has increased by 5-7 times compared to 2012. Fuel consumption in driver’s training increased threefold. (In the Troops of the Eastern..., 2014) Tempered by surprise inspections and large-scale exercises, RF military logistics have improved drastically, as witnessed in Syria and Ukraine.

However, the RF AF reserves have shown little improvement, owing to failed attempts to depart from the Soviet concept of a large but poorly trained reserve. Moreover, with the current reduction in the number of conscripts, the total number of available reserve soldiers is also on the decline.

This said, after the success of a small scale pilot program in several regions, a new reform launched in 2018 for the entire country. It makes it possible for individuals to sign a contract for reserve service that commits them to one month per year on active duty, complemented by 2-3 days per month in training. The aim is to develop and maintain highly qualified military personnel on which the Armed Forces can draw upon in times of need. (Stepova, 2018) However, even if this approach is broadened and proves effective, it is unlikely to be sufficient for a major, high-quality expansion of the Armed Forces. To sum up, the key new capabilities in personnel reform since the war with Georgia in 2008 are:

- professionalization of the Armed Forces,
- fully professional sergeant Corps,
- up to 2/3 of forces are permanent-ready and significantly improved training.

2 Russian federation Armed Forces command and control reform

Both Soviet and Russian troops have traditionally experienced difficulties with command and control (C2), with Ground Forces, often suffering from unreliable communications and problems with navigation, especially in unfamiliar territory. This was confirmed again in 2008 during the conflict with Georgia, when Russian forces showed extremely poor situational awareness, experienced problems with military communication, and demonstrated limited coordination between different force branches. (The Tanks of August..., 2010)

The government introduced major changes in the C2 system in the recent years, rebuilding it from the ground up on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. A high-tech, joint National Defence Management Center in Moscow replaced the Soviet era command center of the MoD and the General Staff in 2014. It manages the entire RF AF and Strategic Nuclear Forces, oversees combat

operations in real time, and also tracks vital everyday activities including exercises and logistics functions. (Russia's National Defence..., 2014)

The RF AF procures several thousand units of modern communication equipment each year. In 2017 alone, they procured 4,000 pieces of strategic and operational level equipment and 49,000 tactical level devices. That same year, the FR MoD declared 58 % of its communication equipment to be new and modern. (Report by the Chief of General..., 2017) The new equipment made it possible to monitor strikes on important targets in Syria in real time: live video from the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) "*Forpost*" was streamed simultaneously at the Khmeimim headquarters and the National Defence Management Center in Moscow.

The government created similar but smaller control centers at each of the four military districts, which can be used as backups for the center in Moscow. Russia plans to develop high-tech stationary and mobile command centers on the army level in the future and procure 32 *Akacia-M* mobile complexes for armies' automatization by the end of 2020. (The Ministry of Defence..., 2018)

In 2008, military units coordinated between each other using civilian cell phones. (Bakhur, 2008) For example, the war commander of Russian 58th Army struggled to establish communication with army units and was forced to use a satellite phone borrowed from a newspaper correspondent. Since then, significant progress has been made. Elite Special Operation Forces deployed to Syria in a tactical capacity use individual sets of *Strelec* equipment. Each soldier can receive encrypted radio communication with commanders and within units. Platoon commanders and scouts could transmit the coordinates of detected targets through digital encrypted communication channels to headquarters in real time, interact with artillery and aviation, and had access to satellite communication. This allowed them to be integrated into automated control systems. Russia is actively developing its own version of the joint battlespace information system, which gathers information from different kinds of sensors and different branches of Armed Forces and allocates targets for the military automatically. In Syria, a few of the best trained and most well equipped fighters and staff officers were employing new communication and control equipment, but it was not clear if these systems had been mastered by more common military units in Russia. Of course, *Strelec* and *Ratnik* equipment are widely used in all major exercises, but they, and Russian command and control systems as a whole, remain untested in real, large scale combat.

In sum, Russia's key new capabilities in C2 are:

- a joint National Defence Management Center,
- wide automatization of control of military operations,
- improved communication equipment.

3 Unmanned and robotic vehicles

Successful development of the C2 system would have been impossible without the widespread deployment of small reconnaissance drones on tactical and operational levels. Today, drones are one of Russia's fastest growing military capabilities.

Russia's extensive use of UAVs in Ukraine and Syria provides a case study of how a problem identified in the 2008 Georgia campaign was resolved. (Giles, 2017) The war with Georgia demonstrated the Russian army's catastrophic deficiency in this crucial component of modern warfare. The Russian forces used only one complex with several *Pchela-1T* UAVs during the operation, and even the official RF MoD press was forced to admit that this complex was hopelessly outdated and useless. (Rashepkin, 2009) The only way to gather information was via old fashioned photographic reconnaissance undertaken by *Su-24MR* aircraft. At the same time, Georgia used several effective reconnaissance drones, including *Hermes 450* of the MALE class, which were bought from Israel.

In 2009, the RF MoD conducted comparative tests of all models of drones that were developed by Russian enterprises. The test program cost \$160 million a very large amount for that time. None of the drones satisfied the military requirements. (MO Spent 5 Billion Rubles..., 2010)

That same year, the RF MoD decided to purchase two models of Israeli drones, the MALE-class *Searcher II* and the tactical *Skylark*. In 2011, the RF MoD began to reinvest in the development of Russian drones and financed several light models.

In 2013, after a few years of research and development and testing, the RF MoD began to supply UAVs to the Ground Forces. By the end of 2015, the number of drones deployed with the troops had increased from a few dozen to 1,720 units. (Ministry of Defence, 2015) In 2016 and 2017, another 164 complexes were purchased, including 459 light reconnaissance and electronic warfare UAVs. (Ministry of Defence, 2017)

This pace of development relied substantially on commercial off the shelf components available on the international market. The most common type of Russian light drones, the *Orlan-10*, consists almost entirely of imported components, including key parts such as its engines, video cameras, and flight control systems. (The Russian UAV Orlan-10, 2018)

As a result, a full complex of two light, truck based *Orlan-10* UAVs with payload and ground equipment costs the RF MoD only \$600,000.⁶ Even the procurement of hundreds of such UAVs is not prohibitively expensive. This has enabled the RF MoD to procure 120 more *Orlan* drones in the first four months of 2018, a pace that the RF MoD intends to maintain.

⁶<http://www.zakupki.gov.ru/epz/order/notice/ea44/view/documents.html?regNumber=0195400000217000154>.

The Ground Forces own the majority of the 2,000 UAVs in operation, but UAVs are also increasingly being used in the navy, and several dozen small UAVs are currently employed to guard mobile launchers in the Strategic Missile Force.

Each motor rifle and tank brigade or regiment has created separate companies of tactical UAVs. Special sections for the use of unmanned vehicles now exist at brigade, division, corps, and army headquarters. With the increased use of drones, the Ground Forces have gained improved reconnaissance capabilities and artillery effectiveness. (Lavrov, 2017) Now, drones are included in every major exercise involving RF AF artillery.

Russia can now conduct real time reconnaissance at a range of up to 250 km with dozens of *Forpost* drones and hundreds of *Orlan* drones, which can monitor a range of up to 120 km. Short range reconnaissance and fire direction using *Eleron-3* UAVs gives RF AF unprecedented situational awareness on the tactical and operational level.

Drone use in Syria intensified by two and a half times over the course of the first two years of Russian operations, demonstrating the growing centrality of these systems to Russia's mission. Initially, UAVs carried out about 400 sorties per month, but in October 2017, at the peak of the fight against ISIS, they were used about 1,000 times. In total, Russian drones carried out 23,000 sorties with a total flight time of 140,000 hours in less than three years. (In the Near Future..., 2018)

In 2011, the RF MoD began developing a family of three heavy reconnaissance and strike drones, though owing to the complexity of these projects they are far from complete. Prototypes weighing 1.2 tons ("*Orion*") and 7.6 tons ("*Altius*") performed test flights but it will take years to be implemented. The pace of development of the most ambitious platform, the 20-ton strike drone "*Ohotnik*," is even slower and even its prototype is not yet flight ready.

Heavy strike drones are among the most important UAV components missing from the Russian army. However, in the coming years, strike drones of heavy or at least intermediate class (such as the recently presented "*Corsair*") are likely to be employed. Years of experience with reconnaissance drones and a solid UAV infrastructure should ease their integration into the force.

Russia is also working on acquiring ground "*robots*," or remotely controlled combat vehicles. Over the past few years, Russia has developed a whole line of robots, from small reconnaissance robots to the massive (and futuristic) 11-ton, heavily-armed *Uran-9*. (Bendett, 2018)

The RF MoD is in no hurry to buy robots in large quantities. Many military robots were sent to Syria to test the concept. Combat experience with the *Uran-9* indicated that the technology is still immature. (About *Uran-9* in Syria, 2018) However, both light and heavy unmanned robots have proven useful and their procurement has increased.

To summarize, the key new capabilities in this department are:

- more than 2,000 light reconnaissance drones,

- dozens of MALE-class reconnaissance drones,
- close integration of UAVs and artillery,
- assortment of ground engineering robotic vehicle.

Conclusion

Based on available open sources analysis we can come to conclusion that a decade of Armed Forces reforms followed the war with Georgia, conflict in Syria and Ukraine were significant, emphasized structural changes and mass re-equipment of all branches with new and modernized weapons. Now, Russia must master its new capabilities. Even though Russia's Defence spending and pace of procurement of new armaments has slowed, (Russia to Cut Defence Spending..., 2018) the overall capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces will continue to grow as Russia makes more efficient use of available resources.

Qualitative improvements of the Russian Armed Forces have already been numerous and significant in such military capabilities areas like:

- better personnel,
- new command and control system,
- modern communication equipment,
- improved situational awareness,
- introduction of precise weapons in all branches of Armed Forces.

The RF MoD Sergei Shoigu stated that the most important RF AF transformations were actually related to achieve required combat readiness in all units. This process entailed administrative and C2 reorganisation, acquisition of new modernised equipment, conduct of training closed to Western/NATO standards (82% of usage of full capacity of training ranges, five times more ammunition used than few years ago etc.) and frequent combat control exercises at all levels (battalions to armies and military districts).

Table 2. The share of new and modernized weapons in different branches of the RF AF by the end of 2017

Branch	Share %
Land Forces	45
Aerospace Forces	73
Navy	53
Nuclear Forces	79
Overall Armed Forces	59.5

In addition, the number of contract soldiers exceeds one third of all personnel⁷. But success cannot be taken for granted. During rearmament, Russia

⁷ <https://icds.ee/defence-minister-shoigu-sells-russias-military-success-story/>

has faced serious problems in transitioning to fundamentally new generations of armaments from those inherited from the USSR. This has been especially noticeable in the Navy and the Land Forces. To continue successfully modernizing its Armed Forces, Russia will have to overcome several key challenges in order to:

- recruit enough qualified personnel,
- resolve budget and financial constraints,
- demonstrate the ability of the Defence industry to innovate and produce new types of weapons despite international sanctions and restrictions on access to financial resources.

The bottom line is that Russia today is an even more formidable regional military force than before, but it is still not a global one. Russia's Armed Forces are perfectly shaped to protect its territory and project power nearby, but as distance from the border increases, Russian military capability declines.

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ISLAMIST PROPAGANDA AND RADICALIZATION*

Štefan Danics¹

ABSTRACT

Author intends to describe a place and a role of islamist propaganda in spreading of Islamism and jihad and its security threats. He focuses particularly on propaganda of jihad, which is spreading freely through the internet in the form of online journals. Experiences show that propaganda of jihad significantly reinforces radicalization and recruitment of individuals into jihadist groups, as well as increases their motivation to commit terrorist attacks. Author analyzes techniques, methods, and basic purposes of jihad propaganda. Author describes online journals presenting jihad propaganda and their manipulation with target audience. Author reports on elementary figures of jihad propaganda and their influence on radicalization and recruitment into jihad groups. Finally, author presents important anti-radicalization and anti-islamist propaganda measures in European Union.

Key words: *islamist ideology, jihad propaganda, technics and methods of jihad propaganda, online journals, manipulation with target audience, figures of jihad propaganda, anti-radicalization measures of the EU.*

Introduction

Islamist ideology and its influence on radicalization poses a threat not only to the countries of the European Union, but also the whole world. We are witnessing an increase in radicalization of Islamist groups and individuals who are not afraid to use violence in the form of a terrorist attack. In terms of the extent of this paper and because of the acute danger, the author focuses only on Islamism, which not only recruits new fighters into the holy war through jihad propaganda, but also spreads hatred and justifies violence in pursuit of power-political goals. Experiences show that jihadist propaganda significantly reinforces radicalization, especially of young people, who are easier to manipulate and their ability to critically think is not sufficiently developed. The author will analyze the basic purpose of jihad propaganda, but also its techniques. He will focus on online magazines, which are published in several world languages, are very sophisticated and strongly influence the radicalization of young Muslims as well as their recruitment into jihadist groups. At the same time, he will present the possibilities of direct anti-propaganda as well as anti-radicalization measures used by the European Union institutions. Finally, he will emphasize the role of school and education in strengthening the civic immunity of young people.

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Methodology

Propaganda is a social phenomenon that has existed in various forms throughout human history and is constantly evolving. Propagandists are always looking for new ways and techniques to increase its effect. Propaganda is a kind of special communication. From the propagandists to the target audience, travel messages that aim to influence the audience in some way. Recipients of propaganda should then "voluntarily" accept propaganda theses as their own. Modern propaganda began to use the mass media as a tool that allowed the one-way transmission of messages from a single source to a larger number of recipients (Pratkanis, Aronson, 2010, pg. 8).

While education in liberal countries in general teaches people how to form their own thoughts and how to think, propaganda tries to tell people exactly what to think. Thus, propaganda does not give or allow space to form one's own opinion on a given phenomenon, but directly tries to influence the target audience to adopt proclaimed opinions and attitudes (Welch, 2013, pg. 2).

The author uses a model of propaganda developed by Garth Jowett of the University of Houston and Victoria O'Donnell of the State University of Montana. The model was presented in detail in the book *Propaganda and persuasion*. The book *Propaganda & Persuasion* covers history of propaganda and offers insider definitions and methods of its analysis. In addition, it outlines history of communication, including the rhetorical background. The book provides methodological guidance for analysis of all types of propaganda. The model originally contained ten basic aspects that a researcher should examine when analyzing propaganda (Jowett, O'Donnel, 2012).

These aspects the author modified to use this model for the analysis of jihadist propaganda, especially in online journals. To grasp the main features of jihadist propaganda, it is necessary to examine the following aspects, according to the author:

- ideology, propaganda and its typology,
- the ideology of Islamism, the purpose of jihad propaganda and its techniques,
- online jihad magazines and the Islamic State (IS) magazine Dábiq,
- identification of the target audience for jihad propaganda in Dábiq magazine,
- counter-propaganda instruments and measures against Islamic radicalization by the European Union (EU) institutions.

Ideology, propaganda and its typology

Ideology is the basis of any propaganda that serves it. On the one hand, ideology interprets the world differently, while on the other hand it seeks to change it in the interests of a certain social group. In addition, ideology has goals

that present a way to transform the world and propaganda is the means of achieving these goals. The purpose of propaganda is primarily to gain or maintain legitimacy to fulfill its own ideology. Political ideologies set goals that subsequently inspire our political actions. It is not uncommon for disputes between followers of the same ideology to be more passionate and intense than those between followers of different ideologies (Heywood, 2008, pg. 30-32).

Propaganda is spread through a variety of media and strongly affects individuals, social groups, but also society. The most common typology distinguishes propaganda into white, gray and black. The distinction is based on the nature of the source of propaganda and the accuracy of the information provided. White propaganda is based on a well-identifiable source, and the information that is passed on to the audience is more or less correct. Unlike black propaganda, it does not violate certain ethical rules. Black propaganda is the opposite of white, it spreads lies, deceptions and comes from a false source. It usually follows the saying: „the end justifies the means “. On the border is the gray propaganda, which comes from a source that may not be correctly identified and the veracity of the information is uncertain. Within its framework, only selected messages are shared, and their meanings tend to shift. (Ftorek, 2010, pg. 64).

Furthermore, it is possible to distinguish between political, economic, war, and also ideological propaganda. Purpose of ideological propaganda is influencing the worldview of the target audience, or even a religious conversion with abundant use of threats, emotions and coercion.

The ideology of Islamism, the purpose of jihad propaganda and its techniques

Islamism can simply be understood as political Islam, but also as an ideology that abuses religion to achieve power-political goals, i.e., to create a global community (umma). This umma is supposed to unite all the social layers of society, which are to be subject to Sharia law, which stands in contrast to liberal democracy. In practice then, Islamist movements adopt the theology of Salafism (Roy, 2007, pg. 35). Salafist jihadism allows both Muslims and everyone else to be killed in the name of jihad, using selective interpretations of religious texts (Mendel, 2008, pg. 70). Salafist jihadism is a holy war of Muslims against the enemies of Islam, both against non-Muslims and against bad Muslims (heretics, apostates, excommunicated individuals). Salafist jihadists have intertwined an uncompromising interpretation of Islam with the struggle to defend it (Shiraz, 2016, pg. 208).

Al-Qaeda has created a radical ideology of jihad based on selected verses from the Koran and Sunnah, which are taken out of context. Al-Qaeda ideologues claim that Islam is under attack from all sides. America, the West and the Jews are to blame, along with Arab puppet regimes and treacherous Shiites. It is the

duty of every Muslim to fight these enemies and traitors. And he who refuses to fight is an apostate. This logic then justifies mass murder as a defense of Islam (Müller, pg. 2008). Let us remind ourselves that in February 1998, Osama bin Laden declared global jihad against Jews and the crusaders through fatwa (the religious-legal statement of Islamic law). It ordered Muslims to murder Americans and Jews anywhere in the world. The global jihadists became most infamous thanks to the terrorist attacks on the symbols of American power on September 11, 2001, which greatly deepened the hostility between the West and Muslim radical groups.

The spread of jihadism over the internet radicalizes the people of the West, who are also becoming terrorists, i.e., lone wolves without a direct link to a jihadist group. Lone wolves pose a major security threat to Euro-American civilization. These are mainly descendants of Arab immigrants, young generation that has not identified with the Western way of life, its culture and values. Jihad propaganda recruits new members using an image of a fighter with a holy cause who becomes a celebrated hero. In the case of martyrdom (suicide attack), they become martyrs (Arab. Shahida), who will be rewarded with an afterlife in paradise, which corresponds to the verses in the Koran (Raděj, 2010, pg. 186).

The purpose of propaganda is to spread its own opinions, attitudes and ideas, with a goal to not only change those of the target audience, but to provoke it to certain reaction or behavior. In the context of jihad propaganda, to become a member of a jihadist group means to take part in or finance the activities of the group or otherwise help in establishing a global caliphate.

Jihad propaganda has learned to skillfully use effective promoting techniques: labelling (to evoke a negative emotional response); ordinary people (propagandists present themselves as ordinary people and share their views and attitudes); card unloading (unilateral informing about things of topic or a person); inducing fear (trying to evoke uncertainty and fear in the target audience if they do not agree with the demands of propaganda). And other special techniques: the use of opinion leaders, propaganda of actions in the form of rewards and punishments as well as the use of visual communication focused on emotions (Plisková, 2016, pgs. 13, 22-25).

Online jihad magazines and Islamic State (IS) magazine *Dábiq*

Jihad propaganda in these online magazines presents an assumption that global jihad is developing strongly, while the West is losing the battle. America cannot and will not win, because the global jihadist movement can never be suppressed. On the eve of September 11, it was only Afghanistan, but today it is also Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia, North Africa, and the Arabian Peninsula. The list of countries with jihadists continues to grow (Al-Awlaki, 2010, pg. 56).

Inspire magazine, which has al-Qaeda been publishing since 2010, magazines *Dábiq* and *Rumiyah*, published by the Islamic State (IS), as well as

Azan magazine, first published in 2013, present the goals of the Pakistani Taliban movement. All magazines are available online in English. Their content and visuals are at a quite high level.

The author will focus only on the online magazine *Dábiq*, which was being published monthly since July 2014. Its title refers to a city in Syria, where an apocalyptic battle between Muslims and crusaders is to take place. In addition to English, the magazine was published in other world languages (German, French, Russian and Arabic) until 2016, when the city of *Dábiq* was conquered by insurgents who supported Turkey. The magazine had around 40 to 80 pages and was based on radical Islamism inspired by Salafism, with the fact that everything was done in the spirit of uncompromising introduction of Sharia law in the territory under the control of IS. The propaganda in the online magazine *Dábiq* was using "tauhid", i.e., the perception of Allah as the highest and only authority, to justify the activity of IS through Allah himself. Propaganda used the old technique of black and white perception of the world, which is divided into two camps. The first represents the global ummah, i.e., the party of Islam and the faith that is presented by orthodox Muslims and Mujahideen anywhere in the world. The second camp is represented by traitors and infidels. This society is presented as hypocritical, its members being Jews, crusaders, and their allies. The magazine often focused on the fight against Shiite Muslims, who are perceived as heretics. The magazine placed its greatest emphasis on the development and defense of the caliphate, through which Muslims would regain their dignity after a long period of humiliation. The point was to get the Muslim population of Western countries to return to IS-controlled territory. One of the reasons was that only the IS would be saved, and the surrounding world would perish in the flood. Through this prediction IS was legitimized as a real caliphate. Everyone must fight until all the crusaders near the city of *Dábiq* are defeated. Unlike al-Qaeda, IS holds strong apocalyptic ideas (PLISKOVÁ, 2016: 50-52).

The entire *Dábiq* magazine was based on the context of the impending apocalyptic battle, but also celebrated jihadist attacks around the world as well as their perpetrators. We can observe a distribution into topics within these values: religious arguments 46%, military successes and news from the conflicts 17%, caliphate expansion and cooperation with surrounding tribes 11%, words of enemies 5%, enemies and hostages 15%, the development of the caliphate and life 6% (Plisková, 2016, pgs. 55-57).

Identification of the target audience of jihad propaganda in *Dábiq* magazine

Dábiq magazine was specific in that it was not limited to a selected group of recipients, but instead sought to have a global reach, with some emphasis on the Eurasian region. Its target audience could be divided into two basic groups. The first group represents Muslim society around the world, who are perceived as potential future members or residents of the IS. Therefore, the propaganda tries to

influence them to join the caliphate. The second group is a society of unbelievers and traitors, which is systematically intimidated in various ways. At the same time, propaganda denigrates Western leaders and criticizes various prohibitions and restrictions of their governments against Islam. This may lead to the conversion of some members of hostile Western societies (Plisková, 2016, pg. 54-55).

EU counter-propaganda instruments and measures against Islamic radicalization

Terrorist attacks on suburban trains in Madrid (March 2004) were carried out by radicalized individuals organized via the Internet. As a response, the EU adopted a seven-point declaration on combating terrorism, with paragraph 6 calling for measures against support of terrorism and recruitment into terrorist groups. For the first time, there was a mention of the need to design a strategy to address radicalization processes (*Declaration on combating terrorism*, 2004).

Following the terrorist attack in London (July 2005), the EU adopted the *EU counter-terrorism strategy* and emphasized the need to identify the methods and conditions under which people are involved in the radicalization process, including the need of counter propaganda. At the same time, *The EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment* was adopted. Thus, radicalization has become one of the central themes of the European counter-terrorism approach. In addition, it was emphasized that the vast majority of Europeans do not accept extremist views, and those who do so seldom commit violence (*EU counterterrorism strategy: value added or chimera?* 2010). The strategy, which was updated in 2008 and 2014, speaks of Islamic extremism as a challenge, while showing how the EU can respond:

- ensure that mainstream views prevail over extremist ones,
- combat online radicalization and terrorist recruitment,
- train, build capacity and involve front-line experts in relevant sectors against radicalization,
- support research into trends in radicalization and recruitment for terrorism,
- align the internal and external fight against radicalization (*The EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment*, 2005).

In September 2011, the *Radicalization Awareness Network* (RAN) was established. It is a network created by the European Union in order to connect key organizations and individuals involved in the prevention of radicalization leading to terrorism. Doctors, social workers, teachers, NGOs, victims' groups, police representatives, local authorities, academics are represented here. They are divided into nine groups, all of which are coordinated by a RAN committee. RAN EU also focuses on combating radicalization online and pays close attention to preventive measures (Danics, 2019, pg. 135-139)

In 2015, a specialized unit of Europol was established, the *European Union Internet Referral Unit* (EU IRU), which fights against the spread of extremist, terrorist, and radical groups propaganda online. The EU IRU reports on and draws attention to the spread of online materials, which are subsequently blocked in the vast majority of cases. This specialized unit of Europol carried out several analyzes concerning lone wolves, the recruitment of IS women, but also hackers who are part of jihadist groups (EU Internet Referral Unit - EU IRU, 2020).

In January 2016, Europol established the *European Counter Terrorism Centre* (ECTC), which acts as an operations center and a center of expertise. This reflects the need for the EU to strengthen its response to the fight against foreign fighters and online terrorist propaganda and extremism (European Counter Terrorism Center - ECTC, 2020).

Conclusion

The use of the Internet and social media by jihadists has increased enormously in recent years. Jihadist groups have demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of social networks and launched many well-organized and focused social media campaigns to recruit new followers and promote or celebrate terrorist acts as well as violent extremism.

The fact is that there is no direct antipropaganda online. The US government has tried to create its own videos: *Welcome to the Islamic State Land*, as part of a comprehensive online campaign, *Think Again Turn Away*. Material was also created in the form of *Jihadi Vogue* magazine, which parodied IS fighters, but with little effect (The Telegraph, 2014).

In the text, the author described the current measures against Islamist propaganda and radicalization by the European Union institutions. Author believes that the best defense in this case, is to increase the immunity of civil society in schools, education and public debate with a goal to create a critical public opinion. In this regard, the author draws attention to the inspiring ideas that apply in the Canadian education system, regarding educational practices and recommendations (Ghosh, Chan, Manuel, Dilimulti, 2016). Applying this Canadian approach would certainly require a change in our educational system. This should become the core of the anti-radicalization process, as the emphasis is on educating children, shaping their values as well as reinforcing their skills and behaviors that ensure their economic, social and personal safety.

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US NUCLEAR POSTURE IN 21st CENTURY

Matej Drotár¹

ABSTRACT

This article intends to demonstrate the existence of a direct social sciences-based correlation between some of the existing theoretical approaches in international relations and the current US nuclear posture. The arguments provided tried to show that both the National Security Strategy and the National Defence Strategy recently adopted in the US stem from realism. Understanding this theoretical approach and its basic tenets is a useful contribution to broader statecraft/military logic embraced by the US for the years to come. However, the year 2021 showed that new expectations and challenges are looming on the horizon. Forecasting scenarios and providing recommendations with the help of international theories is therefore in order.

Key words: nuclear posture, strategic documents, security, defence, JCPOA, New START, denuclearization

Introduction

Along with the second nuclear age, nuclear weapons started to spread more quickly throughout the world and became more militarily powerful within the arsenals of the states that had them in possession. New approaches started to echo in an attempt to come to terms with a scenario in which a military confrontation, in which the most formidable weapons available might play a role, would possibly wreak havoc to the world. Scant wonder that a question about nuclear strategies as such started to formalise itself. The primer conundrum has been whether any employment of military devices so tightly linked with words such as apocalypse, disaster or catastrophe can serve any useful political purpose and whether this employment could be sufficiently controllable and in line with the political objectives. Put differently, it meant whether a nuclear strategy is or is not a contradiction in terms (Freedman, 2003).

In order to understand the previous broader question it might be instructive to demonstrate the latest developments of the US nuclear posture. Thanks to a case-study analysis of two recently adopted US national strategic documents, this objective is manageable. This article will try to focus exclusively on up-to-date scientific resources of US provenience available at the time, as well as on official online documents open to a broader public. As for the question of methodology, this article counts on, but is not limited to, methodological individualism and

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rational choice theory including realism. At the core of this approach are states defined as entities that make rational choices. Methodological individualism began as an assumption that the goal of social inquiry is to understand the behaviour of those rational actors and to explain larger-scale social phenomena such as military conflict or disarmament in terms of individual behaviour. Moreover, methodological individualism and rational choice theory both have a long history in the study of strategic studies and international relations. The security dilemma and the topic of cooperation and collective action, where the core model is the prisoner's dilemma, are amongst the most popular ones in strategic studies (Kydd, 2010). The general idea that actors in anarchy will be competitive, suspicious, and violent towards each other became a central theme in international relations theory and serves as the deliberate methodological cornerstone of this article.

1 Grand Strategy Design

In general, applying a holistic scientific approach is useful by default. This article therefore examines the so-called grand strategy design first. Grand strategy, in the classic term, is a systematic, ordered, coherent enterprise that takes into account nation's total resources, its capabilities and constraints and its values to achieve great objectives that include its own security. According to some, it is important for any strategic project whether the times are quiescent or turbulent. In fact, regional military conflicts, massive immigration, climate change and even market disruptions have already made the post-Cold War era turbulent enough. Rapid economic changes, information, industrial revolution and globalization are breaking the old rules and new norms have yet to guide societies through what originally had to be the end of history. It apparently never happened. Scant wonder that these economic and social unrests elevated some parts of the globe, whilst depressed others. As a result, the final revolution – the transformation of conflict – became, not surprisingly, a central factor in every, not only in the US, grand strategy design (Hart, 2004).

The US nuclear strategy, though, remained unchained. It might be instructive to recall that the US was the first country to acquire the bomb, and for four consecutive years, the US held a monopoly on it. The reluctance of so many states to push ahead towards nuclear weapons became readily understandable when one examines the political benefits that do or do not ensue from their possession. Developing a nuclear arms programme has always put a tremendous strain on the technical and financial resources of many countries and yet states keep going nuclear out of their own will or, more precisely, because they are forced by the security dilemma to do so (Creveld, 1991). For those amongst them, their grand strategy design is also about nuclear weapons and the US is not an exemption of this group of states. The world's nuclear-armed states possess a

combined total sum of app. 13 500 nuclear warheads, out of which more than 90% belong to the US and Russia. App. 9 500 warheads are in military service, with the rest awaiting dismantlement (Estimated Global Nuclear Warheads Inventories, 2020).

Estimated Global Nuclear Warheads Inventories in 2020	
STATE	NUCLEAR WARHEADS
Russia	App. 6 375
US	App. 5 800
China	App. 320
France	App. 290
United Kingdom	App. 215
Pakistan	App. 160
India	App. 150
Israel	App. 90
North Korea	App. 30-40

As for the question of theory, the US nuclear posture in the 21st century encompasses many characteristics of realism and its offsets. Strategic documents and the policy of achieving peace through strength support this claim. For example, as offensive structural realists have put it, states face an uncertain international environment in which any state might use its power to harm another. Under such circumstances, even relative nuclear capabilities are of overriding importance, and security requires acquiring as much power compared to the other states as possible. Great powers fear each other, that they can rely only on themselves for their security, and that the best strategy for states to ensure their survival is a maximization of relative power. In contrast to defensive structural realists, who suggest that states look for only an appropriate amount of power, offensive structural realists argue that security requires acquiring as much power relative to other states as possible. Furthermore, increasing capabilities can improve state's security without triggering a countervailing response. Offensive realism in international relations theory provides a structural explanation of great powers conflict, suggesting that the main causes are located in the architecture of the international system. Some offensive realists hypothesize that the three possible system architectures range from unbalanced multipolar conflict-proneness to bipolar peacefulness, with a balanced multipolar system falling somewhere in between (Elman, 2007). The current US nuclear posture clearly adds to this perspective.

1.1 National Strategic Documents

In the case of the US, the grand strategy design clearly shaped its nuclear posture. According to the National Security Strategy adopted in 2017 in the US a

central continuity in history is the contest for power. This, no doubt, resembles some basic tenets of realism and neorealism in international relations theory. Indeed, the US opted for seeking areas of cooperation with competitors from a position of strength. The US did it primarily by ensuring that its military power is the best in the world and that together with its allies and partners it could deter and if necessary defeat aggression against its own interests and increase the likelihood of managing competitions without violent conflict and preserving peace. In this very quest, nuclear weapons play a very special role. Indeed, nuclear weapons have served a vital purpose for the past seventy years. They were the foundation of the US strategy to preserve peace and sustainability by deterring aggression on the US soil and their allies and partners alike. Whilst nuclear deterrence strategies cannot preserve all conflicts, they are essential to prevent nuclear attack, non-nuclear strategic attack, and large-scale conventional aggression. The US would therefore logically sustain a nuclear force structure that meets their current needs and addresses unanticipated risks. Sustaining a necessary nuclear stockpile shall deter adversaries and achieve US objectives if deterrence fails is also important. Modernising the current nuclear enterprise is to ensure that the US have the scientific, engineering and manufacturing capabilities necessary to retain an effective and safe nuclear triad and respond to future national security threats in the 21st century. The existing National Security Strategy also says that to avoid miscalculations the US would conduct discussions with other states to build predictable relationships and reduce nuclear risks and would consider new arms control arrangements if they were to contribute to strategic stability and if they could be verifiable. The US is equally strongly against allowing adversaries to use threats of nuclear escalation or other irresponsible nuclear behaviours to coerce the US. In other words, fear of escalation would not prevent the US from defending its vital interests and those of their allies and partners (National Security Strategy, 2017).

A year after the National Security Strategy had been adopted another strategic document followed. The National Defence Strategy in 2018 stipulated yet again that realism as an approach and strength as a means would be the driving forces of how the US would deal with military challenges all over the world and most importantly what role would their nuclear forces play in this quest. Rogue states and their weapons of mass destruction programmes as well as their range missiles capabilities constituted a problem for the US, though. As a reply to that, the US Joint Force would deter nuclear and non-nuclear strategic attacks and defend the territory of the US along with undergoing a self-modernisation process. Put differently, the existing nuclear triad including nuclear command, control, and communications, and supporting infrastructure would have to undergo a systemic adjustment. Modernisation of the nuclear forces would include developing options to counter competitor's coercive strategies, predicated on the threatened use of nuclear or strategic non-nuclear attacks. Moreover, according to the

National Defence Strategy investments would also focus on layered missile defences and disruptive capabilities for both theatre missile threats and ballistic missile threats. The Joint Force would have to be equally able to strike diverse targets inside adversary air and missile defence networks in order to destroy mobile power-projection platforms. This would include military capabilities to enhance close combat lethality in complex terrain (National Defence Strategy, 2018).

2 Disadvantages of Nuclear Advantages

Having displayed the very gist of the two recent strategic documents the US adopted in 2017 and in 2018 respectively, it is evident that the US remained a proponent of a robust nuclear posture for the 21st century. There are, however, at least three main cited possible costs of nuclear superiority that merit consideration, namely: strategic instability, arms races and nuclear proliferation. According to some military scientists and international relations pundits, arguments about military nuclear advantages and nuclear strategic stability are essentially arguments about how the military balance of power affects the likelihood of conflicts. For instance, traditional realist arguments have maintained that the balance of power is a near law-like phenomenon in the international system. Taking the balance of power as a given fact, structural realists have theorized about whether different distributions of power balance are more or less stable. In order to reply to when states are most likely to make mistakes about the balance of power, an empirical research is in order. Holding other factors constant, conflict is more likely when there is military parity. With a rough balance of power, the outcome of conflict is less certain and bargaining failure is more likely. When, on the other hand, there is a clear preponderance of power, the outcome of conflict comes with greater confidence. Recent empirical research supports this theoretical logic. Furthermore, military scholars have consistently shown a tight correlation between rough parity in the balance of power and the frequency of militarized interstate disputes. The current US nuclear posture supported by the very dictum of both strategic documents counts on superiority logic – an instrument that beats strategic instability in full regalia.

Another very similar question deals with arms races. The argument goes as follows. Attaining enduring military nuclear advantages is difficult because it might very likely provoke opposite states to respond in kind with their own military arms build-ups. Many international relations scholars and policy military analysts have criticized the US nuclear strategy, arguing that a robust nuclear force might result in costly arms races elsewhere. They maintain that efforts to gain enduring military advantages over other capable states are at best costly and pointless and, at worse self-defeating and dangerous. Put differently, the canonical spiral model theory of arms racing provides the intellectual underpinnings for

many of these arguments. The theory explains that security is scarce by default in an anarchic international system. Throughout the nuclear era, theorists opposed attempts of the US to achieve superiority for precisely these reasons. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, if endangered by some recent developments, as well as recent denuclearization efforts in Asia, were viable examples that these presumptions were not completely correct.


Another argument is that there is a direct link between the US nuclear arsenal and the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries. In order to prevent nuclear proliferation, the US, must first make changes to its own nuclear arsenal. But there is also a counterargument, which claims that when deciding whether to initiate a nuclear weapons programme and when formulating a policy towards potential nuclear proliferation in another states, decision-makers and security policy planners must consider a variety of security, economic, and political factors and these variables will ultimately shape state's response. After so many factors taken into consideration, there is only little reason to believe that the US nuclear posture would have a significant impact on the ultimate outcome in that matter. One should not be very much surprised if this is one of the core arguments of why the US are prone to keep its existing massive nuclear posture in the 21st century (Kroenig, 2018).

Last, but no least, ballistic missiles have, no doubt, a close bound with the introduction and expansion of nuclear weapons. Building a large and powerful ballistic missile force has always been an element of every US national security policy founded on the military capability to provide retaliatory force against others. In other words, deterrence was a goal for national survival for much of the Cold War and one might argue that it has remained so ever since. However, deterrence may not be as easily reachable for the US nowadays compared to the era of the Cold War. In fact, many states can use their missile force, be it represented by intercontinental ballistic missiles or submarine launched ballistic missiles or any other types of missiles, to counter the US military strength in any of world's regions. Indeed, according to some the US may not be able under the current circumstances to maintain a single, all-encompassing deterrent policy as it used to do during the era of the Cold War when it could concentrate its military efforts against a militarily robust, yet a single opponent (Chun, 2006).

3 Burning Issues for Next Decade

With the newly US administration sworn in challenges started to loom on the horizon. Restoration of the JCPOA, prolongation of the New START and denuclearization of North Korea are to name just a few. Truth to be said, all the above-mentioned topical matters might very probably require a lot different approach than the one embraced by the previous US administration. The neo-neo

great international relations theory debate seems to offer some answers, namely the importance of the role of international organisations. Once established, international organisations could do more than just to shape or influence the foreign policy of states. International organisations can promote a foreign policy agenda by providing critical information and expertise. They might even serve as a catalyst for coalition building amongst states. If the US truly wish to return to the nuclear deal in order to ensure that Iran operates again according to its own parameters and moves away from the threshold for a military breakout, the US new administration should embrace diplomatic tools at hand and especially the very potential of international organisations (Shine, Shavit, 2021). The P5+1 has already proved itself when negotiating the original JCPOA. Scant wonder that the P5+1 merely differs from the UN Security Council when it comes to its composition. Making benefit of the EU as an honest broker, the IAEA as a verification platform and the UN as an overarching body is in order yet again. Thus, the US might be able to curb Iran's enriched-uranium stockpile, which has returned to growth, after the US have left the JCPOA (Tirone, 2020).



The prolongation of the New START issue is of same nature, for it requires the cooperation vested in neoliberalism rather than the self-help of realism. There is no doubt, that one of the opportunities for incrementalism in movement towards a more disarmed world lies in reinvigorating US-Russian nuclear arms reductions. The New START Treaty limits each country's number of deployed nuclear weapons. Therefore, many arms control advocates applauded its extension in 2021. What will push nuclear arms control and disarmament the last mile from smaller arsenals to zero or effective zero – as abolitionists wish – is, however, not only the commitment to incremental progress by nuclear powers. Also required

are compelling moral imperatives and policy prescriptions that are strategically sound. Put differently, states will not disarm themselves for altruistic reasons. They must be convinced that they are more secure in a nuclear-scarce, or nuclear-free world than in a world in which reliance on nuclear deterrence, nuclear primacy, defence dominance, or nuclear anarchy are the guarantors of peace and safety (Cimbala, 2010). Opponents might claim that the great powers might not entrust each other, and international bodies are notoriously lacking in military power. However, the prolongation of the New START Treaty, which is the last remaining non-proliferation agreement between the former Cold War superpower rivals, after another key nuclear accord – the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty – expired in 2019, proves them at least temporarily wrong. Thus, bringing serious diplomacy and its instruments back to the orbit is by no doubt yet another practical policy recommendation for the upcoming US nuclear posture.

The last topical issue that the new US nuclear posture should bear in mind is the North Korean conundrum. Some pundits claim that the new US administration has two options. First, taking the view that complete denuclearization will likely be highly improbable, if not impossible in practise. The US may also consider permitting some regional neighbours to go nuclear to deter the nuclear threat, or else move to improve bilateral relations with North Korea in order to prevent the further proliferation of its nuclear capabilities elsewhere. Second, if the new US administration is not to give up completely on the near-impossible task of denuclearizing North Korea, it should profoundly rethink the diplomacy/negotiations option. Offering North Korea a trustworthy alternative stemming from an example of the Perry Report might be viable. (Cheong, 2020). Such a task is manageable with the help of diplomacy, statecraft, manoeuvring and negotiations. Proponents of neoliberalism should come up with sustainable solutions and policy-driven recommendations in order to make the world a safer place again.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this article tried to provide as balanced an overview as possible on how to understand the current US nuclear posture and its possible further development. Two crucial strategic documents and a theoretical background of rational choice and neorealism in international relations helped to support the general argument that a powerful nuclear posture is – in theory – easily defensible by its proponents. Answering the initial question, whether a robust nuclear posture is a contradiction in terms, is therefore negative. The security dilemma and the theory of neorealism in international relations give the best arguments for such a claim. Achieving peace through strength, however, might be too ambitious a goal from at least the mid-term perspective. Global affairs are very dynamic and recommendations for a better understanding of the US nuclear

posture in the future are manifold. However, any scientifically based prediction on future nuclear issues-related scenario might prefer to take into consideration neoliberal analysis outcomes, too. The case studies come at hand. First, to monitor the development of the US nuclear posture in relation with the ongoing denuclearisation efforts in the world. Second, to analyse a new strategic concept of NATO and the role nuclear military capabilities play in it. Third, to take into calculations various international relations theory and military strategy approaches and to make a holistic synthesis out of it. A qualified guess says that the time is ripe for the reinvention of neoliberalism in dealing with the all the above.

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OBJECTIVE TRUTH AND INFODEMICS IN 2020

Peter Dubóczy¹

ABSTRACT

The subject of the article is the phenomenon of objective truth in 2020. The paper deals with the relationship between objective truth and (truth) relativism during the infodemic, which followed the spread of Covid-19. It describes the issue in the context of the historical conflict of freedom and authority. In particular, it focuses on infodemic under the scope of threat, which opens up the potential for oscillation between democracy and authoritarian regimes. The article also focuses on information and cognitive security. In this context, it seeks to explain the existence of disinformation as a subset of hybrid activities threatening democratic systems. The aim of the article is to analyze the tools and activities of chaos in opposition to a healthy information and cognitive environment, which should accept the category of objective truth in the role of arbitrator for its proper functioning, not excluding its expressions in the political dimension. The final section of the article is devoted to the mapping of the global democracy index in 2020, which was negatively influenced not only by pandemic, but also infodemic itself.

Key words: *objective truth, relativism, disinformation, hybrid threats, pandemic, infodemic, democracy, authoritarian regimes*

Introduction

Crises inevitably come with impulses that have the potential to change the further development of the world. The conceptualization of the phenomenon of infodemic, which came hand in hand with the pandemic of Covid-19, appears to be a productive goal in the context of the historical conflict of freedom and authority even a year after its outbreak. The relationship and difference between objective truth and relativism turn out to be critical in 2020. An analysis of the oscillation between democratic and authoritarian regimes, which arises from the human desire to find a unique and only correct solution to all problems, becomes necessary. Above all, the complexity of the political system and noise of simplicity come into conflict as a distinction between an open and a closed society. The disinformation wave is a threat to democratic systems, especially under the lens of information and cognitive security. However, disinformation that naturally thrive on the vulnerabilities of democracies acquire the status of hybrid threat under the artificial motivation (manipulation) of a confused and polarized society. The low level of digital literacy and critical thinking means that uncertain times, full of negative emotions and fear, are a breeding ground for sowing infodemic, as a tool for anti-democratic tendencies.

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1 Objective truth and relativism

The year 2020 brought many critical moments in the political and international field, which opened old, but still alive topics. In the context of our article, we mean above all the historical conflict between the freedom and authority, or in today's understanding, democracy and authoritarian regimes. While one side is in the limelight, the other is waiting for its opportunity to take advantage of the weaknesses of the opposite pole to replace it at least temporarily. It is a struggle which, in a regulated setting, is a productive axis of human development, but if it is not subject to any limitation, we encounter the threat of a real end to history under the banner of a single, rigid response. The search for a final solution that would answer all the problems of humanity and the world around it is, in essence, a necessary desire or conviction of man in the effort to fulfil the ideal form of the world. Not its objective version, which with a high probability is not even possible to be found, but its subjective form, which vehemently comes up with a naively taken view that its realization is only a matter of time and available resources. In reality, however, this is an option that risks undermining the pillars of democratic systems and the rule of law. This alone would be the result of a process whose basic characteristic would be what K. R. Popper calls subjective certainty of knowledge. We find this in opposition to objective truth, or rather to the understanding of truth as a basic regulatory principle in evaluating the quality of (not only) practical expressions of human creativity. The never-ending friction of theory and practice defines the fact that the results transformed into reality will never fully correspond to the original ideas and requirements created in the realm of intellect and reason. The key element is the effort to maximize the results, which would be as close as possible to the original intention. As in the case of truth, which we will probably never fully discover, their violent disengagement would mean a radical departure from the principles of critical rationalism and pluralism. They are the difference between systems that distinguish in preference between open and closed society, between critical dialogue and orders, between rejection and acceptance of the division of people into winners and losers. The dynamism of the historical scene is thus essentially a sought-after commodity, mainly for two reasons: the already mentioned progress it brings, and above all the prevention of an epilogue, which would mean the real end of history and man. Whether a selected champion of freedom (such as democracy) or authority (such as an unfinished totalitarian regime) wins, it would inevitably seduce its bearers to the final establishment of authority in its total meaning. In other words, even the category of freedom cannot resist the temptation to establish an order over society that would eventually begin to evoke features of a system defined by rigidity and "forced" authority of one's own notion of social welfare, hierarchical organization of the world and, ultimately, of a man. The new world loses its position of ideal or utopia, decays under the influence of the lawful realities of the actual world, devalues its original

intention and becomes dystopia. The loss of humanity occurs and the last man dies at the moment when the conflict of ideas, the vital nerve of the progress and dynamics of the world, fizzles out and the surviving dystopia cannot find its conqueror. In other words, it is desirable to reject the assumption that there really is such a thing as a complete answer, the necessary acceptance of which by those who found it would solve all questions of theory and practice at once and for all (Berlin, 2002). As we have outlined before, the idea of complete fulfilment thus formally contradicts itself, but the imaginary unity in the totally closed result of the struggle between freedom and authority is a metaphysical chimera, which some, according to A. Applebaum, never give up (Applebaum, 2020). We are increasingly faced with the difference between what K. R. Popper calls old ethics and naive monism, and what he calls new ethics and critical dualism (or critical conventionalism). While the first set was based on the idea of a certainty of knowledge and the idea of authority, the new ethics is based on the idea of objective and uncertain knowledge – the old imperative of intellectuals (and with them "ordinary" citizens) calls for them to become an authority that by rejecting and disguising its mistakes becomes intolerant (Popper, 1995). In principle, this is the difference between critical pluralism and relativism. Despite their similarities, they are different in the critical points that are current for the present time, which is swept in a crisis across several dimensions after 2020.

On the one hand, a complex system that draws on the positive diversity and acceptance of human error, on the other hand, the desire for unity in simple-mindedness. Two opposites, which in the human practical universe quite faithfully reflect the division between the questions of what could and should be. While one leaves open space for the realization of man in certain limitations of productivity, the other encircles him in the unconscious position of a passive addressee of orders from actors who know no boundaries. Either freedom, properly limited by responsibility and a certain order, or its illusion in anarchy, which will ultimately be to the detriment of all. The oscillation between productive uncertainty (of efforts to find the final state of an ideal) and the fear of uncertainty in need of immediate solutions, which do not have to and often do not respect the boundaries of reason, facts and truth, becomes more dynamic in times of crisis. Negative emotions, fear, an uncertain future and other unfortunate aspects lead to tilting the scales in order to fulfil the ominous prophecy of finding the final answer in a closed society of a unique story (or the only correct answer). All the more so if one supports such a state (and development) in accordance with one's own power interests, whether in the domestic or international political sphere. The difference between critical pluralism and relativism lies primarily in the perception of the category of truth, and thus its value and the tools of its search. It is a relationship of two elements, which thoroughly expresses the contradiction in the view of facts (fiction) and fiction. The relationship, which represents a critical point in the development of events on the stage of international theatre, especially in the 21st century, in which information as such becomes an important

tool of power struggle. Thus, its truth value, or the potential for its use (abuse) also becomes significant. If relativism leads to the thesis that all claims can be more or less defended, then everything is allowed, and we are moving towards anarchy, injustice, and thus the domination of violence (Popper, 1995). The category of truth loses its value completely, everything and nothing can be true at the same time. The opposite is represented by the critical pluralism, which D. Dobiaš describes as a method of *trial and error*, where theories are presented and subjected to the strictest possible criticism in order to discover errors made (Dobiaš, 2012). If there is no offer of free competition of claims operating on the basis of admitting one's own error, then in uncertain times it is very easy for statements of low or no quality to come to the fore. While they offer immediate answers in opposition to the uncertainty of endless testing and research for objective truth, their true value is a harmless lie at best, but worse, it can be a catalyst for change on the axis between the poles of democracy and totalitarianism. The threat to countries, especially democratic ones, is represented by the very quality of the information environment that exists within the nation and across the globe. The axiological struggle, which springs from the opposites of critical pluralism and relativism, finds its expression in information and cognitive security, when it acts as a vulnerability of the country or the entire world order.

The questioning of democratic principles, the foundations of the rule of law or the foreign policy orientation of a particular subject then become open. The discrepancy between reality and articulated fiction finds its political expression in the gradual radicalization of actors who, willingly or unintentionally, consciously or unconsciously, lean towards one of the sides. At one pole, rigidity, paradoxically embodied in absolute freedom of thought and the anarchy of reason, which arches avoids the requirement of responsibility expressed by Kant's proposed imperative. On the contrary, it offers a mutated version, a confused law of ethics, at best reduced to Hobbes' natural state. Truth is a wolf to another "truth", the maxim of axiological Darwinism, it is not rational idea that wins, but its counterpart, mass-applied emotion with a globally multiplied reach of social media. Today's dynamics, the demand for immediate solutions, the violent exchange of fact for opinion, reality for fiction, expressed in the spirit of the postmodern and post-factual times. We return to a moment in which knowledge is not a virtue of progress, the idea becomes a power tool through the information revolution. One step forward, two steps back. This is the way by which the current crisis of liberal democracy could be described. Its victory in the 1990s was supposed to be the end of history, but this claim of F. Fukuyama is at least imaginary by today's standards. Relativism responds to the needs of the present. Man is a consumer, the truth is the product of different qualities, it is easily abused and yet sold without shame. Uncertainty, the desire for served results and human life in a consumer society are factors leading to a crisis of values, elites and social order. It may be what T. Snyder called "*Medium-Size Lie*," and thus an effort to

encourage recipients „to engage, at least part of the time, with an alternative reality. Sometimes that alternative reality has developed organically; more often, it's been carefully formulated, with the help of modern marketing techniques, audience segmentation, and social-media campaigns“ (Applebaum, 2020, 48-49p.). The paradox of the mutual relationship between the expressed desire (ideal) and the expression of the reality continues, the internal conflict of the category of objective truth also remains present. Natural atomization also affects the phenomenon of subjective certainty of knowledge – a unit cut off from society, motivated to operate independently, has no problem accepting multiple versions of truth, gradually creating an alternative universe in which "fact" is no longer bounded by the limits of reality. However, the very fragmentation of society eventually transforms into its final form in the creation of an explosively mutated version of interpersonal solidarity, which replaces the original "peaceful" notions of the consensual value of the global community. The result is a global polarization of society, especially of Western civilization, doomed to further radicalization.

2 Infodemic on the threshold of democracy and authoritarian regimes

Crises bring their, often initially unexpected, aftermath. The pandemic of the coronavirus, which we have witnessed since the end of 2019, will probably not be an exception. However, it is not only a threat to public health, a global pandemic necessarily comes hand in hand with the economic crisis. We have witnessed in the past that uncertain times, fear for one's own existence or loss of hope for a better tomorrow can bring drastic changes reflected not only across the political and international spectrum, but also within the value anchoring of society as a whole. Crises act as catalysts for important historical moments – they fulfil their potential by influencing the further flow of history. Above all, however, they represent a breeding ground for the above-mentioned conflict of freedom and authority, either the move towards democracy or the move towards totalitarianism, which are waiting for their opportunity to defeat their opponent and ascend to an imaginary pedestal of victory. Whether it was the First World War, after which new democracies emerged, or the great economic crisis of the 1930s that led to the uprising of fascism and Nazism, or the gradual decline of the Soviet Union, which culminated in the United States becoming a power hegemon in the 1990s (at least for a time), we are still talking about the twists that helped one or the other side. As we have already indicated, the technological development of the 20th and 21st century (among other things) has ensured that the international struggle for power is moved to levels that avoid direct conflict. In the bipolar era, war became an unwanted commodity in the First World, and within the framework of (not only) ideological struggle it moved to the sphere of proxy wars.

Today, we are witnessing a development that vaguely announces the re-presence of war in the territories it avoided during the second half of the 20th century. It is a specific type of conflict, which is based on the parameters of uncertainty – the uncertainty of whether we are experiencing a state of peace or war. The type of conflict which tries to eradicate the differences between peace and war. Hybrid threats are not just a modern matter, as it is also in the case of information or influence operations. Although the term was modernized and popularized, especially in connection with the annexation of Crimea in 2014, information games have always been part of the international power competition. However, the difference between the past and the present lies primarily in the mass involvement of the public. Hybrid warfare is nothing new, but a unified framework that fully defines the issue of hybrid threats is absent in the international environment. The European area (and Western civilization) is facing a dramatic change in the security environment. Nations and international organizations are gradually beginning to focus their efforts on implementing measures to prevent malignant activities by state and non-state actors. In particular, transnational cooperation, which offers umbrella for regional and multilateral initiatives, is becoming key. An effective response requires dialogue and coordination at the political and operational level not only between individual organizations, but also between specific nations and between nations and organizations, respectively. For the time being, a common platform would allow states to combine their separate and dispersed resources into a unified approach that would combat the issue of hybrid threats under a more comprehensive perspective. The definition framework of hybrid threats is not limited to the theoretical area, their importance has also been consolidated by the European Union (hereinafter EU) and NATO in their strategic documents. The EU defines hybrid threats as *“the mixture of coercive and subversive activity, conventional and unconventional methods (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, technological), which can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare. There is usually an emphasis on exploiting the vulnerabilities of the target and on generating ambiguity to hinder decision-making processes. Massive disinformation campaigns, using social media to control the political narrative or to radicalise, recruit and direct proxy actors can be vehicles for hybrid threats”* (Joint Communication of the European Union, 2016). A similar definition was adopted by NATO in July 2016. It also focused on the coordinated nature of hybrid threats, while defining them as *“broad, complex, and adaptive combination of conventional and non-conventional means, and overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures, are employed in highly integrated design by state and non-state actors to achieve their objectives”* (Warsaw Summit Communiqué, 2016). Therefore, the term "hybrid threats" should be considered as an umbrella term covering various destabilizing actions. Their solution considers not only kinetic operations (use of unmarked troops, actions against


critical infrastructure, organization of coups or assassinations, but also non-kinetic means – such as a wide range of measures on disinformation and propaganda, sponsorship of radical political movements, exerting economic pressure or covert actions aimed at destabilizing other nations (including the corruption of politicians).

Disinformation actions can thus be understood as a subset of hybrid threats but framing the issue in terms of "democracy against disinformation" appears to be a problem – their understanding as a foreign disease, an imported phenomenon, completely ignores the fact that they are not only perfectly compatible with democratic principles but they also prosper naturally in democratic nations. At the same time, the pillars of democratic societies are their most vulnerable places. This is the paradox of democracy (tolerance) – its strongest attributes, such as political rights or the need for public consensus when deciding on important issues, offer its enemies an open space to turn unfair intentions into reality. As we have indicated above through the essence of critical pluralism, the smooth running of democratic systems requires ideas and differing views to be free to compete. It needs pluralism of opinion (not fictitious pluralism of facts) and the free flow of information, the competition of which will represent an approximation to objective truth. The "traditional" methods of digital autocracy, and thus the control or blocking of information through censorship, would not survive in a democracy. On the contrary, the key to success is the rapid dissemination and virality of as many news as possible, which a person with undeveloped digital literacy simply cannot absorb and evaluate correctly. Although disinformation is becoming a "popular" tool, its consistency does not matter. The aim is to flood the information space, not to control it with logically coherent messages. The basic effort is to create chaos in the common perception of reality, to question science and facts. It is an advertisement for alternative reality, for fiction, which with its settings fully corresponds to the post-factual nature of our time. The result is a population so confused and demoralized that it cannot even recognize what lies ahead of (Chomsky, 2017). Reality is thus lost, it gets out of the field of view of man. An essential effort is the creation of an uninformed consumer, a voter fully capable of irrational political decision-making. Relativism very easily turns into uncritical "truth" consumerism. As we have already mentioned, democracies require a certain level of social consensus, which is ultimately the product of a common perception of reality. This does not mean that people automatically agree with everything, but at least they can agree on what they reject. Today, when the "alternative" worldview often comes on par with reality, achieving social consensus and stability can indeed be problematic. That is why disinformation is a more dangerous challenge for democracies than for other regimes (Gunitsky, 2020).

The Covid-19 pandemic, in addition to the threat to public health and the incoming economic crisis, has also brought infodemic that corresponds to the above-mentioned attributes of disinformation activities and, in some cases, hybrid

threats. Paradoxically, benefits of today's technologies, which were originally intended to help inform citizens of democracies, are paradoxically hurting them. The free flow of information does not defeat autocrats, on the contrary, it is offered them a tool for asserting their own power (Gunitsky, 2015). The coronavirus crisis multiplied these possibilities. After 2016, when the course of the US presidential election became a warning signal against the digital disruption of human thinking and decision-making, 2020 marked the end of a multi-year process that fully exposed the unpreparedness of the information environment for a mixture of naturally and artificially motivated duel between objective truth and truthful relativism. It was this unpreparedness that was fully reflected in the declining health and quality of space, which to some extent stopped distinguishing between reality and fiction. The belief that there is no alternative to the facts was undermined in gigantic proportions by the creation of an alternative reality. The uncertainty arising from the realities of the pandemic-affected time works primarily in relation to negative emotions, which were caused by fear of the unknown and fears for the future. The desire to explain phenomena around oneself has become an order of society, a demand that has met with an offer of low-quality and untrue, yet immediate and all-explanatory information. They can easily be compared to the above-mentioned final answers, albeit on a smaller scale. The effort to offer a solution, a cure for reason and an understanding of the context, was evident in its avoidance of science and facts. At one point, the coronavirus did not exist, at another it originated from a laboratory, it was to be a conspiracy of economic elites and a pharmaceutical lobby, other times it was a tool for establishing a global dictatorship. Narratives, which were produced as on a treadmill, basically do not matter at all – but the pattern that appears before our eyes and is repeated in the case of other topics related to the pandemic (such as vaccination) is significant. The consistency of the information provided was not important, for striking in connection with previously created topics it mattered above all to harness a critical moment. The audience was more or less ready to consume fiction, an explosive mixture of relativism and fear worked as expected. The existential threat called for encouragement of hysteria, both sides of the "conflict" (supporters of objective reality and alternative reality) were either naturally or artificially motivated to gradually reject the principles of error or critical discussion, to gradually begin to operate on the principle of subjective certainty of knowledge. Thanks to the infodemic, we find that even the part of society that prefers a scientific approach and factual information is not completely resistant to the pitfalls arising from the possibility of offering a final answer. Paradoxically, even the search for objective truth in the critical period thus becomes a phenomenon directly contradicting the original principle in the fallacy of man and the expressions of his (theoretical and practical) activity. Fallibilism thus slowly vanishes, and the pursuit of absolute knowledge, which would replace the uncertainty of the original, modern approach, becomes a stable particle. However, instead of finding it, we encounter the reality of several "absolutely


correct" truths or explanations, albeit contradictory ones. In the harmony of gnoseological anarchy, only the established chaos gains strength. The result is, in essence, the radicalization of the whole society, which is smoothly springing up in its further polarization – an ideal state of conflict that only helps anti-democratic actors to further undermine the principles and question the legitimate justification of their main opponent. The weakening or decline of democracy is a global trend that has been sending warning signals in several index measurements for some years.



Graph 1: Democracy Index of Selected World Regions. Author's work. (Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit)

The year 2020 was no exception and the global state of democracy suffered a heavy blow. According to the global *Democracy Index* from The Economist Intelligence Unit, the decline of democracy continues, with almost 70% of the countries experiencing downgrade in their final score. Especially in relation to the measures they have taken in response to the spread of pandemic. The survey, which has been conducted annually, recorded the lowest global score of 5.37 points (out of 10) since its inception in 2006. In the face of a new deadly disease, efforts to prevent catastrophic loss of life have been marked by a temporary loss of rights and freedoms. States lost on their rating mainly due to restrictions on civil liberties, the absence of proper scrutiny of emergency powers, or the denial of freedom of speech — regardless of whether there was public support for the government measures (Global Democracy Has..., 2021). The graph above shows

that the regressive trend of the democracy index has been here for a long time and affects almost every region of the world. The countries or groups we have selected in the chart below are no exception. It turns out that only 8.4% of the world's population lives in a fully democratic setting, while more than a third live under authoritarian regimes.



Graph 2: Democracy Index of Selected Countries and Visegrad Group (V4). Author's work. (Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit)

The corona crisis thus "only" opened the door more for the next stage of the eternal historical conflict of freedom and authority. This time, democracy is a vulnerable defender, with authoritarian tendencies attacking. The departure from the subjective belief in certainty and confirmation of only one's ideas, only one's answers, towards real liberation from the lurking challenge of a total answer is not yet taking place due to the radicalization and polarization of society. Although the corona crisis also showed the positives of democratic systems or related aspects (e.g. globalization), by simultaneously uncovering their weaknesses, it also contributed to the persistence of the noise of dissent and the possibility of irritation of "people who prefer to live in a society tied together by a single narrative. The strong preference for unity, at least among a portion of the population, helps explain why numerous liberal or democratic revolutions, from 1789 onward, ended in dictatorships that enjoyed wide support" (Applebaum, 2020, 109 p.). Voltaire's call for intellectual bravery or modesty can be freely

translated into a position of answer, an imaginary solution to the problem that is called the fault of intellectuals by K. R. Popper, for G. Sartori it is a perfectionist with his feet on the gas and without control of his maximization efforts, and modernly, in the presentation of A. Applebaum, it is a problem of information clergy who choose the side of chaos with almost complete consciousness. As T. Snyder writes, the present brings perception of *“time (that) is no longer a line into the future, but a circle that endlessly returns the same threats from the past. Within inevitability, no one is responsible because we all know that the details will sort themselves out for the better; within eternity, no one is responsible because we all know that the enemy is coming no matter what we do. Eternity politicians spread the conviction that government cannot aid society as a whole, but can only guard against threats. Progress gives way to doom”* (Snyder, 2018, 16 p.).

Conclusion

Crises come with the potential for both productive and destructive development. The pandemic of the Covid-19 coronavirus has been reflected in several areas. Practical expressions of a critical situation can be sought today and in the future in the political, economic or axiological dimension. The infodemic that followed the health crisis made very flexible use of the uncertainty of a man who had previously faced his atomization and the decline of the value of objective truth. In the time of a pandemic, relativism is proving to be a destructive path in which facts, reality and a common awareness of the situation are no longer important. There are two sides facing each other, their struggle taking place on several levels – whether it is freedom and authority, order and chaos, or democracy and authoritarian regimes, the uncertainty of the time has exposed frictions that only further allow for a closed society to appear. It turns out that non-factual information, whether naturally circulating misinformation or artificially motivated disinformation, can prosper in democratic systems like nowhere else. It does not matter what their logical coherence is, the key is to create chaos, which gains strength only by gradually creating an alternative reality of fiction and lies. Once people had their own opinions, today they have their own facts – the true essence of the post-factual period, which completely surrenders to the interests of anti-democratic elements. The semantic game of words has been replaced by a game with the mind of a man who unknowingly becomes a victim of his own hacking. The presence of gnoseological anarchy results mainly from the absence of critical thinking and low levels of digital literacy, when "truth" becomes a common served product in the spirit of truth relativism (consumerism). The paradox then becomes that the two essential requirements for the proper functioning of democratic systems become their own enemies. The free flow of information grows into a vicious tool, and social consensus becomes the target of attackers who make it an unattainable goal. The unpreparedness of the

information (and cognitive) environment is now reflected in its declining health. The conflict between objective truth and subjective certainty has shifted to new connotations. Competition has been lost and testing of claims (theories) has been replaced by an effort to eliminate uncertainty and fear. Unexplained phenomena were easily mystified, immediate and, above all, contradictory solutions were mistaken for the recipe for the emerging existential threat. The questioning of science and facts was marked by the questioning of reality itself and the creation of its illusory alternative. Subsequently, the undermining of the pillars of democracy itself, or the foundations of the rule of law, is also facilitated. The foreign policy orientation of the subjects finds itself in the same situation. The pandemic, together with the infodemic, created a space open to unwanted interventions by anti-democratic actors. Exceptions are neither legitimate nor illegitimate government measures restricting the freedom of citizens, which, as (hopefully, temporary) responses to catastrophic predictions brought about a regression of democracy. Questions of the effectiveness have been raised. And even though they were raised in difficult times and with reason, they still have the potential for being abused. Especially if the possibility for dialogue is not guaranteed, but an immediate solution can be found in the division of society into winners and losers. The end result of relativism would be the defeat of all. It seems that the Covid-19 crisis can easily become the critical moment that we have witnessed several times in history. The moment that can tilt the scales in favour of the side that has been waiting for its opportunity in the background.

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SECURITIZATION OF COVID-19 AND ITS IMPACT ON PUBLIC OPINION IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC

Libor Frank¹

ABSTRACT

The aim of this contribution is to inform briefly how the public view of the coronavirus disease has developed in the Czech Republic, how intense is the perception of the coronavirus in comparison with other threats, how citizens assessed and assess the state's preparedness for the pandemic situation and what impact the involvement of the Czech Armed Forces in anti-pandemic measures has had on the prestige and trust thereof.

Key words: coronavirus; COVID-19; pandemic; opinion polls; armed forces.

1 The COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic as a strategic shock

The world today is facing a global COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic. The first mention of this disease appeared at the end of 2019 and it was associated with the Wu-Chan region in the People's Republic of China. Over the following several months, the virus spread around the world and, with the exception of several isolated countries and regions, affected the whole of humanity. The unprecedented rapid spreading in populated parts of the planet and the dramatic health, economic, social, political and security consequences have made this kind of coronavirus an extremely important global topic and a problem with a major impact on regional and local levels. The sudden onset and fast spread of the coronavirus, as well as its dramatic consequences, have not been sufficiently predicted (Kalous, 2018) and have caused a sort of strategic shock.

In the Czech Republic, COVID-19 became a political and also an important public issue for the first time at the end of January 2020, when the expansion of the coronavirus in some parts of Europe had become a worrying fact. The Minister of Health at the time, Adam Vojtěch, was questioned in the Parliament about the state's readiness for a possible introduction of the coronavirus into the Czech Republic. Despite the minister's optimistic and self-confident response, the following weeks and months would show a different and unpleasant reality. The hectic hunting for medical material around the world and its domestic production, the unprecedented closure of schools and the lockdown of social and economic life catapulted the coronavirus to the position of the most important topic in society.

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
2 Securitization of the COVID-19 coronavirus disease in the Czech Republic

At the same time, the coronavirus ceased to be a purely medical subject, it also became a security issue. The Ministry of the Interior, the Integrated Rescue System, the Czech Armed Forces, and other elements of the security system were heavily involved in the anti-epidemic measures. In addition to health professionals, the issue of coronavirus was discussed in the media by security experts and, very extensively, also by the Minister of the Interior Jan Hamáček, who later became the chairman of the Central Crisis Staff, i.e., the most important figure in the crisis management system. The effects of anti-epidemic measures have personally affected almost every citizen - the originally abstract coronavirus has progressively become perceived as a negative reality that actually threatens the personal physical security and the socio-economic status of each citizen. The coronavirus has been securitized and, from the public point of view, has become the number one security threat.

This shift is also highlighted by data from opinion polls. (Tuček, 2019) In the middle of 2019, when no one had any idea of the COVID-19 coronavirus disease, the Public Opinion Research Centre, under the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, carried out a survey aimed at perceptions of the sources of threat and the extent of preparedness of the Czech Republic for selected threats. In this research, the threat of an epidemic took the 21st position among the 26 studied threats in terms of severity and relevance, while at the same time the public declared that the Czech Republic was best prepared to tackle an epidemic. (Pilnáček, 2019)

The Czech public was profoundly mistaken, as the following months would show. In 2020, the coronavirus became a priority topic and a major threat that attracted the vast majority of society. So far, the coronavirus disease was the biggest concern in the second half of March 2020, when 81% of respondents reported some degree of exposure to COVID-19, according to the IPSOS survey. Currently, two-thirds to three-quarters of respondents still declare their concerns associated with the coronavirus in surveys of various origin. (Kneblíková, 2020)

This is also confirmed by the so-called Panic Index, monitored by the National Pandemic Alarm, which, despite the summer drop in its values, has once again been on a growing trend in recent months. (Panic Index. National Pandemic Alarm, 2021)



The perception of the coronavirus as a major security threat is also underlined by the comparison with other security threats - as of November 2019, almost half of the Czech population (46%) declared that they had no concern at all and 54% declared having concerns, especially with regard to international migration, terrorism and climate change, all of them currently being overshadowed by the coronavirus. In particular, the topics of international terrorism (Kosárová, 2018, p. 180) and international migration (Frank, Fučík, Novotný, 2019), which were consistently dominating the spectrum of concerns over the past decade, have significantly receded.

3 Changes in the perception of the state and its role in controlling the pandemic


In the context of the coronavirus situation, citizens are primarily concerned about the economic consequences of the epidemic (80%), health of their close ones (76%) and reduction of health care outside of COVID-19 (72%). (Spurný, 2020)

The securitization of the coronavirus has logically generated a general requirement that the state, as a key provider of security, provide its citizens with solutions to the pandemic situation, protect the population and minimize the damage. However, this requirement was far from being fulfilled and the assessment of the state and its political leadership, and especially of the government, is quite critical in the Czech Republic.

The number of respondents who consider government measures against the coronavirus ineffective has been increasing - 10% in May 2020, and 37% in December 2020. Currently, more than half of the respondents (52%) consider

measures to support the economy offered by the state to be ineffective. Half of the citizens believe that the distribution of vaccines is not working properly, majority (71%) blame the government for the failing system (July 2021). At the same time, weakening of the economic, social and security guarantees for the citizens can have significant negative consequences for the state, its stability and public confidence in the democratic political system (Břeň, Urban, Zeman, 2019, p. 2571).

The so-called Government Confidence Index has fallen significantly, currently below the 40-point threshold of the 100-point scale, half of the spring 2020 level and the lowest since the index was established. (Government Confidence Index. National Pandemic Alarm, 2021)




4 Perception of the armed forces during the pandemic

While the assessment of the political leadership of the state, especially of the government, is not very flattering, citizens are positively reflecting the activities of the groups and components of the state involved in the anti-epidemic measures. In the first place, quite logically, the public appreciates the work of health professionals and components of the integrated rescue system, while the involvement of the Czech Armed Forces is also viewed positively. (Červenka, 2021)

There has been an increased public support for the armed forces and the strengthening of the social domain as part of the assessment of the armed forces' potential (Procházka, Stojar, 2019). The armed forces have been significantly involved in the construction and operation of the "smart quarantine" system, participated in the import and distribution of medical material, built field

hospitals, participated in border and internal controls and closures, soldiers are helping in health and social facilities, etc.



Although helping cope with the epidemic is not the main task for the armed forces, according to the “Armed Forces and the Public 2020” survey, which is completed annually for the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic, 89% of respondents think that the involvement of the armed forces in dealing with the epidemic situation is meaningful, 86% believe that the military is carrying out an important task in this area, 80% believe that the army has deployed skilled experts. (ppm factum. 2020, p. 63)

The positive perception of these activities has been reflected in the increase in the already high level of trust in the military, which is now approaching a record 80% level. (ppm factum. 2020, p. 15)

Conclusion

The shocking, rapid, surprising and, in its consequences, extremely serious expansion of the COVID-19 coronavirus disease has had a significant impact on the public opinion in the Czech Republic. Over a very short period of time, successful securitization of the coronavirus has taken place; the pandemic has become unambiguously the most important security threat from the public point of view and has completely overshadowed the issues of international migration and terrorism in the meantime. The way the state and its political leadership tried to address the pandemic has caused a great deal of mistrust and doubt among the

Czech society and the credibility of the state as a guarantor of security has decreased. On the contrary, the public has been very positive about the specific components of the Integrated Rescue System and the prestige of the Czech Armed Forces (CAF) has also increased. The public trust in the CAF has now reached its highest level since the establishment of the independent Czech Republic in 1993.

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IMPORTANCE OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING YOUNG NOVICE DRIVERS*

Tatiana Hajdúková¹, Daniela Becková²

ABSTRACT

The study evaluates the development and current state of the road traffic accidents resulting in the death of road users in EU countries. Attention is paid to the countries with the best results of fatal accidents, which are examples of good practice for other countries. The slowdown in improving EU results over recent years is evidence that the most effective remedial measures have already been applied. The results of other measures will no longer be as effective as they have been so far and will require more money, energy and effort to be invested with slower progress than 15 years ago. The analytical part of the study points to the causes of traffic accidents resulting in injury or death of the road users. Multidimensional scaling has been used to identify differences in the causes of traffic accidents according to the age of drivers, the culprits of traffic accidents. The results point to the need for a graduated licensing system for young novice drivers.

Key words: safety, road traffic accident, fatalities, training, licensing, young driver, experience, injury

Introduction

Mobility is a fundamental prerequisite for quality of life. Walking is one of the most natural activities for humans. However, due to speed of walking and distance we are able to cover, as well as natural human laziness, the most common means of transport is road traffic. In the present, road communications have been well established, which is a prerequisite for their intensive use in the future. Besides the obvious benefits gained from road transport, it also has negative accompanying effects, such as traffic accidents. However, the seriousness of the consequences of traffic accidents is perceived by the community sensitively and with full respect. The long-term goal of traffic safety should be that not a single person is killed or seriously injured as a consequence of traffic collisions within the road transport system. Vision Zero has a scientific foundation, with a focus on kinetic energy as the real cause of deaths and serious injuries, as proposed by De Haven [9]. Indeed, various accident commissions of inquiry have reached the

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conclusion that the road user is the cause of over 90% of all road accidents (Evans, 2004).

1 Traffic Accident

There is no intergovernmental, unified, definition of a traffic accident. The most common indicators of traffic accidents are:

- The amount of property damage,
- Number of road users with minor, major and fatal injuries

The most serious consequence of traffic accidents is death of a person. In this thesis, we define road fatality as death of a person which resulted from a traffic accident as a direct consequence, within 30 days from the occurrence of the accident. A comprehensive analysis of the global transport demanded trend over the next forty years, which was presented by the JTRC/ITF in May 2011 in Leipzig (OECD/ITF, 2011). There is a wide range of factors falling under several disciplines which all affect the potential road safety.

2 Methodology

In this article the safety on the road is expressed in terms of road mortality and injury rates. Source data consists of traffic accidents provided by the European Commission and the ISDN system of the Police Headquarters of the Slovak Republic.

We provide an overview of the latest road safety data and the main road safety development trends in the EU from 2007 to 2017. Furthermore, we differentiate and compare the results of the fatal traffic accidents in the EU Member States. Traffic accident comparisons aim to point out differences in the achieved results. We especially focus on development trends in the countries with the best and the worst results. Considering the different size of countries and the number of their inhabitants, we used single population mean to standardise data on traffic accidents, i.e. the number of persons killed in road collisions divided by their population size. Knowledge of the causes of traffic accidents is crucial for introducing measures to reduce them. We have specified the causes of fatal traffic accidents and proposed possible measures for the current conditions in the Slovak Republic.

This study aims to put together recommendations to increase road safety by identifying causes of traffic accidents with regard to age of people who are responsible for the traffic accident.

3 Status and development of fatal road accidents of road users in European Union

Need for safety and security is one of the basic needs in life of every person. As the most tragic consequence of a traffic accident is the death of a road user, it is important to pay attention to this issue. The EU28 reduced the number of road deaths by 20% between 2010 and 2017 but it is way behind in progress needed for the 2020 target of cutting death by half over this decade (**Fig. 1**).




Fig. 1 Road fatalities in the EU since 2001

Source of data: European Commission with target EU 2020

From the results shown in Fig 1, some stagnation and a moderate lag behind the targeted values are observable for years 2015 and later. Differences between regions and estimation of potential room for improvement can be identified based on the distinction between the smaller EU territorial units, which are in these case individual states, as shown in Fig 2.




Fig. 2 Number of people killed in road traffic accidents per million inhabitants by country, in average for years 2007-2017

Source of Data: Eurostat, CARE (EU road accidents database), Annual Accident Report 2018 and national statistics

The average of the EU-28 countries for period 2007 to 2017 is 49 fatalities in road traffic accidents per million inhabitants. The best road fatality rates are reported from Sweden, Malta, United Kingdom and Netherlands, counting in average less than 40 dead people per one million citizens. The traffic safety has been a long-term goal.

By contrast, the worst results, exceeding 100 people killed in road traffic accidents per million inhabitants, were achieved in Greece, Croatia, Poland, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania. 11 years is a long period, such that there are significant changes in road traffic dynamics. Fig. 3 shows the development of the number of road traffic fatalities per million inhabitants, but we filtered out mediocre countries, leaving only those which achieved the worst and the best results.

The European Union average is shown in the graph with grey background. Sweden, United Kingdom and Netherlands showed stable or slightly improving results throughout the recorded period. Their transport safety shows clear signs of well-designed and functioning systematic measures. Low road traffic fatality rate in Sweden (2.8 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2010) and road safety policy in general (Vision Zero in particular), have roots in a long tradition of systematic road safety work, which involves taking key political decisions by the Government and Parliament (Charlton, Oxley, Scully, Koppel, Congiu, Muir, Fildes, 2006).




Fig.3 Development of fatality rates in the selected countries of European Union, 2007-2017

Source of Data: Eurostat, CARE (EU road accidents database), Annual Accident Report 2018 and national statistics

Slightly fluctuating results with a tendency for deterioration are observable in Malta where there is a plausible indication of the presence of unresolved problems. The situation in Malta is a clear evidence that it is not enough to achieve good results, comparable efforts have to be put in in order to maintain such results.

We can observe a significant progress over the past 11 years in the countries which started with the worst fatality rates in 2007. The latest results demonstrate the successful implementation of measures in practice, particularly in Latvia, where the annual number of fatalities has dropped from 190 to 80 per million inhabitants. The mentioned decline in Latvia over the past 11 years reached almost 60%, to the extent that it is close to the EU average for the year 2017. In principle, it is possible to note that the lagging countries are gradually catching up to the EU average. The worst results were recorded in neighboring countries in the southern EU, Romania and Bulgaria, particularly in 2015, 2016 and 2017. The declining trend in the number of people killed in traffic accidents that was recorded in those countries in 2007 had stopped in 2013 and has been stagnating since.

4 The causes of traffic accidents with injuries and deaths caused by the driver of a motor vehicle in Slovakia

An objective assessment of the situation is an important prerequisite for revealing potential areas of improvement. In May 2018, The Commission published a Strategic Action Plan on road safety that includes a new long-term target to halve road death by 2030 as well as for the first time, a target to reduce serious injuries by the same amount. Taking into consideration the development of the past years presented in the Fig 1 and the Fig. 3, the fulfilment of this goal will not be straightforward. In order to employ effective measures, conditions and causes of traffic accidents must be thoroughly considered. Road accidents occur for a variety of reasons. Determining causes of traffic accidents is the responsibility of the police. Below, we analyze the causes of traffic accidents on the data available from the police database of Slovakia. Over the past 11 years, Slovakia has achieved slightly worse results than the EU average (Fig 2), so it is still at the stage of catching up to the more developed countries, like most European Union countries. During the monitored period, 41,578 traffic accidents, where a person was injured or killed, occurred. The distribution of causes of traffic accident in both absolute and relative numbers is shown in Tab 1.

Tab. 1 Detailed causes of traffic accidents with injury or death caused by motor vehicle drivers in Slovakia, 2007-2018

No.	Cause	Number of TA	Relative Frequency	Total
1.	Violating driver duties	12430	30.29%	29.89%
2.	Speeding	8603	20.96%	20.69%
3.	Improper crossing at an intersection	4720	11.50%	11.35%
4.	Violating pedestrian regulations	2422	5.90%	5.82%
5.	Failure to respect min.distance between vehicles	2372	5.78%	5.70%

6.	Improper turns	2288	5.57%	5.50%
7.	Violating duties of a traffic participant	2240	5.45%	5.38%
8.	Inappropriate style of driving	1908	4.65%	4.58%
9.	Risky overtaking	1274	3.10%	3.06%
10.	Improper turning over and reversing	1147	2.79%	2.75%
11.	Improper road entering	621	1.51%	1.49%
12.	Improper driving in lane	371	0.90%	0.89%
13.	Violating cyclist regulations	288	0.70%	0.69%
14.	Wrong waiting and parking	195	0.47%	0.46%
15.	Improper circumvention/ride about	147	0.35%	0.35%
	Total	41026	100%	98.67%

Source of data: ISDN

The most common cause of traffic accidents is violation of driver duties, most often in form of distracted driving. Combined with the second most frequent cause, driving over speed limit, we get more than half of the observed traffic accidents. The second parameter which we consider is the driver's age. We base this on the assumption that the age of the driver could be a disrupting element for the real causes. In Tab. 2 and Fig. 4, we can see results of applying Multidimensional Scaling used to identify age anomalies with regard to causes of traffic accidents.

Tab. 2 Model Summary of Optimal scaling of causes of traffic accidents with injuries and deaths by driver's age, Slovak Republic 2007-2018

Model Summary

Dimension	Cronbach's Alpha	Variance Accounted For		
		Total (Eigenvalue)	Inertia	% of Variance
1	1,000	14,000	1,000	100,000
2	,998	13,564	,969	96,889
Total		27,564	1,969	
Mean	,999 ^a	13,782	,984	98,445

a. Mean Cronbach's Alpha is based on the mean Eigenvalue.




Fig. 4 *Dimension of Multidimensional Scaling causes of traffic accidents with injuries and deaths by driver's age*

This model explains more than 95% of the variability of causes of traffic accidents by age of drivers. Driving over the speed limit has proven to be a significant correlating factor in the causes of traffic accidents with injuries and deaths due to the age of the driver. Refer to Fig. 5 for a more detailed overview of how driving over the speed limit is connected to driver's age.




Fig 5 Average number of traffic accidents per 100,000 inhabitants/year grouped by cause and age of driver, perpetrator of traffic accident, Slovakia 2007-2018
Source of data: ISDN

The horizontal axis shows the age categories of the drivers. On the vertical axis, there is the average number of traffic accidents with injuries and deaths per year; it is calculated per 100,000 inhabitants of each particular age group. Driving over the speed limit (black curve) is a significant problem for young drivers aged 18 years and above, which is decreasing rapidly with the growing age of drivers. Therefore, we can state that this is the main reason for the predominant prevalence of young drivers in this statistic.

5 Discussion

Training, information, regulation and monitoring directed at the individual road user and a strong lack of trust in the road user's ability and willingness to behave correctly have been key features of traditional traffic safety policy (Evans, 2004).

In Slovakia, a new law came into effect in 2015, increasing fine for driving over the speed limit. However, in practice, the targeted measure did not produce a measurable fall in accident rates caused by speeding.

One possible explanation is the low effectiveness of law enforcement. There is no profile measurement of speed by camera systems in Slovakia. Detection of such cases by continuous monitoring using digital technologies has been proven for many years in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Austria and the Czech Republic. Establishing a profile rate measurement of speed in the United Kingdom in particular meant reducing the number of road traffic fatalities by about 100 people per year. Support for records from these devices must be such as to be acceptable as evidence in court. Also, according to the study (Elvik, 1999), the profile of speed measurement has a greater effect on reducing the number of people killed in traffic accidents than police patrols.

Especially in case of young drivers, we can study a growing trend in Slovakia of young drivers not respecting speed limits. Below, we provide concrete cases of not adjusting driving style to the type and condition of road communication. The cases are sorted in descending order, according to their frequency:

1. Not adapting speed to driver's skills,
2. Not adapting speed to road conditions and road nature,
3. Not adapting speed to weather conditions,
4. Not adapting speed to type of vehicle and cargo properties,
5. Not adapting speed to the visibility and view of the road.

Young drivers aged 20, who have been holding driver's license for very short time, knowingly drive over speed limit and violate the driver's duties. According to OECD material, traffic accidents of young drivers are very frequent due to lack of perceived risk.

The results of increased traffic accident rates of young drivers point to the need for more intensive training, which should be reinforced by increased driving

control. The probationary period should apply to every driver with driving license of B category, who in a period of several years since obtaining their driver's license repeatedly violates the road traffic rules in a serious way or fails to adapt the speed to traffic conditions. The first year after obtaining the driving license is not as critical as the second year, based on traffic accident records. From this view, the trial period should last at least 2 years. Mandatory participation in driving training, psychological training with traffic psychologist, and road traffic police check all could be more effective penalties than a one-off payment of the fine. Recurrence of drivers' risky behaviour should be prevented by precautionary measures. Training in driving schools or driving simulators cannot replace the time needed to change the thinking of a young driver, only miles of experience behind the wheel in real road traffic can do that. Driver is forced to predict behaviour and reactions of other road users and will need to overcome unusual situations.

In case of drivers with three or more offences, third and following road traffic serious or speeding occurrences, penalties should rapidly increase, or their driving license should be confiscated. Essentially, sanctions should be targeted at the riskiest drivers with greatest priority.

Conclusion

The European Union's progress in enhancing road traffic safety has been impressive. The EU cut the number of fatal road crashes by 43% between the years 2000 and 2010 and reduced them further by 20% from 2011 to 2017. However, progress has stalled recently, and has been unequally distributed between different countries and groups of road users. For further improvement of the results, it is beneficial to take examples of good practice from countries that have the long-term lowest number of people killed in traffic accidents. Frequency of road fatalities among young drivers in Slovakia has not decreased at the same pace as for the overall average. Therefore, these vulnerable groups of road users deserve special attention from policymakers. The study shows that young drivers are significantly different from older drivers by causing the road accidents due to inexperience and frequent speeding. Lack of experience combined with inadequate self-confidence and tendency to drive riskier, which leads to an increased number of injured and killed victims of traffic accidents. For elimination of this kind of behaviour, there had already been introduced a probationary period in several EU countries.

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THE SHADOW OF THE 1938 MUNICH PACT: IT'S ECHOING IMPACT ON THE POLITICAL LEGACIES, PERCEPTIONS, AND POLICIES OF EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE AND AMERICA

Pavel Hlaváček¹, James W. Peterson²

ABSTRACT

The shadow of the Munich Agreement hovered in the atmosphere and influenced American and East-Central European decisions in later decades up until the present. As an important legacy, it influenced both the perceptions of leaders and many of the foreign policies upon which they embarked. Did the echo of that agreement from the late 1930s buttress or undercut the rational decision-making that is the heart of systems theory? American support for the national sovereignty of Ukraine after 2014 was one manifestation of the echo of Munich, as was the entry into the Vietnam War ostensibly on behalf of democratic rights in the 1960s. Reluctance of East European states to involve themselves in the Russian-American tensions of the post-2014 period was another indication of the power of the Munich lessons. More recent indications of the Munich shadow include both the unilateralism of the Trump Administration and the ultra-nationalist movements in East-European states. Overall, the lingering effect of the Munich Analogy has undercut the rational decision-making process in the affected states.

Key words: Munich Agreement, System Theory, Western Betrayal, Legacy, Perception, American Foreign Policy

1 Systems Theory: Legacies as Environment, Perceptions as Inputs, Policies as Output

Systems Theory is an important concept that can help explain how critical events impact future state administrative and political thinking as well as policy outcomes. The Munich Pact of 1938 was such a critical event that had enormous effect on the policy-making process of East-Central Europe, Russia and America in the ensuing decades and generations. Particularly, a formal, “open systems perspective” presents a model that can guide elites that struggle in a wartime and post-war setting to plan for improved political outcomes. Such elites can benefit from an organized package of steps to utilize in their state planning process. First, it is vital to pay attention to the social, economic, and cultural environments in which future political designs will be embedded. These can have significant impacts on bureaucratic and “agency growth, decline, and stability.” Second, what

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does the internal conversion process within eventual governmental units look like? It will be their “elements and activities” that will convert inputs from a variety of political actors into outputs that constitute policies themselves. Third, analysis of the eventual outputs is important too, for that provides a method for exploring the impact on persons and groups of eventual bureaucratic “goods, services, and activities.” Fourth, systems are cyclical, and democratic frameworks, in particular, require that feedback of outputs into the environment for future policy prospects take place (Stillman, 2004, p. 27). That accomplishes and preserves the possibilities for responsiveness and accountability.

First, in this case study, legacies such as the Munich Pact became a central part of the overall environment of future policymaking of the three political entities under consideration here (Kovrig, 1995, p. 25). Second, resulting leader and citizen perceptions were as well a critical part of the concrete political inputs and conversion process leading to later decisions. Third, new policies that flowed from the learning process that accompanied the aftermath of the Munich Accord became formal outputs within the open systems model. Eventually, they generated actual policy outcomes of note and thus entered the formal feedback process while generating future cycles of decision-making.

Further, a Rational Actor Paradigm would reinforce the basic tenets of the systems approach in this case study in important ways. This Paradigm assumes the existence of a unified national actor with leadership that can be capable of making a “calculated solution to a strategic decision.” Such an actor would establish and rank order goals and objectives, and that step would be followed by drawing a “decision tree” that would list all feasible alternative policies that would achieve each objective. Next, it is critical to list the potential consequences or costs and benefits of each alternative measure that could accomplish each of the objectives. Choice of the alternative “whose consequences rank highest in the decision-makers payoff function” would be the final step (Allison, Zelikow, 1999, pp. 16-24). Further, the project that is adopted should be the one with the most net benefit to society, and the best option would be the one that offers “maximum benefits” (Peters, 2016, pp. 450-61). With regard to systems theory, it is often cited that the internal conversion process that converts inputs into outputs is the most impenetrable of the steps to verify, but the Rational Actor Paradigm provides clarity on how that process might ideally unfold.

In an effort to establish political equilibrium within the framework of cost-benefit analysis, the emphasis on maximization of public goods requires that the public role be a component part of the process as well. Elections should inform voters of the likely costs of new projects that may affect their lives and those of their families. What benefits would accrue to them to counterbalance any of the visible costs? Following an election, every effort should be made to determine if the votes actually endorsed the proposal, but this process can be opaque and difficult to ascertain (Hyman, 2014, pp. 161-5). However, a public role remains vital to preserve the intactness of the feedback loop that is so significant for the

Systems Approach and democratic values. That loop is also significant in comprehending the ways in which the later policies of the three political units under study here reflected the legacies and perceptions that emerged in the aftermath of Munich 1938.

2 Legacy of the 1938 Munich Pact: Western Betrayal Strengthens Reliance on the Soviet Union and Justifies entry into the Soviet Sphere of Influence – The Case of Czechoslovakia

The notion of the “western betrayal” in the case of the former Czechoslovakia is mostly associated with the Munich Conference in late September 1938. The agreement, signed by four major European powers, belongs to those key milestones in the development of Czechoslovakia in the periods “before” and “after” Munich.

In the textbooks and memories of many Czechs, “Czechoslovakia before Munich” – the so-called First Republic (1918-1939) – is presented as a country with a constitutional order and political regime fully endorsing the values of Western democracy. In comparison with neighboring countries, citizens of Czechoslovakia enjoyed a relatively high level of civil and political rights. According to the myth of western betrayal, the fate of Czechoslovakia was decided by foreign powers without previous consultations and in spite of the fact that Czechoslovakia was fully determined to defend its country. For this purpose, the Prague government declared general mobilization in mid-September of 1938, and the Czechoslovak people loyally accepted that appeal. Within 24 hours, more than one million men had joined the Army. At that point, allegedly, citizens were reassured by their authorities about unconditional assistance from western allies in case of an armed attack (Foltynova, 2018; Moravcová, Bělina, Pečenka, 1994, pp. 90-95). When they discovered that their government had accepted the occupation of the Sudetenland, many felt a sense of shock and disbelief – feelings that František Halas (1939) famously expressed in his poem “The Bell of Treason”.

The narrative of the “western betrayal,” or, as it is commonly called, the “Munich betrayal”, appeared right after the conference. According to some scholars (Tesař, 2000), this false interpretation was intentionally created by Czechoslovak President Edvard Beneš. He understood that major confrontation with Germany was inevitable and that France was not ready to enter another world war. Czechoslovak military commanders were also fully aware that, under such positions (especially after the annexation of Austria into Germany), Czechoslovakia was defenseless. Thus, Beneš did everything to present Czechoslovakia as a victim of German aggression and France as a traitor. Such diplomacy worked very well for him. After the Second World War broke out, Beneš was recognized as the head of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile and, within a few years, France and Britain revoked the Munich Agreement and agreed

with the restoration of the Czechoslovak border to “pre-Munich” lines, once the conflict was over. In contrast, Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states did not succeed in having their borders restored to pre-world war lines.

The major danger of such perceptions does not lie in the fact that it was a myth but rather in its unintended consequences. Once Czech people accepted that their country was abandoned, they began to call for radical “reforms” that would ensure there would be “no more Munichs” in the future. And, by doing so, they paved the way for radical modification of the constitutional order and foreign policy orientation of Czechoslovakia that would hardly be feasible in the “pre-Munich” conditions (Urban, 2018).

“The Betrayal” allegedly committed at the Munich Conference has strongly imprinted into the collective memory of Czechs (and partly Slovaks). It has been widely accepted by people and shared by Czechoslovak political authorities. Even after the fall of communism (1989), when free debate on Czech history might have started, the most common question that had been raised was, whether Czechoslovakia should have defended itself (or not) in 1938. While some Czechs may argue that the consequence of conflict with Germany would have been disastrous, others might tell you that the legacy of “giving up without fight” was worse, because it broke the backbone of the nation that remained crippled for good.

These claims remain so popular partly because it cannot be decided which of them is correct. However, both are taking us away from the profound questions that need to address what happened with democracy in Czechoslovakia that it collapsed so quickly and completely? Where has the democratic spirit, that allegedly guided Czechoslovakia from its foundation, gone? (Zídek, 2008) Such questions are more difficult to answer because one might “unmask” deeply rooted “clichés” about Czech history, the role its political, intellectual and cultural leaders played in the past. It is much easier to assume the narrative of “almost perfect” democracy that capitulated to Hitler’s demands only after blatant pressure from its own allies.

However, democracy in Czechoslovakia did not die with the Nazi invasion (March 1939). It collapsed in 1938 right after the Munich Conference. And so, it is difficult not to see a direct link between “modifications” to the Czechoslovak political regime after 1938 and its development after the end of the Second World War that culminated in the communist coup in February 1948. Within a few years after the end of the war (1945-48), the communists were gradually able to take power, and this did not even result from usage of Soviet tanks or other military facilities. The Prague government started to follow authoritarian directions by its own choice rather than by the use of force from abroad. Key steps in that process included limiting of political pluralism, silencing “inconvenient” persons, restricting political parties, and curtailing the rights of ethnic and religious groups. Czechoslovakia fell into the power-orbit of the Soviet Union after 1945 as quickly as it had become a “client state” of Germany in 1938. On both occasions, there

was little resistance against the rise of newly emerging authoritarian regimes. As Czech historian Petr Zídek (2008) pointed out: “Most totalitarian regulations, introduced during the period of the “Second Republic” (1938-39), remained in place during the period of the Protectorate (1939-45), the Third Republic (1945-48), and communists adopted them as well. The only thing that changed were the values for which everything would be served.”

One certainly cannot blame Edvard Beneš for the fact that Adolf Hitler was willing to start another war and that Western allies were not prepared for such a confrontation. For many Czechs (and Slovaks) Edvard Beneš symbolized a free and democratic Czechoslovakia. However, his political activities after the Munich Agreement speak of a very ambiguous record. Beneš – and other members of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile (1939-45), including Jan Masaryk, the son of the first Czechoslovak president Thomas G. Masaryk – shared a very idealized image of a unity among Slavic nations (1946). And that feeling very likely played a role in his diplomacy during and after the war. Alleged “Betrayal” at the Munich Conference convinced him that Czechoslovakia would have to consider that post-war Czechoslovak security would depend on the Soviet Union rather than on France or any western country, as it had prior to Munich. Among the most controversial acts that further contributed to the gradual collapse of formal democratic principles were the Czechoslovak-Soviet Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation (1943) and the Košice Program (1945). While the first one turned Czechoslovakia into the Soviet sphere of influence, the second one – formally the program for the new coalition government on the liberated territory of Czechoslovakia – adopted practices of the “soviet” model of government, both including a regime of a limited party system where only non-right wing parties were legal and also including restrictions on private property, nationalization of major companies, and the principle of collective guilt that led to the deportation/expulsion of the ethnic Germans and Hungarians from Czechoslovakia after 1945.

Inevitable, although perhaps undesirable, effects of the Munich Agreement were the sharp increase of “dark forces” on the edge of the political specter: the extreme right after 1938 and the extreme left after 1945. For example, the Czechoslovak Communist Party received 10% of the vote in the last parliamentary elections before Munich but increased it to 38% in the first relatively free elections after the war, and the result was that their party chairman Klement Gottwald became the new Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia in 1946. For the fascists and communists, as well as the restrictions they imposed on political and social life, the idea of the “western betrayal” fit perfectly. If one blames others, while accepting the role of a victim, one’s own “sins” disappear. That conclusion also appealed to Czechs whose national identity was built on the false notion that Czechs belong to the peacefully minded Slavic nation that had suffered for hundreds of years under the tyranny of the Habsburg Empire. And, in this sense, the feeling of hopelessness, the belief that Czechs are too small to be able to take

control of their own “destiny,” remained with them into the 21st century on the role of their state in current world affairs.

3 Current Munich-Based Perceptions in America and East-Central Europe

3.1 American support for expressions of democracy: Arab Spring 2011, Russian elections of 2012, and Ukraine/Crimea conflict of 2014

It is possible to argue that, even after more than seventy years, the Munich Accord had a lingering effect on American perceptions of critical global events between 2011 and 2014. One can observe the echo of Munich in their efforts to defend democratic ideals where they were or had been under attack. The Arab Spring of 2011 consisted of a series of citizen outbursts in Middle Eastern states that had mostly been under authoritarian leadership. Tunisia and Egypt were two of the first to experience those demonstrations, and their success in toppling the existing leaders led to parallel movements stretching west into the region. The American public supported those movements as expressions of democratic ideals in tune with their own heritage. However, the Obama Administration was reluctant to take action in support of those popular outbreaks, even after Egypt returned to authoritarian rule, first under a Muslim leader and then under the military. During the crisis in Libya, Obama was willing to support the effort to overthrow Gaddafi, but he insisted that NATO direct the effort rather than the United States. Russian leadership was mistrustful of the democratic rebellions and more concerned about preservation of stability in the region, even under strong-armed rule (Jonsson 2019, 75-6).

Similarly, America gave strong vocal support to the demonstrations in Russia in late 2011 and early 2012. President Putin had pushed for change in the Russian Constitution that enabled him to run for a new six-year term instead of the previously constitutional four-year rule, and he was able run again for another such six-year period at the end of that term in 2018. The Russian protestors had many more points of contention with the Putin regime, and the result was a harsh crackdown by police on their demonstrations. American protests on a democratic basis were much stronger two years later when Russia basically annexed the Crimean Peninsula and made it into a Russian Republic. The region had been a territory of Ukraine since the mid-1950s when Ukraine was a Republic in the Soviet Union. However, creation of an independent Ukrainian state in 1991 left the valued Black Sea region of Crimea as a special republic within that new nation, and its presence within that unit angered Russians for the next two decades. Russia had also managed to maintain a valued military base there in Sevastopol, Crimea throughout the post-Cold War period, and they regained more full control of it with the annexation. American reactions were strong and based on the democratic rights of states to control their own territory (Jonsson, 2019, p. 90), and this expression of values was also in tune with regret over what had

happened to Czechoslovakia after the Hitler, post-Munich take-over in 1938. From the American perspective, loss of national and territorial rights to a dictator was never acceptable, and failure to stand up against it, whether in Arab Spring states or in regard to dual Russian violations, constituted “appeasement” of the first order.

3.2 East-Central European states and renewed apprehensions about Russian-American perceptual conflicts

The East-Central European states were apprehensive about the renewal of American-Russian accusations and resulting tensions after their mutual understandings that followed the 9/11 attacks on two urban centers in the United States. The twin 2008 events of Kosovo’s declaration of independence and of the brief Russian war with Georgia replaced the uneasy peace between Russia and America with more than a decade of continuing conflict between the former Cold War adversaries.

Anxiety about sharply contrasting perceptions between Russian and American leaders resulted from those events and differently affected the East-Central European states. Poland was the most vulnerable after the 2014 Crimea annexation and pushed for more protection from NATO and the United States. As a result, the western military alliance moved troops from the Mediterranean region to the Baltics and Poland. Plans also emerged for possible location of a Russian military base in Poland. In contrast, Hungary under the nationalistic leadership of Orban actually moved toward at least a flirtation with President Putin. In spite of occasional leadership trips to Moscow, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic generally pulled back from the emerging conflict between Moscow and Washington. This apparent neutrality and disinterest in challenging Russia’s absorption of Crimea was unnerving and somewhat off-putting to the Obama Administration, but it probably served the interests of those two East-European players to avoid being sucked into great power tensions once again. Czech reluctance to be a full player in the Bush Administration’s Missile Shield Program may have been a precursor to that distancing and independence.

In a sense, these East-Central European reactions in part echoed the lessons of Munich in their general avoidance this time of being drawn into the struggles by larger powers near their own neighborhood. Czech and Slovak distance from Russia enabled them to avoid being pulled into the raw and much greater conflict that had devoured them, between the West and Germany in the 1930s and 40s. There may also have been a lesson from Munich that influenced Polish thinking and acting after Crimea, for their outreach for military assistance and protection suggested they had learned very well the lesson of no more appeasement. Russian statements that they had no intention of violating the territorial sovereignty of the Baltic states and Poland paralleled to them in a somewhat different way the statements of Hitler in 1938 that he only aimed at protection of German citizens

in the single state of Czechoslovakia. Perceptions of Munich thus impacted a different set of players in the post-Cold War era.

4 Disentangling American, and East-Central European Policy Relationships in the 2000s, in light of Munich 1938

4.1 Unilateralist policies of the Trump Administration in America: A modern expression of the “no more appeasement” lessons of Munich.

For four years, President Trump argued for an “America First” centerpiece to his foreign policy and national security agenda. How did this square with several decades of post-Cold War perceptual differences and misunderstandings between Russia and America? On the one hand, his studied indifference to Russian intrusions into the territories of former Soviet Republics as well as violations of the air space and political processes of other states constituted a surprise to allies within NATO. He also shocked other alliance partners by pulling out of the carefully devised Paris Agreement on global climate change, the WHO, and Iran (Bindi, 2019, p. 8; Hanhimäki, 2019, p. 257). On the other hand, his rush to berate allies and his unwillingness to work closely with them anymore was a distorted section of the shadow cast by the Munich Agreement across East-West relationships. There would be “no more appeasement” of any allies whose plans and alliances might have curtailed the absolute independence of the United States on the world stage. However, that message of Trump’s violated the spirit of western post-Munich decisions to stand up to future dictators who violated national and human rights. In fact, its inherent isolationism was a direct contradiction of the post-Munich intentions to work closely with allies in the face of an aggressive and hostile power. His inability to understand why collective pressure on Russia might have served regional and global stability was also a violation of the lessons learned at the time of Munich.

4.2 East-Central European States’ preoccupation with domestic nationalistic movements: Pressures for reduced policy emphasis on regional involvement in congruence with lessons from Munich in 1938

Each of the four East-Central European states experienced the growth of domestic nationalistic or even ultra-nationalistic policy movements and political parties in the first two decades of the 21st century (Papaconstantinou, 2020, p. 111). The reasons for the emergence of these significant political forces were numerous, and they mostly represented reactions against uncontrollable globalization pressures. For example, each had become preoccupied with terrorism after the 9/11 attacks and had taken steps to tighten up border security. They had also made efforts to develop carefully designed policies that would not provoke attacks on their own territory and people. Another irritating globalization

pressure was the flow of Middle Eastern refugees into the southern part of Eastern Europe. Hungary actually built a wall to keep them out, and all four states in the region resented the EU quotas for absorbing a given number of the refugees. In addition, the presence of Chinese exports into the region raised many questions about the future stability of the Czech, Polish, Slovak, and Hungarian economies. All of these pressures constituted a new set of threats from the outside world that seemed beyond the control of local political elites.

Such globalization forces had a tremendous impact on public opinion and on certain right-wing groups within each state. Ultra-nationalist was one common descriptive word for them, and they morphed into political parties that competed in elections as well. In general, they called for more independence from regional organizations and a greater emphasis on tighter borders. Excessive pride in their own ethnic heritage also generated suspicion and outright hostility to minority groups within their states and those that sought entry from outside them. In all four countries, the ultra-nationalist groups became a force to be reckoned with and actually part of the governing elite in Hungary and Poland.

There was a double connection between ultra-nationalism and the Munich Agreement. The racial undertones of some of these groups bore certain, although less pronounced, similarity to Germans supportive of Hitler and their suspicion and hatred of so many non-German groups. At the same time, the isolationist perspectives of these groups paralleled in a certain way the decisions of the four states in the post-Munich period to withdraw from regional pressures that could lead to an undermining of their territorial integrity.

5 Breakdown of Systems Theory in Light of Legacy, Perceptions, and Policy Conflicts

The Rational Actor Paradigm is at the heart of Systems Theory and presumes that political leaders have the freedom and ability to design strategies with consideration of the costs and benefits of each alternative. There should be careful attention to past legacies that are part of the environment, to current perceptions that are integral to the inputs in the conversion process, and to reasoned new policies that evolve from both those sets of pressures. Examination of the shadow of the Munich Pact of 1938 and its echo effect on later situations that appeared comparable to it, reveal that the lessons of Munich may have been a barrier to rational decision-making processes. First, within future environments surrounding later political systems, its apparent legacy may have led leaders such as those in the Johnson Administration to mistakenly compare the threat posed by North Vietnam and Ho Chi Minh to that presented by Nazi Germany and Hitler. Second, leader perceptions anchored in the Munich Analogy may have convinced governments to pull back into their own territorial orbit during any new emergence of post-Cold War Russian - American tensions, such as those that centered on information and cyber warfare. Third, policies designed to ward off

the ill effects of the Munich Agreement may have led to isolationism such as the unilateralism of the Trump Administration, the excessive border protectionism of Russia, and the ultra-nationalist groups within the East-European systems. As a result, the shadow of Munich was a dark one whose lingering but powerful echo effect at times undermined the rational decisions of a number of important political systems and destroyed their responsive and democratic feedback loops.

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CURRENT TRENDS AND FACTORS INFLUENCING THE SECURITY AND DEFENSE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Radoslav Ivančík¹

ABSTRACT

The European Union has risen from the ashes left by the two devastating world wars, which ravaged European territory and took the lives of 80 million people. Its creation was inspired by a vision of lasting peace on the European continent. However, now, after more than seven decades of peace, when the global and regional security environment deteriorates and mainly non-military security threats grow, the European Union needs to deal with its security and defence much more intensively and take action to raise them so that its citizens can feel safe. For this reason, the author, using relevant security research methods, deals in this paper with current trends and factors which significantly affect the European security and defence.

Key words: *European Union, security, defence, current trends, and factors.*

Introduction

The growing instability and the continuous deterioration of the global and regional security environment, together with the emerging security threats arising from economic, environmental, and technological factors, pose significant challenges for ensuring European security. Citizens of the Member States of the European Union (EU) are increasingly concerned about their security and expect the Union to take care of their protection and defence. If the EU is to meet their expectations, security and defence must play a much more important role in the future of the joint European project than they have done so far. This fact was also recognized in the Rome Declaration (EC, 2017), which set out a vision of a secure Europe in which all citizens feel safety, in which they can move freely, in which external borders are secured, in which international standards are respected; a Europe that is committed to the fight against terrorism and organized crime, and a Europe that is committed to strengthening its common security and defence.

The first ambitious steps towards a European Security and Defence Union have already been taken in the form of a) the EU Global Security and Defence Strategy, b) the European Defence Action Plan and c) a mutual cooperation with NATO. These three basic pillars are currently being translated into very concrete measures: the structures of the common security and defence policy are being reformed, civilian and military capabilities and tools are being developed, European defence cooperation is deepened and alliances with partner countries

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and organizations are strengthened, mainly with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN). Nevertheless, more needs to be done to make the Union more responsible for European security.

1 Current starting points

The EU is living an unprecedented period of peace that has lasted for more than seven decades, what is the longest period of peace in Europe's turbulent history. Although the world in which we live has changed significantly, the commitment to peace and security remains. Today, people can take advantage of various unprecedented opportunities in their daily lives, both private and professional, but on the other hand, they also face new security threats and challenges. In a world in which global and regional powers are once again in great armour, in which terrorists are attacking city centres, whether in Europe or elsewhere in the world, and in which cyber-attacks on public and private computer networks are growing, peace and security can no longer be taken for granted.

In the face of this reality, the European Union and its Member States have a duty and a responsibility to protect their citizens and to promote European interests and values. Unfortunately, security concerns have become one of the things that bother Europeans the most. They expect the Union to take care of their protection and defence. They demand and deserve to be able to feel safe in Europe, and national and Union leaders must take care of that.

In this context, however, it must be added that we all have a shared responsibility to protect and defend our society and freedoms. If we are to deliver the promise of peace for future generations, as it has been for us, security and defence must play a greater role in the European project than we have done so far. The EU is best placed to provide its citizens with unique added value for the future of European security and defence.

Many of the security threats we face today transcend national borders (such as organized crime (Jurčák, 2013), illegal migration (Domalewska, 2016), cybercrime (Brezula, 2018). And although Member States are still at the forefront, responsible for the deployment of their security forces and armed forces where necessary, new, asymmetric security threats can best be prevented and addressed in cooperation with each other.

The EU can initiate, facilitate, and strengthen such cooperation. Such cooperation can help make joint action even more effective. The Union can provide a framework and incentives for individual Member States to develop and maintain better and greater defence capabilities. This can be achieved through more systematic cooperation and the joint development of the technologies and capabilities needed to keep the Union secure.

One of the main advantages of the EU's approach to security is the combination of so-called soft and hard power. In addition to diplomacy, sanctions, development cooperation and trade, which focus on conflict prevention, security

and defence instruments are also used in this approach. The EU promotes peace, inclusive growth, human rights, the rule of law and environmental protection, both within and beyond its own territory. While the so-called soft power may not be enough on its own in an unstable world, this integrated approach is the basis of sustainable security. The Union also provides a unique platform for coordinating security and defence policies with key partners, mostly with the UN and NATO.


2 Current trends and factors influencing the security and defense of the EU

Several strategic, political, economic, and technological trends suggest that the time has come for Europe to make a fundamental change in its policy in the area of security and defence.

2.1 Strategic factors

After three-quarters of a century of peace in Europe, the situation within and beyond the EU's borders is changing. Countries to the east of the Union face military, economic and political threats, and challenges, as well as threats and challenges in the field of energy security. Beyond the Mediterranean Sea and parts of sub-Saharan Africa, a growing number of non-governmental and conflict areas have created a vacuum in which terrorists and criminals thrive. Regional rivalry is escalating, and we are witnessing a dramatic increase in the number of civilian casualties and refugees around the world – more than 60 million people have been displaced. As a result of deepening globalization, the world is more interconnected, the boundaries between internal and external security are blurring. At the same time, climate change and lack of resources, combined with demographic growth and state instability, also contribute to conflicts and instability in the world.

At the same time, the nature of transatlantic relations is changing. The responsibility for improving European security and defence is first and foremost in the hands of Europe. The necessary resources should be available. Europe, together with the United States and other countries, has a responsibility to bring peace and security around the world. While taking action with partners will remain the rule and will continue to favour the EU, it should be able to act alone if necessary.




Graph 1
Defence spending in the EU, US, China, and Russia from 2010 to 2019 (% of GDP)
Source: SIPRI, 2020

In recent years, national governments have begun to address more urgent security threats and issues. Accordingly, they increased their defence budgets. However, the EU still has a long way to go. In order to ensure Europe's strategic autonomy, Member States need to spend more and better and more effectively on their own and at the same time collective defence (Graph 1). The United States invests much more in defence than all the Member States of the Union combined. China has steadily allocated huge resources for defence over the last decade, and Russia has also regularly allocated billions of rubles and more than 2% of its GDP for its defence.

2.2 Political factors

EU leaders, as outlined above, have committed themselves to strengthening European security and defence. That is exactly what the citizens of the Union demand and expect from them. Opinion polls clearly show that people are most concerned about their safety, although the reasons for concern vary from one Member State to another. Overall, within the EU, illegal migration comes first, followed by terrorism, the bad economic situation, the poor state of public finances, unemployment, crime, etc. (Graph 2)



Graph 2
Overview of European Union citizens' concerns (in %)
Source: Eurobarometer, 2020

Joint action by EU member states is a prerequisite for ensuring a higher level of security. A large majority of citizens in all Member States would welcome "more Europe" in the field of security. In an area of free movement of goods, services, capital and persons, security cannot be tackled in isolation and cannot be fully guaranteed by the Member States alone. Europeans have made it clear: security and defence should be an integral part of the Union's action.

2.3 Economic and technological factors

Defence markets are currently very fragmented in the EU, resulting in a lack of interoperability and an alternative cost of at least € 30 billion. Existing defence capabilities are very small compared to the resources spent on them, with Member States contributing differently to European defence. In an interconnected, conflicted, and complex world, the Member States of the Union are simply too small to defend themselves. The great powers, which are spread across continents, are far better equipped than small and medium-sized states. At the same time, savings are much more important than ever before in increasing efficiency and effectiveness.

In the current situation, where national public budgets are under great pressure due to measures to mitigate the consequences of a coronavirus pandemic, this is doubly true. The political economy of many Member States will continue

to be characterized by tensions between fiscal constraints and competing public policy priorities. At the same time, competition between global industry players is growing, which will require even more efficient use of resources. If Europe wants to be globally competitive, it will need to combine and integrate its best industrial and technological capabilities.

As a result of technological changes, the nature and form of security and defence is changing dramatically. Big data, cloud technology, as well as drones and artificial intelligence are revolutionizing the defence industry. At the same time, they increase the technological advantage of the civil sector in the field of security. However, the relative availability of technology also allows a rapid increase in unconventional, transnational, and asymmetric threats in the form of hybrid, terrorist, cyber, or chemical, biological, and radiological attacks. Already today, due to the sharp increase in the number of Internet users, cybercrime, and the use of the web by terrorists have become a new battleground in the war of the 21st century.

In the period ahead, effective European security and defence will depend on the effective coordination of major R&D investments by the EU and its Member States. This will help the Union to keep up with new trends and acquire the technological and defence capabilities that Europe needs to ensure its security, defence, and strategic autonomy.

Conclusion

European security and defence urgently need to be strengthened. The Member States of the Union will play a key role in this, setting the level of ambition at European level with the support of the EU institutions and fulfilling it. It is clear from the initiatives currently under way that the Member States and the EU institutions have already embarked on this journey. But how fast do Member States want to build a real European Security and Defence Union? To what extent are they willing to anticipate strategic contexts and not just react to them? To what extent do they think Europe is responsible for European security and defence? These are all issues that the EU faces and that it must address in order to ensure a higher level of security, defence and protection for its citizens.

At the same time, in response to growing instability and the deterioration of the global and regional security environment, the European Union must promote peace and security not only on its territory but also outside its territory. This means that the Union, in cooperation with its partners, must have sufficient military capabilities and capacities to be able to fulfil its obligations of mutual assistance and solidarity enshrined in the Treaties. Internal and external security are increasingly interconnected: ensuring domestic security today also depends on peace in neighbouring and nearby regions. It is therefore in Europe's interest to prevent conflicts, promote human security, eliminate the root causes of global instability, and promote and support efforts for a safer world.

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TREATISE ON THE POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF THE EUROPEAN UNION SECURITY AND DEFENCE

Radoslav Ivančík¹

ABSTRACT

After more than seven decades of peace in modern European history, the Member States of the European Union must face new challenges and growing security threats. European security has become more complex, less predictable, and more vulnerable. Deepening globalization and technological progress are gradually blurring the line between internal and external security and increasing interdependence and dependence to such an extent that individual Member States are no longer able to face the current spectrum of threats individually but are dependent on mutual cooperation. That is also why security and defence issues are one of the central themes of the European integration agenda today. This is also the reason why the author of the paper deals with this issue in his research and addresses the topic of possible further developments in the field of ensuring European security and defence.

Key words: *European Union, security, defence, cooperation, development, future.*

Introduction

The declining predictability of the further development of human society due to growing instability and the continuous deterioration of the global and regional security environment, together with the growing asymmetric security threats, pose significant challenges for ensuring European security. Citizens of the Member States of the European Union ("EU") are increasingly concerned about their security and expect the Union to take care of their protection and defence. If the EU is to meet their expectations, security and defence must play a much more important role in the future of the joint European project than they have done so far. This fact was also recognized in the Rome Declaration (EC, 2017), which set out a vision of a secure Europe in which all citizens feel secure, in which they can move freely, in which external borders are secured, in which international standards are respected; a Europe committed to the fight against terrorism and organized crime, and a Europe committed to strengthening its common security and defence.

The first ambitious steps towards a European Security and Defence Union have already been taken in the form of a) the EU Global Security and Defence Strategy (EEAS, 2016), b) the European Defence Action Plan (EC, 2017) and c)

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of mutual cooperation with NATO (EP, 2020). These three basic pillars are currently being translated into very concrete measures: the structures of the common security and defence policy are being reformed, civilian and military capabilities and tools are being developed, European defence cooperation is deepened and alliances with partner countries and organizations are strengthened, in particular: with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN). Nevertheless, more needs to be done to make the Union more responsible for European security.

1 Current situation in the field of European security and defence

The security environment in Europe has passed since the end of the so-called the Cold War through a fundamental structural transformation. In particular, the period from the late 1980s and early 1990s represented one of the fundamental milestones for the system of international relations. The construction of a multipolar system replaced the hitherto bipolar world order, and new state and non-state actors and new, especially non-military security threats, began to appear on the international scene. The new environment has forced individual actors to rethink their security policies and strategies so that they are able to adapt to the changing situation (Weiss, 2014, p. 81). In recent years, there has been a significant deterioration of the security environment in Europe, mainly due to the deepening of asymmetric security threats (Jurčák, 2013, p. 614). European security has become more complex, less predictable, and more vulnerable (EEAS, 2016).

Moreover, the situation has been significantly complicated in recent years by globalization, which represents a number of phenomena which generate pressures which are significantly felt by states (Ondria - Kollár, 2011, p. 18) and which affect their defence and security (Ušiak, Trubenová, 2020). Globalization is a highly dynamic multilateral process in which political, economic, social, security, military-strategic, technical, technological, energy, environmental, cultural, and other factors intersect and influence each other. The current development of globalization shows that the decisive influence on its course has economic factors that significantly affect others and, on their basis, a new system of international relations is emerging (Ivančík, 2011, p. 46). As a result of globalization, there are not only changes in stability and security, but also greater vulnerability and interdependence of states (Baričičová, 2017, p. 32).

Individual Member States are no longer able to face current global threats individually but rely on mutual cooperation. With deepening globalization, the relevance of the geographical distance to security threats has fallen significantly, which today can and in some cases unfortunately already have a direct negative impact on the EU. For example, terrorism can currently affect anyone, anywhere, anytime (Ivančík - Nečas, 2019, p. 122). Threats and instability in the immediate vicinity of the EU's borders have therefore become a central topic of political

debate at both national and central European level (Ušiak, Trubenová, 2020). That is why security and defence are at the forefront of the European project today.

The current geostrategic context in which the EU finds itself is defined primarily by those zones of instability that extend eastwards and southwards in the immediate vicinity of European borders (Nečas - Kollár, 2018, p. 521). Recently, the phenomenon of hybrid threats and radicalizing extremist groups has become increasingly important. International terrorism continues to be one of the main destabilizing factors today. At the same time, the importance of this threat is growing with ever-increasing technological possibilities and insufficient solution to the causes of terrorism. Although terrorism as such does not pose a new threat to the EU, attacks in several places in Europe (eg Paris, London, Berlin, St Petersburg, Nice, Manchester, etc.) have significantly shifted its perception in the public debate in recent years. At the same time, cooperation in the fight against terrorism was at the beginning of European cooperation in the field of internal security in the 1970s (Weiss, 2014, p. 83). In the context of current developments, increased investment, solidarity in the fight against terrorism, wider information sharing and closer intelligence cooperation between Member States and Union agencies are key for the EU (EEAS, 2016, p. 15).

The EU does not understand the individual threats separately, but points to their interdependence, demonstrating the complexity of the current security environment. Terrorism, for example, is closely linked to another of the defined threats - dysfunctional (collapsed) states, the so-called failed states. It is a widespread phenomenon that it is dysfunctional states that are becoming a haven for terrorist organizations and organized crime. For this reason, states in which state institutions cease to perform their basic functions and lose control of their own territory and population are one of the main security threats today. The EU is therefore seeking to focus on stabilizing dysfunctional states (EEAS, 2016, p. 7).

Another key threat is organized crime, for which the EU is the primary target. Illegal migration, human trafficking, drug smuggling, financial crime, corruption, proliferation of small arms, all form the framework of organized crime (Závěšický, 2006, p. 15). Information security and data protection against attacks while maintaining an open, free and secure cyberspace is one of the EU's other security goals (Kostrecová - Kostrec, 2012). Strengthening the resilience of critical infrastructure and increasing preparedness for possible cyber threats and the ever-increasing cyber attacks is crucial today (Fabián – Mintal – Ušiak, 2020). Another of the challenges facing the EU today, and that is energy security, cannot be left aside (Dušek, 2016). Diversification of energy sources, routes and suppliers, especially for gas, as well as the promotion of the highest possible standards in the field of nuclear safety in third countries, will be crucial in the future (EEAS, 2016, p. 16).

The elimination of most of the above threats, in the context of their complexity and severity, is not currently in the real power of individual Member

States, and therefore deepening international cooperation is a prerequisite for an effective confrontation with the challenges described above. The above overview of the phenomena that the EU currently identifies as threats shows that the EU, in its understanding of security, has transcended the traditional military and state-centric concept of threat and has embarked on the path of so-called the broader concept of security (Weiss, 2014, p. 82).

In addition to the direct security threats, the EU now faces a number of predominantly political challenges and events that co-shape its security and defence policy (Kavan et al., 2014, p. 57). The primary impetus for the new dynamics in the field of CSDP in 2014 was the above-mentioned events in Ukraine and the subsequent Russian annexation of Crimea. The Ukrainian crisis has brought a new strategic context that has required a concrete response from the international community. The Union used available diplomatic means to impose sanctions on Russia and several of its citizens. NATO has begun implementing Enhanced Forward Presence plan in the Baltics (NATO, 2020) in an effort to demonstrate its military readiness to the Russian side. However, the hybrid war waged by Russia in Ukraine also pointed to the limits and inefficiency of the then form of the CSDP. Russia's activities have thus contributed to reopening the debate at European level on building its own common defence and the possibilities for deeper European integration in the field of security and defence.

2 Required direction for further development of cooperation in the field of ensuring security and defense of the EU

Several strategic, political, economic, and technological trends suggest that the time has come for Europe to make a fundamental change in its policy in the area of security and defence. The growth of security threats near the EU's borders has forced the Union's political leaders to respond more intensively and seriously to these trends. As a result, a number of initiatives are under way to implement the Global Security and Defence Strategy, strengthen EU-NATO relations and prepare programs through which Member States can engage in defence R&D and jointly develop their defence capabilities.

There is a gradual transition from words to real action and the building of the foundations of the European Security and Defence Union. Citizens will only be safe and will feel safe if the Union does not deviate from this direction. Achieving this goal will require progress in several areas:

1) The drive for EU Member States to have a stronger and more sovereign position in a globalized world requires closer cooperation within the European Union, including in the field of defence. This will be done in full respect of the constitutional rights and obligations of each country. In fact, systematic cooperation and gradual integration in the field of defence will help to preserve their national sovereignty.

2) In the past, there were different perceptions of threats and different strategic cultures. The nature of the threats has also changed over time. We are currently facing hybrid and transnational threats, as well as the significant impact of ongoing conflicts in the surrounding regions. The Security and Defence Union should contribute to greater convergence of strategic cultures, to a common understanding of threats and to appropriate joint responses. This will require joint decision-making and action, as well as greater financial solidarity at European level.

3) The nature of transatlantic relations is changing. More than ever, Europeans need to take more responsibility for their own security. As is currently the case, the EU and NATO would continue to coordinate their activities in the field of military and non-military security. At the same time, the EU would provide a framework in which (following the UK's withdrawal from the EU) the 27 Member States (of which 21 are members of NATO) would collectively strengthen their defences and address existing shortcomings. This would allow the EU-27 to take its security more into its own hands² and to make real progress in terms of its contribution

4) The scope and effectiveness of defence spending must be increased. Duplication between Member States may affect the interoperability of their defence equipment. It can also lead to a lack of training and preparedness of the armed forces and to gaps in defence capabilities. To address this, Member States' defence spending should be better coordinated. Most defence funding will continue to come from national sources. However, an EU budget reflecting new defence ambitions, combined with a large European Defence Fund, should enable Europeans to spend better money and improve the quality-price ratio. The European Council could consider how the current restrictions on co-financing the military aspects of the EU could be overcome in the move towards common defence (EU, 2020, p. 11).

² Recently, we can also meet again with the statements of the high representatives of the European Union, especially Germany and France, about the need to strengthen European security by building a common European army. These statements have not gone unanswered at the political level, but so far, they lack a practical, applicable level. The supranational model of the European army would require the need to transfer additional competencies from the Member States to the Union level and the closely related willingness of the Member States to provide these competencies, resp. relinquish their own security and defence competencies. Another question that has not yet been answered would be the position of such a common European army in the current system of ensuring security and peace in the world in international crisis management operations conducted under the auspices of the UN or NATO (Nováková, 2020, p. 198). Of course, many other questions and problems arise in this context.

Conclusion

Finally, systematic cooperation and integration in the field of defence consequently requires a truly single market in this area. This means stimulating competition in industry, cross-border access of small businesses to the supply chain, specialization, savings, optimized production capacity, lower production costs and greater security of supply. A common defence market would also help critical research and the creation of startups to develop the key defence technologies that Europe needs to meet the challenges it faces. However, the transition will also involve costs and legitimate concerns that will need to be addressed through appropriate measures and ensuring the protection of interests at the level of national and collective security.

European security and defence urgently need to be strengthened. The Member States of the Union will play a key role in this, setting the level of ambition at European level with the support of the EU institutions and fulfilling it. It is clear from the initiatives currently under way that the Member States and the EU institutions have already embarked on this journey. But how fast do Member States want to build a real European Security and Defence Union? To what extent are they willing to anticipate strategic contexts and not just react to them? To what extent do they think Europe is responsible for European security and defence? These are all issues that the EU faces and that it must address in order to ensure a higher level of security, defence and protection for its citizens.

At the same time, in response to growing instability and the deterioration of the global and regional security environment, the European Union must promote peace and security not only on its territory but also outside its territory. This means that the Union, in cooperation with its partners, must have sufficient military capabilities and capacities to be able to fulfil its obligations of mutual assistance and solidarity enshrined in the Treaties. Internal and external security are increasingly interconnected: ensuring domestic security today also depends on peace in neighbouring and nearby regions. It is therefore in Europe's interest to prevent conflicts, promote human security, eliminate the root causes of global instability, and promote and support efforts for a safer world.

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THE UNITED KINGDOM'S SAFEGUARDING OF POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH KENYA

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ABSTRACT

The subject of the paper is the United Kingdom's safeguarding of political relations with Kenya. The introduction contains the main methodological findings and indicates the theoretical perspective of postcolonialism. The first part of the paper discusses the evolution of the political relations between the United Kingdom and Kenya from colonial to postcolonial. The second part presents Great Britain's efforts to maintain and deepen political relations with Kenya in the 21st century. The main thesis of the paper assumes that the United Kingdom is committed to securing political relations with Kenya. Postcolonial dependencies create conditions for closer cooperation between states in the present day. On the other hand, for the cooperation to be tightened, the partners must treat each other equally.

Key words: *The United Kingdom, Kenya, political relations, postcolonialism.*

Introduction and theoretical assumptions

The subject of the paper is the United Kingdom's safeguarding of political relations with Kenya. The main research question is whether the United Kingdom cares about securing and deepening political relations with Kenya? The main thesis of the paper assumes that the United Kingdom is committed to securing political relations with Kenya. Kenya is the UK's key partner in rebuilding its position in East Africa. For Great Britain, deepening its partnership with Africa has become especially important because of Brexit and the pressure from China. Great Britain must treat Kenya as an equal partner in order to be able to secure political relations with this country.

Political relations between the United Kingdom and Kenya will be analyzed through the prism of the postcolonial theory. The theory of postcolonialism criticizes the analysis of the period of colonialism and neo-colonialism from the perspective of the West, without properly considering the perspective of the East. This one-sided view may lead to the belief that the West was an active participant expanding its influence, ideas and values, and the rest of the world was a passive viewer, acting like a victim or subject to external authority (Gawrycki, 2013, p. 37). Such attitude entails binary categorizations - master-slave, colonizer-colonized, civilized-uncivilized, white-black (Grovgui, 2007, p. 233). Non-Western entities very often have been presented as „others”, meaning „inferior”.

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This approach allowed the West to spread its domination over the rest of the world under the slogans of bringing civilisation and progress (Nair, 2017). Exponents of the postcolonial current tend to redefine the period of colonialism, supplementing the discourse with the perspective of colonized states and societies. They also emphasize the contemporary impact and effects of colonialism on political, social and cultural issues (Gawrycki, 2013, p. 38).

1 The transition of British-Kenyan political relations from colonial to postcolonial

The British ruled in Kenya according to the divide-and-rule tactics through the imposition of arbitrary national and sub-national boundaries (Kinyanjui, 2013, p. 117). In the first half of the 20th century, British colonial rule in East Africa, including Kenya, was heavily criticised, even in Great Britain. Britain's failure to protect natives in the settler colonies, where land expropriation, punitive taxes and forced labour undermined traditional structures while depriving the natives of the benefits of modernization, was condemned. For example, the Labour government of James R. MacDonald was turning a blind eye to the settler monopoly of the best land in Kenya. It happened despite that the British minority in Kenya was accused of racism, corruption and neglect (Callaghan, 2007, p. 91, 104).

After World War II, the United Kingdom's political and economic capabilities, and thus its global influence on international affairs, shrank significantly. Therefore, it limited its involvement in Latin American and Far Eastern affairs. Outside Europe, it remained a valuable player only in the Middle East and to some extent also in Africa (Bell, 1972, p. 109).

After the war, abuses of colonial power against Kenyans continued. The problematic situation of the indigenous people of Kenya led to the outbreak of a rebellion against the colonial administration in 1952. The press in Great Britain demonized the rebel organization Mau Mau, which committed murders on British farmers. This aggravated racism in the United Kingdom (Callaghan, 2007, p. 238). In 1955, the British managed to suppress a rebellion at the expense of about 3,000 Kikuyu members and several hundred British, using brutal methods, including torture (Elkins, 2013). Brutality against insurgents was a manifestation of a desperate attempt to maintain the colonial empire of Great Britain. Despite this, as a result of the rebellion in 1958, Kenya gained autonomy and in 1963 independence. Independent Kenya took over many systemic solutions from Great Britain, including the parliamentary system. However, it did not take over modern solutions that could ensure an effective rule of law (Nasong'o, Ayot, 2007, p. 176).

Mau Mau Uprising Leader Jomo Kenyatta was an important figure of the African independence struggle. He was also a major proponent of the Organization of African Unity, which was founded in 1963 (Husar, 2016, p. 123). After being released from prison in 1961, he took over the leadership of the Kenya

African National Union (KANU), which played a vital role in the fight for independence. In 1963, Kenyatta became the first prime minister of independent Kenya. After proclaiming the republic in 1964, he became the first president of Kenya and held that office until his death in 1978. After Kenya gained independence, officially its importance in the foreign policy of the United Kingdom decreased (Cullen, 2017, p. 38). In the relations between Great Britain and Kenya, however, a significant role was played by informal ties between representatives of states. It was not a typical activity in British bureaucratic policy (Cullen, 2016).

During the decolonization period, the United Kingdom tried to maintain its influence in Africa through the Commonwealth of Nations. Already in the early 1960s, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan believed that the Commonwealth held little prospect as a major foreign-policy platform for Britain. This situation was due to the fragility of political ties that were between states within the organization. Especially the withdrawal of South Africa in 1961 exposed the weakness of these connections (Dobson, 1995, p. 125). There are different levels of interaction within the Commonwealth. In general, for Great Britain, its existence is more important than for other members. However, these relationships are subject to considerable and sometimes rapid change (Lyon, 1972, p. 143).

While in the 1960s, Great Britain negotiated the terms of accession to the European Communities, British ministers and officials focused their attention on how to defend the legacy of Commonwealth connections and trade interests. In the popular mind, the Commonwealth was primarily associated with aliment, and Kenya in this image played the role of the leading coffee supplier (Gowland, 2017, p. 68-69). At the same time, in many African countries of the Commonwealth, including Kenya, the possibility to seek association arrangements with the Community was discussed. They were interested in switching trade preferences from focusing on trade just with Great Britain to all Western European countries (Wall, 2013, p. 138).

In the 1970s, the United Kingdom was attached to the détente process. However, at the same time, it was concerned with an increase in the Soviet Union's involvement in its former African colonies (White, 2002, p. 137). As for Kenya, until the end of the Cold War, there were no significant fears that it could enter the Soviet sphere of influence. Kenya was highly dependent on British sources of supply for weaponry and military equipment (Kaplan, 1982, p. 422). Also, it benefited from the export of agricultural commodities to Great Britain, and from development and investment aid from that country.

During the meeting of the Commonwealth Finance Ministers in 1990, Minister John Major proposed the relief to half or even two-thirds of low-income countries' government debt. The G7 London summit in 1991 chaired by Prime Minister John Major endorsed 50 per cent relief, and the 1994 Naples summit

raised this to two-thirds. This level of debts remission was sufficient for some Commonwealth debtors, including Kenya (Bayne, 2010, p. 109).

In the 1990s, Kenya underwent a process of democratization, which was affected by some pathologies, including massive corruption, ethnic violence and severe economic turmoil. During this time, Great Britain and Kenya worked together to resolve conflicts in Central and Eastern Africa, including in Rwanda (Cameron, 2013, p. 46). They also strengthened cooperation in combating international terrorism, especially after the attacks of Al-Qaeda in 1998 on the US embassies in the Kenyan capital - Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in neighbouring Tanzania, and the attacks in the United States in 2001 (Brown, 2016, p. 86). Nevertheless, in the first decade of the 21st century, the influence exerted by Western governments, including the UK Government, on Kenyan politics decreased significantly (Branch, 2011, p. 299).

2 The United Kingdom's safeguarding of political relations with Kenya in the 21st century

Due to the colonial history between Great Britain and Kenya, a cultural closeness has developed which promotes political relations. One of its manifestations is English, as the second official language in Kenya next to Swahili. An office that maintains and develops relations between the UK and Kenya is the British High Commission in Kenya located in Nairobi. Its counterpart is Kenya High Commission in the United Kingdom located in London. Jane Marriott has been the British High Commissioner to Kenya since September 2019 while Manoah Esipisu has served as the High Commissioner of the Republic of Kenya to the United Kingdom since November 2018.

The rank of political relations between Kenya and the United Kingdom has been reduced from a political level to a clerical level. British officials, however, often worked in informal and highly personal ways with leading Kenyans. Such contacts were very often used to solve emerging problems. Furthermore, they have become a kind of crucial strategy of policy-making between Great Britain and Kenya (Cullen, 2016).

A relatively large degree of political competition was allowed in Kenya. Nevertheless, it took place under the long-term reign of the same party - Kenya African National Union, which was the former single party (Cassani, Carbone, 2016, p. 192). Its rule lasted in Kenya from 1963 to 2002 and ended with the defeat in the presidential election of the representative of KANU - Uhuru Kenyatta – a son of Jomo Kenyatta. Former liberation movements or army officers still govern most of the East African countries. Nowadays, Kenya and Tanzania are exceptions to this rule (Hartmann, 2016, p. 95) .

In the first years of Mwai Kibaki's presidency, relations with the United Kingdom were bright despite Kenya strengthening friendly relations with developing countries, including China, India and Brazil. They were achieved to

some extent at the expense of Great Britain and the United States (Nzau, 2016, p. 154). Also, tensions between London and Nairobi periodically arose. For example, in July 2004, the British High Commissioner, Edward Clay, accused Kibaki's government of corruption accounted for around 8 per cent of Kenya's GDP (Branch, 2011, p. 253). He was so angered with corruption in Kenyan Government that he spoke publicly of corrupt ministers "eating like gluttons" and "vomiting on the shoes of donors" (Gallagher, 2011, p. 12). This disrupted to some extent diplomatic relations with donor governments, including the UK Government. The relatively positive London-Nairobi climate ended in 2007 when after the re-election of President Kibaki, Kenya faced electoral violence. His opponent, Raila Odinga, reported electoral manipulations and did not accept the election result which led to a severe political crisis that lasted for over two months. During the crisis, there were mass manifestations dispersed by force and targeted ethnic violence. Britain temporarily turned diplomatically away from the country, limiting its relations to essential issues. Eventually, the country pulled itself together thanks to the introduction of the new constitution in 2010, embarking on national rejuvenation (Khadiagala, 2016, p. 180).

During the next presidential election campaign in Kenya, Great Britain distanced itself from the deputy prime minister and presidential candidate Uhuru Kenyatta and the candidate for vice president - William Ruto. For the United Kingdom, it was problematic that they were facing criminal charges related to their participation in the post-election violence of 2007 at the International Criminal Court. At that time, the British High Commissioner to Kenya Christian Turner said Great Britain would continue to maintain only "essential business" with Kenyatta government (Kamau, 2013). In April 2013, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto took over the functions of president and vice president of the state. Shortly after the election, the British Government through Senior Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Sayeeda Warsi announced that Britain would maintain normal diplomatic relations with Kenya. The minister argued that the British Government decided to adopt a pragmatic position because of close relations between the states in economic, humanitarian and security cooperation (Kamau, 2018, p. 89). In early May 2013, President Kenyatta visited Great Britain to attend the London Conference on Somalia. Some of the British newspapers called him "criminal president." Nevertheless, the UK authorities hosted him under the diplomatic protocol, treating him on an equal footing with other heads of state (Nzau, 2016, p. 155). President Kenyatta met with Prime Minister David Cameron, who promised a return visit to Nairobi in the near future. However, the lost referendum on Brexit forced him to resign from the office, and his trip to Kenya did not take place. Finally, in 2014, charges against President Kenyatta were dropped. It is worth mentioning that in the summer of 2013 Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs William Hague acknowledged and apologized for the torture of Kikuyu during the Mau Mau rebellion. At the same time, he announced reparation payments for elderly Kikuyu

survivors who brought suit against the British Government for abuses committed during the rebellion (Carotenuto, Luongo, 2016, p. 41).

The dislike of the new president could not affect the political relations between Great Britain and Kenya, especially since other Western countries quickly adapted to the new political situation in Kenya. For example, the United States, which during the election campaign also remained moderate towards Kenyatta, after the election began to declare its desire to strengthen relations with Kenya. The US Ambassador to Kenya Robert Godec stressed the importance of fifty years of partnership and friendship between countries and stated that US-Kenya relations are much stronger than with any other country in Africa (Nzau, 2016, p. 155). The main reason for the change in London's policy towards Nairobi was, however, China's increasing economic involvement in Kenya. At the same time, the West tried to isolate it internationally (Kamau, 2013).

In foreign policy, Kenya is increasingly adopting a strategy of "Look East Policy". First of all, it strengthens relations with China, which worries the British. During a visit to Kenya in May 2019, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Jeremy Hunt denied that Britain was trying to stop the spread of China's influence in Africa. He stated, "I don't see this visit as catch-up with China. I think China is making a very important contribution to Africa's development and you can see that in Kenya with the new railway to Mombasa" (Wakaya, 2019). Although the British authorities are trying to hide it, in practice, their actions are focused on competition for influence in Africa with other states interested in the continent, mainly with China. Great Britain has big ambitions in this competition. Nevertheless, it remains questionable whether London can offer something that other countries with increasing interest in Africa do not already have on their agenda (Kohnert, 2018, p. 126).

In August 2018, Prime Minister Theresa May travelled around Africa, focusing on three key African Commonwealth partners - South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria. During the trip, she promoted the vision of "Global Britain", actively engaging in regions outside Europe. Among other things, May promoted the vision of free trade agreements in Africa. She promised that Great Britain would become the G7's number one investor in Africa by 2022 (*Prime Minister's...*, 2018). A visit to African countries mostly aimed at boosting Britain's post-Brexit trade prospects on the continent.

The visit to Nairobi was the first one of the British Prime Minister to Kenya in three decades. During the visit, Prime Minister May and President Kenyatta signed two important agreements: the first to enhance military co-operation, the other to fight corruption (Webber, 2018).

Great Britain pays particular attention to this last issue. Limiting the phenomenon of corruption among Kenyan Government elites is an essential precondition for strengthening relations between the two states. For example, in May 2016, representatives of Kenya were invited to London for a summit to combat this phenomenon. The purpose of the meeting was "promoting integrity,

transparency and accountability, by exploring innovative solutions and new technologies, and by strengthening international co-operation” (*Anti-corruption Summit...*, 2016). London supports not only the fight against corruption but more broadly the strengthening of democratic processes and political reconciliation in Kenya (*Prime Minister’s...*, 2018). British Government sees Kenya as a mainstay of stability in the region and wants democratic reforms in this country to be exemplary for its neighbours.

Kenyan Government respects Britain's sovereign decision to leave the European Union. For Kenya, the most important thing is to secure its interests, mainly commercial, during Brexit. Therefore, a consultation and cooperation platform has been set up to enable ongoing briefing on this issue and adapt to changing international circumstances. In March 2019, Kenya's High Commissioner to the UK, Manoah Esipisu, pledged to defend Kenya-UK ties as he presented his credentials to Queen Elizabeth II. He said that Nairobi would continue to focus on old friendships despite the UK's political changes (Mutambo, 2019). During the meeting in London in January 2020 Prime Minister Boris Johnson and President Uhuru Kenyatta agreed on the need for a new strategic partnership between Great Britain and Kenya.

Conclusion

Africa played an important role in in the British colonial empire. Relations between Great Britain and Kenya developed during the colonial period when the British ruled in Kenya. The United Kingdom imposed many systemic solutions on Kenya while promoting Western values among its society. Great Britain maintained in Kenya a system of inequality based on a racial criterion and did not attach much importance to the economic development of the colony and the standard of living of the inhabitants. Kenyan independence riots were met with a brutal response from the colonial authorities. Kenya and its inhabitants were objectified during this period, which is in line with the criticism from postcolonial theory.

After the period of decolonization, Africa played a much smaller role in Britain's policy of maintaining great power status than in the policy of its traditional competitor on the continent - France. However, Kenya was one of the few exceptions in Africa with which Great Britain wanted to maintain and secure very close relations. Kenya and the United Kingdom have a long tradition of bilateral relations primarily in areas such as trade, investments, tourism, and cooperation in defence and security, anti-piracy, counter-terrorism and climate change (*Kenya-UK Relations*). From a postcolonial perspective, we can say that British-Kenyan relations were projected by a period of colonialism, the consequences of which are very noticeable to this day.

The two states must adapt to new circumstances in order to maintain and deepen relations between them. Although the period of colonialism has a

significant impact on modernity, it is possible to gradually overcome inequalities that are its consequence. However, this requires a proper approach of both - the former colonial power and the former colony. Kenya is currently a state with a vibrant democracy, assertive foreign policy and dynamic digital economy (Crump, 2019). It has aspirations to increase its position in the region, including more considerable political influence on its neighbours. Great Britain sees opportunities in cooperation with rapidly developing Kenya, and also feels a historical sense of responsibility for Kenya and the need to support this country.

It should be highlighted that the United Kingdom is after Brexit, so its leaders must thoroughly re-think Britain's role in the world, including Africa. It should be emphasized that an enormous amount of uncertainty surrounded the whole Brexit process. During the negotiations, many problems of a political, legal and economic nature emerged (Mold, 2018, p. 3). In the context of Brexit, however, the United Kingdom is looking for alternative partners outside Europe, which makes Kenya a natural recipient of closer cooperation in Africa. Besides, the British authorities are observing with concern the increasing Chinese economic involvement in Africa, including in Kenya. The development of economic ties between Great Britain and Kenya is accompanied by tightened political and security cooperation. For the above reasons, the United Kingdom is very concerned with safeguarding relations with Kenya. However, this requires Great Britain to treat Kenya as an equal partner, which fits in with the theory of postcolonialism.

In recent years, the political climate between the United Kingdom and Kenya has warmed up again. The frequency of diplomatic visits on the highest levels has dynamized. Politicians from both countries declare their desire to strengthen multifaceted cooperation. The need to resolve crises and conflicts in East Africa favours deepening cooperation. Because of colonial traditions and desire to rebuild its position in the region, Great Britain also depends on its stabilization. Kenya, as a relatively stable and rapidly developing country, is to be a model example of constructive partner for Great Britain. Kenya, in turn, counts on further development support from the United Kingdom and hopes to raise its position in the region based on close cooperation with this European country increasingly active in Africa.

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IRAN'S POLICY TOWARDS RELIGIOUS MINORITIES

Andrej Kolárik ¹

ABSTRACT

The Islamic Republic of Iran has been criticised for its policies regarding its religious minorities. Yet, it has acknowledged the presence of only the Armenian and Assyrian Christian, Jewish and Zoroastrian communities by allowing them reserved seats in parliament. However, the Baha'i community has faced intense repression from the apparatus of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This paper will also examine the status of other, mostly newly converted Christian communities, as well as Sunni communities in border regions of Iran.

Key words: Iran, Baha'i, Zoroastrians, Assyrians

Religious demography of Iran

The largest religious group in Iran is Shia Islam of the Twelver branch, who according to M. Izady, scholar at the University of Columbia make up 85% of Iran's population (Izady, 2020)

Adherents of Sunni Islam make up approximately 11% of the country's population, located in border regions. They belong to ethnic or linguistic minorities, namely the Baloch in the southeast, the Kurds in the west, the Lari² ethnic group in the south, Turkmens and Talysh in the north and Pashtuns adjacent to the Afghan border (Izady, 2020).

A fraction of Iran's Kurds, living chiefly in the Kermanshah province, are reported to be practicing Yarsanism, sometimes also referred to as Ahl-i-Haqq.³ This religious system has incorporated elements of the original Kurdish religion as well as Islamic influences, and currently they have aligned themselves as Shia Muslims. They make up 3% of Iran's population.

The largest recognized non-Muslim religion in Iran is Christianity⁴, which can be divided into three primary branches. The Armenians, adherents mainly of the Armenian Apostolic Church make up the largest recognized minority religion in Iran, living chiefly in three regions – Iranian Azerbaijan in the northwest, Tehran agglomeration in the north and Isfahan province in central Iran. The

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² The Lari people speak an Iranian language and can be found in southern Fars and western Hormuzgan provinces.

³ Meaning in Persian „People of the absolute Truth“. (Halm, 2012)

⁴ Official census figures reveal 117 704 Christians in 2011 and 130 158 in 2016 (Selected Findings of the 2016 National Population and Housing Census, p. 20)

Armenian community in Iran has declined considerably from 300,000 in 1979 to somewhere between 40,000 to 80, 000 in the present (DaBell, 2013).

Assyrian Christians, chiefly followers of the Assyrian Church of the East, can be found mainly in the vicinity of Urmia as well as in Tehran. The estimates for Assyrian population in Iran are at around 20,000 (DaBell, 2013).

Adherents of Christianity from ethnic backgrounds other than Armenian or Assyrian (usually of diverse Protestant or Evangelical denominations) have been subject to persecution on charges of apostasy, which may be considered as an offense punishable by death in Iran (DaBell,2013). Furthermore, “*any utterance or distribution of materials on Christianity in the Persian language is grounds for arrest*” (UNPO, 2020). This is because these converts are to come mostly from Muslim backgrounds.

The Baha’i religion has been founded in Iran, but since the Islamic Revolution, its members have been actively persecuted. Estimates on the numbers of Baha’i adherents in Iran range between 300,000 (MRGI, 2013) to 350,000 (Da Bell, 2013).

Iran also recognizes its Jewish community (to be found mainly in Tehran, Shiraz, and other cities)⁵ as well as a very small Zoroastrian community, concentrated in Tehran, Yazd, and Kerman. According to their own count, the estimated presence of the Zoroastrian community in Iran lies between 15,000 and 24,000⁶ (Patel, 2010).⁷

Sunni Muslims in Iran

Article 12 of the Iranian constitution states: “*The official religion of Iran is Islam and the Twelver Ja’fari school (...), and this principle will remain eternally immutable. Other Islamic schools, including the Hanafi, Shafi’i, Maliki, Hanbali, and Zaydi, are to be accorded full respect. In regions of the country where Muslims following any one of these schools of fiqh constitute the majority, local regulations, within the bounds of the jurisdiction of local councils, are to be in accordance with the respective school of fiqh, without infringing upon the rights of the followers of other schools.*” (Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran,

⁵ The number of Jews in Iran has declined from 80,000 in 1979 to a current 25,000 (DaBell, 2013). However, official census figures indicate a much smaller Jewish community: with 8 756 in 2011 and 9 826 in 2016 (Selected Findings of the 2016 National Population and Housing Census, p. 20).

⁶ A figure dating back from the year 1981 stated the Zoroastrian population of Iran to being 92 000, and has been thought of as an over-estimation, due to many Baha’is self-reporting as Zoroastrians (Patel, 2010).

⁷ The figures of 25, 271 and 23 109 were reported by official government censuses in 2011 and 2016 respectively (Selected Findings of the 2016 National Population and Housing Census, p. 20). Thus, the numbers can be considered accurate.

1989). The constitution recognizes the jurisdiction of other Islamic schools of law regarding personal status, religious education, and litigation in courts of law.

Out of those mentioned, only the Hanafi and Shafiite schools have any discernible presence in Iran (Alhar, 2012).

Recognized Minorities

There are three officially recognized minority religions, as per article 13: *“Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian Iranians are the only recognized religious minorities, who, within the limits of the law, are free to perform their religious rites and ceremonies, and to act according to their own canon in matters of personal affairs and religious education.”* (Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1989).

The article 64 constitution also states the political representation of religious minorities: *“The Zoroastrians and Jews will each elect one representative; Assyrian and Chaldean Christians will jointly elect one representative; and Armenian Christians in the north and those in the south of the country will each elect one representative”* (Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1989).

However, until 2018 non-Muslims could not run for municipal elections in Muslim-majority constituencies. The law has been amended after Sepanta Niknam, a Zoroastrian municipal councillor in the city of Yazd was suspended from the municipal council and the event caused public uproar (U.S. Department of State, 2018). Barring non-Muslim councillors from getting elected in Muslim-majority constituencies had effectively barred them from ever getting elected to any other position than the five constitutionally recognized minority seats in parliament, as few localities in Iran exist that don't have a Muslim a majority.⁸

The Jewish community in Iran has been suspected of having close ties to Israel, sometimes Iranian Jews being alleged Zionist supporters, and the Jewish community in Iran has tried to distance itself from Israel (DeBell, 2013).⁹

Protestant Christian communities have not been officially recognized (U.S. Department of State), on grounds that their members are apostates from Islam. Nevertheless, phrases like *Zionist Christianity* were used in court when referring to Christian converts from Islam. (U.S. Department of State, 2018). While such thing as Christian Zionism does exist (Čejka, 2013), this ideological current exists mainly in the United States among Evangelical Christian communities. Labelling

⁸ These include several Armenian and Assyrian villages in Isfahan and West Azerbaijan Provinces (Izady, 2020).

⁹ Interestingly, a pre-Muslim, Zoroastrian Iran under the Achaemenid and Sassanid dynasties has enjoyed good relations with the Jewish community. Namely, Shah Cyrus enabled the Jews to return to Jerusalem and rebuild their Temple, and Sassanids had supported the Jewish faction in Yemen against the Christians sponsored by Ethiopian (Author's note).

all Protestants in Iran as Zionist Christians is implying collective guilt and holding Iranian converts responsible for political stances of American Protestants.

Ignored Yarsanis and Mandeans

The Islamic Republic of Iran does not acknowledge the Yarsanis as a distinct religion, rather it claims that they are Shia Muslims practicing Sufism.¹⁰(U. S. Department of State).

The Mandeans are considered officially Christian, a categorization they themselves do not agree with. The reason for which Mandeans remain unrecognized is unknown – their community is inward looking and does not seek converts.

Both Mandeans and Yarsanis have been denied building permits to build places of worship or permission of performing religious rites in public. The Yarsanis did face attacks on places of worship, intimidation in schooling and military (U.S Department of State, 2018).

Targeted Persecution of the Baha’i Community

The Baha’i community of Iran has faced targeted repression from the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Since the year 1983 membership in Baha’i administrative institutions has become a criminal offense after the decision of the Iranian Attorney General (Situation of Baha’is in Iran, 2020).

The official policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran against its Baha’is citizens has been written down in 1993 taking the form of a government memorandum title the “Baha’i Question”, stating that “*government’s dealings with the Baha’is must be in such a way that their progress and development are blocked*” (Situation of Baha’is in Iran, 2020), thus establishing barriers preventing them from fully participating in educational, economic, and cultural life.

A new law in force since January 2020 has removed the option “Other” when applying for the state-issued National Identity Card necessary for most transactions, thus forcing adherents of non-recognized religions to lie and register as members of other religions. The law itself was changed since a conservative MP has specifically pointed out that allowing the option “Other” legitimised unrecognized religious beliefs (CHR Iran, 2020).

Iran has been suspecting Baha’is of ties to the State of Israel. Apparently, the basis for these accusations may be found in the fact, that the headquarters of the Baha’i faith (the Universal House of Justice) are in the Israeli city of Haifa.

¹⁰ Sufism is an umbrella term for Islamic mysticism (Author’s note).

Reasoning Behind Iran's Policy

The rationale behind Iran's policy in the religious question may be motivated by two major factors. Firstly, as Iran does have Islam as its state religion, this necessarily brings about upholding the principles of *sharia* law, among them being a prohibition of apostasy away from Islam. Secondly, it may be motivated by interest in self-preservation and fear from the most recent trends in the religious landscape of the country.

Despite official statistics, an independent recent survey has shown a drastic decrease of religious adherence in the country. A survey conducted in June 2020 on a sample of 50,000¹¹ respondents, out of whom 90% lived in Iran has found that the proportion of respondents identifying as Shia Muslim has dropped to a mere 32.2%. The second largest category was "None" with 22.2%. The combined share of respondents who did not identify with any religion scores a high 46.6%¹² (Gamaan, 2020). Sunni Islam did not fare very good either, with only 5.0% of the respondents identifying with it. The only religion which did experience a drastic increase was Zoroastrianism, with which 7.7% of the respondents identified. Further religions reported include Mystical (Sufism, 3.2%) Christianity (1.5%), Baha'i (0.5%), Judaism (0.1%) and other religions (3.3%) (Gamaan, 2020).

Of course, the results of this survey may be taken with a grain of salt. Certain segments of the population may have been overrepresented, while others may be underrepresented¹³, although the surveyors did adjust the results accordingly by weighing individual categories. Nevertheless, a significant trend towards secularization can be observed as taking place in the Iranian society.

The general decline of Islam may be explained by the interconnected nature of religion and state in Iran. Because the Shia clergy in Iran also hold key government positions, any unpopularity of the government would portray itself as well into unpopularity of Shia Islam.

Apparently, the government is very aware of the situation. As it would be uncompetitive in a free religious market, it fears any possible competition therein. Furthermore, once official figures would reveal a high secularization of the society, the very legitimacy of the Islamic Republic comes into question. A political system ruling on behalf of Shia Islam would no longer be legitimate once Shia Muslims would make a minority of the population. The Shia clergy on its

¹¹ The methodology included targeting users of social media. Some 70% of Iranians do use at least some social media platform (Gamaan, 2020)

¹² Adding up the shares of „None “(22.2%), Atheist (8,8%), Spiritual (7.1%), Agnostic (5.8%) and Humanist (2.7%)

¹³ Most significant distortions may have occurred since 85,4% of the original respondents had a higher degree than a high school diploma and were weighted to 28% in accordance with census data. Similarly, almost 97% of the original respondents lived in urban areas, leaving the rural regions underrepresented – for reference, 21% of literate Iranians lived in rural areas (Gamaan, 2020)

part may come to realize indeed that wielding political power has resulted in an unprecedented decline of religious adherence within the country itself. The Shia clergy may thus question the legitimacy of the existence of a theocratic regime itself, as many Iranians turned their backs towards Shia Islam.

The Baha'i community apparently did pose a grave danger at some point, as it grew rapidly and emerged within the Shia Muslim environment. However, in the present Baha'is do not pose a real threat to the country's religious establishment, as the survey found only 0.5% of respondents being Baha'is. (Gamaan, 2020)

Unlike the traditional Armenian and Assyrian churches, Protestant Christianity does pose a slight threat to the regime due to its openness to converts. Estimates have shown that Protestant Christians outnumber the recognized Christian denominations at least twofold (U.S. Department of State, 2018). However, Christianity has been cited as the religion of only 1.5% of the respondents in the 2020 survey.

Zoroastrianism during the Pahlavi dynasty has been looked favourably by the government. Mohammed Reza Shah had himself crowned in Persepolis in a ceremony of celebration of 2500 years of Persian civilization (Axworthy, 2007), and Zoroastrianism itself was seen with sympathy as an expression of Iranian nationalism, while all the responsibility for Iran's hindering was blamed on the Arab invasion. Such an attitude therefore could not be continued under a regime ruled by an Islamic (albeit Shia) theocracy.

Nevertheless, a striking 7.7% of the respondents in the survey identified with Zoroastrianism. This figure cannot be explained by statistical error or presence of crypto-Zoroastrians alone.¹⁴ Apparently, it can be interpreted as part of a trend back towards Iranian nationalism. similar movement has been taking place in Iraqi Kurdistan.

The Zoroastrian revival in Kurdistan is the direct result of the rise of Islamic State and its radicalism, according to **A. Tayib**, the Zoroastrian representative at the Ministry of Endowment and Religious Affairs in Iraqi Kurdistan. It is enjoying support from the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (Mory, 2019).

The survey thus may point out to a similar trend arising in Iran itself, perhaps by Iranians critical to the regime, or Islamic radicalism itself. It is possible that several of the reported Zoroastrians are secular Iranian nationalists, fascinated by the Zoroastrian religion as has been the case during the Pahlavi dynasty or in Kurdistan.

¹⁴ Christianity in Iran with a known existence of a crypto-Christian Protestant community has reached only 1,5%. The figure of 7.7% is in stark contrast with the self-reported 16,000 - 24,000 and the pre-revolution figure of 90,000 which was dismissed as too high (Author's note).

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Annex




Chart 1:

Source: GAMAAN, 2020 *Iranians' Attitudes Towards Religion: A 2020 Survey Report*

GEOGRAPHICAL DIMENSION OF THE EXTERNAL SECURITY OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Jaroslav Kompan¹

ABSTRACT

The paper characterizes geographical dimension of external security of the Slovak Republic in terms of the new Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic (dated 2021) and generally specifies and analyses the external security environment of the Slovak Republic based on the geographical affiliation of current security threats, security challenges and security interests of the Slovak Republic.

Key words: *external security, Security strategy, geographical affiliation, security interests, Slovak republic.*

Introduction

The external security environment of the Slovak Republic (hereinafter only “SR”) consists of states, international organizations and other entities that influence the security of the SR. We could claim that it is a physical space in which those activities take place that directly and indirectly affect the level and perception of the security of the SR. Therefore, the external security of the SR could be transformed into a geographical area, and thus defined geographically. The development of security in this geographical area is influenced by the foreign policy of the SR, although mostly only to a very limited extent but unequivocally it is an area in which the SR promotes its security interests.

The paper is based on the often-proclaimed basic premise, namely that the security environment in which the SR has its security interests is deteriorating. There are partially unpredictable fluctuations in the security environment, which are caused by closely related internal and external factors. Disruption of the continuum of trust and the "status-quo" in international relations, changes in spheres of influence, but also the current pandemic situation, go hand in hand with the emergence of crisis situations, to which it is necessary to respond dynamically.

This reaction should be correctly dimensioned (Mušinka, 2020a), and at the same time, if possible, predicted in advance, this also applies to the potential geographical space of this crisis and potential reaction. The aim of the paper is therefore the geographical definition of the external security of the SR in correlation with the current development of crisis situations, focusing on security threats resulting from armed conflict and environmental degradation.

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1 The External Security Framework of the Slovak Republic

The SR is the guarantor of security for its citizens, and at the same time it ensures the protection of values and ideas carried by society - citizens of the Slovak Republic. One of the conditions for maintaining security is also maintaining the stability of the society in terms of its structure. This structure and the resulting security within the SR are ensured by a set of internal security regulations and legislative standards by which the SR ensures democracy, prosperity and the security of citizens. Of course, the SR is not an isolated state, but it must apply the same principles in international relations, so it must apply the same standards to maintain the internal or external security of Slovak citizens. The security of the SR is not a static, but a significantly dynamic state, which reflects the development of the security environment and security threats in connection with security risks, at a specific time. It is clear from the above that achieving the ideal state of security of the SR is very challenging, and therefore the SR must try to preserve at least its security interests, i.e. societal values in its security environment.

The security environment represents a spatial dimension of security, where security actors operate at a specific time and with specific security interests. *"The security environment is the environment in which the reference social entity promotes its security interests in interaction with the sources (carriers) of security threats"* (Žídek - Cibáková, 2009, p. 39). For the purposes of this paper the SR is considered a social entity. From the point of view of security sciences, based on the levels of security, the security environment is divided into internal and external. The internal security environment of the SR is mostly defined by its borders. In addition to internal ones, the security environment of the SR is also determined by external factors. At present, however, there is a noticeable trend towards greater interdependence between external and internal security factors, and the consequent need to address these environments in an integrated way. Proper understanding of the security environment and identification of security threats and risks is key to achieving security (Bučka - Turaj, 2020).

The external security environment is made up of a set of reference objects (states, organizations, institutions, interest groups and other groups, etc.), their mutual relations and activities that are relevant in relation to security. Developments in the external security environment can affect the reference object only to the extent that its power potential, resp. its prestige in the international security and political system (Hofreiter, 2006). It follows from this definition that the external security environment of the SR will include entities that influence the promotion of its security interests. When defining the external security environment dynamism and unpredictability over a longer period of time must be considered. Its main attributes include its instability, uncertainty and complexity, which is also documented by the current development of crisis situations, which

arise even without warning and the response of the international community may not be immediate or adequate.

When defining the external security environment, it is necessary to understand its geographical definition. Its definition is possible in 3 geographical levels, namely global, regional and local (Žídek - Cibáková, 2009). In this division, of course, it is always necessary to consider the geographical location (Sedláček - Zelený, 2019), but also the impact on the security interests of the state, in our case SR, because the mutual interaction of security actors in a certain territory creates a security situation to which the SR must be able to respond adequately.

2 Definition of the global security environment of the Slovak Republic

The global security environment of the SR essentially covers the whole world, because with the development of the security environment in the 21st century and the phenomenon of globalization, the SR is not protected from any security threats.

"The Slovak Republic is part of the Euro-Atlantic security area and sees its security in a broader context. In assessing its security environment, it shall also consider those challenges and threats to the stability and security of its allies that are important on a global scale or have implications for regions adjacent to the Euro-Atlantic area." (Security strategy of the SR, 2021, p. 3)

The SR is not one of the geostrategic security actors, therefore its greatest possible integration into international security structures is necessary, so that it is able to promote its security interests together with other states. It follows from the above that despite the fact that the position of the SR from a global security perspective is not essential for the promotion of its security interests, its full integration into global security structures gives it opportunities, after finding consensus with other members, to promote these interests. On the other hand, even if it is not essentially and geographically affected by the SR, it must be prepared to respond to global threats and challenges within the framework of reciprocity for the support provided.

Armed conflicts, as well as environmental changes, can be considered as one of the main sources of global security instability, because both of these categories create a degree of imbalance in society. This imbalance affects the perception of security by the citizens of the SR, regardless of the geographical distance of a specific area of instability. This is caused by the transmission of information through the media in almost real time.

Security instability caused by armed conflict stems in particular from differences in the distribution of resources, access to which becomes a security interest for security actors. In 2019 and 2020, there were more than 30 conflicts (IISS, 2020, p. 5), which can be characterized as armed conflicts, with up to 21 of them being led by non-state actors (IISS, 2020, p. 5). These armed conflicts create

a "belt of instability" in the world, which can be observed between the Tropic of Cancer and the Equator, with a more pronounced overlap to the north of this belt (Figure 1). Basically, only the conflict in eastern Ukraine is out of this belt. From a global perspective, armed conflicts create the right conditions for other sources of instability, namely global terrorism, the proliferation of weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, and mass migration, which is directed mainly to north of the zone.




Figure 1 Armed conflicts in 2019 and 2020.

Source: Author's construct based on data from (IISS, 2020)

The impact of climate change on the overall instability of the security environment is even more significant from a global perspective (Security Strategy of the SR, 2021). One of the reasons is that changes in the environment can lead to armed conflict, which exacerbates the instability caused. Therefore, it is necessary for the SR to thoroughly assess the impact of environmental changes on the global security environment, because these changes can lead to humanitarian crises, mass migration, which causes social imbalances.

The environment is constantly affected by human activity. Therefore, it is degraded, which directly affects the population. From a global point of view, we can observe especially changes caused by global warming, which do not primarily geographically affect the external security of the SR, because it is outside the areas that are fundamentally affected by these changes (Figure 2). However, those could affect the external security of the SR secondarily, for example by the lack of resources that are imported into the SR.




Figure 2 Global environmental changes in 2019-2020.

Source: Author's construct based on data from (McSweeney, 2020)

3 Definition of the regional security environment of the Slovak Republic

The regional security environment is a very important reference environment for the SR, it is even more important than the global security environment. This importance is given mainly by the greater ability of the SR to influence this security environment (Hofreiter, 2006). The regional security environment of the SR can be geographically defined by continental Europe and adjacent areas of the Mediterranean Sea, the Middle East and North Africa, together with the Sahel and the Horn of Africa (Security Strategy of the SR, 2021). Global threats intersect with regional threats in this area and the SR must be prepared to show the ability to eliminate those.

"The existence of unresolved conflicts and instability in the neighbourhood of the Euro-Atlantic area has direct negative effects on the security and prosperity of the Slovak Republic and its allies. Disputes of an economic, territorial, political, ethnic or religious nature within or between states can lead to armed conflict or chronic instability in the regions, which is a breeding ground for a whole range of threats, from illegal migration to terrorism." (Security strategy of the SR, 2021, p. 5)

In addition to global organizations, we can consider the European Union (hereinafter only "EU") to be a significant regional security actor in this region. Within the EU, there has long been a drive for greater integration of its members, and in recent years, culminating in 2017, for building common capacity to ensure security within the EU (PESCO agreement). The agreement made it possible to launch larger projects of permanent military-security cooperation in the conditions of the EU. As a motivation for the implementation of the agreement,

we can see in particular security threats, which disrupt the decades-old status of regional security in Europe.

These threats can include disruption of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, violation of airspace and territorial waters of EU member states, terrorism, cyberterrorism and uncontrolled migration in particular across the Mediterranean, or the return of extremist terrorist organizations former combatant's back home. Apart from Ukraine, we can also see a degree of destabilization in the countries of the former Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where several of the above-mentioned security threats are manifesting themselves.

Within the regional security environment, we can also consider various separatist or extremist organizations as a significant security threat, which can contribute more sharply to regional destabilization.

The most serious regional threats include economic and social disparities, which can lead to manifestations of terrorism, nationalism and widespread human rights violations, which can lead to regional conflicts. From the geographical distribution of conflicts (Figure 1) it is clear that the "belt of instability" essentially forms the southern border of the regional security environment of the SR, so it is necessary to consider the possible risks arising from this location. Another area of conflict is the east of Ukraine, where there has been a long-term unresolved conflict and the annexation of Crimea, which has set a serious international legal precedent and at the same time a security threat to the rest of the region. This instability in Ukraine represents a significant security threat to the SR as well.

The SR is also significantly involved in resolving the Transnistrian conflict, although it seems that this conflict does not have a direct impact on the security environment of the SR. However, as mentioned, the SR is a member of the EU and the mentioned conflict is practical on its border. Therefore, this or similar conflicts also have a direct impact on the security environment of the SR (Mušinka, 2020b).

Another regional challenge is the decline in the credibility of integration structures, Eurosceptic challenges calling for a reduction in the influence of the EU and NATO, or the exit of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the EU. Events across Europe are largely influenced by the spread of disinformation and propaganda that supports Euroscepticism and separatist movements. On the other hand, there is a visible inclination of EU and NATO members to support the collective defence system, including by increasing their own contributions to security.

Changes in the environment, especially in the Sahel region, but also in the Arctic, or in the flow of the Gulf Stream in the Atlantic Ocean also define the regional dimension of the security environment in the SR (Figure 2). Although these changes do not directly affect the SR, because the sea level rise on the coast of Europe, or the expansion of deserts in the Sahel, does not directly affect the territory of the SR. However, these factors can trigger other threats, especially the struggle for resources and living space.

4 Definition of the local security environment of the Slovak Republic

The local security environment of the SR can be defined by its neighbouring states, the Czech Republic, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Austria and western Ukraine. The geopolitical situation in the Slovak Republic's neighbourhood is influenced by the fact that the Czechia, Poland and Hungary are members of both NATO and the EU, as well as the SR. At the same time, these countries, together with the SR, have been forming the Visegrad Group (V4) since 1991, which wishes to contribute to building a European security architecture based on mutually reinforcing cooperation and coordination within existing European and transatlantic institutions. On the other hand, this cooperation is partly weakened by differing views of political leaders on the degree of integration within structures and access to individual security policy threats and challenges. Another local security actor in the Slovak Republic's neighbourhood is Austria, which is not a member of NATO, but is a member of the EU.

"The risk of a direct threat to the Slovak Republic from armed attack is low thanks to NATO and EU membership. However, the armed attack remains the most serious potential security threat to the Slovak Republic. The escalation of tensions on the eastern border of the EU and NATO, the hybrid action of some actors against the security interests of the Slovak Republic or its allies and the growth of conventional and unconventional capabilities of these actors increases the likelihood of serious security incidents and potentially escalation in the region." (Security strategy of the SR, 2021, s. 5)

The situation seems to be the most complicated in the eastern neighbourhood of the SR. However, within the local security environment, we consider in particular the western part of Ukraine, which shows a higher level of stability than the eastern part affected by the conflict. Of course, the conflict destabilizes the whole of Ukraine, which, while proclaiming its desire to join Euro-Atlantic structures, on the other hand, its internal and external security environment is seriously disrupted.

Within the framework of environmental changes in the local security environment, the impact of global changes is not significantly visible, and rather local changes are manifested. These are one of the triggers of natural disasters, for example, deforestation is one of the causes of flash floods. Therefore, the overall security system must be prepared to adequately respond to these threats within the territory of the SR, and at the same time be able to provide support to neighbouring states, which will increase the level of local security in the SR.

Conclusion

The security situation in the SR is influenced by the geographical location of the SR itself, but also by its integration within Euro-Atlantic security structures.

Among the most important factors influencing the external security of the SR we can include the crisis in Ukraine, which brought new challenges to ensure the resilience of the SR to hybrid threats and instability in North Africa and the Middle East, which are a source of other destabilizing factors such as migration or terrorism.

The SR undertakes that its membership in Euro-Atlantic integration structures is its highest priority. At the same time, the membership of the SR in NATO and the EU represents an international guarantee of ensuring defence, achieving goals within the formation of a security environment and an effective tool for promoting security interests (Security Strategy of the SR, 2021). Last but not least, the close cooperation of the SR with other states within the international framework provides the SR with support in an adequate response to current and future global, regional and local security threats. These threats are becoming one of the most significant challenges today and it is therefore essential that states at national level make commitments and measures that are able to guarantee the security of their citizens and ensure their territorial sovereignty and sovereignty (Brezula, 2017).

If the SR wants to promote its security interests, it is necessary that when addressing security threats and challenges, it does not focus only on the local security environment, but also on areas that are a potential focus of global and regional security threats.

When shaping the external security environment of the SR, it is appropriate that the security interests of the SR are generally focused on:

- fulfilling the obligations arising from membership in international integration structures, which can also affect the global security environment,
- support for the development of freedom, peace and democracy in the transatlantic environment, which can influence the regional security environment,
- creating stability in the region of Central Europe, which makes the SR a significant stabilizing actor in its local external security environment.

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PASSENGER PROFILING AS A MEANS OF INCREASING THE LEVEL OF CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY IN EUROPE

Zbyšek Korecki¹

ABSTRACT

The basic premise of the article is the priority interest of states in ensuring the civil aviation protection against illegal acts, which reflects the social and economic stability of each state. The issue of aviation security deals with the area of aviation security policy related to the protection of civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference with a high level of regulation at the international, regional, and national levels. The person's movement in the Schengen area will continue to require the implementation of new technologies due to possible asymmetric security threats. However, the artificial intelligence development and the possibility of using modern software tools at the airport may mean a reduction in the level of protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms. The level of aviation security regulation is high, not only because of the large number of participating subjects but especially for dealing with law and safety requirements. The interconnectedness of the requirements for harmonization and simplification of processes requires international cooperation, which is due to the need to respond to new threats and the resulting risks. Participating entities must act proactively in contractual and non-contractual means of an organizational, technical, and personnel nature. A widely discussed issue is the passenger profiling implementation as a security field preventive method. The aim of the article is to analyse the effectiveness of biometrics in the context of passenger privacy. The aim of passenger profiling in a civil aviation environment is to decrease the likelihood of a terrorist attack or other illegal act related to civil aviation security. The passenger profiling process uses available information from open sources and information entered by passengers. Creating a profile of a regular passenger uses the information obtained about the habits, behaviour, and other needs of the passenger on a given airline. The profiling process uses risk analysis, which includes analysis of the air threat and standard passenger profile of a particular airline.

Key words: aviation security, passenger profiling, artificial intelligence.

1 Aviation security and protection of human rights and freedoms

Ensuring the civil aviation protection against illegal acts is a social and economic stability reflection of each state. Civil aviation security comprehensively addresses safety and security processes and requires a high level of regulation at international, regional, and national levels.

The topicality of the subject is very urgent in view of the asymmetric security threats, and the requirement to increase the level of security within the Schengen

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area probably requires the need to limit the level of protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms.

The level of regulation in the field of aviation security requires close cooperation of all participating entities and the search for consensus on legislative and safety requirements.

Interconnection, the need for harmonization, and simplification of processes must international cooperation because threats are emerging and the requirement of a proactive approach in the creation of contractual and non-contractual means of organizational, technical, and staff character comes to the fore.

A widely discussed issue is the "passenger profiling" implementation as a preventive method in the field of security. Passenger profiling combines technological and subjective profiling.

The aim of the article is to analyse the security of the flow of passenger information, the protection of passenger privacy in connection with passenger profiling, and the benefits of using biometric features.

The task of profiling in the civil aviation environment is to minimize the probability of a terrorist attack or other illegal act in connection with the security of civil aviation to the lowest possible level.

The whole process of passenger profiling is based on the quality information collection to create a profile of a regular passenger for the later evaluation of the degree of deviations from non-standard reactions.

The profiling process uses the results of a risk analysis, which includes an analysis of the flight threat and the profile of the standard passenger on the route, including personal data.

In the flight order process, the passenger gradually passes personal information within the Passenger Name Record (PNR), where he enters the full name (first, middle and last, as it seems on the photo ID used for travel), date of birth, gender, redress number (if applicable), order, ticket payment, nationality, residence, place of residence in a foreign country, profession, etc.

Subsequently, the data inserted into the Advance Passenger Information (API), which is used by immigration authorities.

The global distribution system "AMADEUS" manages passenger data.

1.1 Legal environment of civil aviation security

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), in particular, plays a key role, in law-making activities, in the field of international law. The process of processing the passenger's personal data is a risk-based approach. Risk analysis is a basic prerequisite for the design and implementation of preventive mechanisms and creates requirements for state entities, owners, and operators that take part in ensuring the safety of civil aviation.

At the same time, a set of requirements for passengers in the security and control measures implementation is being developed.

The risk analysis also takes into account emerging conflicts of value (Mikołajczyk, Struniawski, 2017). The risk analysis seeks to strike a balance between ensuring safe international air transport while protecting fundamental human rights and freedoms.

Aviation security mainly used a reactive approach, where the response to threats was formulated ex post.

The milestone was September 11, 2001, which has a lasting impact on security mechanisms due to the growing threat of extremism.

Current legislation balances the need to make sure the civil aviation protection from acts of unlawful interference and the clear attempt not to infringe on the personal freedom of passengers.

The security measures taken, including preventive ones, must be based on the proportionality of the measures taken and the likelihood of an illegal act.

Risk assessment for international air transport works with new risks, which may include the threat of a cyber-attack, a man portable air-defence system, or an unmanned aerial vehicle (Gardner, Sahotra, 2013). Nevertheless, the primary risk remains the prohibited articles bringing on the aircraft board.

The percentage of offenses is Person borne IED (30%), MANPADS in conflict (10%), IED in cargo (10%), land side threat (10%), Person borne IED in Hold Baggage (7%), MANPADS in no conflict / proliferation zone (7%), Airborne threats (4%), IED in service (4%), and Airborne threats (4%)².

The provisions on civil aviation security use a technical, organizational, and staff measures combination that are in line with the applicable normative requirements and allow cooperation of the security system components.

New risks need a proactive approach to the illegal activities assumption that increase the likelihood of detecting and eliminating illegal acts.

The transition to a proactive approach can be shown by the creation and implementation of International Standards and Recommended Practices³ (IATA), which make it possible to respond to emerging threats.

An effective process of collecting, analysing, and adopting information measures on passengers' personal data and sharing information between cooperating security authorities and states is a cornerstone of increasing the level of security.

The risk analysis reflects current and real threats, including potential targets and predictions of modern illegal trends.

² ICAO Aviation Security Global Risk Context Statement,

³ Supporting the Implementation of Safety Management systems

1.2 Advance Passenger Information

Advance Passenger Information (API) is an electronic communication system that collects basic personal data obtained from travel documents or other official identity documents, flight information, length of planned stay.

The technical requirements of the API and the complexity of the system are probably a major obstacle in the API implementation process

The high costs are both in the acquisition phase and in the operational phase of the system. The ICAO-level solution is the worldwide implementation of machine-readable documents (Mustapha, 2020).

The transfer of personal data and the comparison of data with national and international watch lists are in line with UN Resolution 1373 of 2001⁴, which obliges all UN Member States to make joint efforts to prevent and combat terrorism.

UN resolution emphasizes the obligation of a Member State to prevent terrorist activities by the most effective border control and increased attention when issuing identity documents, in particular travel documents.

UN calls on the Member States to find a common approach to speeding up the exchange of information, with an emphasis on members of terrorist organizations.

Modern trends in the field of civil aviation security include the area of personal passenger data and the effective transfer of such data between those involved in the international aviation protection for prevention, and later illegal activity investigation, preliminary risk assessment, or passenger profiling.

The overall concept of the flow of passenger information can be imagined as information server's passenger - airlines / GDS - ICAO / GSDA - Airport operations / LSDA.

Vertical passenger information sharing goes through PNR - API - PTP, DPEA, DPES and DMDP.

The National Intelligence Service, Europol, and Interpol also use information shared vertically.

The Global Supplier Diversity Alliance (GSDA) uses databases that work with Passenger Travel Profile (PTP), Database of Potentially Endangered Subjects (DPES), Database of People Excluded from Aviation (DPEA) and Database of Missing and Dangerous People (DMDP).

The whole process of making personal data available is started by making a flight reservation until the moment of boarding the aircraft. The entered information is automatically shared. Travel agencies and air carriers collect data for commercial reasons. The security authorities collect data to make sure a high level of protection of air transport and the health of persons and to regulate the

⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 1373/2001

entry of foreigners into the territory of the state as part of the border entry controls implementation.

PNR data are key sources of information in the process of risk assessment, prevention, investigation, and later offender punishment (Abeyratne, 2017).

*Data must be depersonalised after 6 months and data must be deleted after 5 years*⁵. Passenger and flight information in the DCS is, on the other hand, available only from when the flight is “open” for check-in (up to 48 hours prior to departure). Departure control information for a flight will be finalized only upon flight closure and may remain available for 12 to 24 hours after the arrival of a flight at its final destination⁶.

1.3 Principles of PNR data processing

ICAO has issued Guidelines on Passenger Name Record, which describe the implementation guidelines for passengers' personal data and the form and principles of data processing. PNR is an integral part of the global campaign against international terrorism.

PNR data are transmitted, according to ICAO guidelines, in two basic ways „pull" and „push".

Using the "pull" method, public authorities can access aircraft operator databases and share the required data. If the aircraft operator uses the "push" method, it itself actively transmits the data to the public authorities to the safety authorities.

The process of transferring PNR data describing Doc 9944⁷.

Minimization of transmitted passenger data is a principle described in the PNR manual issued by ICAO.

Data minimization consists in the legitimacy of the transfer of only data that are in the request of public authorities. The information transmitted shall apply only to passengers arriving, departing, or transferring in the territory of that State.

The Directive on the use of Passenger Name Record data makes it possible to compare lists with databases of wanted persons, to take measures to increase the level of prevention, detection, and prosecution of terrorist acts.

The current level of air transport risks is likely to require an amendment to the Directive as the current state of transfer of PNR data by air carriers to flights outside the Schengen area, but PNR data should also be transferred within the Schengen area without the need for a written opinion from the European Union.

Bilateral agreements are a necessary condition for the transfer of PNR data between each state. The contract defines the mutual rights, obligations, and

⁵ Passenger Name Record

⁶ Guidelines on Passenger Name Record

⁷ Ibid.

principles of personal data processing, including guarantees of an organizational and technical nature.

1.4 Risks of processing personal data of passengers

The processing of personal data creates a high level of risk of leakage of personal data or unauthorized processing.

Harmonization of the processing process is a way to minimize the risk of data leakage.

Eliminating the current differences in the level of protection of passenger data is an important contribution to increasing the transmitted data security, but also aviation security (Rosen, 2007; B. Gu, X. Sun, V. S. Sheng, 2014).

UN Security Council Resolution 2178/2014 emphasizes the need for States to reach a consensus on the fundamental human rights and freedoms protection when taking action to combat terrorism.

Passenger profiling can be seen as an interference with the protection of personality, dignity, and privacy, but it must be acknowledged that ensuring the safety and security of civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference is a relevant consideration.

The sharing of PNR data must be based on the assumption of a high level of security and protection of personality and an individual assessment of security risks and possible consequences when working with personal data.

The bilateral agreement creates a legal framework for the transfer of information and at the same time creates suitable conditions for the air carrier in communication with the authorities of the countries where the flight takes place, so it is a suitable solution for collecting and sharing passenger information.

1.5 Principles of biometric data processing and related risks

Biometric data obtained from machine-readable travel documents are another area of passenger identification. The biometric data advantage is the elimination of risks associated with digitally stored data.

The process of collecting biometric characteristics into the system and their subsequent use has three procedural phases: enrolment, verification, and identification.

The phase of the biometric verification process attempts to confirm the identity of the individual on a one-to-one basis.

The identification phase, where the captured biometric information is compared with all stored samples, is based on the one-to-many principle.

At present, the basic requirements for biometric data in a machine-readable travel document format are incorporated in the documentation on machine-

readable travel documents, which is gradually being supplemented and revised by the ICAO Technical Advisory Group.

Biometric data of travel documents bear the unique coding of the biological characteristics of the passenger in a biometric identifier or biometric formula.

The reading device evaluates the biometric characteristics conformity with the holder of the travel document.

ICAO has defined appropriate biometric data sufficient to identify a person, which is divided into two groups for physiological and behavioural measurable characteristics.

Given that biometric data can be considered unique and relatively unchanged over time, it is possible to clearly identify a specific person.

The processing of biometric data uses two coefficients: False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate (FRR), which indicate the index of security and the rate of rejection of an authorized user by the system, which are calculated in

Table 1 (Ščurek, 2008).

Biometric characteristics	FAR	FRR
Finger print	0,000 1 – 0,000 01%	<1,0%
Hand geometry	0,1%	0,1 %
Face geometry	0,1%	<1,0%
An image of the retina	0,001%	0,4%
An image of an iris	0,000 78 %	0,000 66%

The sensitivity of biometric data requires a secure process of collection and subsequent sharing with selected government agencies.

Implementation The General Data Protection Regulation, which is the most comprehensive set of personal data protection rules in the world, considers biometric data to be a special category of personal data, the processing of which is subject to even stricter processing criteria, as they allow a specific natural person to be identified⁸. The biometric features collection requires robust protection against cyber-attacks and data theft. (FRR), which

The biometric authentication undeniable advantages are given by a high degree of reliability, clarity, and efficiency.

Conclusion

Passenger profiling is a preventive tool combining the processing of personal and biometric data. The undeniable advantage is the process does not disrupt the flow of check-in and the extra checkpoint construction. Continuity of passenger movement without unnecessary stops also eliminates crowding.

⁸ Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council

Passenger profiling is less predictable for potential offenders and focuses primarily on the personality traits of passengers.

Passenger profiling brings with it a number of debatable areas, including feasibility in the context of large airports, legal admissibility, the setting of decisive criteria, and the principle of non-discrimination.

In the area of the principles of non-discrimination, it is necessary to fulfil the existing obligations of states in protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms.

ICAO has not yet made a clear statement and carriers to the legal aspects of international agreements in the area of passenger data processing principles. The passenger is clearly limited to the rights associated with the principles of personal data processing, in particular the right to information on the processing and portability of personal data.

The ambiguity of the concept of privacy seems to be an obstacle to the adoption of an internationally acceptable consensus on the sharing of personal data of a natural person and the adoption of unified international regulation in the areas used in the processing and sharing of passengers' personal data.

The current pandemic situation, the level of security, and the Security Information.

It is clear that the requirement to create a Covid Passport is the next step in the unified document adoption in the field of passenger profiling to make sure the current level of security.

The use of modern technology can thus be perceived as a privacy invasion.

Assuming that most passengers comply with the legal requirements of the community and the technical level of security of personal data theft reduces the level of risk close to zero, then I recommend incorporating it into the air carrier's obligation to provide personal data to public authorities without requesting it.

At the same time, complement the text Aviation Act Section§ 69 paragraph. 1 of the provision: "the airline is obliged to immediately hand over Czech Police office data on passengers who cross the external border after finishing boarding all passengers."

A prerequisite will be the conclusion of bilateral agreements between Member States, which will simplify and allow the transfer of PNR data.

The implementation of biometric data will thus be the next step in increasing the level of security while maintaining the continuous movement of passengers through checkpoints.

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EXTERNAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT OF THE GCC REGION*

Dominika Kosárová¹

ABSTRACT

The GCC area is part of the Middle East, one of the most turbulent regions, characterized also by conflicts, internationalized civil wars, fragile states, and subversive activities of non-state actors. Regional developments have a potential to influence the Gulf security environment. The objective of this paper is to assess the external security environment of the GCC region with a particular focus on external threats and opportunities and their implications on the security and stability of the Gulf monarchies. Four major threats are discussed: the US withdrawal from the region, regional instability, fluctuations in oil prices, and climate change. These threats may endanger not only the energy security but also the domestic stability of the Gulf monarchies. At the same time, given a similar threat assessment, an opportunity of normalizing relations with Israel has emerged for the GCC states. The paper argues that the GCC states could ultimately mitigate certain threats by grasping some opportunities that emerge on their background.

Key words: GCC, security environment, external threats, external opportunities

Introduction

The area of the Gulf Council Cooperation is comprised of six Arab monarchies located on the Arabian Peninsula at the coast of the Persian Gulf. This area has been subject to increased world interest since decades given its abundant reserves in hydrocarbon resources, making the region strategically important for energy security. Yet, the Gulf monarchies are part of the Middle East, one of the most turbulent regions characterized also by conflicts, internationalized civil wars, fragile states, and subversive activities of non-state actors. Despite the relative stability and wealth in the Gulf monarchies, dynamic regional developments have a potential to influence the Gulf security environment, eventually endangering energy security and domestic stability of individual states. This paper aims to assess the external security environment of the GCC region and the implications of recent developments and ongoing trends on the security of the GCC area and individual GCC states. To assess the external environment, a logic of SWOT analysis will be used, hence threats and opportunities with external provenience will be assessed. At first, four specific threats will be

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examined: withdrawal of the United States from the region, regional instability, drop in oil prices, and climate change. On the other hand, the major opportunity discussed in the text stems from the normalization of bilateral relations with Israel. This assessment could eventually serve as a base for a more comprehensive SWOT analysis. An extensive analysis of both internal and external security environments of the GCC region has been provided by Kristian Ulrichsen in 2009. Since then, numerous studies have been published focusing on specific threats and challenges faced by the region, yet, given the dynamics of Middle East developments as well as the role of the GCC region in ensuring energy security and regional stability, there is a need for regular re-assessment.

1 Threats

Threats to the security and stability of the GCC area with external provenience may be clustered into four main categories: the US withdrawal from the region, instability in the adjacent area, drop in oil prices on global markets, and climate change. They are all caused by a mixture and interconnection of factors related to geopolitics and geoeconomics and if not addressed properly and timely, they risk provoking serious consequences for the stability of the GCC region.

1.1 US withdrawal

Since the last decade, the GCC states have been concerned about the lesser US engagement in and commitment to the Middle East. The US has taken over the role of the security guarantor in the Gulf from the United Kingdom after it had pulled out of the region at the beginning of the 1970s. The US has been increasingly engaged in the region since the events in the late 1970s and the 1980s (Iranian revolution, Soviet invasion to Afghanistan, Iraq-Iran war) which made US realize that to secure oil, it needs to build military infrastructure in the region. In 1980, President Carter declared that the US would use force against any external threat to the Gulf. Subsequently, since the 1980s and throughout the 1990s, the US established a security umbrella in the Gulf consisting of defence and cooperation agreements with individual Gulf monarchies, joint military exercises, military bases and weapon sales. The main interest of the US in the Gulf has been to ensure energy security (to secure the flow and price of oil), which is to a large extent conditioned by the regional stability. Ultimately, the US became the hegemon in the region, which was manifested during the Gulf war of 1991, when the US-led coalition expelled Hussein from Kuwait. As pointed out by Yetiv and Oskarsson (2019), the US reaction to Hussein's intervention to Kuwait contributed to calming energy markets and stabilizing oil prices. At that time, US capacities in the region were unparalleled and their commitment to regional security undisputable. This started to shatter on the background of several

events in the 21st century which made the US rethink its strategy in the Middle East, culminating in Obama's promulgation of "leadership from behind" while promoting the so-called "pivot to Asia".

Since the beginning of the 21st century, the relationship between the GCC states and the US has been influenced by several factors: terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the fact that 17 attackers were from the Gulf monarchies; intervention to Iraq, which not only enabled the spread of Tehran's influence, but it decreased the US appetite to deploy its troops on the Middle Eastern ground again, while it raised the voice of those calling for the US disengagement from the Middle East. Moreover, the US intervention in Iraq was followed by the withdrawal of most of its troops from Saudi Arabia as the kingdom had difficulties in legitimizing such an intervention. The US credibility in the eyes of the Gulf monarchies was further eroded during the Arab Spring, when Washington did not support its long-term ally, Hosni Mubarak, and did not stand for Bahrain (called by President Bush the major non-NATO US ally), when it faced popular demonstrations. In the last decade, US withdrew its forces from Iraq, Afghanistan, and even from Syria under President Trump, thus abandoning its Kurdish allies. US did not act after Assad was blamed of using chemical weapons against its own people and proved unable to remove him from power as called upon by the GCC states. In addition, the GCC states were concerned over the US negotiations with Iran about its nuclear program and possible US concessions to Iran without taking into account the interests of the Gulf monarchies. (Bianco, 2020) Finally, the strategic importance of the Gulf for the US has decreased since the US has started to produce oil. Obama even called upon the GCC states to share the burden and take a greater share of responsibility for their own security. (Quilliam, 2020) In line with his strategy of "leadership from behind", he increased weapon sales to the GCC states in order to improve their own defence capabilities.

Yet despite boosting weapons sales, security of the GCC region has remained dependent on US presence and commitment to the region. Without it, the GCC states would become vulnerable and they would struggle to ensure their national security especially when facing the threat from Iran. The GCC states perceive the US withdrawal as abandonment. Despite the US desire to see more security cooperation within the GCC, such attempts are hindered by different threat perception and interests among the GCC states as well as the lack of mutual trust. (Yetiv, Oskarsson, 2019) Therefore, opportunities emerge for other regional and global actors (especially China and Russia) to try to overtake the US role in the region, at least partially. However, this will not happen anytime soon given that both Russia and China still cannot compete with the US security and defence links to the region. Moreover, despite the decreased US need for oil imports from the region and lesser commitments, the US has not fully withdrawn from the area. It is still interested in its regional stability given that any major instability in the Gulf would influence the global oil markets.

1.2 Regional instability

Regional instability as an external threat to the GCC states stems from the tensions with Iran and its nuclear ambitions in the first place, and second, from regional conflicts that have emerged on the background of post-Arab Spring developments.

All the GCC states perceive *Iran* and its regional ambitions in security terms. A threat is posed to the region by the escalating tensions with Iran and especially by the latter's potential acquirement of nuclear weapons. However, the attitude towards Iran as such is different across the GCC. For Bahrain, Iran represents an existential threat as it has been making claims of sovereignty over the island. Bahrain has accused Iran of subversive activities against the regime and support for its Shia opposition. Meanwhile, tensions in the bilateral relations between UAE and Iran stem especially from territorial disputes over three strategic islands in the Persian Gulf (Abu Musa, the Greater and Lesser Tunbs) seized by Iran in 1971. Saudi Arabia perceives Iran as its rival over the regional hegemony and leadership in the Muslim world and an ideological enemy. All three of them, Bahrain, UAE and Saudi Arabia, are afraid of the spread of Iranian influence in the region through its proxies and they have criticized the JCPOA for not dealing with Tehran's regional engagement. When it comes to Oman, Kuwait and Qatar, they perceive Iran as a risk rather than an existential threat and instead of curtaining its influence, they opt for strategy of pragmatic hedging. (Bianco, 2020) As pointed out by Bianco (2020), their attitude towards the JCPOA has been rather moderate, as they focus on the de-escalation potential of the deal, while Oman has even served as the facilitator of the negotiations. Despite security concerns over Iran (or probably because of them), the small GCC monarchies maintain ties with Iran in the economic or even security area (the latter is especially true about Qatar and Oman) to a various extent in the effort to normalize relations and avoid direct military confrontation. The policy of the small GCC states towards Iran may thus be understood as a combination of balancing and bandwagoning. (Guzansky, 2015) Meanwhile, relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, two regional powers with different ideological background (Sunni versus Shia) are sometimes referred to nothing less than a cold war. Tensions between the two states across the Gulf have been escalating since 2016 and since then there have been repeated demonstrations of force and mutual accusations of violating the regional status quo. Saudi Arabia even called upon the US to destroy the Iranian nuclear program by military means. It claimed that it would provide enough oil to substitute the missing supplies if the US attacked Iran. (Yetiv, Oskarsson, 2018) Despite no direct military confrontation between the two, Saudi Arabia (with several other GCC states) and Iran stand on the opposite sides in some regional conflicts (Yemen, Syria).

Since the Arab Spring, Middle East has witnessed a number of (internationalized) *intrastate conflicts* that pose a threat to the GCC states given

their potential spill-over or possibility of dragging the states into a direct confrontation. There are three particular concerns of the Gulf monarchies over the conflict-torn states in the Middle East: (1) support for pro-democratic calls from Islamist movements, (2) increase of Tehran's influence, and (3) spread of terrorism. First of all, the post-Arab Spring increased support for Islamist movements that call for democratic elections across the Middle East poses a threat to regime stability and legitimacy of the conservative Gulf monarchies. All of the GCC states except Qatar have subsequently experienced a certain level of uprisings calling for socio-economic or political changes. All of them have been ultimately suppressed primarily by means of increased subsidies, public spending, and social benefits, in some cases also by reforms and changes in the government posts (Oman) or even by military force (Bahrain). Islamist movements linked to the Muslim Brotherhood operating across the Middle East are perceived by the GCC monarchies as a threat to their stability (Saudi Arabia and UAE even labelled the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization) with the exception of Qatar, which, on the other hand, by providing support to the Muslim Brotherhood affiliated groups seeks to enhance its independent foreign policy and regional role. Moreover, the post-Arab Spring regional development has raised concerns over Iranian regional influence as well as the spread of terrorism. In Yemen, all of the GCC states except for Oman took part in the military campaign led by Saudi Arabia (although Qatar later left the coalition) to support the internationally recognized President Hadi against the Houthi rebels supported by Iran. (Grabowski, 2016) They wanted to avoid Yemen becoming yet another state in the GCC neighbourhood under Iranian influence. Moreover, the security and power vacuum in Yemen increased the attractiveness of parts of its territory for terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State. As Břeň, Urban and Zeman (2019) point out, escalating intensity of a violent conflict increases the threat of terrorism. A similar scenario occurred in Syria after the Arab Spring, when the GCC states supported various Sunni anti-government rebels by providing them with material support, while Iran has been one of the major allies of Bashar al-Assad. At the same time, Syria temporarily became a safe haven for the so-called Islamic State, which made all the Gulf monarchies become part of the Global Coalition Against Daesh. Confronting Daesh was in the interest of the GCC states given that their own citizens did join its ranks and could pose a threat to their own regimes, which are perceived by ISIS and ideologically similar groups as illegitimate and "corrupt puppets of the West".

Escalation in regional conflicts, including an eventual confrontation with Iran, might endanger the energy security, hence also domestic stability in the GCC states.

1.3 Drop of oil prices on the global market

Any unfavourable shocks in oil price or decreased demand for oil would be especially harmful for the economies of the so-called rentier states such as the Gulf monarchies whose wealth is derived mostly from oil. All of the Gulf monarchies depend to a large extent on oil revenues² (four of them being members of OPEC). The social contract between the states and their population is based on redistribution of revenues coming from the oil industry in the form of subsidies and social benefits in exchange for loyalty. Therefore, not only the economy but also the legitimacy of the Gulf regimes depends on a sustained income from oil, which makes the states vulnerable to any fluctuations on the global oil markets. These can be of internal as well as external provenience. These external factors include the pandemic, which caused a steep decrease in oil demand in 2020 and subsequently pushed the prices down. While in January 2020, before the outbreak of the pandemic, a barrel of crude oil from the GCC OPEC members cost over 60 USD; in April, when most of the world was experiencing a lockdown, prices dropped to 12 to 16 USD. (Oil price charts, 2021) On the world markets, the price of crude oil dropped to minus 37.5 USD per barrel in April 2020. (Crude oil, 2021) This “*historic market collapse in oil prices*” caused by an unprecedented demand shock (Blessing, 2021) influenced the economies of the GCC states, causing a sharp decline in their fiscal revenues. (Monitor Deloitte, 2020) For instance, Saudi economy shrank by 7% in the second quarter of 2020 (Saudi Arabia GDP..., n.d.)

The GCC monarchies are well aware of their vulnerability, therefore they seek economic diversification, however, it is unlikely that this goal will be fully achieved in the near future. Moreover, with the risk of depletion of fossil fuels, the world is looking for alternatives in order to decrease the global dependence on the hydrocarbon resources. Yet, a complete substitution of oil by renewable clean energy will not happen anytime soon, therefore, in a short-term horizon a greater risk for the Gulf monarchies is posed by wild cards or other events with a significant impact on the demand for oil, such as the pandemic in 2020.

1.4 Climate change

The Gulf area is part of a broader Middle East (also referred to as the MENA region), which is one of the regions that are the most affected by the climate change, the rentier states of the Gulf being highly vulnerable to it. (Cross, 2019) The Gulf monarchies face several challenges induced by the climate change, including increasing temperatures, water scarcity, food shortage, raising sea level, and decreasing biodiversity.

² In Saudi Arabia for instance, “*petroleum sector accounts for roughly 87% of budget revenues, 42% of GDP, and 90% of export earnings.*” (The World Factbook, 2021)

It is expected that in the territory of the Gulf monarchies, temperature will rise by 2°C by 2050 in average. A significant increase has already been recorded. In Saudi Arabia, for instance, the average temperature in the hottest month of August in 1901-1930 was 31.63°C, while in 1991-2016 it raised to 33.35°C. (Climate Change Knowledge Portal, n.d.) According to the worst-case scenario, the MENA region might experience 200 days of extreme heat per year by the end of this century. (Hergersberg, 2016). In recent years, the GCC area has already experienced record temperatures of over 50°C with the highest temperature of 54°C measured in Kuwait in 2016. (Broom, 2019) However, the threshold for survivability has been defined as 35°C (Pal, Eltahir, 2016), which could make parts of the MENA region and the Gulf uninhabitable by the end of the century. Moreover, rising temperatures increase evaporation while rainfalls are anticipated to decline in some areas,³ which could negatively affect the already scarce water resources (the GCC states need to rely on desalination process to meet their demand of fresh water). In the MENA region, rainfalls are predicted *“to decline by 20 to 40% in a 2°C hotter world, and up to 60% in a 4°C hotter world”*. (Climate Change..., n.d.) However, most of the agricultural production in the region depends on rainfalls. With droughts expected to be longer, and accelerating desertification, food security will be endangered. Most of the GCC states already depend on imported food given the shortage of arable land - in Saudi Arabia only 2% of land are arable. (Al-Olaimy, 2018) The increasing shortage of fertile ground would thus further intensify the pressure on food security in the long term and eventually increase food prices. (Al-Maamary et al, 2017) Food and water supplies will be further challenged by the rising demand given the anticipated increase in population. (Waha et al, 2017) Moreover, destruction of soil may not only result from desertification, but it may also occur as a result of the rising sea level. In the MENA region, the sea level is projected to rise by half a meter by the end of this century, which makes low-laying areas including parts of UAE, Kuwait or Qatar at risk of being flooded. (Broom, 2019) Besides, the changing salinity of oceans is another concern that negatively affects especially the biodiversity in the region. A combination of all the environmental changes (extreme heats, lack of precipitation, changing salinity) risks to severely affect the number of species living in the Gulf, especially its coastal areas. It is predicted that by the end of this century the Gulf *“may lose up to 12% of its marine biodiversity”*. (Wabnitz et al, 2018) In this context, southern Gulf states are particularly at risk of becoming unsuitable for the current species.

The Gulf monarchies' vulnerability to the climate change is aggravated also by their rentier system, which, according to some experts, may hinder the state's ability to respond proactively to the climate change. (Sargent, 2020) Such a response would require decreasing dependence on the fossil fuels and removing

³ At the same time, the frequency of extreme rainfall events and floods is expected to increase in some parts of the GCC. (Almazroui, 2013)

subsidies on water to decrease its consumption and thus overcoming the global primacy of the GCC societies in per capita consumption of water. (Sargent, 2020) Although the GCC states are increasingly investing in clean energy (especially solar one) and adopting energy strategies (such as UAE's Energy Strategy 2050), such steps to be successful in the long term would also require a redefinition of the social contract. If not addressed, the climate change risks provoking internal social tensions, migration flows, conflicts for water and agricultural resources, and last but not least, it could also negatively affect people's health.

2 Opportunities

In 2020, a major opportunity emerged for the GCC, when two of the Gulf Arab monarchies formalized their relations with Israel, while more states may follow. United Arab Emirates, followed shortly by Bahrain, announced normalization of its bilateral ties with Israel in August; subsequently, both Arab monarchies signed deals with Israel known under a common denomination of Abraham Accords. Not only do these enable the signatories to establish formal diplomatic relations and pursue cooperation in a number of pre-defined areas (Abraham Accords Peace Agreement, 2020; Landau, 2020), but UAE has also made Israel postpone (although not renounce) its plan to annex large areas of the West Bank.

There are several preconditions for the rapprochement of Israel and the GCC states. First of all, the Arab Gulf monarchies have been engaged in the Arab-Israeli conflict primarily by economic, political and diplomatic means and only to a lesser extent did they engage militarily. Moreover, despite lack of diplomatic relations, there have been certain links between Israel and the GCC states in the areas of trade, business but also security and defence for years. Already in 1996, Israel established trade missions in Oman and Qatar (although both were closed in 2000). Since 2016, UAE and Israel participated in a series of military exercises under the auspices of NATO, while UAE even purchased weapons, cyber technology and a spying system from Israel. (Jones, Guzansky, 2019) Even before the bilateral agreement of 2020, the two states had established intelligence cooperation. (Guzansky, Heistein, 2020) Moreover, the GCC states have been engaged in track II diplomacy with Israel (on the ground of the Middle East Desalination Research Center in Oman, or International Renewable Energy Agency in UAE, where Israel has established a permanent mission). Occasionally, countries even exchanged visits of high state representatives.

Yet, most importantly, the opportunity for rapprochement between Israel and the GCC states stems from a shared threat perception (at least to a certain extent) in three main areas: Iran and its nuclear ambitions, US regional withdrawal, and Islamism. For Israel, Iran with its regime hostile towards Zionism represents a prime enemy and it is in Israel's interest to avoid Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon. In this respect, Israel was highly critical of the JCPOA and

together with the Gulf monarchies (especially Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and UAE) it shares the perception that the JCPOA would only enhance Tehran's regional ambitions. As none of them was involved in the negotiations, this made them coordinate their diplomatic efforts to push on the US and other parties of the deal for a harsher stance against Iran. Media in Saudi Arabia and UAE even provided a positive coverage of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu with his intensive lobbying against the deal, while at the same time, Israel supported Saudi and Emirati involvement in Yemen. (Jones, Guzansky, 2019) For Bahrain, the existential threat from Iran has been the most prominent driver in the recognition of Israel, Iran's major foe. Moreover, since Washington under Obama administration had adopted a policy of "leadership from behind", Gulf monarchies need Israel to contain and balance against Iran given that Israel has the strongest military in the region, and it is willing to confront Iran. When it comes to US withdrawal from the region, all of the GCC states and Israel share a common concern. Netanyahu warned that the US withdrawal could create a vacuum to be filled by militant Islamism, in particular by Hezbollah and Hamas. Israel even got involved in the Syrian conflict by striking against Hezbollah, which met with only little condemnation from the Gulf monarchies (the air strikes against Hezbollah were in fact supported by Saudi Arabia). (Jones, Guzansky, 2019)

From the four remaining GCC states that have not yet normalized relations with Israel, Oman is often cited as the one to follow the suit. (Benoist, 2020) Oman and Israel have been engaged in a dialogue, with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu even visiting Oman in 2018. Oman also declared support for UAE after it had announced formalization of ties with Israel. Although some (especially members of the Trump administration) expect also Saudi Arabia to normalize its relations with Israel soon, the situation is more complicated given its regional role and domestic conditions. Saudi normalization with Israel would be expected to encounter strong domestic as well as international opposition, especially from Iran and Qatar. (Kaplan, 2020, MBS said..., 2020) Saudi officials have thus reiterated their adherence to the Arab Peace Initiative from 2002, which expects normalization of relations between the Arab states and Israel as soon as the Palestinian state is established in the pre-1967 boundaries, and not the other way round. Although Saudi Arabia allowed the passage of flights between Israel and UAE through Saudi airspace, it has repeatedly emphasized its requirement for a return to Israel-Palestine negotiations as a precondition for any future normalization. However, there are certain reports that the Saudi crown prince is more open in the question of normalization compared to King Salman. (Benoist, 2020) Expectations towards Saudi normalization with Israel stem also from the fact that Bahrain and UAE, two countries whose foreign policy is usually coordinated with Saudi Arabia, did formalize their ties with Israel. Such move would probably not be possible without Saudi (at least tacit) approval. In this context, Saudi officials claim that they will not try to thwart the recognition of Israel by other Arab states, but their own stance remains unchanged. (Pompeo

encourages..., 2020) Given the Saudi regional role, it can be thus expected that its own steps towards Israel would be more prudent, or at least not overtly public. On the other hand, Qatar and Kuwait continue to reject normalization until the Palestinian state is established. Compared to the other GCC states, Qatar is more inclined towards Iran, and by trying to lead an independent foreign policy, it supports Islamist groups linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, which Israel perceives as a threat. Yet despite this, some argue that even Qatar might proceed towards normalization if it were to set itself free from the dependence on Turkey and Iran. (Ibishi, 2020) Such development might occur in the wake of January 2021 agreement of the GCC states to end the blockade of Qatar, which had made Qatar shift closer to Iran and Turkey.

The normalization of relations between Israel and the Gulf monarchies would open new opportunities for regional cooperation across different sectors. (Zielińska, 2020) It could bring important investments in the Gulf monarchies, which is in line with their policy of economic diversification and opening in order to overcome their budgetary dependence on fossil fuels. Moreover, it would enable the Gulf monarchies to further enhance their relations with the US and gain access to some more sophisticated security technology without Israel trying to thwart it (by signing the deal, UAE were granted the possibility of purchasing F-35 fighter jets from the US). Finally, it has been argued that it could even restart the peace process between Israel and Palestine. (Jones, Guzansky, 2019) However, Palestine has been highly critical when it comes to the normalization deals, which it considers a betrayal of the Palestinian cause. (Khurma, Farley, Sherman, 2020) Both, the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, categorically rejected the Emirati and Bahraini decision and they called upon the Arab League and Organization of Islamic Cooperation to do so as well. (Barron, 2020)

Conclusion

Security and stability of the GCC area are challenged by four major external threats or trends related to (1) decreased US commitment to the region; (2) conflicts and instability in the neighbouring areas as well as Iran potentially possessing nuclear weapons; (3) drop in oil prices on the global markets; (4) implications of climate change, which could make certain areas of the Middle East and GCC region uninhabitable in the long-term horizon. However, with all the threats, certain opportunities emerge either on regional or national level. Due to similar threat assessment between most of the GCC states and Israel when it comes to the perception of Iran, US withdrawal and regional activities of Islamist movements linked to the Muslim Brotherhood especially in the post-Arab Spring period, there is a certain ease in relations between the Gulf monarchies and Israel, which has led to full normalization and formalization of bilateral relations with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. At the same time, however, the threat perception is not identical across the GCC with Qatar deviating the most

especially in its relations to Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood affiliated groups, which even resulted in a blockade of Qatar by three other GCC states plus Egypt for more than three years.

In addition to this, there are some opportunities on the national level which if properly grasped might help mitigate the threats. If the GCC monarchies managed to diversify their economies as well as energy resources by investing more in solar and other clean energies, they might decrease their vulnerability to the drop in oil prices, yet also reduce environmental imprint of fossil fuels extraction and thus contribute to environmental sustainability. Moreover, the US withdrawal opens opportunities for new partnerships with global (Russia, China) but also regional players (India, Turkey), especially in the economic but to a certain extent also in the security field. Such partnerships may be attractive for the GCC states given that they do not condition cooperation by enhanced principles of democracy and human rights. Last but not least, with the US withdrawal and recent large US investments in increasing the GCC states' own defence capabilities, there is an opportunity for the GCC members to reinforce cooperation among themselves as well as enhance their regional role in sustaining regional stability and possibly adopting more independent policies from the US. Whether they will be able to grasp such an opportunity depends on their ability to boost trust among themselves, overcome intra-GCC disputes, such as the recent ending of Qatar's blockade, and finally find a common approach towards shared regional threats.

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THE ROLE OF SOCIETY IN CREATING STRUCTURAL AND PERSONAL SECURITY

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ABSTRACT

Meeting contemporary challenges and threats related to both personal and structural security requires a properly organized algorithm of actions that guarantees efficient response to all types of threats. One of the fundamental resources on which it is based includes society, properly motivated to pro-social and pro-state activities, based on universal values, which is a necessary condition for the smooth functioning of the state and for building its proper state of security. The created social security potential is characterized by the involvement of citizens in solving public issues and important social questions, as well as civic cooperation with state institutions, which is a necessary condition for the functioning of communities, their development and survival, especially in emergency situations. This requires consistent and methodical actions in which various institutions must be involved, with particular emphasis services specialized in the rescue and protection of public safety and order and non-governmental organizations.

Key words: *personal and structural security, creation of pro-social and pro-state attitudes, social security potential.*

Introduction

When defining various scenarios of “crisis operations” one should be aware of the importance of security issues, which, apart from freedom, is a condition of a dignified human life. It is not about the choice between freedom and security, often undertaken in public discourse, but about counteracting threats – both in the personnel and structural dimension – and social development (Dory, 2003). This is especially evident in COVID-19 time. The superiority of security over other fields is quite special, because it is a value whose achievement is a necessary condition without which it is impossible to develop other forms of social activity. This is perfectly illustrated by the pyramid of needs developed by the American psychologist Abraham Maslow (security and safety needs are basic human needs – “deficiency needs”) (Maslow, 1987). Security having an interdisciplinary

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character cannot be considered without looking at it in a broader context, also considering the social dimension.

The security of the state policy determines the scope of the state capacities for pro-development activities in social, political, cultural, economic or health spheres, consequently forming bases for engaging the state in activities aimed at the development of its potential, which is determined by abilities to create multi-sectoral platforms of cooperation, development platform through proper social, demographic and educational policies. The contemporary security environment is characterized by “the blurring” of the boundaries between its internal and external, military and non-military dimensions. The globalization and increasing interdependence often result in unpredictability of phenomena, the scope of which is no longer limited by geographical borders, political and economic systems. This is a qualitatively new situation that requires a change in the approach of the state to the security issues.

Designing activities in the field of personnel and structural security necessitates the need to have and constantly improve the system that allows it to respond properly to challenges and crises arising in public space. The essence of these activities is conditioned by their character, which boils down to eliminating and neutralizing phenomena perceived as negative for the state and its citizens. This aspect of security policy points to two complementary elements. The first is of reactive character with respect to occurring events and the second, having a creative character, which involves preparation for the absorption of negative impacts, as well as creating the right potential for it. In the existing world order, many issues undergo significant changes, including the very concept of security, which has ceased to be limited to the military dimension only, expanding to other categories, e.g. energy, health, food, ecological, information, social or cultural security. As a result, more and more emphasis is placed on the implementation of strategic goals not through the use of military force or economic pressure, but the social dimension, attractiveness of culture (axiology), or the style of practiced politics, which is often referred as soft power (Brown, 1983; Collins, 2010; Dory, 2003; Drabik, 2013; Floyd, 2007; Jurgilewicz, Sulowski, 2018; Kitler, 2011; Kośmider, 2018; Krause, 1998; Misiuk, 2013; Łoś, 2017; Rechlewicz, 2012).

On the one hand, the effectiveness of contemporary public management is guaranteed by an efficient state concentrated not only on administration but its development management as well, on the other, social trust, i.e. a helpful state, based on redefined subsidiarity principle and social capital conditions. The coupling of the efficiency of the state and civic ability to cooperate stemming from social capital is particularly visible in the times of threat and crisis. In contemporary inclinations to the multi-sectoral perception of security, the social dimension of security takes on a special meaning. It creates a complex and dynamic indicator of the country's organizational efficiency, enabling its citizens to be united around the important goal of countering threats and building social

support for decisions taken by management factors in the creation of safe spaces (Jakubczak, Flis, 2006).

1 Building social security and safety potential

The designing of activities relating to the security of the state, whose role and position as an international relations entity is evolving and must take into account the most likely scenarios for developing security conditions and operations to stabilize security (promoting and developing cooperation, exploiting opportunities, preventing risks and threats), respond to crises (prevention, preparation, response, reconstruction) and defence operations (deterrence, prevention) as well as those which are carried out below the threshold of war (Gryz, 2007; Kośmider, 2018).

One of the fundamental resources on which the organization of universal security is based is the society, properly motivated to pro-state or pro-social activities for the benefit of local communities (what we can observe in many countries during a pandemic time). Norms and values are perceived as an important factor joining the efforts made to build a security space both in internal and external dimensions, creating such social emotions as a sense of community identity or inspiring activity for the set priorities, as well as reducing threats and counteracting violations of public safety and order (Stammers, 1995).

When a community undertakes activities for their security and freedom, being properly prepared and, more importantly, motivated – Napoleon Bonaparte noted two centuries ago – it is a force that allows to challenge adversity. All activities with a social dimension are difficult to understand without taking into account human motivations, which in turn forces us to include categories such as behaviors, attitudes and systems of values, which – in addition – are difficult to grasp and precisely define. Security issues cannot be considered in isolation from the social dimension, which is an important factor in the creation of a social security base, equally important in the past and nowadays in a globalized world in which it is impossible to free ourselves from potential threats, which may also have an asymmetrical and hybrid dimension (Kośmider, 2018).

Building the right level of structural and personal security requires a collective effort from both the state and society as well. The assessment of security environment, its directions in global, regional and national dimensions allows generating a likely scenario for shaping strategic security conditions in the upcoming time. There is no doubt that despite seeking and preferring various forms of cooperation, it is not possible to build international relations free from confrontation, as evidenced by the case of Ukraine or the Middle East. The contemporary world map of threat is characterized by a great diversity, including, inter alia, terrorism (cyber terrorism), proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, hybrid and irregular operations, regional conflicts, migration processes, organized crime, insufficiency of states, and also various disasters,

calamities and catastrophic events and others that exert influence on the safety and security of populations and defence system of the state. All this imposes the necessity to undertake multifaceted actions that take into consideration security issues. The qualitative change taking place in the security environment causes that classical categories of war and peace are not sufficient to describe it. Today, there is an increasingly clear tendency to broadly perceive national security threats in close relation to international security threats both in military and non-military contexts (Jurgilewicz, 2018; Kitler, 2002).

Security, safety and development are basic dimensions of the functioning of the state. On the one hand, without a proper level of security and safety it is not possible to ensure a stable and long-term development of the state structures, on the other, without development it would not be possible to improve the national security potential. The final success in the process of security command and control in the state is determined by the compilation of such factors as population and territory, economic and military potential as well as the strategy and will to implement it. Security tasks of the state should be considered through its specific and systemic functions. They result from its external and internal functions. The external one includes foreign and defence policies of the state. In this case, security activities involve the protection of the state interests on the international arena. In turn, the internal function of the state consists in achieving and maintaining a social order. It is manifested in activities undertaken to ensure internal security through strong structures of the state, stable law, protection of the environment, social security and stable economy (Szcurek, 2012).

In the world which is affected by globalization processes, the fundamental issue remains the capacity of the state to shape increasingly complex social, political, economic and cultural reality. This is due to the process of formulating the scope of personal safety and structural security, to which there will be employed assets, forces, methods and forms of operation at the disposal of the state (Foucault, 2009). The security of the state paradigm is the resultant of many variables, whose capturing is a prerequisite for its construction.

There is no doubt that the basis of effectiveness in managing the public sphere, next to an efficient state, focusing not on administration, but on managing its development is social trust –note that the security system cannot function in a social vacuum. Coupling the efficiency of the state and civic ability to cooperate flowing from social capital is particularly visible in times of crises and threats, and their catalog is quite wide and there is no indication that it will be exhausted in the near future. Coronavirus confirm this regularity. The network of social bonds, reciprocity norms and social trust deserves special articulation. James Coleman and Robert Putnam defined this feature of social structures as social capital (Putman, 2001). Society, as already mentioned, is one of the fundamental resources on which the dimension of structural and personal security is based. Deepening social awareness in the sphere of security remains extremely important, let us add that this is not possible without activating social capital and

conscious citizenship (interesting solutions in this regard exist, for example, in Switzerland). Citizens' motivation depends on the methods used to solve public matters and important social issues. This applies especially to democratic countries, whose strength is expressed in citizens' inclination to pro-social activities, as well as the recognition of the primacy of the common good over individual aspirations. In countries with consolidated democracy, a certain type of political (civic) culture has developed. It is made up of a community characterized by open ego, the ability to respect foreign values, a pluralistic attitude in the sphere of values, trust in the social environment and relative insensitivity to fears. Due to this type of political culture, rationalist activism attitudes are common. Cooperation is an inseparable feature of civic culture. Citizens make joint decisions on a voluntary basis, bearing in mind the community as a whole (this is perfectly illustrated by a Latin maxim: "pro rege saepe, pro patria semper"). Everything cannot be casuistically predicted and enforced, and where there is an antisocial factor, courts and law must be activated (Schmitter, Lynn, 1995; Utrat-Milecki, 2006).

One could venture to say that democracy should not be considered merely a political category. In fact, it has its moral dimension, imposing moral obligations on its citizens. In the opinion of American sociologist Edward Shils, civil society is characterized by "collective self-awareness – cognitive and normative. (...) Collective self-awareness of the whole society is characterized by interest in the common good. (...) The popularization of civic attitude makes it possible to maintain a balance between different, competing and contradictory elements of society. Keeping this balance means that the whole society can continue to function as a society, and not just a by-product of rivalry and conflicts of its individual parts. (...) The civic element of society is that structure or network of institutions, activities and shared beliefs that connects individuals, groups and institutions with central representative institutions, and thus with society as a whole and with each other" (Krasnowolski, 2014). This corresponds to the view developed at the Center for Civil Society at the London School of Economics, according to which he terms civil society refers to the sphere of voluntary collective action organized around common interests, goals or values (Kośmider, 2018). We can come across such cases many times, flipping through pages of history, and as we know history is a teacher of life.

Some exemplification of this regularity may be the history of the Polish state or the Jewish nation, which survived despite the loss of sovereignty and rebuilt their statehood – living in difficult conditions – Poles after more than a century of partitions, and the Jewish people after living for nearly nineteen centuries in a dispersed foreign life. This is largely influenced by values adopted by society, norms of behavior enabling communication, cooperation. One of the most outstanding representatives of Renaissance political thought, the author of the well-known treatise on exercising power, bearing the title "Il Principe" by Niccolò Machiavelli, drew attention to these issues (Machiavelli, 2015).

The identifying citizens with the public policy and concept of citizenship creates a necessary condition for the functioning of communities, guaranteeing proper cooperation with state institutions in building the desired state of internal and external security, allowing survival even in crisis. It's special importance in the crisis situation, or also situation of reviving the so-called local ethnicity, as exemplified by Catalonia, where secessionist ideas or undergoing migration processes are very popular, which can contribute to cultural or ethnic disintegration (casus of France), introducing significant "confusion" in public space.

Values space can create conflict fields and this applies not only to the dimension of values distribution when it is treated as a typical product. All concepts of the "clash of civilizations" are the result of values differences. This affect the evolution of conflicts in terms of their forms and methods of conduct. That is why it is important to diagnose the functionality of products of our own values, primarily from the point of view of using them in the process of strengthening impacts on other entities. In thinking about the common good, the problem of axiology is even more apparent when we take into account the individualism that is quite common in Western civilization and strongly associated with post heroic culture (Huntington, 1993). The manifestations of such an attitude are striving for independence from the social context, freeing oneself from interacting social ties and focusing on self-realization. It should be expected that communities building their attitudes in relation to the category of cultural identity, easier than those referring to ethnicity, will function in a democratic state. Appealing to culture rather than ethnicity may seem to facilitate the building of civil society. It is impossible to consider these issues in isolation from religion, which is a complex social phenomenon (Anders, Woyke, 1992). For the overwhelming majority of people, according to the American writer and social activist George Weigel, "religious beliefs are a source of knowledge about the sense of life (...) and ideas have consequences", affecting the ability to build a platform for social cooperation (Weigel, 2009). Rejection of such attitude often results in the creation of an indifferent, submissive and devoid of identity society. However, when considering the problem of the impact of religion on the creation of social space, one should also be aware of the possibility of its destructive impact, e.g. in environments where religious divisions are more important than ethno-cultural solidarity.

The role of the system of values in the creation and development of communities is hard to overestimate. Already August Comte – a French philosopher and positivist – noticed that the stability of societies is largely determined by commonly recognized ideas and views, called *concensus universalis*, which give them the moral dimension, while providing symbols and culture, with the power of consolidating human collectivities (Turner, 1994). When analyzing the functioning relationships, one should see a different dimension of this impact in history in relation to communities and states. Two

issues remain important here. The first relates to the dynamics of the historical productivity of this discourse and its changes, while the second concerns its present state and further possibilities of functioning in the society of the 21st century. Note that the study of identity processes occurring in history allows us to recognize the continuity of phenomena, the stability of their functions towards communities, as well as to determine the variability occurring in different eras. This issue is so extensive that in practice it is possible to study narrowly defined fields, using the method of generalization on the one hand, and case study on the other. Limiting the axiological dimension or attempts to exclude it from public space do not make society modern. In the opinion of Richard Malcolm Weaver, man should not concentrate on the development of civilization “with simultaneous moral impotence” (Weaver, 2013). This regularity also applies to the category of security.

In the modern world, unfortunately, many categories undergo re-evaluation, also including the image of a citizen, and the borders of citizenship are becoming more open in both the territorial, as well as social and political spheres. While in the past the sense of national or state belonging determined the general background for shaping identity and readiness for austerities and sacrifices, nowadays more and more often a man is a *citizen* of many communities. The characteristics of a good citizen promoted in a particular environment are a variable design and include various patterns of human activity. During the war, the ideal of the citizen-soldier dominates, during the reconstruction of the citizen-employee. In multinational countries, the citizen's model is often built around the idea of a nation, while in culturally diverse societies membership of a particular ethnic group, language or religion is brought to the fore. There is no doubt that civic identity in a democratic society is shaped in the conditions of dynamic socio-cultural transformations. Being a citizen is associated with involvement in public affairs and measures to strengthen security not only in the local dimension (Urban, 2013).

In view of the currently weakening condition of the state and the expansion of globalizing commerce, the premises for the rational development of democratic societies are disappearing, and there is a threat of increasing fundamentalism and activation of criminal groups, including organized ones (Turner, 2006). Awareness of the community is constituted in the process of broadly understood education, embracing a set of recognized values and behaviors (sense of personal dignity, love of freedom, bravery, resourcefulness), which are used not only by individuals but entire social groups in community activities and its state organization. Prussian Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, among others, also noted these features. Describing pre-partition Poland, he noticed that “nowhere was the nobility and the state identified” as in the Republic of Poland, which in the 15th century was one of the “most sacred countries in Europe” (Moltke, 1996). However, when in the place of these values “human unkindness towards the Commonwealth and greed of domestic covetousness” and “discipline disappeared

in the kingdom without which no government can do anything”, the condition of the state began to weaken, leading to the tragic end, which were partitions that sealed the fall of the state after over 800 years of its existence.

The contemporary world is paradoxically very divided despite unification trends. An important problem today is the issue of world's ability to formulate a universal message in the field of security – not only in external but also – perhaps primarily – in internal dimension – in a world characterized by multilateral architecture where previously unknown threats exist, for example COVID-19. In this situation, having adequate security potential ensuring readiness to prevent threats and eliminate their consequences seems to be something obvious. To paraphrase the contemporary postmodern philosopher Richard Rorty, one may risk the statement that security should not be placed on the altar of freedom, especially associated with excessive individualism, or implemented without responsibility (Dakowicz, 2014).

Analyzing the problem of factors affecting personnel and structural security, we encounter a number of difficulties related to showing the relationships between the activities of power centers, decentralized forms of political organizations, and internal security that creates a sense of stability for individuals and groups and offers development opportunities. The issue of the quality of political power exercised and the level of its concentration as well as the nature of the functioning of self-government and non-governmental organizations remain significant. As a consequence, it is about diagnosing the phenomenon of public participation not only in exercising power but the functioning of communities and integration with them. The nature of society, tradition or political culture can be treated as a kind of starting point for defining the activities of the institution of political power in ensuring security in extenso (Anders, Woyke, 1992; Davis, 2005). Citizens' motivation depends on the methods used in solving public matters and important social issues, not to mention countering the distance of citizens from public matters, or engaging in pathological and even destructive actions – expressed through cooperation with criminal groups or supporting terrorist environments.

The basis for activating society in the field of security should be the cooperation, among others, of state institutions with non-governmental organizations and other social partners (collaborating by partnering with communities; consulting, whereby the affected community provides feedback; involving, or working directly with communities). Meeting modern military challenges and threats by a democratic state requires modern organization of national security in which governmental and non-governmental entities participate complementing each other on equal grounds (Kośmider, Gąsiorek, 2017). Non-governmental organizations' attributes predispose them to be included in the process of education for security and prevention activities in various areas of security, as well as monitoring threats, especially non-military ones. Note that non-governmental organizations have special opportunities for

social monitoring of threats, especially in the areas of detection, warning and alerting, which means increasing readiness to anticipate, prevent, mitigate and cope with the effects of these threats or disasters. The effectiveness of services and inspections specialized in creating the desired state of security and public order depends to a large extent on this (Tvaronavičienė, 2018). Note that the activity of non-governmental organizations for security is manifested not only in activities that directly strengthen internal security, as is the case with Volunteer Fire Brigades (such solutions exist e.g. in Republic of Poland), performing both protective, intervention, educational and even cultural functions, but also indirect, as can be observed in relation to organizations counteracting pathological phenomena or institutions supporting education conducted for security (such solutions exist e.g. in Scandinavian Countries) (Kośmider, 2018; National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, 2020). Let us not forget that entities responsible for security issues – armed forces, police, guards and inspections – cannot act effectively without social support. It seems to condition good civil-military cooperation, both in peace, crisis and wartime.

Apart from protection and defence the state need to build fundamental pro-social and pro-state ties and values, which allows (this is confirmed by the research conducted by the authors -members of Ministry of National Defence Republic of Poland the research team for developing assumptions of organizational-functional new solutions of the cooperation with non-governmental organizations and study of organizational and functional solutions for the National Reserve Forces, member of the Strategic Defence Review Team – Research Team – Non-military defence preparations) (Kośmider, Gąsiorek, Kuliczkowski, 2015):

- accelerating development of civil society;
- stimulating social activity related to common security issues;
- creating local communities' security and safety as a contemporary basis of institutional and personal security;
- coordinating efforts of government and non-governmental entities in their efforts for security;
- undertaking activities for common security education;
- coordinating efforts for spatial and comprehensive monitoring of contemporary threats as a prerequisite of effective counteracting threats.

Community-forming mechanisms must focus on a specific transfer of values and ideas that occur through the learning process and specific behavioral patterns. Note that these issues were already pointed out by Aristotle in "Nicomachean Ethics". For him, being human meant being virtuous, and therefore equipped with various ethical skills such as wisdom and prudence (Finkelkraut, 1987).

The creation of desirable algorithms that allow counteracting threats is also a kind of *signum temporis*, also – and perhaps primarily – through appropriate social or educational policy. Educational projects, however, cannot be limited only to young people, but they must be targeted at broad social circles and be

permanently done, although you must be aware of the complexity and difficulties associated with their implementation. The concept of improving forms of education that address security issues – taking into account current threats and challenges – must be focused on changing the structural and program structure to take account of contemporary challenges and threats. It is necessary to adopt a program with an interdisciplinary and transsectoral dimension that will increase its effectiveness (including the need for a coordinating center). Dissemination of knowledge about security (in extenso) is a necessary condition for building an appropriate level of awareness of citizens and social structures allowing them to carry out tasks in the sphere of both internal security (public, universal, social security and constitutional order) and external security (political and military security). Definitely more actions must focus on activating social capital, conscious citizenship, as well as a coherent migration policy (Gryz, 2007).

There is no doubt that the building of civic security facilities must be accompanied by an increase in the effectiveness of public administration in matters of security through systematic and continuous improvement of the quality level of activities leading to the achievement and maintenance of a high degree of readiness and the ability of administrations and services specialized in ensuring security and public order to respond efficiently to emerging threats. This corresponds to the conviction of the Polish political writer of the Renaissance period Andrzej Frycz-Modrzewski that there is no greater happiness in the social dimension than honesty of morals, justice of courts and knowledge of the principles of creating structural and personal security (Frycz-Modrzewski, 1997).

Conclusion

Meeting modern challenges and threats by a democratic state requires a modern organization of its security system. One of the fundamental resources on which it is based is a society properly motivated to pro-state and pro-social activities. This is particularly important in the situation of contemporary non-separate attitudes characterized by a sense of human isolation, which is often the case in the era of mass culture. This demotivates us to engage in solving public matters and important social issues, and everything that is referred to as the common good, and even contributes to taking anti-system activities and the growth of antisocial attitudes, which in consequence lead to the disappearance of social solidarity, and the growth of destructive phenomena and the accumulation of various types of threats in internal and external terms. In a globalized world, community-forming processes are seriously weakening, the process of social disintegration is increasing, thus the preparation process taking into account the dimension of structural and personnel security is significantly complicated. Preparing citizens, in particular the young generation, to work for the development of communities and counteracting emerging personal and structural threats is one of the main challenges of security policy. A society aware of their

rights and obligations creates the foundation for actions undertaken for the proper functioning of the state and the organization of its security. This requires consistent and methodical activities in which not only institutions specialized in creating the desired state of security and public order must be involved. Civic cooperation with state institutions is very important, because is a necessary condition for the functioning of communities, their development and survival, especially in emergency situations (White Book on national security of the Republic of Poland, 2013).

When assessing social potential, attention should be paid to the issue of disseminating knowledge about security while maintaining appropriate transectoral and interdisciplinary nature. This is a necessary condition for building conscious citizenship and social sensitivity that allow us to carry out tasks in the sphere of security, which, as a reminder, has a complex and multifaceted dimension. The scope of activities undertaken to create a social security base must therefore include initiatives aimed at developing an effective system of promoting civic ideas and education for security, including a wide range of projects ranging from creating desirable motivations for pro-social and pro-state activities to specific concepts including support, and even cooperating with pro-defense and rescue services and organizations (e.g. very important role of non-governmental organizations). These initiatives are a kind of *signum temporis*. Note that human consciousness is definitely more than just certain knowledge, it is the ability to understand yourself and the surrounding reality. This is what mainly determines the readiness to take risks as well as creative and innovative activities, and also has a significant impact on the ability to cooperate and create social capital and its activation, becoming increasingly important as a factor of development.

This issue is directly related to the ability of the political power institutions to take actions for its development and a certain level of security. It largely depends on the level of civic culture manifested in the methods used to solve public matters and important social issues. It's impossible to disagree with this thesis, observing current world in pandemic time. This applies especially to democratic countries, which strength is expressed in the moral values of citizens and their inclination to pro-social activities, as well as the recognition of the primacy of the common good over individual aspirations. The spirit of the Socratic idea remains important – a good citizen in a good country.

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WHAT CAN WE DO TO MAKE THE WORLD SECURE FOR THE HUMAN KIND? – INTELLECTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF POWER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Barbora Krištofová¹

ABSTRACT

The world we live in is increasingly interconnected, is evermore affected by globalisation, and of course by global security threats. Keeping the world safe and secure is more complex than ever before. In order to make the world safer, we must be fully aware of what power means. The paper will discuss an understanding power in international relations by Joseph Samuel Nye, American political scientist, who was named one of the top 100 Global Thinkers, by Foreign Policy in 2011.

Key words: Behaviour, international relations, Joseph Nye, resources, power

Joseph Nye's understanding of power in international relations has seem to be original. Unusually for a scholar, Professor Nye has excelled as much in public service as in academia. From 1977 to 1979, he served as Deputy to the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology and chaired the National Security Council Group on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This was the era of the Cold War and the bipolar system. International policy was divided between the block of the United States of America and of the Soviet Union. In 1994 and 1995, Nye served as Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs, where he used his political science expertise to construct a new institutionalized relationship between the United States and Japan, which helped to defuse the trade conflict of that era. (Nye, 2009) His work in the US government inspired him to focus on the concept of power in academia.

Professor Nye perceives power as “*the ability to achieve one's purposes or goals*”. (Nye, 1990, pp. 25-26) It is very important to note that context is a key aspect in terms of power. In other words, power always depends on the context in which any relationship exists. Thus, all power in international relations depends on context - who relates to whom under what circumstances. The importance of context for power relations is clear in the following example, as Nye notes: “*in the middle of the twentieth century, Josef Stalin scornfully asked how many divisions the Pope had, but in the context of ideas, five decades later, the Papacy was still intact while Stalin's empire had collapsed.*” (Nye, 2013, p. 561) In this sense, Nye underlines the term “*contextual intelligence,*” (Nye, 2013, p. 562)

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which he defines as a “*crucial skill in enabling leaders to convert power resources into successful strategies.*” (Nye, 2013, p. 561) Simply put, Nye introduces two definitions of power, (Nye, 1990) that is to say, the behavioural definition and the definition based on the possession of power resources.

The first concept of power is associated with the behavioural definition, which is based on the observation of human's behaviour. Power, in this sense, is the ability to affect the outcomes one wants, and if necessary, to change the behaviour of others to make this happen. (Nye, 2002) Power is, thus, the ability to control others and make them behave in a particular way. This behavioural perception of power is derived from Robert Dahl, a leading political scientist and professor at Yale University, who emphasised that power is a relationship between two actors. (Dahl, 1961) In this sense, Dahl perceived power like a matter of actor A getting actor B to do what actor A wants, or even of actor A forcing actor B not to do what actor B wants to do. As Dahl noted “*A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.*” (Dahl, 1957, p. 201)

The second definition of power is based on the possession of certain power resources that can influence outcomes. Power is the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcome one wants. (Nye, 2004) In this perception, power is defined as the possession of relatively large amount of power resources which “*include population, territory, natural resources, economic size, military forces, and political stability among others*”. (Nye, 1990, p. 26)

To succeed in the international political scene, political leaders must have an excellent understanding of both definitions and the ability to apply this understanding, because proof of power lies not only in resources but also in the changed behaviour of nations. (Nye, 1990) However, policy-makers and diplomats often tend to turn only to the definition based on power resources because “*it makes power appear more concrete, measurable, predictable than does the behavioural definition*”. To predict how one will act is very difficult because “*when we measure power in terms of the changed behaviour of others we have to know their preferences.*” (Nye, 1990, p. 26) Furthermore, “*knowing in advance how other people or nations would behave in the absence of our efforts is often difficult.*” (Nye, 1990, p. 26) However, sometimes a country can get the outcomes it wants by affecting behaviour without commanding it. Nye underlines that “*in my experience in government, policy-makers do tend to focus on resources*”. (Nye, 2004, p. 572) However, these political predictions and diplomatic strategies based on power resources alone can be misleading. It could be argued, that it is easier to predict that a country that is well endowed with power resources is more likely to affect a weaker country and be less dependent upon an optimal strategy than vice versa. It is understandable that smaller countries may sometimes obtain preferred outcomes because they pick smaller fights or focus selectively on a few issues. “*On average, and in direct conflicts, one would not expect Sweden or Georgia to prevail against Russia*”. (Nye, 2013, p. 560) It is

true that possession of power resources provides at least a basic approximation of the possibilities of outcomes, but political leaders can risk a lot in this case. They sometimes encounter the paradox that having power resources does not guarantee that a country will be successful in achieving its desired outcomes. This fact can be seen in several examples from recent history. For example, the United States was the largest power after the First World War, but it failed to prevent the rise of Germany or Japan, as demonstrated at Pearl Harbour. To take another example, in terms of resources the United States was more powerful than Vietnam, yet the United States lost the Vietnam War. For this reason, it is clear that converting power resources into realized power in the sense of obtaining desired outcomes always requires well-designed policy and skilful leadership. This fact is connected with power conversion, which “*is the capacity to convert potential power, as measured by resources, to realized power, as measured by the changed behaviour of others*”. (Nye, 1990, p. 27) For example, “*NATO's military power reversed Slobodan Milosevic's ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, and the promise of economic aid to Serbia's devastated economy reversed the Serbian government's initial disinclination to hand Milosevic over to the Hague tribunal*”. (Nye, 2002, p. 4) Roughly speaking, NATO possessed sufficient military and economic resources with which they could affect and control the behaviour of the Serbian government in the way it wanted. In other words, NATO was able to convert its power resources into strong influence very effectively. It could be argued that NATO was skilled at power conversion and possessed sufficient power resources. Despite this practical experience in government, Joseph Nye notes that in practice, discussion of power and diplomacy must definitely involve the behavioural definition and also the definition based on power resources. He gives an example of why it is so important to combine both these definitions: when one wants to predicting the successful development of a rising powers² such as China or India.³ These countries have large population and increasing economic and military resources, but whether the capacity that these resources imply can actually be converted into preferred outcomes will depend upon the contexts and the countries' skills in converting resources into strategies that will produce preferred outcomes.

On the basis of the behavioural definition and the power resources definition, Nye introduces two types of power, that is to say, hard and soft power.⁴ Hard

² The rising powers can be understood as a grouping of nations that share the characteristics of being the fastest growing, most dynamic large economies in the world economy. See Chin, Gregory “*The Economic Diplomacy of the Rising Powers*” in Cooper, Andrew The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy. Oxford: 2013.

³ It could be argued that this example can include all the BRIC, a group of countries consisted of Brazil, Russia, India and China with a dynamic economies.

⁴ Joseph Nye has used the terms hard and soft power for the first time in his book *Bound to Lead*: NYE, J. 1990. *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. New York, Basic Books: 1990. 370 p.

power can be defined as the ability to achieve one's purposes *“by the use of force and payment and some agenda-setting based on them”*. (Nye, 2013 p. 565) In contrast with hard power, soft power can be seen as the ability to affect others to obtain preferred outcomes by the use of *“agenda-setting that is regarded as legitimate by the target, positive attraction, and persuasion”*. (Nye, 2013, p. 565) In other words, hard power is push, soft power is pull.

As shown above, to exactly define power we have to be aware of whether we are speaking of the behavioural definition or the definition based on power resources. In behavioural terms, Nye writes about command and co-optive methods of exercising power. Command power is the ability to change what others do. It is the ability to get others to do what one wants. This method can rest on coercion, inducement and threats. Thus, we can talk about the method of *“carrots and sticks”*. (Nye, 1990, p. 31) In this sense, a country gets other states to change according to its purposes. On the other hand, co-optive power is the ability to get others to want what one wants. This method can rest on the attractiveness of one's ideas, culture, ideology or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes actors fail to express some preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic. Simply put, a country may achieve the outcomes it prefers in world politics because other countries want to follow it or have agreed to a system that produces this effect.

In terms of power resources, Nye writes about hard and soft power resources which *“are aspects of the ability to achieve one's purposes by controlling the behaviour of others.”* (Nye, 1990, p. 267) The distinction between these two types of power resources *“is one of degree, both in the nature of the behaviour and in the tangibility of the resources”*. (Nye, 1990, p. 267) Nye notes that *“the types of resources that are associated with hard power include tangible factors like military and economic strength.”* (Nye, 1990, p. 267) He explains that *“the resources that are associated with soft power often include intangible factors like ideas, values, culture, institutions and perceived legitimacy of policies.”* (Nye, 2013, p. 267)

During his political and academic career, Nye often focused on the relationship between the United States and Japan. As an example, he offered a short comparison of the United States with Japan at the end of the twentieth century. His claim was that in terms of command power, Japan's economic strength would be increasing in the future, but assumed that Japan would remain vulnerable in terms of raw materials and relatively weak in terms of military force. Furthermore, in regard to co-optive power, Japan's culture is generally highly insular, which let him to suppose that Japan's culture has yet to develop a major voice in international relations. In comparison with Japan, according to his opinion, the United States had always possessed an universalistic popular culture which also will allowed it a major role in international institutions. It could be argued that in today's twenty first century, the United States is recognised for its noticeable strength in command but also in co-optive power. However, Japan's culture still

remains insular and relatively isolated while China's culture is more widely spread mainly in countries situated in the Western Hemisphere. (Nye, 1990)

Nye notes that *“soft power tends to be associated with co-optive power behaviour, whereas hard power resources are usually associated with command behaviour”*. (Nye, 1990, p. 267) It is very important to note that this relationship is not perfect. Roughly speaking, in political practice, there are many cases when it is not possible to strictly categorise power in this way. If one remembers the distinction between power resources and power behaviour, one realizes that resources often associated with hard power behaviour can produce soft power behaviour or vice versa, depending on the context and how they are used. For instance, the creation of institutions that will provide soft power resources in the future. Similarly, co-optive behaviour can be used to generate hard power resources in the form of military alliance or economic aid. For example, *“naval forces can be used to win battles (hard power) or win hearts and minds (soft power) depending on who the target and what the issue is*. (Nye, 1990, p. 267) Joseph Nye takes an example of the American navy's help in providing relief to Indonesia after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami had a strong effect on increasing their attraction towards the United States. The Navy's 2007 Maritime Strategy refers not only to war-fighting but additionally maritime forces will be employed to build confidence and trust among nations. (Nye, 1990) Similarly, as Nye adds, *“successful economic performance such as that of the European Union or China can produce both the hard power sanctions and restricted market access as well as the soft power of attraction and emulation of success”*. (Nye, 2013, p. 564)

Hard and soft power are interrelated: They can reinforce each other, but sometimes they can interfere with and undercut each other. Thus, it is very important to have very good *“contextual intelligence”* which is needed to distinguish how these two types of power can interact in different situations. This could be demonstrated by the example of the Vatican and his persistent soft power. In fact, *“the Vatican did not lose its soft power when it lost the Papal States in Italy in the nineteenth century”*. (Nye, 2004, p. 9) Conversely, *“the Soviet Union lost much of its soft power after it invaded Hungary and Czechoslovakia, even though its economic and military resources continued to grow”*. (Nye, 2004, p. 9) Imperial policies that utilized Soviet hard power actually undercut its soft power. In contrast, the Soviet sphere of influence in Finland was reinforced by a degree of soft power. The United States' sphere of influence in Latin America in the 1930s was reinforced when Franklin Roosevelt applied soft power. (Nye, 2004, p. 9) It could be argued that no country likes to be manipulated, even by soft power. As a good example of this, Nye takes a decision of President John F. Kennedy in 1961 to go ahead with nuclear testing in spite of negative polls. J. F. Kennedy took this decision because he was worried about global perception of Soviet gains and the Soviets' potential dominance in the arms race. J. F. Kennedy *“was willing to sacrifice some of America's soft prestige in return for gains in the harder currency of military prestige.”* (Haefele, 2001, pp.

63-84) On a lighter note, in 2003, just a few months after massive anti-war protests in London and Milan, fashion shows in those cities used models in US military commando gear exploding balloons. As one designer put it, American symbols “*are still the strongest security blanket.*” (Horyn, 2003)

In political practise, it is thus important to possess the ability to combine hard and soft power resources into effective strategies, which is called smart power.⁵ To take an example, the end of the Cold War was marked by the collapse of the Berlin Wall, which fell as a result of a combination of hard and soft power. Throughout the Cold War, hard power was used to deter Soviet aggression and soft power was used to erode faith in Communism. As Nye said: “*When the Berlin Wall finally collapsed, it was destroyed not by artillery barrage but by hammers and bulldozers wielded by those who had lost faith in communism.*” In practice, smart power strategies can be used not only by large states such as the United States,⁶ but also by small states. Some countries such as Canada, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian states have political clout that is greater than their military and economic weight, because of the incorporation of attractive causes such as economic aid or peacekeeping into their definitions of national interest. To take an example, Norway, a small state with five million people, has enhanced its attractiveness with legitimising policies in peace-making and development assistance that enhance its soft power. (Nye, 2013) Norway has taken a hand in peace talks in the Philippines, the Middle East, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Guatemala and the Balkans. Similarly, but other end of the spectrum in terms of population size, China, a rising power in hard economic and military resources, has deliberately decided to invest massively in soft power resources so as to make its hard power look less threatening to its neighbours. (Nye, 2013)

On the basis of the previous analysis of power according to Professor Nye, it could be argued that at least five trends have contributed to the diffusion of power: economic interdependence, transnational actors, nationalism in weak states, the spread of technology and changing political issues. (Nye, 2013) To succeed in international relations, countries must strongly maintain their hard power, clearly understand their soft power and excellently combine hard and soft power into smart power strategies in the pursuit of national interests.

⁵ It is obvious that smart power has the evaluation built into the definition and goes to the heart of the problem of power conversion. Smart power could be defined as strategies that successfully and skilfully combine hard and soft power. The first step towards smart power and effective power conversion strategies is an understanding of the full range of power resources and the problem of combining them effectively in various contexts. Smart power strategies could be compared to the proclamation of US President Theodore Roosevelt in 1901: “Speak softly and carry a big stick.” (Nye, 2013, s. 58)

⁶ The former American Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described the diplomacy of the twenty-first century and importance of smart power in the following words: “America cannot solve the most pressing problems on our own, and the world cannot solve them without America. We must use what has been called smart power, the full range of tools at our disposal.” (Nye, 2013, p. 60)

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HYBRID THREATS IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE

Jana Lukáčová¹

ABSTRACT

We are talking more and more often about the phenomenon of hybrid threats and hybrid warfare, either in the form of prevention against them or in connection with the activities that states suffer in this form of destabilization of the internal security environment of states. The fragile post-Soviet region faces several security policy challenges, one of which is hybrid threats, which often become a opinion-forming factor and a relatively powerful weapon in the hands of the adversary, especially in the form of propaganda, especially with political overtones or dissemination.

Key words: *hybrid threats, security, post-Soviet space, cyber security, misinformation, propaganda, war, stability.*

1 Hybrid threats and their common alternatives

The definition of hybrid threats can be different, and the authors creating these definitions look at this kind of currently very current threat and often inflected concept from different angles. However, these definitions meet on points such as flexibility to capture a set of different coercive and subversive activities, conventional or unconventional methods, such as diplomatic, military, economic, technological and other activities, which can be used in a coordinated manner by both state and non-state actors to: achieved specific goals without a formal declaration of war. These concurrent activities significantly threaten the basic attributes of the state (state power, state sovereignty, state territory, citizenship, state symbols) or its functionality.

Hybrid threats can also be defined as a set of coercive and subversive activities of conventional and unconventional, military and non-military methods that can destabilize the internal security environment (European Commission, 2016).

Thus, hybrid threats can combine several different elements that create a multidimensional threat. Many state and non-state actors are trying to achieve their goals through open and covert activities, regardless of the destabilization of the international order. Hybrid threats include, in particular, the use of foreign power in various areas and can create this "intruder" threat in cyberspace, inciting energy instability, destabilizing raw material and industrial security. These threats can act in a coordinated manner as a targeted activity aimed at destabilizing the state.

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The hybrid attacker creates and performs activities that damage the life, strategic or generally security interests of another actor, but seeks to create an environment where it will not be possible to clearly prove responsibility for subversive activities (www.mvcr.cz).

2 Hybrid threats in selected countries of post-soviet area

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia still did not accept the independence of its former states, which later formed the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) and often seeks to control or manipulate them through its subversive activities, especially in information services and cyberspace. threats in this area. There are various alternatives to hybrid threats that countries in the region pay for with their destabilization of the security environment. Propaganda, dissemination of misinformation, cyber-attacks, information service activities and espionage, manipulation of election results, creation of paramilitary groups and the like are most often used as subversive activities. They are often combined in order to achieve the desired effect.

2.1 Hybrid war in Ukraine

In Ukraine, the term hybrid warfare began to be used especially after the outbreak of conflict in the southeast of the country. However, this is not a new term only popularized after the Russian annexation of Crimea. The analysis of the Russian concept of hybrid wars, hybrid threats and hybrid methods of fighting is extremely important for further research on this issue, not only because of the enormous military strength of the Russian Federation, but also because of the successful application of hybrid warfare first (albeit only partially). in 2008 and later (fully) during the lightning annexation of Crimea in spring 2014 (Reichborn-Kjennerud, Cullen, 2016).

The author of the Russian concept of hybrid warfare is the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the First Deputy Minister of Defense - Army General Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov, who speaks of hybrid warfare as a new generation in which traditional military methods and procedures are replaced by hybrid, political, economic, information, international, humanitarian and other instruments ". Gerasimov also argued that the line between war and peace in the 21st century is very blurred and the differences between them are blurred. Wars no longer follow the traditional pattern and that even a seemingly economically strong state can be the scene of war (Gerasimov, 2013). The unlawful annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol has resulted not only in restrictions in tourism but also in restrictions on the supply of goods, services and technologies of Crimean companies to Europe, and brokering construction or engineering services must not be provided in this area either. Ukraine's newly elected president (after Crimea annexation) Zelensky, is actively fighting

propaganda in Ukraine, also by banning pro-Russian televisions that could spread and incite it.

2.2 Hybrid threats in Belarus

Following Belarus's independence in 1991, Alexander Lukashenko became President of Belarus in the first presidential election in 1994. He remained in office for 26 years (2020) and is likely to continue his government in 2020, although he will continue to do so. even these elections did not go unrest and protest. It is an open secret that Belarus tends to pursue its foreign policy towards Russia, as evidenced by the establishment of the Union of Russia and Belarus in 1999. Lukashenko's government has been criticized for controlling executive and security forces as well as restricting pluralism and democratic competition, This was particularly evident in the 2020 elections, which are considered rigged by observers, and sanctions by the European Union have been proposed. According to official election results, Lukashenko won 82%. In the case of these elections, the refusal of visas by Belarus for European Union observers to oversee the transparency of the elections was also a controversial event. The impetus for the uprisings in the country is an increase in the democratic feeling of the population, where the citizens of Belarus no longer want to live in an autocratic regime led by Lukashenko's arbitrariness (www.belarus.by, 2020). During the election, Lukashenko's preference for the pandemic caused by the COVID-19 virus also had a negative effect on the coronavirus and its first spread by spreading disinformation, which deliberately endangered the lives and health of the people of Belarus. He often either expelled his opponents or imprisoned him. The case of Svetlana Cichanovska's husband, who was Lukashenko's opponents in the presidential election, is also known, and as his preferences rose, Lukashenko saw him as a direct threat, so he was imprisoned, but his wife Svetlana was allowed to run for president instead of her husband. elections she had to flee the country while finding asylum in Lithuania.

2.3 Hybrid threats in a cyber space in Estonia

In 2007, Estonia battled a three-week-long cyber-attack targeting the websites of state institutions, banks and the media. This threat or the attack took place without any formal declaration of conflict using a combination of several subversive activities in order to destabilize Estonia's internal security environment. These anti-state activities took place "coincidentally" during disputes with Russia over the relocation of the war memorial from the center of Tallinn to the periphery. This invasion of Estonia was considered politically motivated as well as cyber-attacks carried out (Kozlowski, 2014). The monument provoked an uprising of the Russian minority in Estonia, but Estonians perceive it as a symbol of Russian occupation. The cyber-attacks lasted until Estonia was

assisted by the North Atlantic Alliance. In 2008, Estonia established the Center of Excellence for Cyber Security Cooperation in the North Atlantic Alliance. In addition to accusing Russia of cyber-attacks, Estonia suspects Estonia of espionage activities on its territory. The response to cyber-attacks is also an increased activity of citizens, who voluntarily check messages and comments in the online space and prevent the spread of misinformation, thus eliminating hybrid threats in the cyberspace. There are thousands of citizens involved in the prevention of cyber threats in Estonia but also in Lithuania and Latvia. The aim is to reduce subversive activities on networks, and to reduce the impact of false messages called trolls. This citizens' initiative was established in Lithuania in 2014.

Conclusion

Given the comparison of individual states, we can say that the biggest initiator of hybrid threats in the post-Soviet space is Russia, which participates in a wide range of its activities in this area in order to dominate this territory or at least part of it. It is not clear how much and in what combination it most often uses hybrid threats to subvert the relative stability of states in the region. Kazakhstan or Georgia, which, like Estonia, accuse Russia of destabilizing, can also speak of hybrid threats on their territory. However, European states often call on the help of institutions that help them in the fight against hybrid threats, and gradually states themselves create defense mechanisms to prevent hybrid threats.

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FORMATION OF REGIONAL ENERGY SECURITY COMMUNITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE: A CONSTRUCTIVIST INVESTIGATION OF THE NORD STREAM 2

Margaréta de la Infanta¹

ABSTRACT

The Nord Stream 2 is an offshore gas pipeline heading from Russia to Germany under the Baltic Sea, where several European companies cooperate or are co-owners. Central European countries are often presented in local and international media as detractors of Nord Stream 2 gas project. The main objective is to define a concept of Regional Energy Security Community/Complex and to sort out the Central European countries associated to those concepts. Since no research has scrutinized the attitude of these countries, the paper analyses: Why Regional Energy Security Community/Complex are created? What are the reasons Poland is strongly opposed to Nord Stream2? What is the main reason that most of Central European countries are neutrally favorable to the gas project? The Speeches of politicians from Central Europe were analysed together with the securitisation of the Nord Stream 2. The research is articulated within a qualitative analysis. To take a fresh look within energy security investigation, as methods, a constructivist operational method for the process of securitization is employed - Speech act, comparative method, case study and coding. The technique of ATLAS.ti was used. Contrary to the presentation by the main detractor of the Nord Stream 2 – Poland and massmedia, other countries in Central Europe make part of the proponents of the project. The investigation identifies that majority of Central European countries are formed within the Regional Energy Security Community. They are looking for ways of how to be connected to the project, demonstrating amity perception and cooperative interdependence. Poland belongs to Regional Energy Security Complex, perceiving a mutual interdependence with Russia as a threat. Securitisation of the Nord Stream 2 by Poland in various areas does not affect on the energy security perception of other states in Central Europe. The research has demonstrated that Speech act theory represents an innovative way of using the theory created in linguistics, as a method of research in International Relations, applied to energy security. The authentic advocates of the Nord Stream 2 were identified as a result of this method. The involvement of an External actor is also partially included.

Key words: Security Community, Regional Energy Security Complex, Energy Security, gas interdependence, energy dependence, Nord Stream 2, Russia, Central Europe, Speech act theory, ATLAS.ti

Introduction

The European Union is officially considered as a security community, because the states in EU should share the same values and similar perception of

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the threats. But in reality, we observe that there is a different perception of threats by various states. For instance, migration of economic illegal migrants is considered as a threat by CEE.

In the actual investigation within energy sector, it was discovered that we cannot talk about Security Community within the whole Europe. In fact, some states in Central Europe² belong to Energy Security Community and some to Energy Security Complex. The construction of Energy Security Community / Complex depends on different perception of the threat/energy dependency perception and securitisation/desecuritisation by various states in Europe.

Security is present in almost every sphere of our lives. Nowadays we can talk about military, economic, social, and environmental. Energy Security until recently was not considered as a security question. Especially after several energy crises in 2006, 2008, 2009, 2014 and 2015 between the EU, Russia and the transit countries, which have contributed to the politicization and securitisation of the energy dilemma. Although Russia is perceived as a relatively stable supplier of energy resources to the EU, in some states of Europe, the need for diversification away from Russia was proclaimed arguing about the strong dependence of the EU on Russia. The project, supposed to be operational in 2020, was halted for several months due to the impositions of US sanctions. It is targeted by further sanctions and threatening letters from USA since the owners of the project, with support of some governments, continue its finalization. US sanctions led to a confrontation with the EU and most of the states in Europe. Therefore, controversial, politicized and securitized interpretation of mutual interdependence on gas makes the conflict indeed worse.

The focus of the research is to study Energy Security between Russia and Central Europe within the Regional Energy Security Complex and the Regional Energy Security Community. Moreover, the Speech act theory is used for analysis of the illocutionary speech acts of the policymakers for securitisation and desecuritisation of the Nord Stream two pipeline.

The Nord Stream project, especially its second line, which is in construction limbo for the moment, is exposed to different perceptions by various states in Europe and external actors impacting the construction or blockage of Nord Stream 2, affects the perception of energy security balancing. At the difference of energy balancing, this is perceived by various states within a specific perspective, not yet as something taking place objectively. Because of the importance of energy security for the states, comparable securitisation or desecuritisation speeches occur and, in this way, leading to the alignment of certain states within a similar rhetoric. The investigation is important, because according to a theory of Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), Europe is composed of two centered

² The author is grateful to Dr. Jaroslav Ušiak, who gave to the author a courage to pursue the research focused on Central European countries analysis about the Nord Stream 2 gas project. For the results of the research, responsibility lies with the author.

RSCs: Russia and the EU. In this investigation, we can observe that in energy issues some states are reunifying the RSCs of Russia rather than the EU and proves that the theory of RSCT is not static.

Taking into account the complexity of the gas pipeline as a phenomenon with a huge impact, the research is articulated within qualitative analysis. As a methodology, discourse analysis has been chosen. As means, a constructivist operational approach for the process of securitization is employed, Speech act, comparative method, case study and coding.

All of them are used for the analysis of in depth speeches of politicians, taking into account the macro-internationality. As a technique, computer assisted qualitative data analysis software – Atlas.ti was used for augmenting the transparency, efficiency and visual demonstration of contradictions of some politicians, compared to the simple reading of speeches. Network analysis within Atlas.ti supported the process of structured thinking.

The research sets several objectives, but in this presentation only one will be analysed due to space restrictions. The main objective is to define and develop a concept of Regional Energy Security Community and to sort out the countries belonging to Regional Energy Security Complex/Community in Central European area. It concerns the grammar of securitization that securitizing actors of the countries in CEE express. Selection of the most important illocutionary speech acts are included out of the whole research realised.

The approach of the analysis is led in terms of Regional Security Complex Theory elaborated by the Copenhagen School of International Relations. The speeches of policy leaders about Nord Stream 2 were scrutinized and based on the speeches, the countries were sorted out to Regional Energy Security Community or Complex. Copenhagen school does not place energy at its focus of research interest. Energy issue is included as a section of economic security sector in the Regional Security Complex Theory.

The point of view of RSCT is opposite to that of Huntington's Clash of civilisations (1993). What is similar is the emphasis on the importance of a distinct middle level between a state and global system. Huntington emphasises the clash among large civilisations like Islam, West and Asia and emergence of conflict of culturally affiliated macro-units. On the contrary, RSCT stresses that security regions form subsystems in which security interactions are internal. States fear their neighbours and associate with other regional actors, borders between regions are mostly geographically circumscribed. Huntington's theory ends up with a struggle at the system level, placing United States at the centre. But from the point of view of most of other countries in world, the strategic context is not at the system level, but the regional level has a priority. Regions matter more in current period and cost of underestimating can be high (Buzan 2003:41). The approach of RSCT is bottom up and captures specificities of regions and then gather global picture from these elements.

Studies of “regional security” are led usually without any coherent theoretical setting. This is because there were only some basic notions about balance of power and interdependence taken from system level. The approach of RSCT is constructed around security. Therefore, it is up to us to map the security practises. RSC is our analytical term and is created according to our criteria. It is not defined according to criteria of practitioners. The evaluation is on securitisation practices of practitioners. RSCs are therefore very particular, functionally defined regions, which are mutually exclusive. They gravitate in world among insulator states and global actors.



1 Regional Energy Security Complex in Central Europe

Regional Security Complex: RSC is our analytical term and therefore something adds up to RSC when it qualifies according to our criteria. It is very specific, functionally defined type of regions which may or may not coincide with more general understanding of region. It can have overlapping memberships. A concept as SECURITY COMPLEX is defined not by whether actors label themselves a complex, but by analysts interpretation of who is actually interconnected in terms of security interaction (Buzan et al. 1998, p.34). Security complex is a constellation of security concerns, Security complex is not defined by actors but by referent objects. Referent objects are more basic, relevant on security landscape (Buzan et al. 1998, p.43).

1.1 Poland

In Poland, a political storm was raised around the Nord Stream project. This country has received extensive media interest, which led to rethinking of

national policy priorities as a result of pipeline. This situation can be associated with its historically difficult relationships with Germany and Russia, the countries where the companies constructing the pipeline are based. Also Poland's geographical location on the energy transit corridor is important because it is connecting Oriental Europe with Western Europe. Although the pipeline was supposed to connect two geographical units, it has led to new divisions among these neighbour countries.

The Polish voice is the most critical of all involved states. From Polish policy leaders, we can often read that dependence on Russia will a priori boost its influence over Europe. This argument was already explained in previous pages. Poland is mainly motivated by business interests. The aim of Poland is to become a hub for alternative gas supplies to Europe, especially liquefied natural gas (LNG). The import of cheaper Russian gas can make this business plan unrealistic. But investment in some alternative gas is needed, in order to avoid a monopolistic stranglehold over Europe's energy supplies. The question arises who will finance the alternative project led in parallel with NS2, which would be economically expensive?

USA as an external actor tries to influence the energy politics in Europe, because it has an excess of liquefied gas and another US aim is to undermine the state budget of Russia.

We will focus again our attention on securitization speeches of politicians, choosing some of the speeches out of the whole research realised. For instance, Polish Prime Minister, Mateusz Morawiecki has securitized an issue for Poland and Ukraine of Nord Stream 2 construction with these words:

Two powerful countries, one of which is a world power, Russia, and the other, Germany, the fourth economy of the world, decided to build a gas pipeline. These are two powerful States and... it is not easy to prohibit them from doing something. We believe that it contradicts European rules. It is egoistic activity. We also believe that it contradicts security guarantees for this part of the world: for Ukraine and Poland. (Uawire.org, 2019b)

Prime Minister Morawiecki wanted to explain that it is impossible to stop two powerful countries in their decision and that Germany is supporting the pipeline only for its business purposes in order to sell the gas to other European countries. Moreover, Poland is worried whenever there is some close cooperation between Germany and Russia, which is due to historical experience of Poland.³

³ Russia was a part of the Soviet Union. After the German-Soviet non-aggression pact, Poland was invaded by Nazi Germany on 1 September 1939 and by Soviet Union on 17 September. In October Germany and Soviet Union divided Poland and annexed the whole state. After the Axis attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, Poland was occupied entirely by Germany. Polish citizens suffered loss of human and material conditions. Institute of National Remembrance says about

Because of Germany, the transition fees paid until now via Yamal-Europe pipeline leading from Russia, towards Poland and Germany, will be diminished. It is because transit flows of gas from Poland to Germany will be cut down. It is true that Nord Stream 2 is an additional benefit for Germany and other source of supply if alternative routes are disrupted. When Nord Stream 2 and Turkish Stream will become operational, Ukraine will lose of 205,9 bcm per year of transit capacity of Russian gas to Europe. With this capacity, Russia can reduce gas flows via Poland and Ukraine, which will undermine the negotiation ability of the mentioned countries with Gazprom. The EU intends to keep Ukraine a transit state. But who will pay for its transit pipelines, which need to be refurbished if Gazprom might not be interested? Is it egoistic to look for its own national interest? Referent object in speech of Morawiecki is EU and states of Poland and Ukraine. Prime Minister is securitizing a topic in his last sentence, because Poland is losing its negotiation capacity with Gazprom and possible transit fees paid in millions of EUR.

Moreover, geopolitically, Poland has a desire to become a leader state⁴ of Intermarium - Three Seas Initiative⁵ - idea supported by USA also. Aim of Poland, instrumented by USA, is to stand between Germany and Russia in order not to block interconnectivity between Germany and Russia due to historical fear. US aim is to block cooperation between Russia and Germany since cooperation of German technologies and Russian resources can easily eject USA as a global actor. Idea of Three Seas was supported directly by USA also on the meetings of the concerned countries and President Donald Trump in 2017.

The Prime Minister stressed also: “We need allies that will seriously raise the question [of the need to construct the gas pipeline]” (Uawire.org 2019b). Therefore, Poland is looking for allies in Europe – such as the Ukraine and outside Europe its main supporter is USA, which imposed sanctions on European

5.82 million Polish citizens died as a result of the German occupation and about 150,000 died as a result of the Soviet occupation (Expatica, 2009).

⁴ Poland’s idea, backed by USA, is to undermine both the fading German-dominated EU and ambitions of Russia. Poland stands to not just become a major geopolitical actor by bridging East and West as leader of the Intermarium. Pompeo demonstrated it clearly in the August visit in 2020 where he preferred to talk to Central European leaders, instead of German Angela Merkel. It was a clear message for Merkel, where USA showed that US main partner in Europe is Poland. Poland however claims that although the name is TSI, the debate in Poland is around the idea if it is the old Intermarium idea of a Polish lead bloc in Central and Oriental Europe, while Poland is denying this role. The risk taken deliberately to please a domestic audience for whom such ‘maritime’ metaphors will invoke the image of Polish grandeur and regional leadership. Officially it is an initiative of several member states coming together to collaborate more intensely on matters of mutual interest.

⁵ The origins of the Intermarium and its geopolitical implication comes back to 1569, where the Union of Lublin (1569) forged a single confederation comprising of Poland and Lithuania. For Lithuania, this union secured their eastern frontier from Russia; whereas the small, but more modern Polish kingdom sought new lands, which included Ukraine, that Lithuania willingly agreed to.

companies, private persons involved in construction of Nord Stream 2 and threatens German ports also. He is making a direct call for a securitization in politics among the largest possible audience.

Polish prime minister Morawiecky, said in February before his trip to Berlin in 2018:

In case of Nord Stream 2 operation, Russian dependence on Ukraine will be declining. We can imagine then various military and political scenarios, and this is the thing I warn our allies against. This is the danger I talked to Mr. Tillerson about in Warsaw a few weeks ago. (Kajmowicz, 2018)

He clearly securitized the Nord Stream 2 in a military and political way, where the threat is Russian state. This would look like an explanation inspired by liberalism, which stipulates that more interdependence among states, the better relations there are, and the conflict cannot appear. But traditional IR theories were proved insufficient in order to explain the actual situation.⁶ Therefore, the use of Speech Act theory explains better analysis in energy security, since Poland is using a large palette of securitization issues, transcending energy security from one security sector to another and presents lot of referent objects of possible threats. The interesting aspect is that Morawiecky is securitizing the diminishing dependence of Russian state on Ukraine. As an educated economist, he is playing on liberal notions and tries to put on his side the orthodox liberals from Western part of Europe.⁷ The referent object of a possible threat is the whole continent of Europe.

Also, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs considers Nord Stream 2 as a threat Europe's energy security. During the Warsaw Security Forum, several politicians have exposed their ideas. Polish authorities lobbied for the putting of the second branch of the pipeline as a subject to EU law, which would make the investment unprofitable for Gazprom. Czaputowicz warned of project's wider geopolitical and security implications.

If finished, the Nord Stream 2 could become a political tool in the hands of Moscow according of Poland: "The transmission line itself gives Russia a pretext to patrol the entire Baltic Sea or it can be used to send information. It has this military dimension. (Brzozowski, 2018)

⁶ There were conflicts among Ukraine and Russia about gas dispute, even though interdependence of Ukraine on Russian gas was very high. Liberal theories suggest that more interdependence, less possibility of conflict or war among states.

⁷ Morawiecki was nominated in December 2017 as Prime Minister of Poland by the chief staff of the ruling Law and Justice conservative party.

He is securitising the topic in politics and military sector, especially due to history, geography. The referent object is sovereignty and state of Poland, Region of Baltic Sea.

At the Council of the Baltic Sea States at Reykjavik, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs (2015- 18) stated Witold Waszczykowski: “The Nord Stream 2 project creates a major risk to the diversification of gas supply sources in the region” (uawire 2017). Polish foreign minister puts the project as political not economical. He wants to say that the project is created to have political influence within Europe. This is an example of securitization in politics.

He added that within regional energy security, solutions must be found which will be beneficial for everyone. As examples of such solutions, he mentioned the North-South Gas Corridor and the Baltic regional investment plan, which look for eliminating of dependence on Russian gas. The solution for him would be to look for another alternative projects or to construct different gas pipelines with other suppliers.

He also emphasized that he does not understand Germany’s position, which regards Nord Stream 2 favorably. According to him, it is:

obviously political, and wants to bypass Central Europe in order to blackmail it in future. Eventually the Russians will use the gas supply as a political weapon, which they don’t even hide. They will blackmail our part of Europe. We cannot agree to this. (Uawire, 2017)

He is securitizing the area of Central Europa as a referent object, where Russia can use Nord Stream as a political weapon blackmailing this region. Securitisation is in political sector.

Polish Foreign Minister said that he is constantly consulting the problem with the Americans: “*The Americans understand our arguments and the significance of the problem*” (Uawire, 2017). This speech revelation proves that USA might be acting in coordination with Poland, as US admitted in case of Ukraine. It reveals also that Poland is subordinated to another Regional security complex – USA and promoting its ideas, which are in contradiction with Vysegrad group states.

Environmental issues were not mentioned by Polish policy leaders as it was with Nord Stream 1. Although the economic sector has the least successful securitization, Poland managed to securitize issue of high dependence on Russian gas by Europe. This was especially possible after 2009 crisis of gas supply to Europe. Therefore, the EU decided to diversify its supply of gas and promoted alternative suppliers and LNG construction.

Blocking the project, therefore, does not seem realistic. But Poland with its opponents has succeeded in securitization speeches of this project, which was regarded as purely economic for several years. It has had an immense impact on audience, such as European Parliament (majority of votes in EP against the

project), European Commission (New directive towards Nord Stream 2) and USA (several sanctions against European companies, ports in use and in preparation).

Moreover, Poland is presenting Nord stream 2 as a Russian tool against NATO. Poland tries to present various referent objects which are threatened such as: (1) as EU (2) the Polish state (3) the Polish nation (4) the Central Europe region and (5) is also NATO in order to alarm USA and Ukraine (6). USA - according the RAND corporation plans (Dobbins 2019) financed by the US budget, will support anti-Russian tendencies in Ukraine, promote regime change in Belarus. The authors of the report point out that Washington can count on Warsaw's "hawks". In this document the strategy of promoting further sanctions and the boycotting of Russian raw materials is the best option to eliminate Russia. And Poland is fulfilling this role very good for USA's satisfaction. What is crucial is to make Poland a weapon to fight the import of Russian gas and exchange it for liquefied gas imported from the United States. The Government of Law and Justice is pursuing such a strategy

Poland as a main opponent has contributed to the fact, that Nord Stream 2 has a large geo-political consequences. Not only it was included among the topics of important basis within geopolitical discussions and topics during all working and officials visits by all state representatives. Nord Stream 2 project served as an excuse to launch more actively a geopolitical strategy against Russia in form of the Three seas initiative.

Poland therefore tried to look for other allies also within its neighbors in Europe and tried to renew old geopolitical project of Intermarium or Three Seas Initiative - TSI. This was successful and the first meeting was organized in 2016.

We can observe that the Polish position on Nord Stream 2 is the same as with Nord stream 1 project. Polish grammar of securitization is the most visible. Polish politicians are demonstrating what elements of a securitizing move in a speech act should be included. Securitization of Nord Stream 2 prevails in all areas, political, economic, and military. Even though Poland has more than 190 gas suppliers and the dependence on Russia is low, the speeches of politicians are very aggressive. If we analyze separate opinions and words to express the disagreement with Nord Stream 2, we will find all securitization items in speeches of the Polish politicians. Speeches which securitize a topic within military, politics and economy in amount of analyzed documents are similarly represented with more representation of political securitization. The idea is to present the project not as a business deal but as a political tool.

Poland openly admits that it is a political decision to stop Nord Stream 2, no matter of how low priced will Russian gas be and it was a political choice to buy more expensive LNG American gas.

To conclude, Polish grammar of securitization is the most visible, showing how securitization move in speech act should be. The polish position of Nord Stream is the most hostile when analyzing separate attitudes and words of polish political elites to express their dissatisfaction. The threat perception is high,

despite a small energy dependence in Poland. Enmity in Poland is reflected in looking for other suppliers than Russia, to cut off the dependence on Russian gas completely, looking for allies against Russia in Europe and out of Europe, in securitisation of Russian gas dependency in all sectors, as well as of securitisation of Russia.

2 Regional Energy Security Community

The Regional Energy Security Community is formed by countries which perceive positively the interdependence on supplying Russian gas. They do not securitize Russian gas, in contrast with the Regional Energy Security Complex. They might desecuritize the topic of the construction of North Stream 2, but on the other hand, since energy is a security issue, they use „antagonistic securitization“. We begin providing a network analysis graph of amity in securitization speeches, presented by various states: Austria, Slovak Republic, Czech Republic, Hungary, France, Germany, and Russia.

Some of the countries perceive very strong amity towards the project of Nord Stream 2, while other countries, such as Slovakia and Czech Republic, are more neutral to this project, because of their close neighborhood to Poland. In this chapter we will evaluate countries of Central Europe: Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary and Austria. Russia's attitude towards Nord Stream 2 will be evaluated also, since the mentioned countries form Energy security community with Russia.

2.1 Slovakia

Central European countries do not share the same view as Poland, which can be seen in speeches by policymakers. Some of them depended on the gas supply from Russia more than 80%.

There are very few speeches by Slovak policymakers. Since Slovakia is dependent on 100% gas supply from Russia, and does not have any access to sea, compared to Poland, LNG is not option for Slovakia or for other countries in Central Europe.

At this time, the Prime Minister of Slovak Republic - Rober Fico has articulated his concerns during the working visit of Prime Minister of Ukraine Arsenij Jacenuk in Slovakia.

Several months it has been told within European Council, that it is necessary to help to Ukraine in order to keep her status of transit country. Suddenly, there was an announcement, that Gazprom has signed an agreement with gas companies from western EU countries about the possibility of building another line of Nord Stream. I will use an expressive expression - they make idiots from us. It is not possible to talk politically about the need to stabilize the situation for several months and years and then take a decision that puts not only

Ukraine but, above all, Slovakia in an unenviable situation. These are gas transits in huge volumes through Ukraine and Slovakia, and if this transit is interrupted, Ukraine will lose billions and Slovakia hundreds of millions of euros. (Government office of Slovak Republic, 2015)

We can observe that Prime Minister of Slovakia tries to uphold the gas transit via Ukraine and therefore via Slovakia, because of transit money which can be lost. But he is diplomatic; knowing that Ukraine is totally against this project, since Jacenuk has pointed out that that the project is anti-Ukrainian and anti-European. The Slovak prime minister does not express his opinion about Nord Stream 2, knowing that cheap gas will be necessary in the future in Europe. Securitization is mostly about Ukraine, but concerning her political and economic situation. We do not observe any remark of securitisation of new energy project. On the contrary, the interdependence on Russian gas is perceived positively by Slovak leader and he desires to keep the status quo- therefore to supply cheap Russian gas to Europe via Ukraine and Slovakia.

Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico talked with British Prime Minister Cameron in 2016 in London also about Nord Stream 2, which should be delivering gas to Europe avoiding Ukraine and Slovakia. While Germany considers the project as a purely economic project with private investors, Slovak Prime Minister said that it is a political project. Cameron agreed about it. Robert Fico added: *"And in this way, it must be also evaluated. First of all, it must be in accordance with all principles of the Energy Union"* (Government Office of Slovak Republic, 2016). Prime minister did not express any negative opinion or any securitization about Nord Stream 2, even though Slovakia would be losing millions of Euro on transit. Contrary, he only suggested that it must fulfill the criteria of the Energy Union. His attitude was later changed, as it is clear now that Slovakia will also earn on transit thanks to the connection on Nord Stream 2 and possibly to the Turk Stream project. Also, the transit of Russian gas via Ukraine is maintained because the contract between Russia and Ukraine was signed in 2019 for another 5 year period.

Then Ministry of Economy Peter Ziga has proclaimed about Nord Stream 2:

On the other hand, we are very sensitive to the preparation of some new gas infrastructure projects with an impact on the EU market. Such is, for example, the Nord Stream 2 project. The opposition voice of several European countries proves its legible negatives. In our opinion, all such projects should be in line with European energy goals, should contribute to increasing energy security, should also fully diversify sources and transport routes, as well as comply with EU legislation. For the Slovak Republic, in terms of transport routes and corridors, the absolute priority is to maintain gas transport through

the corridor through Ukraine and Slovakia. (Ministry of Economy of Slovakia, 2016)

His aim is to keep the project within EU rules. No securitisation of new Russian projects is visible, neither Russia is securitised as a supplier. He reiterated that priority for Slovakia is to maintain the Ukraine transit. In 2016, it was not yet clear that Slovakia can be connected to Nord Stream 2 and earn also on transit fees.

Later at the meeting with the Russian Ministry of economic development, Economy Minister Ziga proclaimed quite undiplomatically: *“It will not bring any benefits to either side, we consider it unnecessary”*, recalling that in terms of transport routes and corridors, maintaining the transport of gas through the corridor through Ukraine and Slovakia is an absolute priority in order to ensure a high level of security of gas supply.

This is an example of *antagonistic securitization* act, which is a term used when politicians from a RES community treat an issue as security but do not securitize it in negative way as do countries in a RES complex. He is considering a supply of Russian gas as an important security question. Therefore, we can observe Amity in his speech. However, it was well-known that it will bring huge benefits to Russia, to Germany and the price of gas will diminish for final customers. Nowadays, it is already recognized, that all countries in Central Europe (except of Poland) will be connected to this project and will earn money on transit from west to east or to south.

Subsequently, Minister Ziga discussed with President Putin about the possibilities of connection and the usefulness of Slovak pipelines in transmission of Russian gas. Slovakia is looking how to connect the Slovak gas network with Nord stream 2, instead of securitizing the issue:

We are making technical adjustments. Roughly 60 million euros are going to the new compressor station, which will be used to draw capacity that would flow to us through NS2. (Ministry of Economy of Slovakia, 2019)

Slovakia, together with Czech Republic and Hungary, understood that gas will be delivered from Germany to CEE countries and there is a possibility of how to become connected to the new pipeline. This is a different attitude compared to Poland and Baltic states. Moreover, Slovakia offers to the Gazprom a possibility to use its underground territory for stocking of the gas. Russia has declared the will and continuation for gas delivery via Ukraine and Slovakia after the contract expiration in 2019. We can observe that the Minister Ziga altered his attitude towards more clear Amity position.

The new Prime Minister of Slovakia Peter Pellegrini stated at the signing ceremony of the supply of nuclear propellant agreement for Slovakia:

Slovakia is one of the most open economies in the world. Therefore, it is crucial and important for us to have well-balanced political relations with all countries. I want to declare very clearly, that Slovakia wants to have friendly relations based on mutual respect with Russia. These relations should be based on the confidence, pragmatic cooperation, in the way, how it should be for modern countries of 21. Century. Russian Federation is one of the most important business partners with Slovakia out of the EU countries. We see a big potential in the future. Our cooperation is present not only in a commercial and energy sector, even though it is a key area. I would like to thank you, Prime Minister, for noting that the security of the Slovak Republic's energy will in no way be threatened in the future. This is good news for the people of Slovakia and for Slovak companies. I would like to thank you as the head of the Government for this clear-cut pragmatic position. Slovakia wants to continue to be a transit country for gas and oil, as it is nowadays. Transport will become another important pillar. Russia is a good partner in area of energy for Slovakia, and Slovakia wants also to be a good partner for Russia and fulfill its obligation. (Peter Pellegrini, 2019)

Pellegrini declares that friendly relations are important. Especially as Russia is the third most important foreign business partner. He is pleased about the declaration of Russia and continuation of energy supply. For the Prime Minister, it is important to keep the status of Slovakia as a transit country and to carry on deliveries of Russian gas to Europe. He wanted to point out, that the desire of Slovakia is to transit the Russian gas. In 2019, it was not yet clear, how Slovakia can be connected to Nord Stream 2. Pellegrini might have been talking about the transit from east to west.

Moreover, there is no securitisation of Russia or Nord Stream as in Poland's case. It might have been due to the fact, that there was already some reflection of the possibility to deliver gas anyway via Slovakia to east and south thanks to connection with Nord Stream 2. On the contrary, Pellegrini expressed that Russia is a good partner in energy. The Slovak Republic represents therefore a totally different attitude about Nord Stream than Poland.

After the press conference, Pellegrini was faced with a direct question from a Russian journalist about the fact that last month he, along with President Trump, spoke out against the Nord Stream 2 project and supported reverse-flow gas supplies to Ukraine. She stated also, the fact that Slovakia is earning money on reverse-flow to Ukraine. She wanted to know reasons of this declaration on which the audience received a diplomatic answer from Pellegrini:

The attitude of Slovakia to Nord stream 2 has its rational justification. Yes, initially this project had the capacity of changing existing gas supplies from Russia to Europe, and, of course, (we have stated this

openly), this may have a significant impact on the infrastructure that goes through Slovakia. Based on this understanding, the Slovak Republic has adopted this position. (Peter Pellegrini, 2019)

We can observe that Pellegrini is justifying logically his attitude about Nord Stream 2. He expresses the fear of discontinuation of Russian gas via Slovakia, if the project is finished.

On the other hand, we are looking for opportunities to use the existing Slovak infrastructure and include it in gas transit in case Nord Stream 2 becomes operational. Also, the Slovak Republic is looking for opportunities for our transit infrastructure to be included in gas supplies, which, in the future, will go through our territory as part of the TurkStream. If Slovakia could find opportunities for cooperation in the first and the second case, it would alleviate any economic ramifications. Of course, it would not be good if our territory were left out from this supply system. You should realize that it has economic reasons for us. We must deal with this matter very seriously. Today, we listened to the positions of the ministers and the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation. (Peter Pellegrini, 2019)

Prime Minister Pellegrini is looking for possibilities of Slovakia to be connected to these new projects of Nord Stream 2 and Turk Stream. He is not securitizing either of them. On the contrary, he shows Amity towards the transit of gas from Russia and also seeks opportunities, how to be connected to other new pipelines.

Later he talks about the stocking options of gas under ground and cooperation with Gazprom:

I see a big potential in stocking gas in Slovakia. We have the biggest stock of underground gas in Europe. This stock is already today used by Russian company Gazprom. We have offered to Russian companies to augment this capacity, so that in Slovakia, we can have even more underground gas stock. (Peter Pellegrini, 2019)

His attitude towards Russia and Gazprom is amicable. Prime Minister Pellegrini even proposed to Gazprom the territory of Slovakia for its stock of gas. Towards new pipelines as Nord stream 2 and Turk stream he does not express any negative feeling, on the contrary he is pragmatically looking for paths, of how to be connected to these pipelines. We do not observe any securitisation of new pipelines and any securitisation move.

At the moment we can present the fact, that Slovakia will continue the transit of Russian gas from Ukraine to west. The will of transferring gas via territory of Slovakia was confirmed by Prime Minister Medvedev, even before the contract with Ukraine was negotiated. Perception of positive interdependence

of gas by Slovak policymakers derives also from history, since there were no problems with supply in the past on the Russian side. Slovakia does not share any threat perception to be dependent on 100% on Russian gas as it is in case of Poland which is dependent on less than 60%. Moreover, it is advantageous to negotiate with Russia, because Slovakia will buy Russian gas, oil and fuel for nuclear power plants anyway.

Although Slovakia participated in a signature of the letter signed by nine Prime Ministers in 2016, the situation has changed since then. In the letter, they expressed their worries about the change of transit flow of Russian gas by avoiding Ukraine, which is against the priority of Slovakia in the area of securing energy security. The only concern was transit of Russian gas via Ukraine, which is now resolved thanks to a new contract with Ukraine and Russia. Out of the signed letter by Prime ministers, only Poland and the Baltic countries are securitizing a project at this moment and desires in several years to cut completely the delivery of Russian gas to Poland. Instead it plans to buy American LNG and supply gas from Norway.

Also, what is important to understand is the fact that Russian gas will be delivered from Germany from Nord Stream 2 if operational, and will come to Slovakia via Moravia – Czech Republic and will continue towards Austria or Ukraine. Slovakia will become an intersection of supplies from western and southern pipelines. Through Slovakia, gas supply will flow to Ukraine, which is a new situation as it was until now.⁸ Thanks to this, Slovakia will gain other transit fees on Russian gas, this time coming from west part. It will be equally economically advantageous as with unique flow east to west, which is maintained. This advantage was quickly understood also by Czech Republic and Hungary and we can see it reflected in speeches of policymakers. Amity pattern relates to connection of Nord Stream 2, possibly of Turk Stream, offer of further underground stocking for Gazprom's gas.

2.2 Austria

Austria is a participating country in Nord Stream 2 with OMV. During the visit of Pompeo – US Minister of Foreign Affairs in august 2020, the Prime Minister of Austria showed to Pompeo a card of Austria, reminding him that Austria is a neutral country.

Austria and Italy were the first countries to rebel against the US attempt to influence Europe's supply of energy from Russia. Austrian Vice-Chancellor Heinz Christian Strache called for an end to Moscow's sanctions. Due to sanctions on Russia, which were also adopted by Brussels under pressure from Washington, EU member states are starting to boycott sanctions against Russia. *“That needs to*

⁸ The Exception of Russian gas flow from Slovakia to Ukraine was in 2015, where Slovakia enabled reverse flow to Ukraine, which was a success and saved Ukraine in winter.

be stopped“, Strache explains in the Viennese daily Oesterreich, adding that *“sanctions on Russia have caused damage to the Austrian economy”* (Sudecký, 2018).

“It is an extreme time for sanctions to be lifted and security and economic relations with Moscow to return to normal” From 2014, when the sanctions were imposed, until 2016, Russia lost 25 billion of Euro, but Europe lost up to 100 billion Euros (Sudecký 2018). This statement came for the first time from a top leader of an EU country, which were followed also by Italian politicians.

Austria is presenting its opinion which is against sanctions. This is a sign that a country demonstrates amity perception of Russia. As we can see later, leaders of Austria are strongly criticizing US sanctions against European companies involved in a project and demonstrate strong support of project, like Germany. Austrian politicians are most concerned about the fate of the semi-state-owned company OMV, which is cooperating with Russia's Gazprom on the North Stream 2 project.

Strache warned:

Sanctions had forced Russia to cooperate more with China. The trade and sanction wars that are currently underway are an unfair means of competition, which pushes rivals out of the market. (Sudecký, 2018)

Austria is strongly criticizing sanctions against European companies, because in the future this practice from the US can block future projects in energy between Russia and European companies. This can lead to the fact that Russia will choose its future partners from Asia instead of Europe.

Sebastian Kurz – Austrian Prime Minister, expressed his opinion about Nord Stream 2 at the Press Conference with President of OMV⁹ Rainer Seele. Sebastian Kurz declared: *“We can complete this project. This is the case that two routes are better than one, and three are better than two”* (Proquest, 2019). Kurz was defending the importance of diversifying the routes of the European gas market. Amity can be perceived clearly towards the project in his speech presentation.

2.3 Russia

The Nord Stream 2 project differs from Nord Stream 1, since in this project, we can observe the intents of an external actor to influence the construction with the aim to block it completely. For Russia, the project of Nord Stream 2 is one of its main disputes against USA. As Russia is dependent to a large extent on its gas exports, the aim of the external actor, which is USA is to maximize pressure on

⁹ The OMV Austria and other five European energy companies are involved in Nord Stream 2 project of offshore gas pipelines linking Russia and Germany through Baltic Sea.

Russia's income from gas exports, having consequences on national and defense budget (Dobbins, 2019, p. 62). Like with Nord Stream 1, the key speakers for Nord Stream 2 is President Putin and Medvedev. Since the population of Russia is not politicised and securitised with the project, the main audience is European. Russian leaders use the same type of reasoning as Germany and Austria, accentuating the commercial benefits of the Nord Stream 2. They often mention also supply security for Europe due to its diminishing reserves. Therefore, the majority of speeches are from press conferences or working visits in other European states.

The “*antagonistic securitisation*” is used by Russian leaders, accentuating the enhancement of Europe's energy security in a situation where European production will decrease. Nord Stream 2 is promoted also as a project, which will enhance the onshore infrastructure to transport gas from the pipelines across Europe. This will lead to inter-country connections and reverse flows.

Desecuritisation is visible mainly in environmental discussion, where it is argued that thanks to the monitoring of the Baltic Sea pipeline, Nord Stream 2 is fulfilling high standards of environmental protection, especially promoted by Energy Minister Novak.

President Putin has reassured that the Nord Stream 2 is a commercial project, accentuating that government is not involved in the project. He proclaimed the same statement as does Angela Merkel about commercial project. Moreover, the idea of only a commercial project was presented ten years ago about Nord stream 1 by Medvedev.

The desecuritisation and depolitisation is direct. The states within Regional Energy Security Community do not depreciate the issue from security and political area to the level of economic and environmental. Rather, the topic is referred as the element of security, but not as a threat. It is presented as something that boosts energy security. For this situation, the author invented the term “*antagonistic securitisation*”, which can be visible in the speeches of Russian politicians.

Zavalny as chairman of the State Duma Committee on Energy commented on the Austrian position about the statement made by Austrian Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg, about rejecting Washington's extraterritorial sanctions against the Nord Stream 2:

I would call this position the position of common sense. Europe depends on energy supplies, it is clear that Europe needs gas, only Russia can offer the necessary volumes of gas at affordable prices. It is clear that both Europe and Russia will benefit. (Tellerreport, 2020)

This is an example of the “*antagonistic securitisation*”, accentuating the enhancement of Europe's energy security. Moreover, economic aspects of the projects are promoted. He continues by pointing out about external actor:

the United States does not like this alignment, because they want to dominate both politics and the economy [...] And it is clear that European countries, such as Austria and Germany, which pursue a more independent policy, talk about this. And other countries that are more dependent (the Baltic countries, Poland) either take a negative, aggressive position with respect to Russia, or a neutral position. It's all visible, everything is clear - goals, objectives. (Tellerreport, 2020)

Zavalny expressed his opinion on the statement by Austrian Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg that Vienna rejects Washington's extraterritorial sanctions against the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project. He presented the same position about the Austrian statement, which means also depolitisation. Common sense is the only idea which leads to the construction of this project. He explained it in a clear and simple way. Zavalny uncovered the interests of USA behind its acting.

We can observe the merging of two RSC - Regional security complexes, where Germany and Austria were a part of EU-Europe RSC as a great power and Russia represents a separate RSC also as a great power. Applying it in energy security within Regional Energy Security Complex/Community, Germany, Austria and Russia - are merging within energy security more quickly also thanks to US actions where Amity is reinforced mutually. They represent the most stable actors of Regional Energy Security Community.

Important to the analysis is to include the reaction about the criticism of the project by the external actor – USA, a crucial part of the theory of Speech act, which says that a securitisation act is based also on the reliance on its own resources, trying to govern its actions by its own priorities (Buzan et al., 1998). The reaction from Russian leaders follows after the declaration of US President Trump:

I think it's very sad when Germany makes a massive oil and gas deal with Russia, where you're supposed to be guarding against Russia and Germany goes out and pays billions and billions of dollars a year to Russia. We are protecting Germany, we are protecting France, we are protecting all of these countries and then numerous of the countries go out and make a pipeline deal with Russia where they are paying billions of dollars into the coffers of Russia (Kajmowicz, 2020).

The Press Secretary for the President of Russia referred to this “as egregious example of unscrupulous competition motivated by forcing European buyers to purchase more expensive LNG” (Kajmowicz, 2020).

The press secretary had the same opinion as the German population in polls and some politicians from Regional Energy Security Community, that USA is forcing Europeans to buy more expensive LNG from USA. Peskov did not agree with Trump's comments on the political aspects of the pipeline. He stressed that

Nord Stream 2 is a purely commercial project that corresponds to the interests of suppliers of natural gas and the buyers of natural gas in Western Europe” (Kajmowicz, 2020). The position of USA, which is justified by theory about emphasising the actions of its own priorities, is strengthening the countries in the Energy Community to a more reactive position, as was demonstrated in the speeches of Russia, Germany and Austria.

To sum up, the Russian attitude and the way of how Russian politicians endeavor to dispute politicisation and securitisation of Nord Stream 2 is done in the same way as Austria and Germany, although Russia is more diplomatic in its speeches. Usually, the speeches of Russian politicians are articulated in economic terms, using the same words. In speeches are only a few desecuritisation declarations because as explained, the topic is handled within security area. For this situation, the notion of antagonistic securitization is used, invented by the author. Since 2020, the countries in Regional Energy Security Community have had to face the involvement of an external actor – USA in case of Nord Stream 2. Therefore theoretically, the overlay of external actor is validated and analyzed at least within some of the actors. In many speeches, a leader of one country from Energy Community is supporting the reasoning of the other country from Energy community. An interesting part of the conclusion is that compared to Nord Stream 1, the case of Nord Stream 2 differs curiously. The external actor with its over-use of sanctions targeting European companies involved in the project, provokes the rapprochement even closer of the countries within the Regional Energy Security Community. However, the one can notice that for Austria, Russia and Germany, due to their direct involvement of its companies or the future prospect of becoming the main gas hub for Russian gas in Europe, the speeches are profit driven and therefore can be one-sided.

2.4 Czech Republic

Czech Republic is not securitizing the project of Nord Stream 2 and therefore is within Regional Energy Security Community. There are only declarations of some of the politicians about disagreement with the project, without further explication of the reasons of disagreement. Moreover, the project of Nord Stream 2 is beneficial to the country, since it will be connected via the new Eugal gas pipeline to Nord Stream 2. Strong support of the project and of supply of Russian gas is presented by the President of Czech Republic.

The Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka received the Vice-President of the European Commission in 2015, Maroš Šefčovič, at the Straka Academy. The

topic of the meeting was the Energy Union project, which will be a priority of the topics promoted by Czech Presidency within the Visegrad Group¹⁰

I am glad that Prague is one of the first stops on Vice-President of European Commission Šefčovič's journey through Europe. In the Energy Union project, the Czech priority is to complete the internal energy market. At the same time, the Czech government will continue to insist on its own creation of the energy mix, including the core. In the further development of the Energy Union, the Czech Republic will strive for balanced adherence to the three European goals - security, price sustainability and environmental protection. (Government Office of Czech Republic, 2015)

In this speech, we do not observe any securitization of the project. Contrary, price sustainability and environmental protection is important for the Czech Republic, therefore we can deduce that he is in favour of the Nord Stream 2, since the prices after the completion of the project will be reduced for gas. Moreover, LNG is criticized by experts for being unecological due to the way, of using chemicals for its production. Side effects of using liquid gas for cooking or heating are unknown yet.

Prime Minister of Czech Republic - Andrej Babis during the press conference in 2018 communicated the opinion of Poland about Nord Stream 2, not his own, after the common negotiation of governments with Polish Prime Minister:

Our cooperation so far in a number of areas is bringing ever better results; we are getting stronger when we speak with a common voice. Cooperation in the field of energy security is also important to us. We also talked about this with the Prime Minister. I have once again presented the Polish position on Nord Stream II and the need not to build this pipeline, and also for those external connections to be part of the third energy package in Europe. I also commented on how this project is damaging to security of Europe. (Government Office of Czech Republic, 2018)

Babis is very diplomatic, since he knows about very strong opposition to the project by Poland. He commented that he was presenting a Polish position on the project, which means that Poland is against the construction of Nord Stream 2. This Polish declaration is written in Italics. Babis openly did not securitize the project. He only mentioned the referent object is Europe. We do not observe any enmity in his speech.

¹⁰ V4 is a cultural and political alliance of four countries of Central Europe (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), all of which are members of the EU and of NATO, to advance co-operation in military, cultural, economic and energy matters with one another.

In 2018, Prime Minister Andrej Babiš met with US Secretary of Energy Rick Perry in the Czech Republic. There was also talk of pan-European energy projects, including the Nord Stream II gas pipeline. Prime Minister Babiš presented the Czech Republic's view of the matter and informed Minister Perry that Europe is not united in its views on this pipeline. However, he added that the *“diversification of natural gas routes and sources in general increases energy security”* (Government Office of Czech Republic, 2018).

We can deduce from this speech that Babis is not against the project, but since he knows that USA is strongly opposed to the project, he did not dare to share his view. He was again diplomatic and was talking about diversification. For Babis, diversification has the same sense as in Germany. It is about diversification of gas routes, not necessary diversification of the suppliers. In this way, he is not against the project of Nord Stream 2 and he also does not rule out option to mix several suppliers. Again, we can not find any securitization in his word about Nord Stream. On the contrary, in this speech, he showed a positive attitude towards diversification of routes.

Czech President Miloš Zeman is presenting the point of view of the whole republic: *“I am glad that the Czech Republic has its own stance [on the issue] and protects its own interests”* (Russia Today International, 2017). During an official visit to Russia, the Czech leader explained that the decision to support the Nord Stream-2 project was taken on the basis of recommendations by the Czech Industry and Trade Ministry. Cooperative Interdependence is considered as positive and the President presents this point of view for the whole Czech Republic. For the President and Ministry, the supply of cheap gas is important.

He pronounces the words about *“protection of its own interests”*, since in July this year, there was the visit of US President Trump in Warsaw, putting pressure on leaders in the CEE during the Summit of the “Three Seas Initiative”, where the Czech Republic was present also. The aim of US President was promoting US liquefied natural gas exports in front of dozens of leaders from Central and Oriental Europe, a region strongly reliant on supply of Russian gas (Gotev, 2017).

Two years later at the Zofia forum, the President mentioned about the topic of National interest to the Czech Republic is that according to his analysis, the project of Nord Stream 2 is economically favorable for Czech Republic.

According to Czech President Zeman, who expressed his point of view on Žofínské Forum on the subject of Czech Republic National interest, the project of Nord Stream 2 is economically advantageous for the Czech Republic.

“I have let to make an analysis of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline and made sure that it was economically advantageous for the Czech Republic” (CTK, 2019). He added that this construction is allegedly already 80% completed. The President then continues with criticism of USA.

I see no reason at all why the 'big brother' overseas should comment on whether or not the pipeline should serve its purpose. Germany and

Russia have agreed on the project and the others have nothing to talk about. (CTK, 2019)

Mutual interdependence is seen as positive by the President. He expressed criticism towards USA who has no right to talk to other states' businesses. Then he is reasoning with economic terms. The Czech Republic does not possess energy raw materials and must import gas:

We have two options - either to import liquefied natural gas from overseas, or to import it from the other side of the globe in non-liquefied form. The problem is that the liquefied one is at least 30 percent more expensive than the non-liquefied one. The price difference is too big to be overlooked. (CTK, 2019)

Zeman has expressed the pragmatic point of view about US LNG and about other suppliers, which are too distant compared to Russia. He is maintaining the same position, as several years ago and supports Germany and Russia in doing its business. In this way, he is strongly desecuritizing the issue, because the project is seen as purely economic with no risks for the security of Europe, as it is presented by USA. In this way, Zeman wanted to uncover the real interest of USA to sell its gas in Europe. He demonstrated Amity towards the project and that security interdependence is seen as cooperative, the supply of cheap gas is a priority. Moreover, he criticized "big brother" meaning USA for meddling in the internal affairs of Germany and Russia.

The meeting between the President of the Republic Miloš Zeman and the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo at Prague Castle took place in a friendly atmosphere in august 2020. Zeman repeated his point of view, which he maintains (the support of Nord Stream 2 project), even though USA was lobbying for its LNG gas. As for Russia and China, the President of the Republic emphasized at the meeting that "his policy is pragmatic in the direction of economic diplomacy, not the interests of others" (Zeman 2020). In this way, he diplomatically answered, that the Czech Republic will not buy US liquefied gas or will not cancel other ongoing projects with Russia in nuclear power plants, since the President and his country will not be subordinated to interests of others. In the official letter President Zeman answered the questions asked by the author about the working visit between U.S. Foreign Affairs Minister and President Zeman. He stated that he recognized

in the construction of the Nord Stream 2 in the long run, a huge economic potential for Czech Republic because it would be possible, after its finalisation to transport gas for lower price than it would have been in a case of U.S. liquefied gas. On the contrary, the American government, within an economic diplomacy tries to ensure a market for its production, therefore USA is against the construction of the Nord Stream 2. It is predictable, that similar positons were supported

by U.S. Minister of foreign affairs during his working visits in Czech Republic and other Central European states. (Zeman 2020)

He presented a view that it is important to look on economic advantages and be pragmatic. Zeman also expressed his opinion about Poland and its attitude towards Russia. Zeman said that he *“understood Poland's bitterness because the pipeline would go outside its territory along the Baltic Sea, losing transit fees“*

Holík, a member of committee from SPD political party expressed his opinion about power games played within the region of Central Europe:

Czech Republic is a sovereign state and therefore it is important to push its own opinion. Not by what we're peeking at from the outside. I am an older year and I remember the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA, when we were in some subordination. In 1989, the slogans on Wenceslas Square read: We are not like them. But we are making the same policy now. We are in subordination again. (Sputnik news, 2020)

He also said that diplomacy should seek a common path, not a path to hostility. And he recalled the case of ricin, which he considers a fake. *“We fired agents for nothing. We changed the name of the streets and the like”* (Sputnik news, 2020).

Holík is criticizing the fact that external actors try to influence the position of Czech Republic, which is not favorable for the country, since they push Czech Republic to be presented as an enemy to Russia. Russia was a traditional supplier of gas and just because an external actor is considering it enemy, it does not mean that other countries should behave in this way. He stated that since Czech Republic has been in subordination within the EU and NATO, it has to listen to orders from these centers and act in favor of these institutions, even though he considers that there is a game played from the US side. In this way, he summed up the feeling of the majority of the population and politicians of the whole Central European region.

Gas from Nord Stream 2 is also to be used by the Czech Republic. Country will be connected to the undersea gas pipeline via the new Eugal gas pipeline. Although Prague initially criticized the plans to expand the Nord Stream gas pipeline, it then abandoned critics. At the end of November 2015, the Czech Republic was mentioned among ten EU countries that criticized the enlargement of the Nord Stream 2 project, but in December 2015 the government decided on a proposal from the Minister of Industry Jan Mládek not to join the member states' letter against Nord Stream. We did not find any securitisation of speeches among politicians at the beginning of the decision to construct the project. Policymakers were worried especially about the possibility to maintain the transit via Ukraine due to transit fees for Czechia. Even though, their attitude was neutral towards the project. But, when they negotiated the connection via new Eugal to Nord Stream 2, the attitude towards Nord Stream is even positive. Although the President Zeman was in favor of the project since its beginning. Interdependence

on Russia in energy issues was seen positively all the time. The transit character of the country will be reinforced thanks to the Nord Stream 2 since gas will flow to other countries in Europe from Czechia. Amity is presented within a strong criticism of US meddling to European business deals, critics of EU and NATO orders and comparing of US LNG prices with prices for Russian gas. Hence, the Czech Republic belongs to group of countries belonging to the Regional Energy Security Community.

2.5 Hungary

Hungary was not securitising Nord Stream 2, since it was not clear about possibilities to be connected to it. Nowadays, it has very favorable opinion about it, since Hungary will benefit also on transit of gas towards the south of Europe. Although the EU has ordered to Bulgaria not to allow the construction of South Stream, which has also damaged Hungary. Hungary is favorable towards diversification of deliveries, which is understood here in the sense of diversification of new pipelines, contrary to Polish opinion, who strictly understand under diversification only of those who supply gas.

We can evaluate the transcript of the speech of Prime Minister Orban at the press conference following the meeting with President Putin of Russia.

Hungary tries to keep the ties with Russia transparent. We would like to thank to Mr. Putin for modifying the previous agreements on gas deliveries and that we will make new agreements about gas deliveries after 2020/21. Today we started talks about gas deliveries for the period after 2020-21. Unfortunately, despite all our efforts, trade has diminished at about 600 billion dollars lost. As we state, you cannot solve economic problems with political means. This will cause harm to all of us. We hope to see better relations between the EU and RF in the near future. It is very difficult to talk if we do not have a constructive dialogue with the main powers of world.

We would not want to risk losing ties with Russian Federation.

About gas delivery: we cannot avoid to be consistent and to stick on gas delivery via Ukraine. We are for diversification of deliveries. But the EU has blocked our efforts, currently we are interested in bringing back our efforts on the agenda. We have lines toward the north, if our economy demands, we will buy gas via North Stream. Hungary has a possibility to receive gas via Nord Stream2 through Slovakia and Austria. Also we can receive gas via the Turks stream. (Ruptly, 2017)

Prime Minister Orban is content to make a deal with Russia and modified his gas agreements. This is evidence that the interdependence is cooperative. His aim is to continue deliveries from Russia. He is criticizing the attitude which forces all states of the EU to pursue policy of sanctions towards Russia, which is

already one of the main powers of the world. His aim is to continue to cooperate and have a connection with Russia. Orban is sticking on a continuation of gas deliveries via Ukraine. On the other hand, he is criticizing the EU, which stopped Hungary's effort to diversify in accepting the South Stream. He is not against construction of Nord Stream 2, which he expressed with the desire to buy from North Stream if there is a demand. He is positive also about the Turk stream. In his speech, there is no securitisation move towards gas deliveries from Russia. On contrary, he discussed with Putin the possibility of building new projects of gas, where Hungary can be also directly connected.

This was confirmed later by president Putin: *"North Stream is about diversification. We talked about other projects. Russia can deliver gas via Hungary. It is possible to finance. It will create 10 000 high qualified jobs in Hungary"* (Ruptly, 2017).

Orban expressed at press conference in 2019, his enthusiasm about connection to Russian gas via a new pipeline: *"TurkStream is a preference (for us), the sooner we can join the better"* (Szabo, 2019).

Bertalan Havasi, the Deputy State Secretary heading the Press Office of the Prime Minister, informed that the two leaders Prime Minister Orban and President of Russia Vladimir Putin reviewed the status of international energy projects and their impact on Europe. Special attention was paid to the Turk Stream, which is also highly important for Hungary (MTI, 2018).

Hungary is interested in joining the energy projects with Russian gas. Interdependence on gas is seen positively. We can observe strong amity towards Russia, since they talked about Nord Stream and Turk Stream and other future projects of connection, since Hungary is regretting the non-implementation of the South Stream project. Amity is presented in searching of new connection with other projects beside the Nord Stream 2, such as Turk Stream, the criticism of EU for blocking the South Stream and general policy of sanctions against Russia.

Conclusion

Central European countries, which were evaluated in Nord Stream 2 are categorised as neutrally favourable. They do not want to provoke its neighbour – Poland, belonging to Vysegrad group - V4 and within the area of Central Europe. As was presented in the speeches of politicians in Central Europe, these countries do not perceive a threat from Russia as it is presented by Poland. Poland is putting forward the idea that the whole Central Europe region is against Nord Stream 2. In fact, Poland is the only Central European country opposed to the project. In general Amity was strongly perceived in several countries such as Slovakia, Hungary or Austria. These countries did not have any problems with Russian suppliers in the past, neither they do perceive any mutual interdependence on gas as conflictive. On the contrary, they seek new ways of how to be more connected to the project of the pipeline in construction, or they look for new ways of

constructing another pipeline with Russia. Moreover, they perceive that the European Commission is intervening in their politics, which has resulted in the termination of future pipelines, as it was in the case of South Stream.

The main objective is based on the analysis of illocutionary speech acts of the policy-makers—object of the analysis. Within Regional Energy Security Complex in CEE only Poland makes a part of it with a strong enmity perception towards the energy project. The Nord Stream 2 creates a Regional Energy Security Community. Energy community is composed of more autonomous units, with amity perception towards the energy project. The Nord Stream 2 project has contributed to empirically prove that Central Europe, with the exception of Poland, belongs to the Regional Energy Security Community. The structure of linguistics and reasoning in debates within the Community is not as manifesting as in the Energy Security Complex case. Some states in Central Europe represent a strong criticism towards an external actor – USA involvement in European supercomplex.

Since energy security is already accepted as an important security theme also by states and other institutions, de-securitisation is not a suitable notion to be used for the energy community. Only few desecuritisation speeches were present in policy-makers speeches. As more suitable than desecuritisation, the term “*antagonistic securitisation*” is invented as a new academic term for the reasoning in the energy sector. This term agrees to the importance of energy projects, such as Nord Stream as an important security issue, but does not consider the energy project as a threat. The effects produced, especially by construction of Nord Stream 2, have had much larger effects on a macro-international level than Nord Stream 1.

Abbreviations:

bcm: Billion cubic meters
CEE: Central Europe
IR: International Relations
LNG: Liquefied Natural Gas
NS2: Nord Stream 2
RES: Regional Energy Security
RESC: Regional Energy Security Complex
RSC: Regional Security Complexes
RSCT: Regional Security Complex Theory
TSI: Three Seas Initiative

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EXPERT-MODELING DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR THE DEPLOYMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF A WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK WITH MOBILE SENSORS AND TELECOMMUNICATION AIR PLATFORMS IN THE EMERGENCY ZONE

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ABSTRACT

It was proposed to use an expert-modeling system for supporting decision-making on the deployment and management of a wireless sensor network to control emergency situations and quickly perform search and rescue operations; the concept of construction of the specified system, the problem of optimal placement of mobile sensors and construction of the topology of the repeater network are considered.

Key words: *expert-modeling system, wireless sensor network, mobile sensors, repeaters*

Introduction

Critical infrastructure is such means, equipment, networks and services that, if damaged or destroyed, will significantly affect the security, economic situation or the effective functioning of the region and the state as a whole. Critical infrastructure, if unprotected, may be vulnerable to natural or man-made disasters,

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as well as terrorist attacks. Protecting critical infrastructure is a key operation in NATO's civil emergency planning activities, in which all member states of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council participate (1-3).

Taking into account the events taking place in the east of Ukraine, the constant threat of mining the critical infrastructure of the capital, there is an urgent need to develop modern means of preventing emergencies using modern information and telecommunication technologies.

Thanks to the introduction of an expert-modeling decision support system for the deployment and management of a wireless sensor network with mobile sensors (WSNMS) and telecommunication air platforms (TAP) in the emergency zone at critical infrastructure facilities (EMS), it will be possible to identify in advance the damaging factors of emergencies, predict and make decisions to eliminate the danger that has arisen, and promptly involve the duty units of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine and other state power structures in the response.

Mainpart

EMS is a complex (set) of methods, algorithms and techniques aimed at substantiating decisions related to the implementation of a multi-layer dynamic architecture of a wireless sensor network (WSN), all elements of which are mobile. EMS ensures that in the shortest time possible operational information about events occurring in the emergencies zone.

The EMS will consist of several levels: the first level - a mobile network of airborne wireless multisensor platforms - flying drones that form an adaptive network for the supply of primary information; the second level is a network of telecommunication air platforms designed for the collection and subsequent processing of information from the low-level network and its management, as well as for communication with telecommunication ground nodes or directly with the emergency control center.

The next level is an information transmission system with transport and distribution components based on improving the algorithms for the operation of a high-speed information distribution system using IEEE 802.11xx wireless communication standards, digital switching and cryptographic information protection, researching their indicators and characteristics with theoretical justification and verification in laboratory conditions and in field tests, substantiation of the universal concept of synthesis and mechanisms for adapting signal-code structures for use in high-speed systems to ensure the transmission of large amounts of information at high speed and a given accuracy of information registration.

The EMS uses the potential of multiple access of socially active people to information networks, involves modern technical means of information analysis, namely: intelligent sensors (dosimeters, gas analyzers, seismic sensors, etc.), WSN, video recorders with an intelligent platform for detecting terrorist threats ,

mobile devices, satellite monitoring, the Internet and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and provides operational environmental monitoring. The main factor in achieving efficiency is the appropriate actions of witnesses at the scene of an emergency, which leads to receiving primary information from the population, and informing about the occurrence of an emergency through mobile devices, namely: telephoning, sending SMS messages, and thanks to a software application (Android or iOS) of this EMS. The resource of the EMS will be open to every citizen on an external web portal, which will contribute to public socially active and environmentally responsible activities of the population and the state.

Let's consider the structural and functional diagram of the EMS (Fig. 1). It should be noted that information sources can be not only sensors, but also various personal devices: telephones, smartphones, tablets, video cameras, as well as onboard equipment of UAVs or satellites.




Figure 1. Structural and functional scheme of the expert modeling system

In order to collect and process such a large amount of information, you need a powerful data center (DC). First, data via the Internet or dedicated channels goes to an internal server, then it is processed by employees of the central or regional crisis center, and then placed on an external server.

Depending on the type of data received for processing, the corresponding servers are used: a GIS server, a streaming data processing server, a video analytics server, a mail, file or video conference server.

Let's consider the elements of the system in more detail. The EMS can use mini- and micro-class UAVs, which are advisable to use on urban landscapes, and which can fly around a certain specified route up to 15 km and automatically return to the base.

For flights over longer distances outside the city, it is advisable to use an aircraft-type UAV, the so-called "flying wings", for example, from Skywalker. Such devices can be launched directly from the hand, and video surveillance can

be carried out using a special FPV (first person view) kit, consisting of a camera, receiving and transmitting equipment and glasses with a headtracker.

Figure 2 shows an option for the delivery of remote monitoring information by the WSNMS, telecommunications ground nodes and air platforms in the emergency, and Figure 3 shows the integration of the remote monitoring system by the WSNMS, telecommunication ground nodes and air platforms into a single information field for remote monitoring of an emergency




Figure 2




Figure 3. TAP – telecommunication air platform; GN – ground node

The information is visualized using the Ushahidi information platform. This platform allows you to select a layer that reflects events of the corresponding category: man-made hazard, natural hazard, and the like. In order to use the system, you need to download the corresponding Google Play or App Store software to your smartphone.

To increase the efficiency of using the expert-modeling system decision support for the deployment and management of a WSNMS and TAP in the emergency zone, special mathematical models have been developed for planning a sensor network, its deployment and control of the movement of mobile sensors (MS) (3).

One of the main tasks in organizing a wireless sensor network for remote collection of information is the task of finding the optimal network topology, which is decomposed into two partial tasks - finding the optimal placement of

sensors to fully cover the monitoring area and finding the optimal placement of a set of repeaters for organizing a connected network with given transmission characteristics information (bandwidth, latency, etc.) (4-5).

The initial data for solving the problem of optimal placement of MS is information about the spatial location of the zone to be examined. The operator enters information about the geometric characteristics of this zone and a special algorithm calculates the coordinates of the desired initial location of the MS. After that, an algorithm for calculating the trajectory of the movement of air platforms, which performs the primary placement of MS, is included in the work. Further, MS transmit information from the places of their primary placement, which is processed by experts in an expert-modeling system, and a decision is made to change the boundaries of the area of the location of MS. After promptly changing the boundaries of the monitoring area, the algorithm for determining the locations of the desired location of MS is turned on again and control commands are sent to move them to new locations. Thus, the MS network gradually adapts to the observation area, which is rapidly changing.

Let us consider as an example the model (algorithm) of the EMS operation, which allows planning the WSN topology for monitoring a complex zone S (see Fig. 4). The sensor monitoring area model (detection range) is usually depicted as a circle with radius r centered at the sensor location. Then the task of constructing a WSN for monitoring a complex zone can be formulated as follows: it is necessary to place a minimum number of sensors that provide monitoring (coverage) of the entire complex zone (for example, the territory of a potentially dangerous object). Usually, the monitoring area has an arbitrary shape, which can be approximated by a multiply connected orthogonal polygon A (Fig. 4).

The problem of covering a polygon is reduced to a set of simple problems: covering a rectangular area A with internal obstacles P (Fig. 4). On the plane, we introduce the coordinate system (OX, OY) so that the coordinate axes coincide with the lower and left sides of the coverage of the rectangular area A . The initial information of the problem can be represented by the following data set: $\{W, L, Z, r\}$, where W and L are the width and length of the rectangle that is covered; Z – model of obstacles P given by a set of rectangles $Z = \{Z_1, Z_2, \dots, Z_m\}$, where m – is the number of obstacle rectangles. The sides of the Z rectangles are parallel to the coordinate axes. $Z_i = \{z_x^i, z_y^i, z_l^i, z_w^i\}$ – rectangle modeling an obstacle, where $i = \overline{1, m}$ – coordinates of the lower left corner of the rectangle. Polygon $A \setminus Z$ must be covered with a minimum number of N equal circles of radius r .

The solution to the problem can be presented as a data set: $R = \{N, X, Y\}$, where N – is the number of circles covering the polygon; $X = \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_N\}$, $Y = \{y_1, y_2, \dots, y_N\}$ – vectors of coordinates of centers of circles. Solution R is an admissible coverage if the following conditions Ω are satisfied:

1. *The circles are inside the rectangle A : $x_j \geq 0$; $y_j \geq 0$; $x_j \leq L$; $y_j \leq W \forall j =$*

$\overline{1, N}$.

2. *The centers of the circles do not lie inside the obstacles:* at least one of the inequalities: $(x_j - z_x^i)(x_j - z_x^i - z_l^i) \geq 0$ або $(y_j - z_y^i)(y_j - z_y^i - z_w^i) \geq 0 \forall i = \overline{1, m}, j = \overline{1, N}$.

3. *The whole area is covered $A \setminus Z$:* if an arbitrary point on the area $A \setminus Z$, $\exists j: (p_x - x_j)^2 + (p_y - y_j)^2 \leq r^2$.

A feasible solution R is optimal if the number N of circles of coverage is minimal, that is $R_{opt} = \arg \min_{X, Y \in \Omega} N$.

An example of a coating is shown in Fig. 5. Obstacles in the figure are shown in dark color.




Figure 4. Monitoring area A as an orthogonal polygon with obstacles P




Figure 5. Covering a polygon with circles

To solve such problems, according to the experience of scientists L. Thoth, S. Astrakov, E. Mukhachev, V. Kuznetsov and others, the following basic heuristic approaches are used: block heuristic coverage, hexagonal coverage heuristic, pseudo-hexagonal coverage heuristic, evolutionary goal heuristics, etc.

The limited range of radio transmitters of the WSN nodes necessitates the inclusion of repeaters in the network that transmit information messages from the MS to the data center gateway. To collect data from the sensors and transmit the gateway, a set of K repeaters (routers) based on the UAV is used, located at an altitude of h with the coordinates of the projection $(x_{0k}, y_{0k}), k = \overline{1, K}$ and the radius of the radio coverage area R . If the sensor is in the UAV's radio coverage area, the data from the repeater network goes to the gateway, and then through the global networks to the data processing center.

We understand the network topology as a set of geometric arrangement of its nodes and the probabilities of using communications between them to deliver messages: $(\|R_i\|, \|p_{ij}\|), i, j = \overline{1, N}$, where $\|R_i\|$ – set of WSN nodes; $\|p_{ij}\|$ – set of probabilities of using communications between nodes. Thus, the WSN can be represented as a directed weighted graph, consisting of a set of vertices (nodes) and edges (communication channels) (Fig. 6).




Figure 6. Example of a WSN network graph

Routes are built from end devices to the gateway using a dynamic programming algorithm - the Bellman-Ford method. The original function of this algorithm (Bellman function) determines the conditional cost of transporting the data stream between neighboring nodes of the route:

$$W = C_m + C_r \xrightarrow{\|R_i\|} \min, \text{ where } C_m = \begin{cases} C_m^{nom} \\ 0 \end{cases}, \quad (1)$$

$$C_r = \begin{cases} \frac{U_{RX}^* + U_{TX}^*}{U_{\max} - U_w^*} C_m^{nom}, (U_{RX}^* + U_{TX}^*) \leq (U_{\max} - U_w^*) \\ \infty, (U_{RX}^* + U_{TX}^*) > (U_{\max} - U_w^*) \end{cases},$$

where: C_m – the notional cost of a WSN node, which becomes zero if the node is reused in the topology (thereby minimizing the number of repeaters); C_m^{nom} – notional face value of a node; C_r – the notional cost of retransmission; U_{RX}^*, U_{TX}^* – actual traffic through the node, taking into account repeated retransmissions; U_{\max} – maximum traffic through the node; U_w^* – the equivalent density of the data stream emitted by the neighboring nodes, taking into account the competition for access to the transmission medium (radio channel).

So, we can formulate such a *mathematical formulation of the problem* - find such a network topology (location of repeaters) that minimizes the cost of transporting data streams from sensors to the gateway, while fulfilling the constraints on network resources, ensuring structural connectivity and performance indicators of the network:

$$X_0 = \arg \min_{X_0 \in \Omega_{1,2}} C(X) = \arg \min_{X_0 \in \Omega_{1,2}} \sum_{i=1}^{N+K} \sum_{j=1}^{N+K} W_{ij}, i \neq j, \quad (2)$$

$$\Omega_1 : \{X \in r, p_{ij} \leq PER^0, P \leq P^0, N \leq 1000, K \leq 100\},$$

$$\Omega_2 : \{s(m_{ab}) \geq s^0, t_3(m_{ab}) \leq t_3^0, a, b = \overline{1, N}\},$$

where: X – vector of coordinates of the projections of the location of the set UAV; PER^0 – is the limit value of the probability of packet error in the radio channel; P, P^0 – reliability and limitations of the network reliability; $s(m_{ab}), t_3(m_{ab}), s^0, t_3^0$ – throughput and route latency m_{ab} and related restrictions.

From a formal point of view, the task of designing a rational topology of the WSN is similar to the task of forming the topological structure of any wireless network, which is one of the main in its design and consists in choosing the optimal connection scheme for switching and concentration nodes, choosing the line capacity and optimal information transmission routes. The currently known approaches to solving such problems are based on the use of the apparatus of combinatorial analysis (5).

Conclusions

The paper proposes the concept of building an expert-modeling decision support system for the deployment and management of a wireless sensor network with mobile sensors and telecommunication air platforms in an emergency zone or on the territory of critical infrastructure facilities.

The implementation of the Concept will make it possible to carry out search and rescue operations in real time as quickly as possible, to explore areas dangerous to humans in the emergency zone, to identify trends in the development of a hazardous situation and predict the consequences of its impact on the environment, to carry out ecological, chemical and bacteriological reconnaissance of territories of potentially dangerous objects.

An algorithm for solving the problem of optimal placement of mobile sensors for complete coverage of the monitoring area is formulated.

A mathematical problem was formulated to build such a topology of a network of repeaters (telecommunication air platforms), which minimizes the cost of transporting data streams from mobile sensors to an information processing center.

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CYBER SECURITY AND INFORMATION PROTECTION ON THE TRANSNATIONAL LEVEL*

Pavel Nečas¹ - Dávid Kollár²

ABSTRACT

Nowadays, the field of information and communication technologies belongs to one of the fastest growing areas of today's society. Thanks to the development of these technologies, borders, distances, and time have become more relative in today's modern world. A new domain has been created - cyberspace. However, with the gradual and deepening of interconnections and consequently also dependence in cyberspace, the vulnerability of entities implementing activities in it increases. Threats in cyberspace, linked to the use of information and communication technologies, systems, and tools, are wide-ranging, making it increasingly important and urgent to ensure cyber security and protect information in cyberspace.

Key words: *Cyber security, information protection, information and communication technologies, systems, and tools.*

Introduction

The field of information and communication technologies (ICT) is one of the fastest growing areas of today's society. It is significantly reflected not only in the private and economic spheres, but increasingly also in the state and public administration, and thus also in the field of security and defence (Ivančík, 2019, p. 27). The emergence of a global information and communication network, the massive use of computers, the Internet of society, digital information processing and trade, as well as the transmission of data and information over long distances, lead to the deepening dependence of developed countries and their economies on ICT. At the same time, this not only increases their interconnectedness, but also increases their interdependence. Scientific-technical and technological progress thus brings not only new benefits, opportunities, and challenges, but also negatives associated with new security risks and threats (Kazanský - Ivančík, 2018). Therefore, the protection of information, cyberspace and critical information infrastructure, ie ensuring cyber security, is becoming increasingly important and urgent.

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Thanks to the development of ICT, borders, distances, and time have become more relative in today's modern world. A new domain has been created - cyberspace. However, with the continuous deepening of interconnectedness and dependence in cyberspace, the above-mentioned vulnerability of individual actors is also increasing. Threats in cyberspace have a relatively wide scope (Ivančík, 2020a, p. 10). It can be an illegal collection of information about an individual, group or organization, either in an active or passive way, or it can be an organized crime that abuses this space as a means of illegal gain. Cyberspace can also be misused to spread and promote various extremist views and to promote terrorism. It can also be hacker attacks aimed at harming an individual, a group or an organization. The most extreme potential threat is the implementation of cyber-attacks against the critical infrastructure of the state, which can have a significant negative impact on the security and defence of the state and the lives and health of its citizens (Ivančík, 2020b).

Developments in recent years have shown that cyberspace is also an environment for the promotion of national interests, as evidenced by cyber-attacks against certain countries as a complement to or part of a political or military conflict. These events demonstrate that the state, as the most fundamental entity in the post-Westphalian international system, faces a new type of threat - cyber threats - in a dynamically evolving security environment, with increasing dependence on information and telecommunications technologies vital for each state to address its own security and defence issues in cyberspace.

Cybersecurity requires a wide range of protective, defensive, and rescue measures to be taken to minimize the consequences of a potential enemy cyber-attack. From the point of view of protection measures, this scale may represent national policies in cyberspace behaviour, training and information training of the population and professionals with access to information and telecommunications technical means by enhancing security awareness, the aim is to minimize the potential risks for information and communication technology.

Defensive measures are defensive, offensive and intelligence activities that must be carried out in the event of an ongoing attack in order to stop such an attack and thus prevent the attacker from causing damage. The theory based on the work of Carl von Clausewitz that the fight contains two parts – defence and attack, can be fully applied in the case of combat in a cyber environment, as cyber combat involves both defensive and offensive activities. Defensive activities are aimed at preventing the attacker from performing, respectively, continue the cyber-attack. The aim of offensive activities is to weaken or eliminate the enemy's cybernetic and possibly also kinetic capabilities in order to break his will to fight. Cyber operations aimed at gathering intelligence can be considered a combination of defensive and offensive elements.

This is one of the reasons why the issues of information protection and cyber security and defence clearly play an increasingly prominent role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). On the other hand, it can be said that both the Alliance and the Union have only begun to address this issue more

seriously in recent years. Until a few years ago, cyber threats and related security issues and issues were discussed only in narrow circles of technicians and experts.

However, after the first serious cyber-attacks against certain countries as a complement to or part of a political or military conflict, there has been a fundamental awareness at national and transnational level that the cyber world poses a serious vulnerability to increasingly interconnected communities, NATO, and the EU. Cyber-attacks are among the security threats that states and groups will have to face increasingly in the coming years. Cyber conflicts are gradually becoming part of traditionally conducted conflicts, and therefore "digitized" countries and groupings must work on concrete plans and measures to ensure information protection and the security and defence of their cyberspace, and thus their individual and collective interests.

1 New cyber security threats and risks

Cyber threats are generally considered to be new, emerging and evolving asymmetric security threats (Kollár, 2020). The issue of cyber defence was first mentioned in the 1999 Strategic Concept of the North Atlantic Alliance. At the Washington Summit, for the first time ever, NATO identified information systems and NATO's dependence on them as potential threats to eliminate the Alliance's dominance in traditional weapons systems (NATO, 1999). Subsequently, a year after 11 September 2001, which proved to be a breakthrough in the perception of new security threats and risks, NATO issued a "call to improve the capabilities needed to defend against cyber-attacks" as part of the capability commitment announced during the Prague Summit, in November 2002 (NATO, 2002). In the following years, however, the Alliance focused mainly on the implementation of passive protection measures required by the armed forces.

It was not until the events in Estonia in the spring of 2007 that NATO forced a radical rethink of the concept of cyber defence and the preparation of countermeasures in a new format. The Alliance therefore drafted, for the first time, an official NATO Cyber Defence Policy, approved in 2008, which set out three main pillars of the Alliance's Cyber Defence Policy:

- subsidiarity, e. g. assistance is provided only upon request; otherwise, the principle of the sovereignty of sovereign states is maintained;
- avoidance of duplication, e. g. avoiding unnecessary duplication of structures and capabilities at international, regional and national levels;
- security, e. g. cooperation based on mutual trust, taking into account the sensitivity of the information system that must be accessible and possible vulnerabilities (Theiler, 2011).

This document marked a major qualitative step forward and at the same time paved the way for the fundamental decision of the Lisbon Summit to continue to improve cyber defence. NATO has developed the first cyber defence mechanisms and capabilities and outlined the Cyber Defence Policy Concept.

Developments in the perception of cyber defence as an important part of the comprehensive defence mosaic being built by NATO are also evident in the reading of the NATO Strategic Concept adopted in 2010 in Lisbon. The issue of cyber security and defence is given much more space than in previous concepts, while in addition to defining cyber-attacks as a new threat in the security environment (§ 12), the Alliance (§ 19) proposes a series of measures that need to be implemented to deter and prevent Alliance against this threat: *"We will ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities needed to deter and defend against any threat to the security of our people. For this reason, we will further develop our capability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber-attacks, including using the NATO planning process to improve and coordinate national cyber defence capabilities, ensure centralized cyber protection for all NATO bodies and better integrate cyber awareness, warnings, and responses of Member States."* (NATO, 2010)

Following the decisions of the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, the Alliance has created successful preconditions for autonomous governance and concrete scrutiny of cyber defence, and for the development of concrete measures to respond if necessary. Subsequently, NATO's basic documents for cyber defence were developed and approved: the NATO Cyber Defence Concept (2011), NATO's Cyber Defence Policy (2011) and the NATO Cyber Defence Action Plan (2011), the implementation of which has and will have a real impact in the coming years. impact on the level of competence of NATO and its members in this area.

Threats from cyberspace are potentially broad-based. With a certain degree of simplification, threats existing in cyberspace can be divided into four basic subgroups, which differ in their objectives, procedures, and the consequent possible damage:

- cyber wars,
- cyber terrorism,
- cyber espionage; and
- cybercrime.

In terms of sophistication and complexity, it is possible to define three levels of cyber threat according to Denning:

- a) simply structured with the ability to carry out basic hacking attacks against individual systems using tools developed by someone else; the attacking organization has simple target analysis, command and control, as well as low learning ability;
- b) advanced structured with the capability to carry out more complex attacks on different systems or networks and, where appropriate, to modify or develop basic hacking tools; the attacking organization has an elementary target analysis, command and control, as well as an elementary learning ability;
- c) complexly structured with the capability of a coordinated attack that can cause mass disruption of integrated heterogeneous defence (including encryption); the attacking organization has the ability to create sophisticated hacking tools, while having advanced target analysis, command and control, and advanced learning capabilities.

2 Current developments in the research area at the transnational level

From the above information, it is clear why the issue of cyber defence has come to the absolute forefront of the NATO and EU agendas in recent years. Estonia has regularly, more or less successfully, sought to bring this issue to the talks of NATO's top bodies since the events of spring 2007, when the country's network infrastructure was comprehensively attacked, and the attack caused massive damage. Subsequently, NATO's Cyber Defence Policy was approved, which defines cyber threats as a potential source of collective defence within the meaning of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. In addition, NATO's new Cyber Defence Policy and Action Plan for its implementation provide NATO member states with relevant directives and an agreed list of priorities for the Alliance's progress in cyber defence, including enhanced coordination between NATO Allies and Partners.

At EU level, the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) plays a role in information exchange and ICT advice. At the same time, its role is to serve as a hub for the exchange of information on best practices and practices in the field, facilitating contacts between the EU institutions, individual EU Member States and the private sector, as well as major sectoral players and stakeholders.

As ICT requires a stable, risk-free, and secure environment for its further development, ENISA provides expert advice and recommendations to the European Commission and the Member States of the Union, while actively supporting the stabilization of the KIT environment. The primary goal of ENISA is customer confidence in the security of the electronic communication environment used in business, work, or personal life. However, the reality is that many EU countries are not prepared to face a massive cyber-attack. This was one of the reasons for the emergence of ENISA, as a catalyst and promoter, with the task of accelerating the achievement of a satisfactory level of resilience to cyber threats across EU countries.

Cooperation with partners and international organizations, including the European Union, is an important element of NATO's cyber defence policy. Allied discussions are currently underway on specific modalities for cooperation. In any case, it would be an irrational solution for those NATO member countries that are also members of the EU to build duplicate structures and develop duplicate procedures in areas such as crisis management, education, training, etc. Cooperation must therefore be based on common values and common approaches, with an emphasis on complementarity and the elimination of duplication. Cyber defence capability building targets have also been included in approximately 75% of bilateral cooperation programs agreed at the level of both organizations.

In recent years, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom have joined Estonia in an effort to increase its perception of cyber threats, which can be explained by the significantly increasing number of cyber-attacks on these countries, which probably come from Russia, China, Iran or North Korea. The ongoing intensive discussion in established working groups or committees resulted in a separate meeting of NATO defence ministers on cyber defence on 4 June 2013. The main reason was

that several countries face cyber-attacks almost daily. Unfortunately, several NATO countries have very limited mechanisms to suppress cyber-attacks, and for the first time, the Alliance has included capacity-building tasks in this area among the so-called National eligibility targets.

As the field of cyber defence is constantly evolving, there is a need in the long term to institutionalize joint education and training in this field. For this reason, NATO has prepared a NATO Concept for Cyber Defence Education and Training. It is in the Alliance's interest to step up its education and training efforts through existing schools, as well as the Centre for Excellence in Cyber Defence in Tallinn, Estonia. The centre, which was accredited by both NATO and the EU in 2008, conducts research and training for cyber defence experts from Alliance structures, member countries of both organizations, including experts from sponsoring and partner countries (NATO, 2019).

As important as intensifying and standardizing education and training processes is the organization of regular crisis management exercises, which offer an excellent opportunity to test and consult on cyber crisis management practices. The priority in the field of cyber defence is to protect communication systems and networks owned and operated by the Alliance and the Union. The protection of national critical infrastructures remains within the competence of the Member States, which requires them to invest adequate resources in the development of their own capabilities. Both NATO and the EU are assisting the Allies in their efforts to build adequate national cyber defence through the sharing of information and best practices and the participation of national officials in international exercises.

In addition to the above, there is currently a discussion in the Alliance on the possible deployment of the Alliance's collective cyber capability in response to a cyber attack on a member country, if it requests collective assistance.

The development of partnerships with industry, in turn, is a crucial step towards ensuring effective cyber defence within NATO member states and for the Alliance itself. The partnership with industry should, as far as possible, include the exchange of information, the so-called Lessons Learned,³ cooperation in crisis management, planning and joint participation in exercises. Despite some positive progress, there is still considerable scope for intensified cooperation in this direction. Conferences of Member States' National Armaments Directors (CNADs) as well as the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) should work with industry to find other concrete forms of mutually beneficial cooperation. In accordance with the agreed cyber defence policy, the North Atlantic Council provides political oversight of all aspects of its

³ Note: *Lessons Learned* contains a structured recorded experience gained by the team (design, training, operational, implementation, etc.) throughout the project life cycle (training, operations, activities, etc.). It is a valuable source of instruction for teams that will implement similar activities or projects. Lessons from the project (training, course of the operation) contain not only a set of problems, but also positive events, their impact on the project (activity, training, operation) and recommendations on how to proceed so that the problem does not occur next time or vice versa.

implementation. The Council is aware of serious cyber incidents and attacks. The Defence Policy and Planning Committee provides oversight and advice at the expert level. At the working level, NATO's Cyber Defence Board is responsible for coordinating cyber defence between NATO's civilian and military authorities.

At the technical level, the work of the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Board (NC3Board), which is the main body responsible for consulting on the technical aspects of cyber defence, is important. NATO's military authorities and the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) are responsible for the operational requirements, procurement, implementation, and operation of NATO's cyber defence capabilities. Through its NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) technical centre, NCIA is responsible for providing technical and operational cyber security services throughout the Alliance. The NCIRC Technical Centre is NATO's core technical and operational capability and has a key role to play in responding to cyber aggression against the Alliance.

NATO is currently pursuing a number of concrete initiatives in the field of cyber defence in order to comprehensively compile a mosaic of concrete measures and capabilities needed to combat cyber threats. In line with the conclusions of the November 2010 Lisbon Summit, cyber defence was integrated into the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) in April 2012. At the same time, defence planning is a key tool for the Alliance to ensure the harmonization of national and Alliance planning activities in meeting capabilities building goals and objectives in the most efficient way possible. Awareness of the importance and significance of information security and cyber security is demonstrated by the fact that all Alliance countries to which cyber defence capability targets have been allocated have fully agreed.

Overall, NATO's cyber defence goals have been integrated into the Smart Defence initiative, which represents a way of ensuring an individual and collective defence. The initiative enables countries to work together to develop and maintain capabilities that Member States cannot afford to develop or acquire on their own, in particular because of their high financial demands.

Conclusion

Information protection and cybersecurity, together with cyberspace, create a new and extremely dynamic domain. NATO and the EU and their member states are gradually beginning to discover the positives (advantages, benefits), but also the negatives (threats, risks) that this domain brings. However, unlike classic conventional weapons, cyberspace gives relatively large opportunities to increasingly active non-state actors. International cyber "games", which are full of diverse "players", raise new questions about what information protection and cyber security mean, both nationally and transnationally, internationally.

Given the continuous growth of cyber threats in previous years, in order to increase information protection and ensure cyber security in the coming years, it will be necessary not only in the Slovak Republic but also in other NATO and EU

member states to update, resp. develop comprehensive national strategies, procedures and procedures based on NATO's Cyber Defence Policy and the EU Network and Information Systems Security Directive. At the same time, it will be necessary to set up a joint operation centre, to clearly define the national governance structure in this area, as well as the authority for strategic planning. Intelligence services, in turn, should intensify the development of defensive and offensive capabilities, for example for threat detection and active operations (cyber espionage).

In cyberspace, as in any other operational domain, it is vital for state actors to define how to use this space for national security needs. It is therefore necessary to develop a supporting cyber strategy to develop and use strategic capabilities to operate in cyberspace, integrated and coordinated with other operational domains, in order to achieve or support the achievement of cross-national objectives to support national security strategy. Strategic capabilities for cyberspace include a wide range of different tools, one of which can be seen as building offensive cyber capabilities that can be used to safeguard national and international interests.

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THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE FUND AS A TOOL TO INCREASE THE EUROPEAN UNION'S DEFENCE CAPABILITIES*

Antonín Novotný¹

ABSTRACT

The aim of the article is to describe one of the elements of security-defence cooperation PESCO - European Defence Fund (EDF). The establishment of the fund in 2017 is an expression of the EU's efforts to become a more autonomous player in the field of defence and security. EDF is defined as support for the establishment of cooperative programs, support for joint research and development activities, and support for all phases of the life cycle of military material. The aim of the fund is to make it easier for Member States, for example, to jointly order military technology, which in turn should lead to significant cost reductions. However, the fund also offers the possibility of financing joint research and development projects in the field of defence technologies or the purchase of these technologies by individual states. In order to draw money from the fund, governments or companies from at least three countries need to be involved in a specific defence research project, which is motivated by greater cross-border cooperation.

Key words: European Union; European Defence Fund; PESCO; military capability.

Introduction

It is the most basic and universal of rights to feel safe and secure in your own home. Our Union should provide that for Europeans (President Jean-Claude Juncker, June 2017, EU. Defending Europe).


In June 2017, the President of the European Commission announced the establishment of a European Defence Fund (EDF, EC. Communication Launching EDF) to help Member States develop and acquire key strategic defence capabilities more quickly, jointly and in a more cost-effective way. The EDF is intended as an instrument to strengthen the competitiveness and the innovation of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), (EP. The Development of EDTIB) thereby contributing to the EU's strategic autonomy. Its main goal is to boost cooperation at each stage of the industrial cycle through the necessary incentives to trigger cooperative research and development programmes. This is the first time the EU budget is used to support European defence cooperation. The progressive roll-out of the EDF reflects the nature of the EU budgetary planning cycles.

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The European Defence Fund wants to contribute to strengthening the technological self-sufficiency of EU Member States in the field of defence. It offers them co-financing of key research and development projects in strategic areas defined by the Union itself. Since the outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine in 2014, there has been a lively talk at European Union level about the stagnation of European investment in defence research and development and about Europe's need to pay more attention to building its own defence capabilities. The need for greater responsibility of the Union to defend its territory and interests has been reflected in the EU Global Strategy (EC. EU Global Strategy, 2016), presented in 2016 – Fig. 1. The European Defence Fund is as one of the components of the so-called European Defence Action Plan (EDAP), (EC, European Defence Action Plan). The coherence between the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO, EDA, PESCO) and notably the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD, EDA. CARD) and the European Defence Fund and its precursors promotes a better use of scarce resources by increasing the joint development of the capabilities needed for Europe's security.

Fig.1 EDF is a part of comprehensive defence package, other parts are Coordinated Annual Review and Defence (CARD) and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)



2 Characteristics of EDF


2.1 Objectives and legal basis

With the publication of the EU Global Strategy in 2016, European defence cooperation entered a new era. Driven by a common determination to invest more and make defence cooperation the norm, the EU raised its level of ambition aimed at developing a more coherent European defence landscape with a more capable, deployable, interoperable and sustainable set of military capabilities and forces. To implement that new ambition, Member States set up a series of new EU defence cooperation tools:

- a revised Capability Development Plan (CDP), (EDA. The EU Capability Development Priorities);
- the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD);
- the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO);
- the European Defence Fund (EDF).

CDP, CARD, PESCO and EDF are there to provide a coherent EU framework to promote and facilitate collaborative defence capability development in Europe. The success of those tools will depend on how coherently they are implemented and to what extent they will be embedded into and used by Member States' national defence planning – Fig. 2

Fig. 2 A coherent approach from priorities to impact



Source: EDA. Ensuring coherence among EU defence tools.

PESCO is closely connected to the CARD and the EDF. They are complementary and mutually reinforcing tools:

The CARD, run by the European Defence Agency, through systematic monitoring of national defence spending plans, will help identify opportunities for new collaborative initiatives. PESCO will develop capability projects responding to the EU priorities identified by EU Member States through the Capability Development Plan, also taking into account the results of the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence. Eligible projects could also benefit from financing under the EDF. The EDF provides financial incentives for Member States to foster defence cooperation from research to the development phase of capabilities including prototype.

To the present day, European funds made it virtually impossible to finance purely defence research and development projects. EDF should significantly change this situation. It aims to contribute to strengthening the technological self-sufficiency of EU Member States in the field of defence by offering the possibility of co-financing research and development projects focused on key technological areas. These areas are defined in the Capability Development Plan. This generally includes areas where Europe's defence-industrial base does not provide sufficient capacity or is not at the required level. The second importance of EDF lies in the effort to better combine joint efforts in defence research, development and acquisitions, by merging them into joint projects. These would reduce duplication across the Union and make spending more efficient.


2.2 Management structure and funding

The European Defence Fund will boost the EU's excellence and efficiency in defence equipment and technology by supporting the whole production chain: research, prototype development, and acquisition.

To achieve this, the Fund has two strands with different legal and funding structures (or "windows") which are complementary and are being gradually deployed:

- **Research** ("research window"): the EU will offer direct funding (grants) for research in innovative defence products and technologies, fully financed from the EU budget;
- **Development and acquisition** ("capability window"): Member States will pool financial contributions to jointly develop and acquire key defence capabilities. The EU will offer co-financing from the EU budget to incentivise cooperation and leverage national financing.

Fig. 3 European Defence Fund



Source: Edited by author from Launching the European Defence Fund.

The main features of the European Defence Fund are:

- Financing of projects which help make the EU safer and which correspond to priorities agreed by Member States within the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (EC. The CSDP) and other regional and international organisations such as NATO;
- Only collaborative projects involving at least 3 participants from 3 Member States are eligible;
- The EU will only co-fund the development of common prototypes where Member States commit to buying the final product;
- Cross-border participation of SMEs and mid-caps is strongly incentivised by providing higher financing rates, favouring projects by consortia which include SMEs and, if necessary, launching dedicated calls for proposals;
- Targeting breakthrough innovation, with 5% of the funds dedicated to disruptive technology and innovative equipment allowing the EU to boost its long-term technological leadership;
- Permanent Structured Cooperation projects may, if eligible, receive an additional co-financing bonus of 10%, but funding is not automatic (EC. EU budget: Stepping up the EU's role).

Both strands will support the priorities agreed by the Member States within the EU, notably through the Capability Development Plan, who will also ultimately own and operate the assets. If the PESCO project is implemented with the support of the European Defence Agency, the third country must also have an administrative agreement with it. The agreements that currently exist for the participation of third countries in the defence fund's capability development


program are restrictive. EDA and EDF support will only be eligible for defence companies established in the EU and controlled by Member States or their nationals. Defence companies established in the territory of a third country or their subsidiaries should only be allowed to benefit from them if strict conditions regarding the security and defence interests of the EU and its MS are met.

2.3 The European defence fund in context

In March 2017, a call for projects for the first part of EDF was launched. This is a research window, which is currently represented by the Preliminary Action on Defence Action (PADR), (EC. EDIDP and PADR – factsheet). The total budget from 2017 to 2019 was then set at EUR 90 million.

The EDF Capabilities Window was put into practice for 2019 and 2020 in the form of the European Defence Industry Development Plan. It is a program based on the identification of key capabilities for the EU's defence capabilities. In other words, he has dealt with areas where the EU is lagging behind or where the development of these fields is desirable due to trends in defence. EDIDP defines products and technologies that relate to these capabilities. On the basis of this specification, the submitted projects will be evaluated by at least three Member States of the Union with regard to their uniqueness, contribution to the widest possible range of countries, degree of SME involvement or declared willingness of participants to purchase the product.

Fig. 4 EDF in context



Source: EUISS. Funding EU defence cooperation

Projects from the EDIDP 2019 calls (9 in total, EC. 2019 calls for proposals: EDIDP) were launched at the end of 2020. The EDIDP 2020 call (12 in total, EC. Towards a European Defence Union) was closed in December 2020 and project proposals are currently being evaluated by independent experts. It turns out that compared to 2019, the attractiveness of the program, is much greater.

In 2019-2020, the first full CARD cycle took place with EDA acting as the CARD stakeholder. The final CARD report was presented to Defence Ministers in November 2020. It identifies a total of 55 collaborative opportunities throughout the whole capability spectrum, considered to be the most promising, most needed or most pressing ones, also in terms of operational value. Based on this catalogue of identified opportunities, Member States are recommended to concentrate their efforts on the following six specific ‘focus areas’ which are not only covered by the EU Capability Development Priorities agreed in 2018 but where the prospects for cooperation are also looking particularly good (encouraging number of interested Member States, national programmes already underway or in the pipeline), namely:

- Main Battle Tanks (MBT)
- Soldier Systems
- Patrol Class Surface Ships
- Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (Counter-UAS)
- Defence applications in Space
- Military Mobility (EDA. 2020 CARD REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY).

Launching new collaborative projects in the six focus areas can bear a “significant impact on both Member States capability profiles and the coherence of overall European capability landscape”, is stated in the report. In addition to that, 56 options to cooperate in R&T have been identified as well.² The draft EDF Regulation was presented to the Council. Now is preparing a draft of the 1st EDF Work Program (WP). Following the approval of the EDF Regulation (April 2021), an EDF Program Committee will be established to formally approve the WP (May 2021). After that, a call for project proposals will be announced and subsequently published at the beginning of June (by the end of 2021, assuming the conclusion of grant agreements by the end of 2022). An evaluation of the award of grants to winning proposals is planned from mid-June 2022 to mid-July 2022. The European Commission plans to launch also a call for proposals for the 4th Wave of PESCO Projects (planned approval November 2021), which will reflect, inter alia, the analyses and recommendations of the CARD report with emphasis on individual Focus Areas (in which PESCO projects are already included) and priority areas at operational level. A key challenge for the EU is the fragmentation of armaments with their implications for communications, logistics and troop interoperability when deployed in CSDP missions and operations. PESCO projects are considered to be the primary tool for bridging capability gaps and increasing the effectiveness of EU defence planning through a common approach (55 opportunities for capability development cooperation, 56 R&D opportunities).

² For instance - Artificial Intelligence, Cyber defence, new sensor technologies, emerging materials and energy efficient propulsion systems or unmanned systems and robotics

It is certainly also necessary for the CSDP to learn from COVID-19 and to fill the capability gap in air mobility and medical evacuation.

The hierarchical structure of the WP proposal covers the areas of defence R&D for the entire period 2021-2027. In the first level, it identifies 11 thematic clusters, another 12. The non-thematic cluster, open to defence innovation, is intended for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and disruptive technologies. In the second level, it newly identifies 18 thematic categories of actions together with two open ones (in accordance with the EDF Regulation, Article 27.3.) Based on the thematic proposal presented in summer 2020, 21 Member States sent a total of 742 proposals; the Czech Republic sent 9 proposals.³ The key criteria for inclusion in WP 2021 were the defence focus of the proposals, synergies with other EU areas, complementarity with PADR and EDIDP, follow-up to PESCO, CARD, CDP and maturity of the proposals. The draft WP 2021 includes a budget indication with an allocation of 310.1 M Euro for research, 620.2 M Euro for development, a total of 930.3 M Euro - Fig. 3. It also brings the distribution of funds by individual clusters and categories of events (e.g. the largest allocation of 140 M Euro is occupied by the Air Power cluster). Approval of the consolidated proposal WP 2021 is expected in 03/2021, approval of the EDF Regulations in 04/2021. The approval of EDF is planned for the beginning of 06/2021 and the publication of EDF 2021 calls in June 2021. The individual industrial entities will then have a 6-month deadline to submit their proposals (Czech Delegation to NATO, 2021). From 1 January 2021 to 31 December 2027 will be EDF endowed with a financial envelope of EUR 7 953 000 000 in current prices (EC. Provisional agreement reached on setting-up the European Defence Fund). This is a significant amount of funds with great potential to start international projects in sectors with high added value, which would not be feasible without co-financing from European sources.

3 Position of the Czech Republic

The Czech Ministry of Defence was actively involved in the preparation of this program and tried to reflect the interests of the Czech defence industry and research institutions as much as possible.

Unfortunately, the Czech plans did not make it into the selected PADR projects in the first or second round, although has good initial conditions (Procházka and all, The Long Term Perspective for Defence 2030 - Comparative Analysis, 2018).

The successful completion of these efforts was the acceptance of all 9 thematic areas proposed by the Czech partners. Czech companies have long appreciated the activities that the industrial cooperation section and

³ For instance - materials and technologies for next-generation defence aircrafts or electronic warfare

representatives of the ministry in Brussels systematically carry out to support Czech applicants for project funding from EDIDP funds and now also from EDF for the years 2021 to 2027 represents a real chance for Czech entities to participate in promising multinational projects, in which small and medium-sized enterprises are also subsidized, as well as the emphasis on breakthrough technologies.

Conclusions

The European Defence Fund is the successor European Defence Industry Development Program 2019 and 2020. The strengthening of European defence through the EDF and similar initiatives can thus also be seen as a possible way to strengthen NATO, which will continue to be seen as the only real security guarantee for European countries.

The European Defence Fund has much potential: the amounts of money are significant and real success can be achieved in achieving Europe's strategic autonomy if money is invested in the right future-oriented capabilities, directed according to an effective and efficient governance model without any external constraints, be they internal or external to the EU (Weissenberg, Look out for the new EDF).

The European Defence Action Plan is an important step in developing Europe's defence industrial base and contributing to building the Union's defence capabilities. The way is to support joint projects of Member States in the field of research, development and acquisitions of military equipment. These newly acquired technologies will improve the North Atlantic Alliance's ability to act, which remains the primary guarantor of Europe's defence as such. It should be in the interests of the countries of the EU themselves to increase national R&D funding at national level. At the same time, it will assume responsibility for building the defence capabilities of the entire European Union.

The European Defence Fund will then support an innovative and competitive defence industrial base and contribute to the EU's strategic autonomy.

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POSSIBLE USE OF SELF-ESCAPE BREATHING RESPIRATORS IN SELECTED FACILITIES FOR SENIORS

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ABSTRACT

The main part of the article is the presentation of findings that arose from a targeted questionnaire survey of a group of respondents from the ranks of seniors and the evaluation of the use of self-escape breathing respirators. The article deals with the possibilities of self-escape breathing respirators using designed to protect the respiratory organs from the effects of fumes generated by fires in buildings. The article describes the requirements for this type of resources.

Key words: *self-escape breathing respirator, evacuation, combustion products, crisis situations, integrated rescue system.*

Introduction

From a historical point of view, it can be stated that the issues associated with the use of escape self-rescue breathing apparatus are practically completely new. Buildings that have recently been significantly renovated or newly built must meet several technical and technological parameters. These parameters are essential from the point of view of ensuring the personal safety of the accommodated persons and they place the buildings in a different, it must be said qualitatively much better position. In terms of escape self-escape breathing apparatus, we generally speak of filter breathing apparatus for the escape of persons from the action of particles, carbon monoxide, and other toxic gases formed as combustion products, thus in case of various intense fire. It is assumed that these will not be reusable devices and devices intended for use in the absence of oxygen, thus at a concentration of less than 17 % by volume. In practice, therefore, these will be devices either worn by persons and for stationary storage, and which will be designed primarily for adult users.

At present, it is completely automatically assumed that both the basic and other parts of the integrated rescue system (IRS) of the Czech Republic (CR) will perform their tasks professionally. The biggest shortcoming in reducing the consequences of emergencies is the population itself. Here we mean the

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information and readiness of the CR' inhabitants to deal with the issue of emergencies and individual crises and life-threatening situations. If we talk about low awareness among the general population, then the situation is the same among seniors and perhaps even worse, even though they rightfully belong to a very vulnerable group (Melichaříková, 2018).

1 Definition of Terms and Standards Addressing the Issue of Self-Escape Breathing Respirator

Self-escape breathing apparatus, which can currently be purchased, are included in the group of filter breathing apparatus without a forced air supply. Based on the state standard ČSN 133 (Úřad pro technickou normalizaci, metrologii a státní zkušebnictví ČSN, 2002), self-rescue equipment is divided into two basic groups. The first group is the escape filter breathing apparatus with a fire hood, which is discussed in ČSN EN 403 (Úřad pro technickou normalizaci, metrologii a státní zkušebnictví ČSN, 2005), and the self-escape filter breathing apparatus specified by the ČSN EN 404 (Úřad pro technickou normalizaci, metrologii a státní zkušebnictví ČSN, 2005) standard as a self-rescue filter breathing apparatus with a mouthpiece for protection against carbon monoxide. However, it should be noted that the standard, which should define short-term protection against chemical, biological, and radiological substances (CBRN substances), is not currently introduced in the CR. The specification of requirements for self-contained breathing apparatus is given in the "Title 42 Code of Federal Regulations, part 84, Subpart A" National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2003; Florus, Otrísál, 2010).

1.1 Requirements for escape breathing devices

Title 42 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 84, Subpart A states, inter alia, that the recommendation on the protective and technical properties of escape respiratory protective equipment is based on relevant existing national and international standards. In the CR, a standard addressing this issue is not currently in place. This document refers to several methodologies that describe how to measure a specific technical or protective characteristic of a device. It can therefore be stated that these devices can meet the requirements below at different levels. The requirements are based on the valid standards in a specific geographical area, or on the particular user' specified specific conditions.

The main requirements for this group of resources include in particular:

- the used materials must be resistant to handling and use for the time intended for the use of the device;
- materials that come into contact with the skin must not cause irritation or health problems;

- no air must be released from the filter material during the flow of air through the filter, which would represent a health burden for the user of the device;
- the parts of the device with which the user may come into contact must not have any sharp edges or burrs;
- the breathing resistance must not exceed the required value. For example, in 42 CFR, part 84, it is stated that in the area of the inner mask or mouthpiece of the device mounted on the test head and the continuous air flow of $85 \text{ l}\cdot\text{min}^{-1}$, the inhalation resistance should not exceed $70 \text{ mm H}_2\text{O}$ (686 Pa) and the exhalation $20 \text{ mm H}_2\text{O}$ (196 Pa)];
- if the device is equipped with a visor, it must be securely connected to the device and must withstand all expected stresses. The connection must be verified by the relevant standard;
- if the device is also intended for fire protection, then the helmet must be tested for flame resistance, while the conditions for testing are the same as in the standard EN 136: 1998 (ČSN EN 136: 1998) (Úřad pro technickou normalizaci, metrologii a státní zkušebnictví ČSN, 1997);
- the device must provide reliable protection of the head, eyes, and respiratory system from contaminants;
- the structure must be designed in such a way that it is not necessary to use your hands to ensure that the device is in the correct position when it is in the protective position;
- the device must be designed as a hood that covers the head and neck, or the head, neck, and shoulders. The device must provide a good view and access of air to breathing;
- the device may be equipped with an internal mask or mouthpiece. If a mouthpiece is used, technical measures must be taken to prevent the possibility of nasal breathing;
- self-escape equipment intended to escape must meet the conditions for a minimum protection period (for example 15, 30, 45, or 60 minutes). This period must be specified by the manufacturer and verified by tests;
- the filter must meet the conditions specified in the standard. Testing is required for basic chemicals, usually ammonia, cyanogen chloride, cyclohexane, formaldehyde, hydrogen cyanide, sulphane, nitrogen dioxide, phosgene, phosphine, sulphur dioxide, and chlorine. The standard specifies test substances, their test concentrations, penetration concentrations, and test conditions such as temperature, relative humidity, etc.;
- if the device is also intended for protection against carbon monoxide, the testing of the device must also be stated for this substance in accordance with the specified requirements of the standard;
- practical testing of the device by testers is required. The standard defines the tests that must be practically performed with the help of test persons, the test conditions, the minimum success value, and the approved test method. Practical

tests may be carried out to determine fogging of the lens, to determine the concentration of carbon dioxide in the exhaled air, to determine audibility, the speed at which the device is used from the standby position, etc.;

- the maximum permissible time for the device to move to the protective position can be determined. For example, the NIOSH standard specifies that the device must be deployed from the standby position to the protective position in no more than 30 seconds;
- the device must be resistant to external influences and must pass tests for heat and cold, humidity, vibration, transport and falling. The standard defines test methods, test conditions and quantitative testing requirements;
- the device must contain instructions for use and information on maintenance, durability, restrictions on use, restrictions on the size, shape of the user's face and, where appropriate, other information necessary to use the device and to maintain its protective properties for a specified period;
- the standard can determine the shelf life of the device (expiration date).

2 Basic Characteristics of Selected Self-Escape Respirators

Self-rescue respirators are generally intended to protect against chemical, biological, and radioactive warfare agents. Here, however, we deal with their usability in terms of respiratory protection after exposure to combustion products that arise in a fire. The professional literature states that these are about 200 products of combustion, thus pollutants. The following parameters and data must be observed when selecting a device:

- name and type of resource;
- illustrations;
- product characteristics;
- manufacturer;
- technologies and materials used;
- filter type;
- separability (filtration efficiency) and filter resistance time;
- time required for deployment;
- number of sizes;
- restrictions for users;
- weight of the device;
- storage time;
- package dimensions;
- accessories.

3 Obligations of the Founder in the Field of Fire Protection Arising from Legal Standards

From the point of view of fire protection, the founder is governed by Act No. 133/1985 Coll., on fire protection. In this case, it is not a question of meeting the requirements of fire protection during the approval procedure, but especially during the use of the equipment during its operation. The purpose of the law is to create conditions for effective protection of life and health of citizens and property from fires and for providing assistance in natural disasters and other emergencies by setting the responsibilities of ministries and other administrative authorities, legal and natural persons, status and competence of state administration and self-government fire protection, as well as the status and responsibilities of fire protection units. Everyone is obliged to act in such a way that it does not cause a fire, endanger the life and health of people, animals, and property; when fighting fires, natural disasters, and other extraordinary events, he is obliged to provide adequate personal assistance, unless it exposes him to serious danger or threat to himself or a close person or unless an important circumstance prevents him from doing so, and the necessary material assistance (§ 1 of Act 133/1985 Coll., on fire protection). Based on § 4 of Act 133/1985 Coll. on fire protection, houses for seniors are included in the category without increased fire risk.

Based on the above-mentioned Act on Fire Protection § 5 "Obligations of legal entities and natural persons engaged in the business" paragraph 1 b), the operator is obliged to create conditions for fire fighting and rescue work, especially to maintain free access roads and boarding areas for fire equipment, escape routes and free access to emergency exits, to electricity distribution equipment, to water, gas, heating and product pipelines, to material means of fire protection and to manual operation of fire safety equipment.

The operator shall designate a professionally qualified person (fire protection technician) to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arising from the above mentioned Fire Protection Act, in particular, Sections 5, 6, and 16. Based on the fulfilment of the conditions of § 11 of the above mentioned Act, the Ministry of the Interior (MI) of the CR shall issue a Certificate of Professional Competence. Based on the issued certificate, the designated person may perform the function of fire protection technician. In the case of buildings with sheltered housing or a seniors' house for the elderly, in one case the operator is the City of Olomouc, and in the another case the Olomouc Region. In both cases, this condition is met. However, it should be noted that the Decree of the MI of the CR 246/2001 Coll., on the determination of fire safety conditions and the performance of state fire supervision, § 2 "basic requirements". For example, we can mention especially seniors with reduced mobility or impaired quality of hearing and sight. In addition, for both houses, there is no person present in the evening and at night to help solve this situation for accommodated seniors. In addition, during the evacuation, conditions will certainly deteriorate due to the presence of people with

reduced mobility, but also people using wheelchairs, which will limit the movement of other people in such places, which are designated as escape routes. In these cases, it is certainly possible to use in the mentioned § 2 paragraph 2, namely: "The number, types, and manner of furnishing the premises and equipment of legal persons and natural persons engaged in business with fire protection equipment and fire safety equipment determined in accordance with paragraph 1 may be extended (for instance on the basis of an approved fire risk assessment or fire safety conditions)."

At this point, it is appropriate to indicate in particular for paragraph 3 b) personal protective equipment, and for paragraph 4 in particular:

- fire alarm equipment (for instance electric fire alarm, remote transmission equipment, equipment for the detection of flammable gases and vapors, autonomous fire alarm, hand-held fire alarm equipment),
- fire or explosion suppression equipment (for instance fixed or semi-stable fire extinguishing equipment, automatic explosion-proof equipment, automatic fire-fighting systems),
- devices for directing the movement of smoke in the event of a fire (for instance smoke and heat extraction devices, overpressure ventilation devices, smoke damper including control mechanism, smoke-tight doors, natural smoke ventilation devices),
- equipment for the persons' escape in case of fire (for instance fire or evacuation lift, emergency lighting, emergency communication equipment, functional door equipment, safety, and warning equipment).

4 Current State of Selected Accommodation Facilities for Seniors

Based on Act No. 133/1985 Coll., on fire protection, attention was focused on finding out the current state of security of accommodation facilities in the field of fire protection in three buildings (sheltered housing and two houses for seniors). Sheltered housing is equipped with a fire alarm room on the ground floor of the building with the appropriate responsible employee. These workers are regularly instructed in the field of fire protection training and are also acquainted with the Internal Rules of the Organization for the Provision of Sheltered Housing, which contain a specific point number VII, which addresses emergencies and emergency situations. On each floor there is a fire extinguisher with information on emergency telephone numbers and main water, gas and electricity shutters. In the event of an unexpected situation, spare keys for each apartment unit are stored in the organization's vault. Residents will also receive internal rules for the provision of sheltered housing when moving into the facility.

The situation is different for pensions for seniors. There are no fire reports here, unless we are talking about the offices of care service providers, where there is no permanent employee or care staff. The fire extinguisher is on each floor with information on emergency telephone numbers.

However, the situation is different after the end of the caring staff's working hours. Employees are present at the Sheltered Housing from 07:00 to 19:30. After this time, residents are dependent on their own help. At the Pension for seniors, residents can call carers by telephone if they are currently in the building. In the period from 3.30 pm to 7.00 am, however, there is usually no one in the building and the inhabitants are dependent on their own help.


5 Results and Discussion

The authors set the following hypotheses:

- H1 Are the inhabitants of selected homes for seniors aware of the possible risk of fire, or the presence of pollutants in the facilities in which they currently live.
- H2 They are sufficiently familiar with and know how to behave when evacuating a building in the period after a fire and in the absence of caring staff.
- H3 They have a well-established idea of self-rescue breathing apparatus and the possibility of their use.


5.1 Methods used

For the self-evaluation within the practical part, the methods of questioning in the form of a questionnaire have been chosen. To fill in the questionnaire, the target group of respondents living in selected homes for the elderly was asked. Completion of the questionnaire was voluntary and a total of 19 were evaluated. The questionnaire consisted of a total of 16 questions. The purpose and aim of the questionnaire have been to find out what is the state of knowledge and information of the addressed respondents in the field of activities during a controlled and uncontrolled evacuation in the event of a fire, or presence of pollutants in the air. Furthermore, how would they perform respiratory protection during the evacuation.




Graph No. 1 Respondents' age and sex

Graph 1 shows that most respondents were in the age range of 81-90 years, where women predominate in a ratio of 14: 5. The first area of questions was focused on finding out the state of knowledge, or at least the idea of the respondents on the issue of population protection and fire protection (questions 3 to 11). The second area was focused on the issue of escape self-rescue breathing apparatus (questions 12 to 13). The aim of the third area was to find out whether the respondents are worried about the possible occurrence of a fire in their facility and whether they have an idea of how long they are able to leave the building in case of fire (questions 14 and 15).



Graph No. 2 Positive answers from respondents



Graph No. 3 Negative answers from respondents

The graphs show the answers of the respondents to the individual questions of the submitted questionnaire. (positive answers - graph no. 2) and (negative answers - graph no. 3). The above graphs show the absence of questions No. 1 and 2, which are evaluated in Graph No. 1. From the above graphs 2 and 3, the following situation can be stated:

Question 3 "Do you have any idea what population protection and fire protection are?"

Most respondents answered in the affirmative. In three cases the answer was no and in all three cases they were the oldest respondents.

Question 4 "Do you consider information on fire risks important?"

Question No. 5 "Do you think that this information should be passed on to all categories of the population, including you?"

For both questions, all respondents' answers were positive. From the above situation, it can be stated that the respondents take the issue of fire protection seriously and are certainly interested in being informed about the issue.

Question No. 6 "Have you ever encountered the fact that you were directly endangered by a fire or witnessed a fire in the vicinity?"

It is clear from the above answers that approximately every fourth respondent has direct experience with fire (5 respondents out of 19 respondents). It can be concluded from the results that the occurrence of a fire is not only an exceptional and marginal issue and the possibility of a fire cannot be taken lightly. The high number of positive answers among respondents can also be attributed to the age of the respondents in connection with their life experiences.

Question No. 7 "Do you know how to behave in the event of a fire, how to protect or save?"

7 respondents answered this question in the negative, which is a high number and indicates that more than a third of respondents do not know what to do in the event of a fire and how to behave.

Question No. 8 "Do you have fire-fighting equipment in the building/apartment? (for example, fire detector, gas leak detector, fire

extinguisher, etc.) YES / NO * In the case of YES, please indicate which equipment."

From the above answers it can be concluded that the respondents usually have an overview of the presence of fire-fighting equipment. Respondents answered in the negative in 4 cases and one answered in the affirmative, but the answer was wrong. This is a respondent aged 91 who answered that he has a fire detector in the shaft on the toilet.

Question No. 9 "Are you informed in the field of fire protection and human protection in emergencies? YES / NO * In the case of YES, state how or who provides the training. In case of NO, please indicate who you think should ensure it: "

For 8 respondents, the answer was no. Here I would like to state that the high number of negative answers is also supported by the fact that individual respondents due to their age and reduced mobility do not have the opportunity to participate in individual trainings. Considering the results of the answers to questions 3, 4, 5 and 10, it can be clearly concluded that the interest in these trainings is completely demonstrable.

Question No. 10 "Are you interested in regular training in the field of fire and emergency protection? YES/NO * In case of YES, indicate which form of education you prefer: "Internet" "Discussion" "Press" "Radio" "Television"

Only two negative answers again indicate a positive interest in education in the field of fire protection and public protection. The most common forms were "discussion and television".

Question 11 "Do you know the emergency number to call the fire department?"

From the above answers, it is quite clear that, except for one respondent, who belongs to the age category of 91 and more, they know the emergency telephone number.

Question 12 "Have you ever heard of self-rescue breathing apparatus?"

From the results of the answers to this question, where 15 respondents answered in the negative, it is evident, and it can be concluded that the issue of self-rescue escape breathing devices is unknown for most respondents. Ignorance of this issue cannot be attributed only to the age of the respondents, but in the CR

this area is not given due attention. The issue of improvised protection, especially of the respiratory organs, has long been underestimated.

Question 13 "Do you consider it important that your building is equipped with self-rescue breathing apparatus?"

Here it is necessary to take into account that 4 respondents answered, "I do not know", because they do not know the issue and have never heard of it. A total of 10 respondents answered in the affirmative, which again indicates an active approach to the possible provision of their protection against harmful combustion products.

Question No. 14 "Do you have any idea how long it will take you to leave the building in the event of a fire?"

Based on the number of 11 negative answers, it can certainly be stated that the respondents are not ready to carry out an evacuation in the event of a fire or other crisis situations. One can only assume what the negative answers are based on and what they are based on. It is argued that they cannot imagine what this situation might look like in their environment, given their age from their physical and mental dispositions.

Question 15 "Are you concerned that there may be a fire in your environment?"

5 respondents gave negative answers, which indicates the fact that the prevailing opinion is that they are afraid of a fire in their immediate vicinity.

5.2 Evaluation of hypotheses

H1 Are the inhabitants of selected houses for seniors aware of the possible risk of fire, or the presence of pollutants in the facilities in which they currently live.

Evaluation: Within the evaluation of the questionnaire, it is certainly possible to state the respondents' interest in information that concerns the issue of protection of the population and that they have the necessary knowledge about the presence of fire-fighting equipment. They have knowledge of the telephone number for the IRS CR emergency line. In the case of the answers to question no. 15, where 14 respondents stated that they were concerned about the occurrence of a fire, it is certainly possible to infer an interest in the issue of fire protection and protection of the population. It also follows from the above that the respondents are fully aware of the risk of fire and hypothesis No. 1 is confirmed.

H2 They are sufficiently familiar with and know how to behave when evacuating a building in the period after a fire and in the absence of caring staff.

Evaluation: It should be noted in the introduction that no person from the ranks of caring staff is present in the evening and at night. The situation that would arise in the event of a fire at this incriminated time would certainly be problematic. A total of 7 respondents out of 19 respondents in question No. 7 gave a negative answer, which indicates the fact that more than one third of respondents do not know how to behave in this situation. To evaluate whether the hypothesis is confirmed or refuted, it is necessary to state that in order to solve this situation, the respondents have a handicap in the form of their age. Here it is necessary to consider that their orientation in space, the way and speed of solving the situation and the ability to move is significantly reduced. From the above, we clearly conclude that hypothesis No. 2 is refuted based on the findings of the current situation.

H3 They have a well-established idea of self-rescue breathing apparatus and the possibility of their use.

Evaluation: Based on the answers of the respondents to question no. 12, where 15 respondents out of 19 respondents answered in the negative, it can be clearly stated that they have no idea about the means. A total of 14 respondents stated in question no. 13 that they wished that the buildings where they are accommodated be equipped with these means. It is necessary to point out to what extent the resulting answers to question no. 13 can be evaluated when the vast majority have no idea about the mentioned means. Based on the answers of the respondents, especially in question No. 12, it can be stated that hypothesis No. 3 is refuted.

Conclusion

In the form of a questionnaire, it was found that the readiness of accommodated seniors to deal with the situation associated with fire is at a low level. In addition, in the event of a fire in the evening and at night, the situation is even worse, as none of the caring staff is present to help them with the situation. A possible solution may be, for example, the selection with subsequent training of individuals from the ranks of residents who are physically and mentally at such a level that they will be able to solve the situation at least partially. The advantage is also the fact that the specific environment and most of the residents know their habits to some extent. If the person in question should move in a smoky environment to help the accommodated person leave the building, it is entirely appropriate to ensure respiratory protection. In terms of the financial availability of these funds and certainly the limited financial resources of the founder, the

situation cannot be solved by purchasing a larger amount of these funds for the accommodated, which is quite understandable. The purchase of a limited number of this protective equipment for persons who should be in charge of leaving the residents as effectively as possible as part of the evacuation from a burning building would be legitimate and justified.

The results of the survey certainly show that most respondents are dominated by a request for the implementation of lessons in the field of fire protection and public protection. The most common form of required training would welcome a discussion. In order to increase the level of readiness of seniors to solve the situation in the event of a fire, the founder can solve it through a fire technician. It can be stated that on the basis of the results of the questionnaire and the evaluation of the established hypotheses, it is necessary to consider the low level and experience of the accommodated persons in relation to the ability to solve these situations. It is also necessary to consider their physical and mental dispositions. It will probably not be possible to reduce the level of the feeling of danger from the possible occurrence of a fire in the accommodation of seniors, but the effort to increase the level of their readiness and conditions for leaving these areas quickly is certainly within the possibilities of the founder.

In total conclusion, we would like to state that the Czech market is not sufficiently supplied with escape self-rescue respirators, which was found to be a secondary finding. However, there are simple and relatively inexpensive means available on the market for various types of mouthpieces that use nanomembranes to trap pollutants. Aware of the very problematic capture of combustion products, which are formed by small molecules of toxic substances and particles of dust or carbon type (soot), it can be stated that mouthpieces with an active sorption layer based on catalysed activated carbon would be quite sufficient to capture significant amounts of pollutants arising from combustion, both on the basis of particles and toxic substances. However, it is necessary to state that on the basis of the currently valid legislation, the area of fire protection for nursing homes or sheltered housing is addressed by the founder in full compliance with the legislative standards valid in the CR.

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POPULATION PROTECTION AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN TERMS OF MIGRATION AND THEIR POSSIBLE IMPACTS

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ABSTRACT

The article introduces important concepts and motives of migration. The article also deals with the issue of migration from the point of view of understanding its significance. The practical part discusses the results of the questionnaire, which has been conducted to find out the views of society on migration and refugees. Not only the relations to the migration policy of the Czech Republic are defined, but also the possible impacts and risks related to migration are presented.

Key words: migration, immigrant, migrant, migration crisis, security, migration risks, crisis management, civil protection

Introduction

Migration is a complex and dynamic phenomenon that has social and economic impacts on the Czech Republic (CR). Entry stay and integration of foreigners in the CR are processes with possible positive and negative consequences for Czech society - processes that are largely dependent on the ongoing, active, and flexible approach of the CR (Ministerstvo vnitra, 2020). The Department of Asylum and Migration Policy bases its activities on the Strategy of Migration Policy of the CR (Strategie migrační politiky České republiky, 2015), which was approved in 2015. It also draws on long-term own and international experience. The CR's migration policy strategy clearly defines a balanced and flexible Czech migration policy, including its principles, objectives, and tools. The migration strategy of the CR leads to the strengthening of the positive aspects of migration and to the most effective combating of negative phenomena and risks associated with migration. The CR's migration policy is enshrined within the common policies of the European Union (EU) and its implementation to a corresponding extent follows from the common legal instruments of the Union (Adašková, Kazanský, 2013). Specific areas of migration that are most regulated by common EU policies include, in particular, international protection, the protection of the EU's external borders, and the area of return (including the expulsion of illegally staying aliens). In the areas of legal migration and integration of foreigners, the member states of the Union have

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maintained a relatively high degree of discretion. In its approach to migration issues, the CR must take into account not only the specific needs and possibilities of the state and Czech society but also the situation in the EU, including its participation in solutions within its common policies (Kazanský, Andrassy, 2019). The common Schengen area, of which the CR is a part, brings a significant advantage in the form of the abolition of internal border controls for people and goods. This concept also brings security challenges and places high demands on the cooperation of individual members of the common Schengen area. The CR's goal is to maintain a secure, functional, and stable Schengen area, including through a more effective and responsible migration policy at both the national and EU level.

1 Migration and its Determination

The concept of migration can best be understood in Czech as moving. It is a movement in space to change the place of residence. This movement can be intended as temporary or permanent, it can be understood as a positive change or as the enforcement of a decision. It can even be realized as a transfer of man against his will. Uherek, 2016 states that migration means: "A change of territory, the transfer of a person to another place, which will have a number of consequences, both for the place from which he left and for the territory where he now occurs." According to Koudelka (Koudelka, 2018): "Migration is a common phenomenon in human history and is understood as one of the solutions to various problems. From the beginning of human history, it was a matter of finding better conditions for cattle management, hunting or fruit picking. "

1.1 Motives for migration

There are countless reasons why a resident of a country decides to leave their country. However, one of the most common causes of migration is the political and economic instability of countries of origin. Political conflicts have created inhospitable conditions that have not been in line with citizens' conditions for a happy life (Hejduková, 2018). This phenomenon can be observed, for example, in the movement of people in post-war Czechoslovakia caused by a political factor. It is estimated that between 1945-1947 there were approximately 5 million people in motion in the former Czechoslovakia, of which about 4 million were in the Czech lands. During these years, over 2.8 million Germans were expelled, which contributed to the homogenization of the population of the Czech lands (Drbohlav, 2006).

Another motive for migration is job opportunities. Horáková, 2011 states that between 2000-2010 there was an increase in the employment of foreigners in the Czech Republic from 164,987 to 306,350. This number represents more than 5% of the total employment in the Czech Republic. In the migration system, where

the shift takes place from less developed countries to richer countries, the immediate benefits of both stakeholders can be observed. Immigrants will get a job and thus financial security, and the destination country of immigrants will be cheap labor, on which, moreover, they did not have to spend funds through education or training (King, 2008).

2 Possible Impacts of Migration on Population Protection and Crisis Management

Migration has been a natural phenomenon and opportunity for:

- immigrant;
- the recipient country;
- country of origin.

Migration is associated with international trade, foreign investment, studies, internships, highly and low-skilled labour, culture, and scientific cooperation. Banning migration would therefore be a major economic threat, leading to a loss of competitiveness. However, there are also certain security aspects associated with migration. This threat can take the form of terrorism, organized crime, the spread of infectious diseases, cultural practices inconsistent with our legal order, or a reduced willingness to integrate. Such a threat can be posed by certain immigrants or their masses, as well as the volume of migration flows and mass uncontrolled migration.

2.1 The threat of uncontrolled migration

The threat of losing impact on migration is divided into two main factors:

- internal factors, which are the inability or impossibility of setting up immigration processes or a system that continues to become vulnerable and untrustworthy. These shortcomings can be prevented mainly by quality legislation and increasing the capacity of the whole system;
- external factors that present much greater risks, which are objective facts. These affect the fulfilment of this threat (various conflicts, natural disasters or organized crime) and psychological factors (willingness of migrants to take risks, unrealistic ideas about opportunities, subjective economic motive of migrants,...). These risks are more difficult to prevent and the ability to prevent them significantly depends on the degree of their controllability.

The practical absence of internal borders between the Member States of the Schengen area and the limited possibility of applying legislative regulation due to the mutual legal system of the EU play an important role in assessing the vulnerability of the current system. Due to this common EU legal system, Member States cannot intervene in certain areas of migration policy, such as visa policy or external border protection standards, as well as in the area of international protection, which is largely regulated in the form of regulations and directives.

On the contrary, in the direction of legal migration, states have maintained a certain degree of discretion and can thus use some national regulatory mechanisms despite the creation of several directives. These capabilities set legislation for the entry and residence of foreigners so that immigration benefits all parties involved, while minimizing theoretical and practical negative impacts, is a key point in effective migration management.

However, in addition to the legal side of the matter, in order to reduce the risk, it is necessary to ensure sufficient system capacity, quantitative and qualitative assurance, efficiency of the visa process, controls at international airports, detection of forged or altered documents and law enforcement. Equally important is the interconnection of individual communication information systems at the level of nation states, the sharing of intelligence and thus ensuring better communication between individual nations and their ministries. Other risk areas include permitting entry and residence in terms of corruption, so it is necessary to properly set up anti-corruption measures of the state administration.

Certain procedural functional rules are essential for the effectiveness of migration management, which must be sufficiently immune to possible abuse such as fictitious employment or fictitious family ties and thus be a sufficient means for managing migration. These rules must be able to assess in a short period of time whether a certain foreigner is desirable in the territory of the state and whether he poses a threat, but at the same time this process must not hinder legal migration. An integral part of the immigration system are the security forces, which play a crucial role in reducing individual risks.

Another essential element of the immigration process is the ability of the state to ensure the effective and efficient return of foreigners who entered the state illegally or lost their residence permit. Here, the effectiveness and real feasibility of the return of foreigners is also important, on which the success or failure of the return policy depends, thus eliminating possible threats.

2.2 Issues of motivation - push and pull factors

The so-called push and pull factors influencing migration were laid by D. J. Bogue. Referring to it, Uherek, 2016 states: That migration requires certain forces that push or pull a certain individual to certain countries.

Push factors include all the forces that act on a foreigner by supporting his decision to leave a country. These factors most often include the security and economic situation of the country, natural disasters, but also bad government, unemployment, or corruption. The key influence on the issue of migration is therefore the socio-economic situation, security and living standards of the population in the country of origin and transit. On the contrary, pull factors include all the forces that attract potential immigrants, such as the level of health care, the availability of the social system, the size of the settled community or the attitude of the society towards migration. The level of punishment for illegal

migration also plays an important role in motivating immigrants. The given motivation is therefore the vision of a large reward with minimal retribution.

The threat of uncontrolled migration therefore lies in the unsatisfactory setting of the system, its limited credibility and limited ability to implement the established procedures. If these legislative opinions are not sufficiently set and complied with, additional pull factors may arise and thus the subsequent motivation to bypass or abuse the system.

2.3 Terrorism and crime

It is appropriate to speak of immigration in the context of other generally recognized threats, including global terrorism. Terrorism can be defined as conduct that is politically, religiously, or otherwise ideologically motivated and uses violence or its threats, especially with the aim of provoking fear.

Terrorism has been the most serious potential threat to migration since the events of the September 11, 2001 attacks. Until now, terrorism has been a major argument for restricting immigration. However, if there is a link between terrorism and migration, this does not mean that restricting it will be an effective means of combating terrorism. Rather, these restrictions discourage potential immigrants who do not want to enter a foreign country without state consent. For migrants who have some criminal or terrorist intentions, these measures do not prevent them in any way, as even with the restriction of immigration, the borders remain to some extent permeable. Foreigners more often cross borders as students, tourists, businessmen, etc., and not as those who intend to settle in each country.

If we divide terrorism according to the perpetrator, then in recent years Islamic radicalism appears to be the greatest threat to the CR and Europe. The population has this threat linked mainly due to several terrorist attacks by terrorists who support the Islamic State or another radical Islamist ideology. Despite these events, however, the risk associated with Islamic radicalism is minimal, but not zero. This small risk is mainly associated with the different position of the CR within the rest of Europe, as the Muslim community is less numerous in the CR and no radicalization tendencies have been recorded so far. These radicalization tendencies have also been linked to exclusion in other EU countries. In this respect, most members of the Muslim community in the CR are well integrated into society and thus do not create socially excluded communities that could serve as a background for terrorist activities.

While there is a low probability of terrorist attacks by international terrorist organizations (Islamic State,...), there is still a risk of radicalization of small groups or individuals who may attempt violent action without the protection of a terrorist organization.

In addition to the potential risk of terrorism, immigrants are also credited with higher crime rates. This criminality of immigrants can be influenced to some extent by the problems of acculturation and assimilation into the new society, as

immigrants are often forced to settle in localities where criminal activities are more common. Several EU member states face the problem of higher crime rates for immigrants, for example in Berlin 20 % of violent crimes were committed by about a thousand juvenile immigrants from Turkey or Arab countries, even though this figure represents about 3 per mille of the total population of Berlin.

According to available data from 2015, there were 101,597 solved crimes in the CR, of which 7,264 were committed by foreigners and 2,717 were committed by foreigners from third countries. Of the number of crimes committed by foreigners of third countries, 292 were violent in nature (murder, violent crime). Thus, foreigners committed 7.2 %, while foreigners from third countries committed 2.7 % of the total number of crimes. The data of the Czech Statistical Office also show that in 2015 there were 467,562 foreigners in the CR, including asylum seekers, which is about 4.3 % of the Czech population. Although it may appear from the data that foreigners commit more crimes than their share in the population, this is not entirely true. Most crimes were committed by EU foreigners who are not required to register their temporary residence. The figure of 4.3 % does not correspond to the real representation of foreigners in the population. According to the data, the share corresponds closer to 2.5 % of foreigners from third countries in the population, thus about 268,940 foreigners from third countries. Thus, they committed 2.7 % of solved crimes. We can therefore say that the crimes of foreigners approximately correspond to their share in the population.

Organized crime groups run this activity for profit. Activities include car theft, production, distribution and smuggling of drugs, as well as organizing illegal migration. Between 1998 and 2004, illegal migration was one of the most widespread activities of organized crime groups. However, from 2005 this share began to decline (Cejp, 2010).

Until 2016, the share of illegal migration among organized crime groups was still slightly declining (Scheinost, 2018). It is also necessary to take into account the fact that illegal migration is a major source of profit for organized groups, as migrants pay considerable sums for each part of the route. These amounts can climb up to ten thousand euros. The same cannot be said of other non-governmental and voluntary organizations, which we often place at the level of groups organizing illegal migration as a business, as these organizations operate purely for humanitarian reasons without any enrichment, and yet they are still being criticized.

Although the crime of foreigners in the CR is not a significant problem at present, there is still a risk of the emergence or growth of new socially excluded groups of foreigners who may become members of organized crime groups.

2.4 Health risks

Although migration may seem to be a major risk factor for disease transmission, this risk is equally associated with ordinary or tourist travel abroad. However, there is still a risk associated with the transmission of imported infectious diseases such as measles, tuberculosis, but also diseases common in European society, such as influenza, respiratory infections or hepatitis. A key role in preventing the transmission of infectious diseases is the proper vaccination of immigrants entering our territory, thus significantly reducing the risk of infection (Teva point.cz, 2020). According to the World Health Organization, 2020³, most refugees and migrants are healthy, despite frequent poor hygiene conditions and the collapse of health systems in their country of origin, but they can become infected during a trip or while in reception facilities. Due to their social and legal status, they may have more complex access to health services, so it is important that states provide health services to all immigrants, regardless of their legal status.

3 Findings and their Discussion

To find out opinions on migration, research was carried out in the form of a questionnaire survey. The aim of the research was to gain an overview of views on migration in society. The conclusions of the research show that most respondents are not actively interested in migration but are afraid of refugees and immigrants, and yet feel safe in the CR. They are most worried about refugees coming from Muslim countries and are least afraid of refugees from the Vietnamese minority. According to more than half of the respondents, the CR should not accept refugees at all. Two-thirds of respondents would not be in favour of the CR's withdrawal from the EU in connection with migration, even though they believe that the EU has failed to resolve the refugee crisis.

Respondents are most concerned about crime, terrorism, and the possible consequences of religious or cultural beliefs. Approximately 43 % of respondents see disease transmission as a threat, although more than half of respondents think that migration poses health risks to citizens. According to 1/3 of the respondents, migration brings benefits, but only for those who subsequently stated what the benefits are and consider their claims to be positive. Most people believe that migration is only a burden for the destination country. Although most respondents feel the fear of possible violent or criminal activity of refugees, only a small proportion of them have come into conflict with or witnessed a migrant in their lives.

³ *Stránky World Health Organization* [online]. C2020. 10 things to know about the health of refugees and migrants. [citováno 2020-10-29]. Dostupné z <<https://1url.cz/AMEd5>>.

Conclusion

The text published in this article can serve as one of the tools for a basic understanding of migration issues. He focuses on the effects of migration on the protection of the population. The fundamental knowledge is that migration does not pose any major risk for the CR. It was found that, according to the Czech Statistical Office data, migrants participate in crime in the CR with approximately the same share as other Czech citizens. Health risks are also more likely to be tourism, and terrorism is currently not a relevant threat to the CR. Likewise, the trend of organized crime is declining due to illegal migration, which has been considered a major risk in previous years. The only significant threat at present is uncontrolled migration.

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HUNGARY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN REGIONAL SECURITY AND POSSIBILITIES FOR THE COOPERATION WITH THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC FOR STRENGTHENING REGIONAL SECURITY

Ladislav Pásztor¹

ABSTRACT

At the beginning of the 21st century, three security threats have affected Central Europe as well as other European regions. First of all, it was the “Arab spring”, which evoked migration from the “Arabic world” to Western Europe and caused a refugee crisis. The second significant security threat was the “reunification” of the Crimean Peninsula to Russia and the breakaway Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics’ proclamation. The third security threat was the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levante (ISIL/Daesh), followed by a wave of terrorist attacks in Europe. Another security threat is a global world order changing from bipolar to present unipolar world order, which has been continuously shifting to the multipolar world order, resulting in the national and geopolitical interests coming to the fore on the global and regional environment. Multiple Central European countries reacted to the security threats changes, evaluated the current security situation, and adopted new national security strategies to reflect changes in the new security environment. Hungary and the Slovak Republic are neighbouring Central European mid-size countries without considerable military power. The author of this article evaluates - in practice - the new Hungarian National Security Strategy and indicates possibilities for the cooperation between Hungary and the Slovak republic on the military security field.

Key words: Hungary, the Slovak Republic, Central European regional security, security threats, Hungarian National Security Strategy

Introduction

In April 2020, the Hungarian government adopted a new Hungarian National Security Strategy (*Magyarország Nemzeti Biztonsági Stratégia - NBS*), which replaced the previous National Security Strategy of 2012. After 1989’s peaceful transition from socialist rule to a democratic political regime in Hungary’s modern history, the new Hungarian National Security Strategy (NBS) is the fourth essential strategic state document. The first primary Hungarian National Security Strategy was adopted in May 2002, but its application was not possible in practice due to the contradiction of the program statement of the new Hungarian Social-Liberal government and partly due to the adoption of the new European Security Strategy 2003. The Second Hungarian National Security

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Strategy was adopted in April 2004, which was in line with Hungary's accession to NATO² and the EU³. The third Hungarian National Security Strategy was adopted in 2012, states that the foundation of a security policy of Hungary constitutes of a NATO membership, an economically prosperous Europe, and a stable Balkan region and Eastern Europe – especially the neighbouring countries of Hungary. (Pásztor, 2020a, p. 216-221)

This paper's primary goal is to introduce the new NBS focusing on the Hungarian security ambitions and its impact on the Central European region, especially on the Slovak Republic. In conclusion, the author focuses on possibilities for cooperation with the Slovak Republic for strengthening regional security in line with the new Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic (*Bezpečnostná stratégia Slovenskej Republiky*) adopted by the Slovak government in December 2020 and approved by the National Council of the Slovak Republic in January 2021.

1 The new National Security Strategy of Hungary

The NBS 2020 reflects current global and European security challenges, risks, and threats from the Hungarian point of view, mainly following national interest and membership in NATO and the EU. The NBS drafting process was in progress between autumn 2016 and spring 2020. The Office of the Deputy State Secretary for Defence Policy of the Ministry of Defence was responsible for drafting NBS. This leading state office closely cooperated with civilian and military national security services and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (Pásztor, 2020b, p.147) Hungarian think-tanks⁴ and some experts were also involved in the preparation of NBS from 2018, but the document was never discussed nor in the circle of the professional public until its adoption by the government in 2020. (Csiki, 2021, p. 1-2)

The NBS titled "Secure Hungary in a changing world" (*Biztonságos Magyarország egy változóvilágban*). The second paragraph of the NBS makes clear the primary emphasis and the current basic security situation: "*One of the most defining features of the processes that affect our security is that their formation, development, and impact are difficult to predict, and this results in increasing uncertainty. Therefore, the focus of our answers to the changing challenges must be a solid system of Hungary's values, endowments, and priorities, one of the determining elements of which is the national economy and within that the defence industry development. Thus, the starting point of our answers to the global, European, and national challenges affecting the security of our country is always Hungary and the Hungarian nation.*" (NBS, par.2)

² Hungary joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on 12th March 1999 (Külgyminisztérium, 2014)

³ Hungary joined the European Union (EU) on 1st May 2004 (European Union, 2021)

⁴ the Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies and the Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade

Hungary's membership in NATO and the EU is no less critical for increasing the currently stable Hungary's security situation. (NBS, par.44) NATO is the cornerstone of Hungary's security (NBS, par.14). As a result of the Hungarian Armed Forces' development, Hungary contributes to the collective defense guaranteed by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. (NBS, par.129) Hungary believes in a successful EU that respects the sovereignty of the member states and has their united support, promoting both the European continent's global competitiveness and the effectiveness of the common defense. (NBS, par.15) Hungary's interest is to have a common EU foreign and security policy and the associated support for more effective enforcement of the common defense policy. (NBS, par.93) Hungary has clearly stated its position on the introduction of a compulsory mechanism for refugee relocation quotas:⁵ “[...] *any attempt to require the compulsory resettlement of stateless persons or foreign nationals to be contrary to Hungary's national sovereignty and unacceptable.*” (NBS, par.9) Hungary attaches great importance to closely interrelated values such as peace, security, state sovereignty, and territorial integrity (NBS, par.11) and sees no country as an enemy in this regard. (NBS, par. 12)

To achieve the primary goal of NBS – secure Hungary – has the confident ambitions and set the following fundamental priorities, interests, and values:

- Build a secure Hungary by 2030 and reach fifth place in Europe and top tenth in the world. The ambition priority is relied, on the one hand, on maintaining a high level of public security in the country and, on the other hand, building one a regional group of the dominant, modern forces that relies on an exportable domestic defence industry; (NBS, par.5 and 6).
- The gradual development of the Hungarian Defence Forces (NBS, par.5 and 27) is a fundamental institution for guaranteeing Hungary's sovereignty and territorial integrity. In terms of its international roles, it is an essential tool for implementing foreign policy. (NBS, par.25)
- Development of the domestic defense industry (NBS, par.28) focused on Research and Development and Innovation and reduce import dependence on all parts of the economy. (NBS, par.105)
- Improving Hungary's demographic situation (NBS, par.6) is the most crucial national affair (NBS, par.104) and high-security risk. (NBS, par.124g)
- A substantial Hungarian national fund based Hungary, millennial statehood, language and culture, history and traditions, the Christian-based values, and the Hungarian national identity⁶ are the keys for the Hungarian nation to survive. (NBS, par.7)

⁵ For more details please see „Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015”. (Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601)

⁶ By István Simicskó (September 2015 – May 2018: Minister of Defence of Hungary; May 2018 - May 2020: Government commissioner for patriotic and defence education), the “Hungarian national identity” is a national feeling and emotional pillar throughout history and

- Hungary's responsibility promotes the prosperity of Hungarian communities across the Hungarian border in their homeland and protects the persecuted Christian minorities. (NBS, par.13) The Hungarian minority living across the border is inseparable from Hungary's security ⁷ (NBS, par.84). It is a high-security risk if they may be forcing to leave their homeland due to the deteriorating situation. (NBS, par.124f)
- NATO is the cornerstone of Hungary's security. (NBS, par.14) As a result of the Hungarian Armed Forces development, Hungary contributes to the collective defense guaranteed by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. (NBS, par.129)
- Hungary believes in a successful EU that respects the sovereignty of the member states and has their united support, promoting both the European continent's global competitiveness and the effectiveness of the common defense. (NBS, par.15) It is in Hungary's interest to have the common EU foreign and security policy and the associated support for more effective enforcement of the common defense policy. (NBS, par.93) Hungary does not rule out creating the joint European army, which can only be built after effectively implementing the common European defense policy. It is necessary to maintain the joint promotion of security interests at the national governments' level until then. (NBS, par.94)

To strengthen Hungary's current security level and ensure its further development, the new NBS 2020 specifies the strategic partners. Hungary's priority national interest is to maintain and develop political, economic, and defense cooperation with the V4⁸ countries. (NBS, par.108, 109) Due to the traditional bilateral and multilateral political, economic, human society, and defense cooperation's, Hungary considers Germany⁹, a key partner in its foreign

educates in respect of its national values, without violating other nations. (Simicskó, 2021, p.66-67)

⁷ From the beginning of the 1990s for Hungary, the quality of life and safety of the Hungarian minority living across the border is a factor strengthening Hungary's security. (Pásztor, 2020a, p.219-220, 25-226)

⁸ V4 had founded on 15th February 1991 in Visegrad town in Hungary. V4 members are Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. One of the fundamental objective for the foundation was, and still is - the full involvement in the European political and economic system, as well as the system of security and legislation. (Visegrad Group, 2021)

⁹ Since 2018, representatives of the Ministry of Defense and the Hungarian Defence Forces have signed contracts for the supply of 20 Airbus H145M attack helicopters, 16 Airbus H225M multi-purpose helicopters, 44 new Leopard 2 A7 + tanks, and 24 PzH 2000 self-propelled howitzers. The new military equipment had been implemented since 2020. (Pásztor, 2019, p.220) In August 2020, the Hungarian government signed an agreement with the German company „Rheinmetall”, which established a joint venture in Hungary to produce Lynx infantry combat vehicles. In September 2020, General Ferenc Korom, Commander of the Hungarian Armed Forces, and Armin Papperger, CEO of Rheinmetall, signed a contract to produce 218 pieces of Lynx KF41 combat vehicles. The contract also includes that the vast majority of the

and security policy. (NBS, par.110) Based on “a millennial community of destiny and arms friendship” between Hungarian and Polish nation, as well as a joint NATO and EU membership, Hungary pursuit to strategic cooperation with Poland within the bilateral¹⁰ and V4 format too. (NBS, par.111) The USA is a significant player in a global security policy and will encourage its allies and partners to be more powerful and reliable in foreign, security, and defense policy. Hungary’s interest in continuation strategic partnership with the USA on the high-level cooperation on the defence¹¹ and economic fields. (NBS, par.112) In the imaginary ranking of strategic states, Italy is in fifth place, with which Hungary has significant defense¹² and economic cooperation. Italy is also NATO, and the EU member state has with Hungary another multilateral security and defense policy¹³. Due to the mass immigration, Italy and Hungary have an opportunity to coordinated action in this significant security threat. (NBS, par.113) The next strategic state is France, which plays a substantial role in joint EU security and defence policy, and it’s an influential NATO member. Maintaining and increasing multilateral and bilateral security and defence relationships are significant for

vehicles - 172 pieces - will do manufactured at the newly established factory in Hungarian city Zalaegerszeg. (Révész, 2020)

¹⁰ Poland is a key partner for Hungary. It does also confirmed by the bilateral cooperation agreement signed on 16th February 2021 covered 63 areas, including the areas of training, military drills, as well as nurturing historical ties and traditions. Besides that, Hungary and Poland cooperate within the joint military exercises of the special forces and utilize experiences gained from training and preparing reserve soldiers and the joint UNIFIL mission in Lebanon. Also, Hungary and Poland exchanged Leopard 2 crew training methodologies because Hungary commissioned a similar platform by Rheinmetall. (Snoj, 2021a)

¹¹ In the first half of 2019, Hungary and the USA signed the „Agreement on Defence cooperation between the government of Hungary and the government of the United States”. (2019. évi LI. törvény, 2019) In November 2020, it became to the public that the Soviet air defense system 2K12 KUB using by Hungarian Armed Forces would be replaced in 2023 by the Norwegian-American air defense missile system - NASAMS (National/Norwegian Advanced Surface to Air Missile System). The NASAMS is the joint development of US “Raytheon” and Norwegian “Kongsberg Defense & Aerospace”. The system combines the well-proven American AIM-120 AMRAAM medium-range active radar-guided anti-aircraft missiles, and the AN/MPQ-64 Sentinel 3D mobile X-band uses a radar system. Norwegian Kongsberg has incorporated the principles of network-centric warfare, command and launch systems, and the Royal Norwegian Air Forces expectations into the missile system. (Trautmann, 2020a)

¹² On the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), Hungary contributes 432 soldiers, and Italy contributes 490 soldiers, which is the largest number from the European-based NATO members. (KFOR, 2021) Besides, Hungary has received support from NATO to appoint a new KFOR commander. For Hungary, the KFOR is „a high-priority military operation”. (Euroactiv, 2021)

¹³ More significant is the Multinational Land Forces (MLF), with Hungarian Defence Forces, Italian Armed Forces, and Slovenian Armed Forces. (Honvédelmi Minisztérium, 2020) Also, Hungarian and Italian Air forces alternately provided Airpolicing for Slovenia. (Pásztor, 2020c, p,75)

Hungary. (NBS, par.114) Hungary is interested in political, economic, cultural, and defense industry cooperation with Turkey.¹⁴ Its geostrategic location has an important role in Europe and Hungary security, including the Middle East and the Western Balkan stability. (NBS, par.115)

Hungary considers essential for the geographical reasons the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics successor states, the Middle East¹⁵, Asia, Africa, and Latin America¹⁶ states in the foreign trade's field. (NBS, par.117) The countries belonging to this region occupy eighth place in the "economic ranking of partner countries and regions" of Hungary.

The Russian Federation is in ninth place, which is essential for Hungary from an energy point of view. Russian Federation plays a substantial role in the global and regional security environment. (NBS, par.118) Lastly, the tenth most crucial country for foreign trade and politics for Hungary is the People's Republic of China. Hungary is interested in intensively building pragmatic trade relations, emphasizing mutually beneficial construction of a modern "Silk Road" connecting the European, African and Asian continents.¹⁷ (NBS, par.119)

2 The regional security policy of Hungary

Hungary's regional security policy's primary point does express in par.19 of the new NBS 2020: *"Even from historical perspectives, the Carpathian Basin locates in the great powers' traditional conflicting areas of influence. Today, Hungary is the border country of the EU, the Schengen Area, and NATO, so our historical duty and fundamental task are to protect our nation and our wider community"*. Hungary's fundamental interest is its immediate neighbours' stability, especially in the Western Balkans. There are processes in the region

¹⁴ Hungary ordered more than 300 pieces „GIDRAN” 4x4 military armored off-road vehicles from the Turkish factory „Nurol Makina”. The first 40-60 pieces will be made in Turkey, and the others made in a joint factory shall establish in Kaposvar town by Hungary, Nurol Makina, and German „Rheinmetall”. (Portfolio, 2021)

¹⁵ In December 2020, Hungary signed a contract with Rheinmetall Canada to develop a new 3D „ELM-2084” radars. The radars use Israeli know-how and technologies. Defense industry cooperation and Research and Development programs also connect with the procurement. (Portfolio, 2020)

¹⁶ In November 2020, Hungary signed a contract with Brasilia to develop two Embraer „KC-390 Millenium” medium-size transport aircraft. (Trautmann, 2020b)

¹⁷ The Hungarian pragmatics trade connections with the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China manifested during the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. Hungary (as a single EU member to February 2021) bought vaccines from these two states. At first, at the end of January 2021, Hungary bought the „Sputnik V” vaccine from Russian Federation, which is enough for 1 million people. (Kálmán, 2021) On 16th February 2021, the first 550 thousand doses Chinese “Sinopharm” vaccine was delivered to Hungary. According to the contract, The People's Republic of China will deliver 5 million doses, which is enough for 2,5 million people. (Bolcsó, 2021) The Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán was vaccinated by Chinese vaccine on 28th February 2021. (Kormány, 2021)

(such as state instability, ethnic and crisis fault lines) that, unexpected and unpredictable, can even pose a security risk not only for Hungary. (NBS, par.87) It considers it essential to strengthen the stability of a geographically more remote territory - the Middle East and North Africa and the Sahel and Central Asia regions - to enhance the transatlantic territory's security. (NBS, par.89) Hungary considers balanced bilateral relations with a more robust, democratic, stable, and economically developing Ukraine to be necessary. At the same time, however, the NBS states that the legitimate strengthening of Ukraine's national awareness cannot realize the expense of depriving the already acquired rights of the Hungarian national minority living in Transcarpathian Ukraine. (NBS, par.88) In these unstable regions, mass refugee waves are emerging (in the Eastern neighbourhood can be) illegal migration routes crossing Hungary further into Western Europe. This alternative is also taken into account by the new NBS 2020, which has placed massive illegal migration at the top of the security risks list, in par.124a.



Figure 1: Hungary's geopolitical location in Central Europe and the significant military security challenges and threats.

(Source of map base: google; the author made graphics)

The new NBS 2020 in Part V. - Hungary's security environment (*Magyarország biztonsági környezete*) describes the current Hungary position in

the global and regional security environment. Based on this chapter's analysis, the author of this article concluded that the Hungarian perception generally corresponds to the assessment of the current security situation from the EU and NATO member's perspectives: "The current global security environment characterized by unexpectedness, sudden changes, and complexity. Regional and global security are inseparable, to which the power struggles of the great powers, declining enforceability of international law, climate change, uneven population growth and the technological revolution in digital and cyber technologies contribute significantly."¹⁸ Regional Special Operation Component Command (R-SOCC)¹⁹ and Multinational Division - Central (MND-C)²⁰ Hungary consider being fundamental pillars of regional and Euro-Atlantic security.

3 The impact of Hungarian security policy on the Slovak Republic and possibilities for the cooperation

For Hungary, the primary regional security challenge is the turbulent West Balkan - south's threat, then threat from the south-east and third place from the east. Slovakia has a little bit another order on the primary regional security challenges. According to the new Slovakian Security Strategy (*Bezpečnostná stratégia Slovenskej republiky - BSS*), Slovakia considers the east's primary regional challenge, second from West Balkan and third place from the south and the south-east wing.²¹ (BSS, par.25-28) These small differences in priorities are completely understandable because Hungary and Slovakia's geographical location is different from the direction in which security challenges arise. However, this is not an obstacle to cooperation between the two countries in the military field - the security challenges are the same. Since 2017 Hungary started a vast revitalization and developing program named "ZRÍNYI 2026" for its defense forces. This activity is currently also emphasized in the new NBS 2020 (NBS, par. 5, 27) with the domestic defense industry's involvement. (NBS, par.2, 5, 6, 28, 105, 128, 136) Throughout the military revitalization program, Hungary creates its new defense industry within cooperation programs with Rheinmetall, Nurol Makina, and Airbus.²² By creating joint production and Research and Development in the defense industry with the world's major market players,

¹⁸ Definition created by the author

¹⁹ For more information, please see NATO Factsheet, available online: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_10/20191022_1910-factsheet-rsocc.pdf. (NATO, 2019)

²⁰ MND-C is currently had been developing with the participation of two framework countries - Hungary and Croatia. (Snoj, 2021b)

²¹ Middle East, North Africa and the Sahel and Horn of Africa regions.

²² Cooperation with Rheinmetall and Nurol Makina explains in this article. Cooperation with Airbus consisted of establishing a joint production plant for helicopter components to Airbus helicopters. (Maróth, 2021)

Hungary can gradually become a leading regional country in the production of defense products and technologies. (Kiszelly, 2021) Moreover, Hungary creating sustainable employment and ensuring a return on investment and domestic GDP growth. Slovakia's benefit is a strong alliance partner in the southern neighbourhood.

The fundamental starting point for the joint Slovak-Hungarian cooperation is the EU and NATO membership. Next, we discuss neighboring countries with shared 655 km longest border than other bordering countries. Both countries started a considerable revitalization of their armed forces. Hungarian Defence Force has a bit advantage in this issue - it has a signed contract to develop new equipment for land forces - Leopard 2 tanks, PzH 2000 howitzers, and Lynx armoured vehicles. Before Hungary, there is another challenge: the replacement of fighter aircraft.²³ Nowadays, Slovakia solves the replacement of its armoured vehicles and tanks. Both countries signed a contract to develop 3D radars with Israeli technology. Hungary has an agreement with Rheinmetall Canada, while Slovakia has a direct contract with the Israeli government. (MOSR, 2021) Hungary favours contracts with private suppliers and more prone to Germany, while Slovakia follows a government-government system and prone to the United States. These measures may take as an opportunity to cooperate between both countries following the main goal - cooperation and cost-effectiveness.

Another possible cooperation field is smart ammunition within the PESCO project led by Slovak Republic „EuroArtillery“, cyber defense, and Post-Quantum Cryptography.²⁴

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²³ Hungary has a valid leasing contract with Sweden about 14 pieces JAS-39 leasing, with is done on 2026. It is a time to look around the international market for who offers the type of gear and under what condition. (Kotulyák, 2019)

²⁴ For more information, please see the article „Prof. RNDr. Otokar Grošek, a member of Military Intelligence of Slovak Republic, was acknowledged with „Slovak Scientist of the Year“ award“. Available online: <https://vs.mosr.sk/vedec-roka-sr/eng>. (Military Intelligence, 2019)

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NUCLEAR DOCTRINES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SECURITY OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC

Adam Potočňák¹

ABSTRACT

The comparative-analytical study compares the current nuclear doctrines of the United States of America and the Russian Federation in four selected criteria, identifies specific implications for the security of the Czech Republic emanating from them, divides these implications into categories of risks and opportunities and provides the Czech political elite with recommendations for addressing the implications. The ultimate aim of the study is to contribute to the current knowledge of a specified area within the Czech and Slovak academic and expert community as well as to identify possible needs for further research and theoretical elaboration on the topic.

Key words: nuclear weapons; doctrine; USA; Russian Federation; Czech Republic; security.

1 The four comparative criteria and methodology

From the European as well as a global security point of view, the fact that the United States of America (USA) and the Russian Federation (Russia) are the two countries possessing by far the greatest nuclear arsenal cannot be overlooked. Even though this type of weapons has been used in a real war fight only twice at the end of World War 2, strategic planning in both, the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia has always taken into account a hypothetical possibility of using nuclear weapons - most often - against each other. Regarding the current confrontational relations between Russia and the, geopolitically defined, West, the threat of the use of nuclear weapons cannot be ignored or downplayed, no matter how unlikely this threat may seem compared to other security threats. Taking into account geographical, historical and above all geopolitical factors, the threat is also relevant to the security of the Czech Republic and its closest allies. It is exactly the comprehensively understood security of the Czech Republic and its citizens that perceives this study as the main reference object (hence protected value) concerning the threat of using nuclear weapons resulting from the doctrines of the two compared powers. The term “*doctrine*” is understood in the whole text not in its narrow sense as a specific document but rather in the broadest meaning

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of the term possible, as a comprehensive sum of plans, theories, strategies and assumptions about purpose, structure, modernization and hypothetical use of nuclear weapons (Ingram 2019). The first part of the study, the one that focuses on a comparison of American and Russian strategic planning in nuclear weapons, is divided into four distinctive areas, corresponding with the four comparative criteria. These are as follows:

1. *The usage scenarios* – conditions, circumstances and situations in which the political leaders of the USA and RF may issue an order to launch a nuclear attack.
2. The role that both countries ascribe to their *tactical nuclear weapons*. Although neither USA nor Russia has a clear doctrinal division of their respective nuclear weapons into strategic and tactical ones, in practice, they attach specific political and military-strategic importance to tactical nuclear weapons.
3. *The vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery* hence the way the compared countries strengthen their nuclear forces, modernize them, or equip them with new means of delivery.
4. Washington and Moscow's long-standing approach to issues of *horizontal proliferation and mutual armament control* hence the future of the entire bilateral nuclear arms control regime which is currently limited to a single legally binding treaty, the recently extended NEW START.

2 Current nuclear doctrines of the USA and Russian Federation compared

According to the top strategic documents of the USA (Department of Defense, 2018) as well as Russia (MID Rossii 2020), their nuclear arsenals should be pure of a defensive nature with *strategic deterrence* being their primary role. However, both powers reserve the right to use nuclear weapons as first under special circumstances thus there does not exist anything similar to the *no first use* principle in the US or Russian doctrine. On contrary, both countries abide by the principle of *launch on warning* (in Russian parlance *Отвечно-Встречный Удар*, Otvetno-vstrechniy udar) thus the use of nuclear weapons as a mean of retaliation immediately at the moment of receiving reliable information about the attack by the presumed aggressor. Even though the principle as such is strategically logical and both countries implemented it even during the Cold War (Trenin, 2020), it is also extremely dangerous given the risk of fatal technical or human error (Sokov, 1997, Aksenov, 2013). Moreover, with the development of new means of delivery reducing the time available for national leaders to evaluate information about the incoming attack and react correspondingly – especially hypersonic ones as mentioned further – the risk of fatal error even increases (Dibb 2020).

This applies especially today as the Russian military and political circles fear the consequences of the American primacy in terms of conventional military capacities and capabilities (Blank 2019). The US conventional prevalence is embodied in the concept of *Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS)* that presupposes the ability to strike conventionally anywhere in the world within a few hours after the order was issued. In combination with the Russian estimations about the capacities and capabilities of the US missile defence systems deployed in Europe and Asia, this raises Moscow's concerns about the strategic stability – a cornerstone of the Russian defence posture - being unbalanced in favour of the USA (Fix, Kühn, 2020). It is only expectable then that Russia comes up with the alternative, quasi-asymmetrical, strategies to counter the assumed American advantage and by doing so, will rely predominantly on its arsenal of tactical nuclear warheads. Supposedly, one of them is the strategy of *nuclear de-escalation* (alternatively also *escalate to-deescalate* or *escalate to win* strategy) theoretically introduced by the Russian military experts at the turn of the millenium (Levshin, Nedelin, Sosnovskiy, 1999). The strategy presupposes immediate use of tactical nuclear weapons in case of any, even local or regional conflict, from the Russian side to immediately shock the enemy with the Russian resolution, intimidate the aggressor and force him to deescalate unilaterally (Forss, 2019). There exist legitimate and well-argued doubts that the strategy exists within the Russian top military and political circles (Gray, 2018, Oliker, Baklitskiy, 2018) but the point is, the American military planning takes the very existence and its applicability from the Russian side for granted (Department of Defence, 2018) and adapts its military planning accordingly. For instance, Trump Administration declared an intention to retaliate against hypothetical Russian tactical nuclear strike with the American ballistic missiles bearing lowered tonnage of the fissile material (so-called *low-yield option*) and also ordered a return of the nuclear-capable cruise missiles *Tomahawk* into the armament of American strategic submarines – an option that was restricted under previous Obama Administration (Bender, 2021).

Another way for countering the American conventional primacy is the introduction of new types of means of delivery. Roughly within the last 3 years, the Russian army introduced, commissioned and deployed several new means of delivery of nuclear warheads such as intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) *RS-28 Sarmat*, nuclear-capable torpedo *Poseidon*, hypersonic glide vehicle *Avangard*, air-launched ballistic missile *Kinzhal* or nuclear-powered cruise missile *9M730 Burevestnik* (Strelin, Khryapin, 2020). These developments naturally triggered a reaction of the USA which intent within the three forthcoming decades completely overhaul and modernize their nuclear arsenal with a brand new class of strategic submarines, modernized submarine-launched ballistic missiles *Trident II*, the complete substitution of ageing *Minuteman III* ICBMs with the brand new ICBM type as well as substituting *B-2* strategic heavy bombers with planned type *B-21*. The total cost of the modernization programs is

expected to peak at 62-85 USD billion over the next 30 years, according to some estimates even up to 95 USD billion (Czulda, 2021). These new modern types of weapons and their means of delivery on both sides are far more technologically advanced than their predecessors, indicating that the new major arms race has already begun.

Unfortunately, the actual arms race has already taken its toll in a definitive termination of the INF Treaty during 2019. The treaty signed in 1987 ceased to exist mainly due to superpower logic that prevailed in both Washington and Moscow as both sides shared the notion that the continued existence of the treaty was not in line with their respective strategic interests. Russia most probably has not been complying with the treaty for a longer period as it developed, commissioned, and deployed the abovementioned new strategic and tactical vehicles as well as other systems capable of bearing both, nuclear and conventional warhead (such as mobile air and missile defence systems *S-400* and *S-500* or mobile short-range ballistic missile system *Iskander*), on the other hand, the USA were far from exhausting all the tools of verification, cooperation and confidence-building when announcing its withdrawal from the treaty in February 2019. After a 6-month notice period the treaty ceased to be legally binding, however, neither party demonstrated a sincere effort to keep it in force (Dienstbier, 2019). A quite is the situation regarding the NEW START treaty that was – almost at the last moment, but still – prolonged in January 2021 for an extended period of 5 years without any additional adjustments. This provided both powers with a sufficient time reserve to negotiate a whole new treaty on strategic arms (and their vehicles) limitations which (as declared) is in the best strategic interests of both. The problem is, however, that Washington and Moscow significantly differ in their views about the form and content of the future treaty – while the USA insist on introducing limitations on new Russian means of delivery as well as its tactical nuclear weapons, Russia will require tangible guarantees limiting the effectiveness of American conventional forces and ballistic missile defence systems in Europe. An additional obstacle problem might arise with the American preference for a new treaty to be multilateral, legally binding not only USA and Russia (like all previous treaties did) but also the third countries, first and foremost China (Pieper, 2020, Felgenhauer, 2021).

3 List of implications for the security of the Czech Republic and proposed reactions to them

The purpose of the second, the analytical one, part of the study is to develop a catalogue of implications for the security of the Czech Republic emanating from the American and/or Russian nuclear doctrines. It also classifies these implications by dividing them into two categories:

1. *Risks* – not specific immediate threats yet but rather warnings of adverse developments that could potentially transform into a specific threat to

the security of the Czech Republic. Each risk is supplemented by recommendations in form of corresponding counter-measures to the Czech government to limit the specific risk.

2. *Opportunities* – provided that the Czech diplomacy and political leaders take an active (or rather pro-active) approach, these implications enable it to make a positive contribution to the fulfilment of the strategic interests of the Czech Republic, as defined by the Security Strategy of the Czech Republic (Vláda ČR, 2015)

Based on the comparison of the American and Russian nuclear doctrines, the catalogue of implications for the security of the Czech Republic contains a roughly even distribution of risks and opportunities. What is particularly remarkable, several implications do not stem directly from the doctrines of either country but either represent a common feature of both doctrines (e. g. *launch on warning* principle) or the implication emanates more the mutual strategic interactions between the United States and Russia than from their respective strategic documents. Tellingly, several implications also cannot be unambiguously classified either as a *risk* or as an *opportunity*, meaning that only further developments of relations and strategic implications between Washington and Moscow will determine how the Czech Republic should perceive any given implication as well as the way to address it.

The implication for the security of the Czech Republic	Origin of the implication in the doctrine of	The nature of the implication
<i>Launch on warning</i> principle	USA/Russia	Risk
Overestimation of the US conventional and missile defence capabilities	Russia	Risk
Misinterpretation of <i>escalate to de-escalate</i> strategy	USA	Risk
New disarmament and arms control treaties	USA/Russia	Opportunity
Participation of the Czech Republic in the missile defence system	USA/Russia	Opportunity/Risk
Deploying nuclear weapons on the territory of the Czech Republic	USA/Russia	Opportunity/Risk

Surely, the Czech Republic alone does not possess all the necessary abilities and capacities to directly influence - currently significantly confrontational - relations between the USA and Russia. Thus it seems to be impossible to influence any of the two compared countries regarding their *launch on warning* principle. The principle itself is as old as the Cold War logic of mass retaliation and even though it significantly increases the risk of an outburst of a global conflict, it represents a doctrinal attitude of a particular actor regardless of the attitude of another that shall be applied only in the worst-case scenario. As such, launch on warning principle is a pure threat (not only) to the Czech Republic and the only way to reduce it is a diplomatic and political activity in the broadest sense to prevent further escalations of the USA – Russia relations.

Fortunately, the Czech Republic has sufficient abilities, capacities and means to perform independent and pragmatic politics, particularly through its diplomatic and intelligence channels, and reduce two following risks. The top Czech political and military circles should strive to act in a position of a ‘middleman’ abrading the edges of distrust and suspicion between Washington and Moscow. The Czech diplomatic representation should openly supply both sides with verified and verifiable information about the logic and thinking of the other side while the Czech intelligence services – predominantly Military Intelligence (VZ) and Office for Foreign Relations and Information (ÚZSI) – should act the same way, however, more discretely or secretly. The Czech diplomatic and intelligence community may play a decisive role in providing the Russian side with credible information indicating that Moscow fundamentally overestimates the capabilities and capacities of the US conventional force and missile defence (Grego, 2018). Simultaneously, it may be similarly instrumental in persuading the American side about their misperception of the *escalate to de-escalate* strategy as not every article published by retired colonels or generals can be regarded as a credible part of official Russian doctrine (van Bruusgaard, 2017). Presumably, both powers should be prone to trust the Czechs more than each other – in the case of the USA because of the Czech membership in NATO, in the case of Russia thanks to historical connotations and close contacts with some top Czech political elites, for instance, president Miloš Zeman.

The area of nuclear non-proliferation is of particular salience for the Czech Republic since it has been prioritised in its 2015 Security Strategy. According to its diction, “*the Czech Republic shall advocate deepening and making more efficient the processes and mechanisms of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery*” (Vláda ČR, 2015, p. 15, author’s translation). The Czech Republic also has a sort of symbolic moral right in this regard, as the recently prolonged NEW START Treaty was originally signed by presidents Obama and Medvedev in Prague in April 2010. Even though the symbolic aspect, the symbolics and traditions as such have been immensely important in diplomacy ever since. The Czech diplomatic representation in both countries should proactively approach and engage both

powers and express its utmost interest in arranging and mediating further talks on new disarmament and arms control treaties. Once the common effort bears its fruits, the Czech Republic will record a significant diplomatic and soft power victory thus using this opportunity in the best way it could.

Last but not least, the Czech Republic must shape its security policies pragmatically and take into account the categories of risks and opportunities, bringing up the questions of strategic analysis and calculations of strategic costs and benefits. Under special circumstances, especially in the case, the confrontational nature of the current US-Russia relations continue to deteriorate, Prague might consider an option to strengthen its missile defence capacities and capabilities with several ways to do so. Prague could invigorate a notion of deploying a part of the US missile defence system in Europe (ACA, 2019) to the Czech territory – at the end of the day, similar initiatives have existed already in 2007-2009. Even though proposals made by US President George W. Bush were met by fierce political opposition from parts of the Czech society and political elite before their final cancellation by the Obama administration (Eugel, 2010), a future change in attitude to the issue cannot be ruled out completely. Nonetheless, more probable – and politically acceptable - than joining the US missile defence structures in Europe is a notion of enhancing the capacities and capabilities of already existing allied missile defence within the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NATINADS) in which the Czech Republic has been participating by sharing information since December 2000 (NATO, 2019). Should any of these options be the case, the strategic calculations would step in once again since the price for the enhanced American or allied missile defence would be that the elements of the system located in the Czech Republic will become a legitimate target of a possible Russian attack, should the worst-case scenario come to existence. Therefore the implication itself represents an example of a potential threat as well as a potential opportunity.

The same principle of “highlighting the Czech Republic for potential Russian attack” and risk/opportunity ambiguity applies in the case of hypothetical presence of the allied tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of the Czech Republic within the Alliance sharing policies. The US tactical nuclear weapons are already present in Europe, in some cases in states comparable to the Czech Republic (e. g. Belgium and Netherlands, in addition to these two countries Germany and Italy host parts of the US tactical nuclear arsenal in Europe). Although the actual control of these weapons and the decision to deploy and use them remains the responsibility of the Alliance, their presence on the territory of a specific allied country serves a strategic deterrence role. However, the host state must possess sufficient know-how in dealing with nuclear weapons, provide them with all necessary services and regularly practise their readiness, deployment and possible use. Recently, Poland demonstrated serious interest in hosting a part of the shared US tactical nuclear arsenal in Europe (Fiszer, 2020). Interestingly, the Czech Republic and its army already have their experience with the ‘nuclear

sharing’ – during the Cold War, there were hundreds of Soviet nuclear warheads deployed on the territory of former Czechoslovakia, however, under the strict control of the Soviet officers (Šedivý, 1997).

Conclusion

The article briefly compared the current nuclear doctrines of the United States of America and the Russian Federation, identified several implications for the security of the Czech Republic that emanate from the doctrines, listed them as either risks or opportunities and suggested possible political and diplomatic reactions to it. The article calls for more active engagement of the Czech diplomacy and intelligence services in mitigating the risks emanating from the US and Russian doctrines while encouraging the Czech political elite to use the opportunities to score a valuable diplomatic victory in facilitating further disarmament and arms control talks. In the case of the worst-case scenarios, there are ways how to enhance the current Czech missile defence capacities and capabilities or strengthen its deterrence potential.

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THE THAWING ARCTIC - THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES

Michaela Ružicková¹

ABSTRACT

The paper focuses on the issue of the growing importance of the Arctic region, which may become a centerpiece of international relations actors' interests. Global warming not only results in the environmental degradation, but it is also uncovering vast economic (natural resources, energy potential, sea routes), military and geopolitical potential. The paper provides an overview of the current potential of the Arctic, reflects the ambitions and activities of the selected actors and emphasizes the significance of environmental security in the vulnerable Arctic region.

Key words: Arctic, climate change, environmental security, geopolitics, Russian Federation, China, United States

Introduction

The Arctic is a territory of extremes. Its location, surface, natural conditions and temperatures have been discouraging and fascinating people for a long period of time. It is located on a frozen subsoil and partly on a surface of areas beyond the Arctic Circle in the Arctic Ocean. It is an inhospitable region, consisting mostly of glaciers, fjords or polar deserts with extremely low temperatures. It is already a relatively well-researched area, but it is still important for collecting data. It is also an object of international political and geopolitical discourse. The reason lies in the increasing tendency of melting of ice surfaces, which causes not only severe environmental damage and degradation, but also the discovery of economic potential of the region. Increased interest in the Arctic region may be potentially reflected in the nature of international relations. We assume that there would be tensions related to the so-called "New Cold War". A question arises whether these tensions may be a precursor of a major conflict that can possibly polarize the world or whether some of the pressure from other parts of the world would be transferred to the Arctic region. It may be already assumed that the activities of particular states in the Arctic would more or less reflect the nature of international relations.

The main aim of the paper is to analyze the ambitions of selected state actors in the Arctic. A key element of further development in the region is the vast economic potential. The paper brings forward this matter and discusses the main areas of potential, which are the sea routes that may become broadly accessible

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for shipping, raw material, metal and mineral deposits, fishing grounds, scientific research, military and strategic potential. The political aspects of Arctic engagement are not to be overlooked. The strongest players so far are the Russian Federation, China and the United States of America. The paper analyzes their ambitions and recent actions in order to specify the current relations of the Arctic powers. For the purposes of our contribution, we use the methods of qualitative research. These are primarily the method of analyses and synthesis, abstraction, geographical and historical methods of research and the deductive-inductive approach. We base our research on the data from secondary sources, such as reports, policy papers, research papers, and studies of relevant established foreign media, think tanks, research centres, agencies and organisations.

1 The Thawing Arctic

The Arctic is undergoing unprecedented changes in its physical, social, geo-economic and geopolitical realities which have a considerable impact on the security of the region. In the state of growing geopolitical tensions both between Russian Federation and its Arctic neighbours and tensions in the Arctic region from the outside, there is a potential risk of tensions being spilled over (Klimenko, 2019). The new security challenges appear in several dimensions, namingly the economic, military, environmental, cultural, food and health related.

As was already said, a significant trend in the current development of the Arctic is the melting of the Arctic sea ice sheet due to climate change, which is the main catalyst for changing security in the region. Global warming results in the two to three times faster temperature rise in the Arctic than the global trend (Shipping logs show..., 2019). This factor is most striking at the end of the summer period and in September when it is possible to observe the melting of the largest range of ice cover. Regular measurement of the extent of the ice surface in September leads to an unambiguous conclusion: the summer melting in the Arctic is a natural process, but it has been in record low numbers in recent decades and years. In October 2019, a record low of 5.66 million square kilometers was measured for the average extent of the frozen area, which is also the lowest number in the history of measurement (A lopsided January, 2021). The most recent sea ice extent statistics from January 2021 shows the values below the average finishing sixth lowest in the satellite record. The air temperatures were above the average on the Atlantic side of the Arctic and the warm spell hit the Canadian Arctic (A lopsided January, 2021).

Decreasing values of the ice cover extent and increasing water and air temperatures at the same time represent a continuous trend. Therefore, it is possible to forecast a negative development with fatal consequences for the fragile environment of the area. Yet, scientific research shows different scenarios depending on the aim of the research or the methods used. Researchers set a different time horizon for the complete absence of summer ice while maintaining

current development indicators - most of them speak of the middle of the 21st century. One of the most pessimistic forecasts is the National Geographic survey, which predicts the absence of summer ice cover as early as 2035 (Borunda, 2020). The melting of the arctic ice cover has far-reaching consequences, as it affects other parts of the planet as well as the global climate. Currently, an increase in the ocean water levels, the warming of the seas and oceans, an increase in salinity, changes in sea currents and in organism's behaviour, their decline or relocation and many more is observed. The thawing of permafrost on Canadian and Russian territories and soil erosion in Arctic coastal areas are dangerous trends as well.

Besides all the negative impacts, there are also potential economic benefits of the Arctic warming that are evident in two main categories. The first category includes possible use of northern sea routes, which are currently used mostly during the summer months when they are the most accessible for shipping. The second category includes the extraction of raw materials from the Arctic subsoil. There are several other categories, such as fishing, tourism, research and technological development opportunities, and agricultural purposes. However, increasing engagement in the Arctic may lead to a number of negative consequences, including environmental pollution, soil erosion and massive land collapse, loss of biodiversity or abuse of indigenous human rights.

1.1 Northern Sea Routes

As was already assumed, the extent of recent Arctic warming allows the use of the north-western maritime route through the Canadian Arctic isles for several weeks during summer. This sea route can significantly reduce transport time when shipping goods from China to Europe, and vice versa. The other option is the north-eastern (northern) maritime route, which connects the Atlantic Ocean with the Pacific along the European and Russian territories. In 2018, Maersk container ship transported goods from Vladivostok to St. Petersburg, thus reducing the transport time by 40 percent compared to the southern maritime route (Frederiksen, 2019). The advantage of using both northern routes would be a significant reduction in transport time, fuel savings, better maneuvering (deeper dive compared to the Panama Canal). Unlike the Suez Canal, ships would avoid paying tolls and waiting for crossing the canal. Northern sea routes have had no experience with piracy or terrorism so far, which represent another disadvantage of using southern routes - for example, the Strait of Malacca in the South China Sea (Marshall, 2017).



The Economist

Picture 1: Arctic sea routes (Source: *Who owns the...*, 2019).

Except for the fact that the north-west maritime route offers the possibility of crossing only for a few months in a year, ships still need to be accompanied by an icebreaker. For this reason, its use in the future would be probably complementary, not a substitute for the use of other sea routes. On the other hand, a partial diversion of maritime traffic from the common routes may impact the regions and states that are dependent on the profit from the management of canals (e.g. Egypt, Panama).

1.2 Natural Resources

The Arctic region has extensive raw material reserve. In 2008, the United States Geological Survey estimated that there were one-fifth of world oil and gas reserves: 47 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, 90 billion barrels of oil, mostly in the offshore deposits (Marshall, 2017). There are also deposits of metals and minerals, mainly gold, nickel, zinc, and iron. The vast resources could be used as a means for gaining strategic advantage over current energy supply giants. On the other hand, oil production in the Arctic remains too technologically demanding, which is a major obstacle to its expansion. Agencies of the mining industry would have to deal with immediate threats such as the need of specific mining technology, problems associated with the surfaces, the need to provide and maintain infrastructure, the threat of collisions due to excessive thawing of the soil, etc. The final product of extraction might be expensive due to the difficult process of separating oil and sand.

Therefore, the extraction of Arctic oil is not yet lucrative for companies. It is most likely that in the future the technologies necessary for extraction of oil and other resources in the Arctic would be developed. Besides the technological difficulties there are concerns about plundering of natural resources, which could be prevented by defining rules and setting regulations for mining and trade.

2 Gaining Advantage in the Arctic

The climate change amplifies the already complex security challenges and threats in the Arctic region, and it is intertwined with social, political, and economic processes (Klimenko, 2019). As was already stated, the character of relations between actors in the Arctic has transformed from cooperative to competitive, creating more tensions. There are already efforts of state actors in the field to gain dominance in the region. Tensions are rising also from the definition of territorial administration and unresolved territorial claims. The Arctic is administered by several states under previous agreements. However, not every state is satisfied with the existing definition.

On the other hand, there is the issue of international waters. The main conflict area relates to Lomonosov ridge, an underwater promontory located in the territory administered by Denmark. The Russian Federation declares its right to this promontory as it considers it a continuation of its own mainland territory. This area includes the North Pole and therefore has a symbolic meaning. Russia considers the acquisition of this territory a matter of prestige, as was demonstrated in 2007 by placing a titanium stainless flag on the seabed at the North Pole (Chivers, 2007). This act of power demonstration recalled the claims of Russia expressed in 2001. We shall consider it not as a new, but rather as a frozen conflict, which may be changed by the thawing of the Arctic. Denmark manages the area of the North Pole and the Lomonosov ridge according to the customary international clause of 200 nautical miles of territorial waters, which has been applied to the redistribution of Arctic territories. Greenland, an autonomous region, could be considered as one of the conflict zones. It is a part of the Kingdom of Denmark, which retains control over foreign affairs and defence. It shows latent resistance to Denmark and is interested in becoming more independent. As the third example of the conflict area in the Arctic, Iceland could be named. The state does not have its own standing military, which makes it reliant on the US and NATO in its defence. Finally, Svalbard (Norway) is a sovereign region, but the 1957 Svalbard Treaty affords third countries certain rights, and therefore makes it vulnerable to external threats (Geopolitics and Neglected..., 2020).

2.1 The Russian Federation

The rising importance of the military and strategic dimension of the Arctic is undeniable, and the Russian Federation seems to have a significant advantage

in both areas. Its predominance lies mostly in the consideration of itself as an Arctic power. It also has a lot of experience with permanently frozen areas and military operations in such an environment. Material and technical equipment is essential as well as logistics and solid infrastructure; hence experience with the Arctic environment is crucial.

Russia has been increasing its military capabilities in the region for the past decade, while reopening military bases, restoring airfields and radar stations, modernizing its sea-based nuclear forces and the surface ships (Klimenko, 2019). In 2017, Russia arranged the largest military exercise in the Polar region since the end of the Cold War. Among the objectives of the exercise in October 2019 were preparation for combat in the Arctic and defending energy capacities in the area including the northern maritime route. In addition to the Russian armed forces, troops from China, India, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan underwent the exercise in 2019, making it the broadest strategic exercise led by Russian Federation to this date with an official number of 128,000 people attended (Buchanan, Boulegue, 2019).

2.2 China

China has been targeting the Arctic since the end of the Cold War. In 2013, it became an observing state of the Arctic Council and it defined itself as the so-called near-Arctic nation. A year later, President Xi Jinping revealed an intention to become a “polar great power” (China wants to..., 2018). Currently the Arctic is included in the concept of the New Silk Road within The Belt and Road Initiative. Thus, the Polar (Ice) Silk Road became the third component of the strategy. Currently Beijing has an increasingly confident, proactive and sophisticated Arctic diplomacy.

Its interests in the Arctic were described in the Polar White Paper in January 2018, which talks about research intentions that would help solve China’s own environmental issues. It deals with the eventual use of northern sea routes and the intention to divert part of China’s transport to these routes in order to gain economic advantage. The document reveals an intention to preserve the fragile ecosystems and specific indigenous communities as well. However, the main point remains the issue of sea routes, natural resources (oil, gas, minerals, but also fishing) and tourism, which may threaten the environmental security of the region (China unveils vision..., 2018).

China focuses on a slightly different approach to gain influence in the Arctic than the Russian Federation. It relies primarily on investing and using soft power instruments. The participation of its military units in the Russian Tsentr-2019 exercise was more a symbolic step rather than a serious effort to maintain security in the region. For its involvement in the Arctic, Beijing uses legitimate means, such as science and research, trade or development. Over the past decade, Chinese companies have tried to invest in several sectors, such as mining, critical

infrastructure (airports, ports, communication infrastructure), real estate. Besides the projects that China is launching or co-owning shares in, there are upcoming projects, such as the planned construction of a polar railway line across Finland (China wants to..., 2018) or planned construction of three Greenland airports (The Polar Silk..., 2019). One of the priorities for the coming years is the project for construction of Greenlandic research and satellite center or China's extraction of Greenlandic mineral sources. (The Polar Silk..., 2019).

Greenland is becoming one of the conflict areas between China, Russia and the US. Massive investments in Greenland, especially in the critical infrastructure, may give China strategic leverage to undermine the US presence and may enable Chinese military to operate in the Arctic (Geopolitics and Neglected..., 2020). China's upcoming projects, its official Arctic policy and the definition of the region as one of the priorities under the New Silk Road indicate that its involvement in the region would increase. There are many eventual benefits of such involvement for Beijing: diversion of transport from the less preferred Malacca Strait and Suez Canal to northern sea routes, possible natural resources extraction and strengthening its soft power by financing lucrative projects.

2.3 The United States

In contrast to the involvement of the Russian Federation and China, which are undeniably dominant in the Arctic, the United States may seem to be lagging behind. It is especially evident in the military field, in which the US does need more preparation: its military capabilities are considerable, but they are not geared to combat in such inhospitable conditions.

The activities of the US in the Arctic are mostly determined by the effort to access the Northwest sea route, where tension between US and Canada occurs. The Northwest sea route with its seven possible forms runs ships directly along the Canadian islands. Canada, which officially acquired these islands with the remaining British possessions in North America as early as 1880, claims sovereignty over the passage. An attempt to resolve the conflict in 1988 resulted in the Canada-US Arctic Cooperation Agreement (Who owns the..., 2019). Reflecting the current trend of the thawing Arctic, the US is not satisfied with the definition of its role. Northern sea routes significantly shorten the transport time, which is desirable for the US. For instance, Nunavik shipped its cargo from Quebec to China in 2014 in a record 26 days, compared to 41 days of transit through the Panama Canal (Marshall, 2017).

In May 2019, the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reopened the question of Canada-US tensions at the Arctic Council meeting in Finland. He stated that Canada's claims to the Northwest sea route were illegitimate (Who owns the..., 2019). The thawing of the Arctic, which has revived the conflict, may also provide a solution. If the conflict area melts enough for ships to pass north of Canadian territory, the problem may become irrelevant. Apart from the mentioned

issue, Pompeo spoke about the huge range of opportunities that the Arctic offers. On the subject of transportation, he compared the Northern sea routes to “*Suez and Panama Canals of the 21st Century*” (US climate objections..., 2019).

3 The Environmental Security Challenges

The geopolitical challenges along with the multiple security and economic challenges put enormous pressure on the Arctic region, its states, and communities. The risks come in great complexity and are connected with each other, making it more difficult to face and tackle them. As was already said, the climate change phenomenon works as a catalyst for the changing security in the Arctic, while amplifying already complex security challenges and threats. The environmental challenges are the most significant in the sense of the water and air temperature rising (amplified by the albedo effect), the extreme weather events, rising of water salinity, thawing permafrost making the soil collapsing and the dangerous gases leaking, and threatening the wide range of animal species, causing harm to the precious biodiversity. Last but not least, the challenges appear in the area of food security, limiting access to traditional and local food sources (Klimenko, 2019). From this aspect, the health-related problems are arising due to the food and drinking water shortages, temperatures rising, loss of ice, and permafrost thawing. As the Arctic environment gets warmer and drier, it is more vulnerable to devastating forest fires, which release large amounts of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.

The results of climate change in the Arctic, as mentioned, demand flexible disaster management and response. The future of the Arctic is determined also by complying with the cuts set by emission targets. Along with the targets declared in the 2016 Paris Agreement, climate change mitigation should take place in the Arctic itself, in the sense of preserving wildlife and ecosystems or preventing pollution from natural resources extraction and oil spills.

Conclusion

As was emphasized throughout the paper, the Arctic undoubtedly is an important point on the geopolitical chessboard of the 21st century. As attention turns north, the Arctic becomes one of the strategic points in calculations of great powers. The struggle for balancing interests of competing actors arises with the transformation of relations from cooperation to competition. The paper discussed the major players that have joined the game so far. It dealt with the different strategies of selected players: Russian Federation, China and the United States. Every one of them has the ability to change the game. However, the future may also shape other competitors or the new rules may enter into force. Last but not least, it should be said that the US and Russia have the worst relations since the Cold War and are supposed to remain dynamic for the coming years, with the risk

of escalation. Potentially dangerous is also the engagement of China, the investment giant.

With its vast economic potential, rich natural resources and the opportunity for rapidly shortening shipping time, the Arctic represents the object of interest and concerns as well. The significant economic advantages may mean environmental degradation at the same time. The negative consequences of climate change bring a number of issues and challenges in the Arctic. Solutions to these problems are not simple and require combined effort of many actors - states, corporations, international organisations. Efforts to protect the pristine and vulnerable Arctic ecosystems are not always successful. The future debate on this matter may run literally on thin ice. The political tensions, which are already arising, being put into this formula, we get a really hot meal.

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THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC, PATH TO TRANSFORMING OUR WORLD

Vesna Stanković Pejnović¹

ABSTRACT

The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated existing global challenges, further exposing the underlying causes of insecurity, social and economic inequality with overtones of racial tension and nationalism. In this perspective, the pandemic represents a rare but narrow window of opportunity to reflect, reimagine, and reset our world. We are facing with a new form of “stakeholder” capitalism which is being advanced in the guise of global governance, biosecurity, the “new normal”, the “New Deal for Nature” and the “Fourth Industrial Revolution”. In the current global system, powerful, mostly Western states already exercise enormous influence in international relations, within intergovernmental organizations such as the World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund and United Nations Security Council, World Economic Forum. We are witness to the period when the compelling power of governments and individuals could change the path of international relations and the transformation of our current political order. Suspension of normalcy due to the security threat constituted by the coronavirus pandemic brought to a certain redistribution of power in the society and particularly in politics.

Key words: COVID 19, The Great Reset, The Fourth Industrial revolution, stockholder capitalism, new normal

Introduction

The global security environment has entered a phase of heightened and extended vaporization with increased threats of civil unrest and a steady rise in instability across the world. The Secretary-General notes that, from the pre-COVID-19 period in 2019 to the unprecedented conditions caused by the pandemic in 2020, the already complex security environment has evolved with shifting geopolitics, protracted armed conflicts, large-scale public health emergencies, economic stresses and debt crisis, climate shocks, deepening social and economic inequity, food insecurity, mass migration, populism and xenophobia, growing nationalism, disinformation and cyber insecurity.

While this crisis is imperiling progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals, it also makes their achievement all the more urgent and necessary. Moving forward, it is essential that recent gains are protected as much as possible and a truly transformative recovery from COVID19 is pursued, one that reduces risk to future crises and bring much closer the inclusive and sustainable development required to meet the goals of the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. This is the first task of the Decade of Action.

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It will require leadership, foresight, innovation, finance and collaboration among all governments and all stakeholders. United Nations will require a surge in international cooperation and multilateralism. (Progress, 2020, 3)

The UN Secretary-General urges that “recent gains are protected as much as possible and a truly transformative recovery from COVID-19 is pursued, one that reduces risk to future crises and brings much closer the inclusive and sustainable development required to meet the goals of the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change.” (Ibid, 3). UN releases a ‘Sustainable Development Goals Report’ that reviews the year’s progress in implementing the 2030 Agenda.

Each crisis is an opportunity that may be used by some for increasing their power through maintaining control over limited resources which have become more demanded, expensive and valuable because of being limited. Health is one of those resources, the one that is sometimes referred to as “priceless”, although it has its price. In the circumstances with the danger of only some people managing to obtain medical protection when they need it, those who made decisions about who “some people” were gained huge social power.

Will governments, businesses, and other influential stakeholders truly change their ways for the better? Looking at the news headlines about layoffs, bankruptcies and the many mistakes made in the emergency response to this crisis, anyone may have been inclined to give a pessimistic answer. Indeed, the bad news related to COVID-19 came on top of the enormous economic, environmental, social and political challenges we were already facing before the pandemic. With every passing year, these issues, as many people have experienced directly, seem to get worse, not better. (Mingardi, 2020)

Many of us are pondering when things will return to normal. President of World Economic Forum thinks never. Nothing will ever return to the “broken” sense of normalcy that prevailed prior to the crisis because the coronavirus pandemic marks a fundamental inflection point in our global trajectory. (Schwab, 2020, 12)

1 New form of capitalism - Stakeholder capitalism

Klaus Schwab, is promoter of the now popular idea of “stakeholder capitalism“. That is the key point of Schwab’s Great Reset. To promote the stakeholder concept, he founded the World Economic Forum. The stakeholder concept argues that businesses should take account of its responsibilities to stakeholders rather than just focus on shareholders. The shareholder concept approach argues that it is the primary responsibility of businesses to act in the interest of its owners - the shareholders. Furthermore, decisions should be taken based on the effect of those decisions on shareholders rather than the wider stakeholder groups. (Miles, 2017).

The traditional definition of a stakeholder is “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984). The general idea of the stakeholder concept is a redefinition of the organization. In general the concept is about what the organization should be and how it should be conceptualized. Friedman states that the organization itself should be thought of as grouping of stakeholders and the purpose of the organization should be to manage their interests, needs and viewpoints. (Friedman, Miles, 2006). But in a general social context, the stakeholder concept is even more nefarious, discarding any idea of democracy, rule by the people, in favour of rule by corporate interests. Society is no longer regarded as a living community but as a business, whose profitability is the sole valid aim of human activity.

Klaus Schwab set out this agenda in 1971, where his use of the term “stakeholders” effectively redefined human beings not as citizens, free individuals or members of communities, but as secondary participants in a massive commercial enterprise. The aim of each and every person’s life was “to achieve long-term growth and prosperity” for this enterprise or to protect and increase the wealth of the capitalist elite.(Schwab, Kroos, 2020) . 1987 European Management Forum become the World Economic Forum, as “the global platform for public-private cooperation”, which promote “partnerships between businessmen, politicians, intellectuals and other leaders of society to ‘define, discuss and advance key issues on the global agenda’.”

The “partnerships” which the WEF creates are aimed at replacing democracy with a global leadership of hand-picked and unelected individuals whose duty is not to serve the public, but to impose the rule of the 1% on that public with as little interference from the rest of us as possible.

The thesis about the Western leadership within global politics also encountered a significant challenge. It has been clear for a long time that the United States is not a global hegemon and that the international order is not unipolar. The time of the unipolar moment is long gone (Krauthammer, 1990).

The myth of Progress has long been used by the 1% to persuade people to accept the technologies designed to exploit and control us and Schwab plays on this when he declares that “the Fourth Industrial Revolution represents a significant source of hope for continuing the climb in human development that has resulted in dramatic increases in quality of life for billions of people since 1800”. (Schwab, 2016, 9)

Many of these innovations are in their infancy, but they are already reaching an inflection point in their development as they build on and amplify each other in a fusion of technologies across the physical, digital and biological worlds”. (Ibid, 7) The tools of the fourth industrial revolution enable new forms of surveillance and other means of control that run counter to healthy, open societies”. (Schwab, 2016, 67)

Synthetic biology” is on the horizon in Schwab’s 4IR world, giving the technocratic capitalist rulers of the world “the ability to customize organisms by writing DNA with impact on medicine, agriculture and the production of biofuels. (Schwab, 2016, 24).

The idea of neurotechnologies, in which humans will have fully artificial memories implanted in the brain, is enough to make some of us feel faintly sick, as is “the prospect of connecting our brains to VR through cortical modems, implants or nanobots”. in areas ranging from gene sequencing to nanotechnology, from renewables to quantum computing. It is the fusion of these technologies and their interaction across the physical, digital and biological domains that make the Fourth Industrial revolution fundamentally different from previous revolutions. (Schwab, 2016, 12).

For him this technology represents an opportunity to create entire new systems of value in the Fourth Industrial Revolution. (Schwab, 2016, 45) There is need to re-establish a dialogue among all stakeholders to ensure mutual understanding that further builds a culture of trust among regulators, non-governmental organizations, professionals and scientists. The public must participate in the democratic shaping of biotechnological developments that affect society, individuals and cultures”. (Ibid, 81) The speed and breadth of this new revolution have unlimited possibilities of having billions of people connected by mobile devices, giving rise to unprecedented processing power, storage capabilities and knowledge access, covering wide-ranging fields such as artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, the internet of things (IoT), autonomous vehicles, 3D printing, nanotechnology, biotechnology, materials science, energy storage and quantum computing, to name a few. (Schwab, 2016, 6). To achieve this goal world order needs „great reset“.

2 Base for changing - Great Reset

According to Kissinger, we live in a world of disorder: “While ‘the international community’ is invoked perhaps more insistently now than in any other era, it presents no clear or agreed set of goals, methods or limits... Chaos threatens side by side with unprecedented interdependence.” Hence the need to build an order — one able to balance the competing desires of nations, both the established Western powers that wrote the existing international “rules” (principally the United States), and the emerging ones that do not accept them, principally China, but also Russia and the Islamic world. (Kissinger, 2015, 56)

The pandemic will accelerate systemic changes that were already apparent prior to the crisis: the partial retreat from globalization, the growing decoupling between the US and China, the acceleration of automation, concerns about heightened surveillance, the growing appeal of well-being policies, rising nationalism and the subsequent fear of immigration, the growing power of tech, the necessity for firms to have an even stronger online presence. (Schwab, 2020,

16) By itself, the pandemic may not completely transform the world, but it is likely to accelerate many of the changes that were already taking place before it erupted, which will in turn set in motion other changes. The only certainty: the changes won't be linear and sharp discontinuities will prevail (Schwab, 2020, 13).

The possibilities for change and the resulting new order are now unlimited and only bound by our imagination, for better or for worse. Societies could be poised to become either more egalitarian or more authoritarian, or geared towards more solidarity or more individualism, favouring the interests of the few or the many; economies, when they recover, could take the path of more inclusivity and be more attuned to the needs of our global commons, or they could return to functioning as they did before. You get the point: we should take advantage of this unprecedented opportunity to reimagine our world, in a bid to make it a better. (Schwab, 2020, 17) According to Schwab, an "infectious diseases" risk is bound to have a direct effect on "global governance failure, "social instability, "unemployment," (to name just a few). (Schwab, 2020, 21)

Is Covid-19 pandemic a unique opportunity to reimagine our future? The first would steer the market toward fairer outcomes. To this end, governments should improve coordination. Governments should implement long-overdue reforms that promote more equitable outcomes. These may include changes to wealth taxes, the withdrawal of fossil-fuel subsidies, and new rules governing intellectual property, trade, and competition.

The second component of a Great Reset agenda would ensure that investments advance shared goals, such as equality and sustainability. The European Commission, for one, has unveiled plans for a €750 billion (\$826 billion) recovery fund.

Rather than using these funds, as well as investments from private entities and pension funds, to fill cracks in the old system, it will be better to use them to create a new one that is more resilient, equitable, and sustainable in the long run. This is base for building "green" urban infrastructure and creating incentives for industries to improve their track record on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) metrics.

The third and final priority of a Great Reset agenda is to harness the innovations of the Fourth Industrial Revolution to support the public good, especially by addressing health and social challenges. (Fisk, 2020)

Revolutions have occurred throughout history when new technologies and novel ways of perceiving the world trigger a profound change in economic systems and social structures. (Schwab, 2016, 11) The fourth industrial revolution, however, is not only about smart and connected machines and systems. Its scope is much wider. Occurring simultaneously are waves of further breakthroughs in areas ranging from gene sequencing to nanotechnology, from renewables to quantum computing.

During the COVID-19 crisis, companies, universities, and others have joined forces to develop diagnostics, therapeutics, and possible vaccines; establish testing centers; create mechanisms for tracing infections; and deliver telemedicine. Imagine what could be possible if similar concerted efforts were made in every sector. (Fisk 2020) The new order envisaged by Schwab will embrace the entire world and so global governance is required in order to impose it, as he repeatedly states.

His preferred future “will only come about through improved global governance”. Furthermore, some form of effective global governance” is needed. (Schwab, 2016, 107) The tools of the fourth industrial revolution enable new forms of surveillance and other means of control that run counter to healthy, open societies. (Schwab, 2016, 90) In an essence, global governance is at the nexus of all these other issues. The idea of reforming governance models to cope with new technologies is not new, but the urgency of doing so is far greater in light of the power of today’s emerging technologies... the concept of agile governance seeks to match the agility, fluidity, flexibility and adaptiveness of the technologies themselves and the private-sector actors adopting them”. (Schwab, 2016, 51)

Illness is simultaneously presented as the excuse for unprecedented social change under the banner of “The Great Reset”.

Although they explicitly declare that Covid-19 does not constitute a major “shock”, the authors repeatedly deploy the same term to describe the broader impact of the crisis. Schwab and Malleret place Covid-19 in a long tradition of events which have facilitated sudden and significant changes to our societies. The global capitalist ruling elite have certainly been doing their best to “take advantage of the shock inflicted by the panic”, assuring us all since the very earliest days of the outbreak that, for some unfathomable reason, nothing in our lives could ever be the same again.

It looks like a new normalcy today is likely to be merely a temporary normalcy. People are ready to accept certain limitations and deviations from the ordinary only on a temporary basis and while it is absolutely necessary. Some customs will definitely change and become part of everyday life, i.e. routine. However, it is unlikely that everything will change in such a way that no one will want to go back to old ways as soon as it becomes possible. People’s adaptability to new circumstances – especially in crisis situations – is huge, but their subsequent adaptability to old ways or to something that is to a large extent already familiar from the pre-crisis period, is often rapid as well. (Jović, 2020, 489).

Schwab and Malleret are enthusiastic in their use of the new normal framing, despite their admission, because they saw illness as defining moment in which many things will change forever. “A new world will emerge”. “The societal upheaval unleashed by COVID-19 will last for years, and possibly generations”. (Schwab, 2020:56) “Many of us are pondering when things will return to normal. The short response is: never”. (Jović, 2020, 97)

At first glance, the pandemic and the environment might seem to be only distantly related cousins; but they are much closer and more intertwined than we think". (Schwab, 2020,102) One of the connections is that both the climate and virus "crises" have been used by the WEF and their like to push their agenda of global governance. As Schwab and his co-author put it, "they are global in nature and therefore can only be properly addressed in a globally coordinated fashion". (Schwab, 2020, 103)The key to crowding private capital into new sources of nature-positive economic value will be to shift key policy levers and public finance incentives as part of a wider economic reset". (Schwab, 2020, 46)

"The pandemic will mark a turning point by accelerating this transition. It has crystallized the issue and made a return to the pre-pandemic status quo impossible". (Ibid, 70)"The pandemic will accelerate innovation even more, catalysing technological changes already under way (comparable to the exacerbation effect it has had on other underlying global and domestic issues) and 'turbocharging' any digital business or the digital dimension of any business". (Schwab, 2020, 107)

The pandemic will fast-forward the adoption of automation in the workplace and the introduction of more robots in our personal and professional lives". (Schwab, 2020,113)The ditching of regulations is a general phenomenon under the new normal global regime.To date governments have often slowed the pace of adoption of new technologies by lengthy ponderings about what the best regulatory framework should look like but, as the example of telemedicine and drone delivery is now showing, a dramatic acceleration forced by necessity is possible. During the lockdowns, a quasi-global relaxation of regulations that had previously hampered progress in domains where the technology had been available for years suddenly happened because there was no better or other choice available. What was until recently unthinkable suddenly became possible... New regulations will stay in place". (Schwab, 2020, 109)

Social- and physical-distancing measures are likely to persist after the pandemic itself subsides, justifying the decision in many companies from different industries to accelerate automation. After a while, the enduring concerns about technological unemployment will recede as societies emphasize the need to restructure the workplace in a way that minimizes close human contact. (Schwab, 2020, 110)

Looking to the future, governments will most likely, but with different degrees of intensity, decide that it's in the best interest of society to rewrite some of the rules of the game and permanently increase their role". (Schwab, 2020, 129) Upcoming financial reset where the global elite forcefully invoke the 'fourth industrial revolution.' The coronavirus measures coupled with purported climate change and statist propaganda are considered the primers of this great reset concept.

Technology is not ideologically neutral, as some like to claim. Technologies and societies shape each other. Technology is not an exogenous

force over which we have no control. (Schwab, 2016, 9) “After all, technologies are tied up in how we know things, how we make decisions, and how we think about ourselves and each other. They are connected to our identities, worldviews and potential futures. From nuclear technologies to the space race, smartphones, social media, cars, medicine and infrastructure—the meaning of technologies makes them political. Even the concept of a ‘developed’ nation implicitly rests on the adoption of technologies and what they mean for us, economically and socially”. (Schwab, 2016, 10)

Technology, for the capitalists behind it, has never been about social good but purely about profit, and Schwab makes it quite clear that the same remains true of his Fourth Industrial Revolution.

Conclusion

UN Secretary-General underlines that, despite the unparalleled adverse effects of the pandemic, the COVID-19 crisis has presented opportunities for joint efforts to tackle interrelated global issues, articulated in the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals. The report highlights the concern on the systemic disrespect for international humanitarian and human rights law, and for the humanitarian principles. According to Secretary-General “Intentional attacks on United Nations and humanitarian personnel constitute a serious violation of international humanitarian law.” He urges governments to bring to justice the perpetrators of such violations. (Progress, 2020:2)

The COVID-19 pandemic, has had a profound impact on peace and security across the globe, compounding geopolitical and security challenges, undermining social cohesion and fuelling unrest, conflict, violent extremism, populism and disinformation. “The world faces security challenges that no single country or organization can address alone. (Ibid, 3) The initial idea that companies should try and optimize for more than just short-term profits came around 2016 from a handful of business leaders who wanted the private sector to play a role in achieving the U.N. (Schwab, 2020b) Individuals such as Moynihan, Frans van Houten of Philips and Indra Nooyi, then at PepsiCo, enlisted many of their peers in this commitment. In the following years, pressure from social- and climate-justice movements such as Fridays for Future (#MeToo and Black Lives Matter added to the sense of urgency. Business needed to do more than make a well-intentioned but vague pledge. Business has now to fully embrace stakeholder capitalism, which means not only maximizing profits, but use their capabilities and resources in cooperation with governments and civil society to address the key issues of this decade. They have to actively contribute to a more cohesive and sustainable world.” (Schwab, 2020a)

Building on the Manifesto 2020, this year’s programme focuses on achieving maximum impact on the Forum’s platform for public-private cooperation across six core areas of activity: Ecology, Economy, Society,

Industry, Technology and Geopolitics. For Schwab, the rethinking of the capitalist system is not necessarily more urgent because of the pandemic crisis, but it becomes easier, more within our reach, because of the growing role that governments have taken on in recent months. So, let's not waste a good crisis.

Schwab's "improvable capitalism" is above all a more manager-friendly capitalism: managers like those who attend the Davos meetings and who certainly, like each of us, prefer to have a free hand in their decisions as much as possible. "Stakeholder capitalism" sounds nicer than "managerial capitalism" but it is difficult to tell the difference between one and the other. Increasing shareholder value is certainly a clearer formula: it gives you something to assess management's performance against.

Marx correctly said that workers were alienated from their products in the machine age. If we progress to the 4th industrial revolution the reset will involve alienation from everything. We already have experienced this during the pandemic with social distancing.

Whoever controls the money, the food, the technology, and the weather, controls the world. The goal is a one world government, a one world bank, and protecting the environment. In new world order we must accept to be much more authoritarian and coordinated internationally, with less freedom for individuals and less power for local governments to make decisions closer to the people. The way they sell it is by concluding that the greatest problems the world faces are global problems such as pandemics, climate change, social injustice, populism, gun violence, etc. They say these new global problems show us we must sacrifice our freedoms of movement, privacy, speech, etc.

Globalization theories start from the hypothesis that traditional identity markers, such as, first of all, time and space are lost in the new globalized world. This approach relies on social constructivism, in the way we see ourselves and others. Globalists notice that people are no longer connected with the territory they live in because they become participants of global trends, global communications – either as active (actors) or passive participants (consumers, users). Someone that is far away becomes closer to them than the one that is close to them. From the physical (body) to the spiritual, they are under the influence of the distant other, artificial/virtual and no longer physical. (Jović, 2020, 494)

States likely would not remain the most significant economic units, replaced instead by myriad regional units coordinated and regulated by genuinely empowered global economic institutions, though not tightly integrated politically at the global level. (Stanković Pejnović, 2017, 125)

Martha Nussbaum calls for a much more extensive system of global governance, including institutions able to achieve state compliance in such areas as environmental regulation, labor standards, human rights standards, and some global taxation to promote development (2006: 216; Barry, 1989; Habermas, 2006).

Thomas Pogge have called for an increase in transfers through taxation of global currency transactions or the use of natural resources, but not necessarily within new global institutions. Pogge has advocated quite extensive institutional changes, or a 'vertical dispersal of sovereignty', where some aspects of sovereignty would be ceded to institutions above the state to coordinate global environmental or economic policies, and some would be ceded to sub-state, semi-autonomous groups (Pogge, 2009).

Bringing new worlds into being "at the outer edge of the possible" is heroic, lonely work, requiring "character and courage. According to Kissinger "international order" is "the practical application of these concepts of just arrangements and the distribution of power held by an individual civilization and "thought to be applicable to the entire world." to a substantial part of the globe—large enough to affect the global balance of power." But these are orders that are imagined and implemented by states. The twenty-first century will require a global order, which will need to be acceptable not only to states but also to the vast majority of the world's people.

Resistance to world government as an institutional aim, as well as its plain absence from various discourses, will be explored here under the banner term 'globoskepticism.'

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THE PLACE AND THE ROLE OF THE CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS IN THE MANAGEMENT

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ABSTRACT

The place and role of crisis management issues has its own historical roots within management. Crisis management deals with crisis situations, their prevention and in case of their effective liquidation. It can also use as an integral part of management in other sectors of human activity, e.g. in ecology in environmental accidents, in health care in the event of various epidemics, but the States should have crisis management and emergency plans to implement in the event of natural disasters, social crises or operational accidents e.g. energy companies at the same time.

Key words: crisis management, problems, planning, organizing, control.

Introduction

With the development of human civilization, there were always rescued members of the genus, the weaker and the injured in proportion to the situation and needs. In this way, their own rescue activities resulting from the stage of civilization and technical possibilities were developed. This fact is evidenced by historical materials, especially written data (Sumer, old China). The issues of protecting the population from emergencies and dealing with crisis situations were part of the life of historically distant generations in ancient times, not only today. Their urgency is increasingly at the forefront due to circumstances.

1 Management

Management is one of the more important human activities. Since people started grouping together to achieve goals they could not achieve as individuals, management has become necessary to ensure coordination of individual efforts. As the Society began to rely more and more on group efforts and the number of organized groups continued to grow, the importance of managers and management grew. With this name, we can also identify a group of executives in the organizational unit, the concept of which depends on the specific context (Adašková, Kazanský, 2013).

Management can be defined as the process of systematic implementation of all managerial functions and effective use of all resources to set and achieve

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goals (Veber, 2002). Management functions are mainly planning, organizing, human resources management and control. Management has many sub-sections that differ in the subject of the application and in the point of view. Some management approaches are considered decisive (e.g. marketing, quality systems, strategic management, etc.), but ideally, they are to be used in a comprehensive and balanced way.

Management is a comprehensive set of proven approaches, opinions, experiences, recommendations and methods that managers use to master specific activities (i.e. managerial functions) that are necessary to achieve a system of diverse organizational goals (Tidd, 2000). Management can be perceived as a management with a strong participation of the human factor. As with other activities (medicine, design, accounting, etc.), in the case of management, there is a certain part of "art", but the most important factor of successful crisis management remains the use of systematic knowledge. Management analyses are much easier when based on a suitable structure of useful and clear activities.

1.1 Crisis management site

People have always had to deal with various adverse influences for the sake of their existence. At the same time, it is demonstrable that humanity has evolved through the management of adverse influences. The present time brings new approaches to understanding adverse effects - it requires to be approached them in a comprehensive and purposeful way, not just by the so-called trial-and-error learning method. For this reason, a new discipline is being developed, which is called crisis management (Grasseová, 2008). But a somewhat superficial approach still prevails in its conception. Crisis management deals mainly with the nature of adverse influences that can affect the existence of people and is based on what human society is based on - the environment and the social environment. The environment is made up of inorganic nature, plants and animals, and the means created by man and by which it interferes with nature. The social environment is made up of human society and the different communities that people create within that society. One person is a member of several communities (e.g. family, municipality, business, state, nation, etc.). One person is often a member of multiple communities (e.g. family, municipality, business, state, nation, etc.) (Ochrana, 2001).

Bringing people together in different communities results from the need, for the sake of their own existence, to meet their different needs and to protect their different interests. The need to come together is a fundamental need for all living organisms. In terms of a systemic approach, society and communities are open, vibrant, complex and learning systems (Kazanský, Andrassy, 2019). This means that they exist in interaction with their surroundings, that their fundamental objective is to assure their existence, that information is essential sources of their development, that they are so-called poorly structured and that they have the

ability to achieve better organisation in the future by analysing the results of their functioning to date. The basic states in the development of the system are its common and crisis state. A common state can be defined as a state of dynamic balance of the system with its surroundings. A state of emergency (crisis state) can be defined as a state of such disruption and conditions of existence of the system that it threatens its long-term degradation to extinction. The crisis state of the system can be defined as the unforeseen state of the system, which usually requires the urgent operation of the management body. This is the state of the system, which means, on the one hand, threats and, on the other hand, opportunities for further development (Fotr, Dědina, Hrůzová, 2003). The system inevitably passes alternately through a normal and crisis state during its development. Whether this passage will manifest itself negatively (as a threat) or positively (as an opportunity) is decided both by objective conditions (possible variants of spontaneous, elemental development of the system) and by subjective conditions (the ability and possibility of purposeful action of the subject to influence the natural course). In particular, the ability of the management body to anticipate possible future system states and the ability to find or generate and efficiently use the necessary resources are essential in this case. The ability to predict possible future states is essentially the ability to distinguish signals of such possible directions of force action between the system and its surroundings, which can increase in threat to system development or bring opportunities for better system organization. In both cases, these are manifestations of a clash of antagonistic forces that signal a mismatch between the system and its surroundings.

Conflicts have both a negative (destructive) and a positive (constructive) side of the action. From a positive point of view, regulators and incentives for system changes, i.e. various mechanisms that direct development so that its negative side does not prevail. This makes it possible to ensure a controlled transition of the system through the crisis state to a new normal state with a better layout to the surroundings than was the original one and thus ensure positive development of the system. The negative side of conflict is that conflicts can grow into crises if there are no regulators and incentives or if they are not put in place in a timely manner. Crisis management deals with options to manage possible threats as effectively as possible (Kazanský, 2001). Since many threats can be neutralized by effective (mostly timely) use of opportunities, or at least mitigate the effects of possible spontaneous (elemental) manifestation of the destructive effects of crisis states, it should be subject to crisis management and possible management of emerging opportunities. Without this, the nature of emerging problems cannot be solved. The crisis state arises in the exposed part of the system, where the potential for possible action to change the current state of the system arises (both in the positive and in the negative direction).

If the managing entity is unable to identify the emergency in a timely manner (or does not want to or ignore it for various reasons), then the likelihood

of a natural occurrence of a crisis state and even the demise of the system increases. The demise of the system is associated with a certain random emergency triggering a crisis and thus unleashing crisis potential. This initial event is thus followed by a number of others, since the different parts of the system are directly or vicariously linked to the focus by certain links in one whole (Štěpánek, Otrisal, 2010). If the managing body records a state of emergency in a timely manner and if it is able, if it is willing and can collect and apply certain resources in a timely manner, then it shall ensure a managed transition of the system through the crisis state without a major threat to the existence of the system.

1.2 The role of crisis management

Crisis management is characterised by the immediate management of a significant number of problems. This is a situation similar to normal management, when the difference lies mainly in the urgency of problem solving (time becomes critical), in the circular dependence of problems and in the distribution of management links, where there is no such thing as a middle link for mutual recriminations (usually there will be a staff change of top management, where the new management must prioritise the management of operational problems). An organization's crisis can be defined as a disturbance of balance in one of its subsystems that may jeopardize the achievement of an organization's goal or even jeopardize its continued existence. If the crisis is identified early and automatically served by management interventions, this may not lead to a deepening of the crisis, which ends only with the demise of the organisation. Crisis management deals with crisis of the organization. More broadly, crisis management is already used as a preventive tool in assessing the risks that may be a potential cause of the crisis. From a narrower perspective, crisis management can be understood as a system of principles and tools actively applied by the management of the organization to manage the crisis situation and bring it to the path of further development (Kanki, Helmreich, Anca, 2010). An integral part of coping with a crisis situation is the understanding of the sources of crises, their typology, as well as the systematization of the causes of their occurrence.

The activities of the organization and changes in its surroundings that directly or vicariously affect the organization and the dysfunction between systems imply a large number of risks. Their management must be integrated into the formulation of the objectives of the organization, as well as strategies and common activities. It cannot be viewed in a detached way and without any link to other activities. Risk management cannot be understood as a one-off or periodic activity but as a permanent activity that not only identifies risks but also monitors their changes (Gause, 2004). It is part of crisis management, which is to say, not only to solve the crisis successfully, but above all to eliminate its occurrence and reduce the negative impact.

The identification of risk as a probability of failure accompanied by the relevant loss is the basis for the activities of the insurance sector, credit policy in banks, but also in the protection of the civilian population or in the military in the choice of an operation strategy or the determination of combat effectiveness. In the insurance sector, on the basis of probability theory and mathematical statistics, income for insurance policies, claims expenses, overheads and insurance premiums must be in a certain balance (Mitchell, 2005). Problems usually arise in large-scale disasters, when theoretical assumptions placed under normal conditions cease to apply. A similar approach is taken in the banking sector in setting interest rates on deposits and loans, taking into account overheads, profits and the market situation. There may also be risky situations of non-repayment of credit and natural collection of deposits. The relevant teams deal with the analysis of the risks thus conceived in the banks and formulate the principles of the bank's policy in terms of minimizing risks in general and with regard to specific clients.

Conclusion

The subject of crisis management is the management of emergencies and crisis situations of various scopes at all stages of the solution. A crisis situation can arise by its very nature without the intention of triggering a crisis, or on the basis of a conflict, that is, with the intention of triggering a crisis. In this breakdown, it is irrelevant whether the conflict arises gradually on the basis of different interests (e.g. political or commercial conflict) or suddenly (e.g. robbery).

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RADICALIZATION IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF FOREIGN INTEGRATION INDICATORS*

Štěpán Strnad¹

ABSTRACT

The paper aims to present a situational analysis of the selected area. The security assessment is based on the underlying concept of internal and external migration factors. It attempts to understand the issue through 3 vertical analytic levels (individual, community, society), which determines the level and extent (latent, socially harmful, criminal) of the threat of the evaluated area. These are based on several mutually correlated analyzes - the growth of the permanently residing foreign population with its nationality and regional structure, manifestations of radicalism, extremism and indicators of integration. Individual aspects of selected priority risk areas thus create indicators for formulation of predictions and recommendations of specific measures of the state migration policy in individual security risk management agendas in the Czech Republic.

Key words: Indicators of Integration, Radicalization, Extremism, Terrorism, Foreigners

Introduction

We can observe a trend of a steady increase in the number of long-term foreigners in the Czech Republic due to the expected economic growth (especially the need for post-pandemic economic recovery), which is mainly dependent on foreign labor migration from third countries in manufacturing and consumer industry. The permanent migration trend is also being maintained by the external geopolitical situation and the persistent instability of conflict regions in the near and wider border of European Union's field of international protection. The growth of the foreign population is also expected in terms of demographic trends in the Czech population development, where foreign migration has long been the main contributor to the increase in the Czech population whereas the natural increase of the ethnic majority has been secondary.

There are two key areas where the strongest emphasis on the prevention of migration-related risks in the Czech Republic should be 1) illegal migration and related threats of violations of administrative, criminal and labor legislation 2) vulnerability of some foreign groups, their integration associated with threats of intercultural differences, reluctance of migrants to adequately integrate and radicalization of the majority. Therefore, the integration policy is focused on the

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continuous evaluation of the position of foreigners in the Czech Republic through cooperation between the state, regional and local public administration and the non-profit sector in the form of a number of platforms, projects and measures that have cross-border reach.

With the increase in the number of legally living foreigners in the Czech Republic (an eightfold increase since 1993) the state is forced to pay closer attention to security issues of foreign legal and illegal migration (especially from so-called third countries²) and has been doing so increasingly for the last five years³. The presented analysis focuses on the areas of risks related to migration and the inclusion of foreigners with regard to radicalization as well as extremist and criminal potential.

Indicators of foreign integration

The state integration policy, its conception, application and evaluation depend mainly on monitoring, which is based on situational analyzes of final reports from regular quarterly assessment of the situation done by Center for the Support of the Integration of Foreigners as well as municipal and NGO projects with financial support from the Ministry of the Interior. Monitoring the situation of foreigners can serve as a certain system of early warning and subsequently as an incentive to adequately solve problems in direct cooperation with local governments, labor offices, employers and non-profit organizations.

The state institution that carries out continuous monitoring and creation of indicators of foreign integration is the Research Institute of Labor and Social Affairs. Its analyses have become an essential part of the evaluation and updating of the government's integration strategy since 2010. The institute's methodology in the area of continuous monitoring of integration processes can be used as a framework for interest indicators for effectiveness of integration of foreigners from third countries in the Czech Republic and the risks associated with it.

The indicators include (Government of the Czech Republic, 2019):

1. relationship of the majority to foreigners,
2. relationship of foreigners to society in the Czech Republic - barriers to integration from the perspective of foreigners,
3. willingness to and obligation of integration,
4. integration of foreigners at the regional and local level,
5. awareness of foreigners - orientation in society,

² Among foreigners legally residing in the Czech Republic, third-country nationals (60.4%) predominate over EU, EEA and Swiss Member States (9.6%) (Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, 2020a, p. 1).

³ The number of foreigners with temporary or permanent residence increased by 150,569 between 2015 and 2020, i.e., by approximately 60,000 each year (Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, 2020a, p. 1).

6. knowledge of the Czech language and access to education,
7. participation of foreigners in public life,
8. access of foreigners to health care,
9. financing integration.

Let us focus more closely on two indicators. The first is the relationship of the majority to foreigners. We can argue that the Czech Republic belongs to the countries with almost zero value in conflicts between the national majority and foreign diasporas, although from subjective experience of foreigners from third countries, 38% of them encounter rejection and xenophobia while 60% do not record anything of the sort (Schebelle, Kubát, Kotíková, Vychová, 2015, p. 74). The highest level of social distance from ethnic and national minorities is shown by people with lower education and the long-term unemployed, for whom foreign employees represent significant competition in the labor market. The rate of social distance also raises with an increase in age and a decrease in income.

However, 53% of the Czech population believe that incoming foreigners are a problem. 63% of the majority population is convinced that foreigners residing in the Czech Republic for a long time pose a health risk (CVVM, 2020, p. 1).

Research shows a markedly negative attitude of the Czech majority towards immigrants and the concept of multiculturalism as well as a paradoxical perception of the assimilation of foreigners in the sense that the Czech majority calls for their assimilation, but also takes a negative attitude towards their state-supported integration. Czechs also tend to believe that it is better for their country if migrants share Czech customs and traditions.

Almost three quarters of Czech citizens (73%) are of the opinion that foreigners should "adapt to our customs as much as possible". This value orientation has not changed according to research in the last three years. For the vast majority of Czech citizens, the most important circumstances in the process of integrating a foreigner into Czech society are language and work. From this point of view, the ability to speak Czech language is important for more than nine tenths (93%) of the population and work in the Czech Republic is important for almost nine tenths (87%). Another important circumstances for the integration of foreigners Czechs consider to be knowledge of Czech history and culture (65%), citizenship (60%), length of stay of at least 10 years (57%) and participation in local social life (57%). About two-fifths (41%) of companies think that it is important for the integration of foreigners to have light skin color. Czechs consider marriage with a Czech (38%) and ownership of a house or flat (33%) to be the least important (CVVM, 2020, p. 3). In the long-term comparison (2009 - 2020), the most stable answers to the circumstances of foreign integration are: "speak Czech", "be a citizen of the Czech Republic" and "work in the Czech Republic" (CVVM, 2020, p. 4).

Public opinion and public attitudes have been strongly influenced by radical anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic movements and political parties over the past five years. This influence culminated in 2015/16 with the immigration crisis in Europe. We can observe a steady trend where the public's tolerance of xenophobic, racist, etc. manifestations is significantly increasing and the boundaries of perception of the conformity of racist and xenophobic expressions are shifting. A place for these expressions has been moving from the original area of the far right and extremist environment in towards the political mainstream. (BIS, 2020, s. 10). The traditional extremist scene and its influence on the polarization of society are on a decline, and the subjects of so-called prejudiced hatred⁴ are coming to the forefront, taking over its rhetoric, programming and activities, although they cannot be described as extremist.

We can thus register a significant increase in the radicality of opinions, especially in the virtual environment of social networks. As before, not only national, ethnic, religious, sexual minorities are targeted by prejudiced hatred, but also the homeless, members of various subcultures, human rights activists, politicians and journalists. The vast majority of aggressive behavior takes place on the Internet, although physical incidents have already been registered. Thus, there is a threat of moving aggressive manifestations from the virtual to the physical environment (Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, 2020c, p. 10). Manifestations of prejudiced hatred do not have to fulfill the essence of a crime. They differ from extremist manifestations mainly in that they are not associated with any of the totalitarian and extremist ideologies. Thus, their perpetrators do not have to be members or supporters of extremist movements that promote the overthrow of a democratic state.

The second indicator is the relationship of foreigners to society in the Czech Republic. In general, we can state that foreigners value freedom, security and care for the environment the most in Czech society. Less attention is paid to Czech culture. Thus, research shows that foreigners residing in the Czech Republic for a long time rather tend to appreciate the perks of a modern civilization in general. Cultural differences form a part of the subjectively perceived barriers of integration into Czech society (Schebelle, Kubát, Kotíková, Vychová, 2015, p. 83). As the most distinctive barriers foreigners perceive the lack of knowledge of the Czech language (59% with temporary residence, 48% with permanent residence), a disadvantage in access to employment (49%) and a disadvantage due to the residence permit regime (39%) (Schebelle, Kubát, Kotíková, Vychová, 2015, p. 69). Despite the feelings and beliefs of foreigners of incompatibility and detachment from the majority towards them, 81% of foreigners trust the majority

⁴ Manifestations of prejudiced hatred refer to behavior that is motivated by intolerance and social prejudices towards a certain group of people, usually defined by race, nationality, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, political or other opinion, social origin, etc. (Ministry of the Interior, 2020c, p. 5).

and most of them hold a positive perception of the majority (Schebelle, Kubát, Kotíková, Vychová, 2015, p. 72).

Reluctance to integrate show 8% of foreigners, mostly Russians (almost half) and Ukrainians (less than a third) (Schebelle, Kubát, Kotíková, Vychová, 2015, p. 71). For foreigners, the most important value in the area of integration problems is family (87%), followed by employment in the Czech Republic. They also assign high importance to ownership of property / money and success at work, therefore values ensuring the economic existence of an individual or family. Less important values for them were education, leisure, politics in the country of their origin and the environment. The least important facts are religion / faith (less than a quarter of foreigners consider religion to be very important) and politics in the Czech Republic (Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, 2016, p. 9).

Foreign crime

At the end of June 2020, the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic (2020a, p. 1) registered 618,131 foreigners with a temporary stay longer than 90 days (313,588) or with a permanent residence (304,543), which represents 5.6% of the total population. Thus, the long-term steady growth in the number of foreigners residing in the Czech Republic continued. The Czech Republic ranks 15th out of the total number of 48 countries surveyed by Eurostat (2020) in the area of annual immigration. In terms of nationality, we have not registered almost any changes for a long time. The structure of foreigners residing in the Czech Republic has been stable for a long time in terms of nationality. A constant trend is in the origin of the most numerous foreign communities - Ukrainian (25, 4%), Slovak (19, 5%) and Vietnamese (10, 1%⁵) (Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, 2020a, p. 1).

With the rapid increase in the number of foreign workers in the Czech Republic over the last two years, the state has to pay more attention to the security aspects of employing foreigners. Especially in the industrial zones of Hradec Králové and Pilsen region, where we were able to register an increase of illegal activity, especially offenses (against public order, civil cohabitation or property) by foreigners, as well as an increased level of conflicts between local people and foreigners, offenses in the field of transport, prostitution and drugs. The measures implemented in 2017 and 2018 contributed to a significant improvement of the situation in these regions, which in turn led to an increase in security and public order (Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, 2019, p. 5).

In addition to security problems, regions with a high proportion of employed foreign workers also have to deal with deficits in the areas of inadequate

⁵ The rest of the shares of the Czech foreign community: Russia 6.6%, Poland 3.4%, Germany 3.3%, Bulgaria 2.8% Romania 2.8%, Mongolia 1.7%, USA 1.4% (Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, 2020a, p. 1).

infrastructure in the form of housing, transport, health, education, waste management, leisure and human resources. The rapid increase in foreign workers in industrial locations was caused by increased demand from manufacturing companies, which attracted low-skilled workers from abroad. Their arrival was associated with an increase of crime and illegal activities, not only by foreigners, but also by employers in the form of labor exploitation, non-compliance with hygiene rules, tax violations, use of buildings for purposes other than those approved or falsification of EU travel documents in order to get a job in the Czech Republic.

In the field of foreign organized crime in Czech Republic, Russian-speaking, Asian and Balkan criminal organizations have long been prevalent. In particular, the Russian-speaking and Vietnamese members of these organizations rely on a large domestic diaspora. Criminal organizations are characterized by a strong link to foreign and domestic criminal structure, the diversity of crimes committed and a corrupt connection to the Czech judicial, administrative and political sphere (NCOZ, 2019, p. 19). From a long-term perspective, the main problem for all foreign language criminal organizations that commit criminal activity in the Czech territory associated with the legalization of proceeds from crime is the search for a so-called source crime, which is mostly committed outside the Czech Republic.

In 2019, the trend for all major foreign organized criminal groups of trying to obtain one of the long-term residences permits for their subjects continued. It is most often achieved by entering a purposeful marriage or a formally proclaimed partnership with another person, or by providing fictitious employment (Ministry of the Interior, 2020b, p. 148).

Manifestations of Extremism

In the last 15 years, we could say that in the Czech Republic, within the foreign and immigrant community there was a whole "fan" of extremist organizations from many regions of the world. For example, there are structures from the Balkans to support Albanian extremist groups promoting the idea of a Greater Albania, and also Serbian extremist nationalists. From Eastern Europe, these are mainly Russian and Ukrainian right-wing extremists or right-wing extremist nationalists from the South Caucasus republics. Groups in support of Northern Ireland terrorism, linked to domestic left-wing extremism, came to us from Western Europe. Last but not least, we register the presence of supporters of extremist organizations from the Middle East (Mareš, 2014).

We could distinguish Islamist extremism into several forms. On the one hand, there are individuals (foreigners and Czech converts), as well as informal groups operating within registered Czech Muslim organizations (Muslim Union,

Islamic Foundation in Prague, Headquarters of Muslim Communities⁶), which bring together mostly moderate Muslims, and transnational Islamic organizations, such as the Third World Development Foundation, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), or al-Haramain Foundation. These *"officially seek missionary action, proclaiming a dogmatic conception of Islam and are sometimes accused of links to terrorists (abroad, not the Czech Republic), even though they deny it and it has not been clearly proven"* (Mareš, 2005b, p. 260 - 261). In the past, we were able to register opinions and speeches within the Czech Muslim organizations that morally justify Islamist terrorism or, from the positions of dogmatic defense of Sharia law, express intolerant and offensive attitudes towards Western countries (Lhoťan, 2011).

We can also register supporters of other extremist organizations in the foreign community (e.g., the Islamic Revival Party (Hizb-ul-Tahrir), Palestinian Hamas, Lebanese Hezbollah⁷ or Bosnian Islamist organizations, such as the Active Islamic Youth Organization (Mareš, 2011). Among the North African students are supporters of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front and the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria. Among Chechen emigrants, we find supporters of the Chechen terrorist Islamist group (Mareš, 2005a).

However, it is important to emphasize that the majority of Muslims currently living in the Czech Republic are moderate believers (non-practitioners or semi-practitioners), with the number of radicals and extremists rising slightly, especially among people from the Caucasus region and the Middle East region. Some Czech converts also share extremist ideas (Hořejší, 2015). Radical believers are trying to influence the community core towards adapting a stricter interpretation of Islam, and in the long run they could seek to shift the whole community in its value orientation, away from the values of liberal democracy. For the time being, we talk only about individuals for whom extremism with criminal and legal consequences has been proven on the basis of monitoring (e.g., the case of Dominik Kobulnický).

⁶ In the case of these organizations, the question is whether to talk about foreign organizations, as there is a significant naturalization of their members and a relatively high number of Czech converts in the leading positions of organizations.

⁷ "At the beginning of 2018, the BIS successfully completed an operation monitoring the infrastructure of the Hezbollah movement's cyber-spy campaign located in the Czech Republic. This cyber-espionage campaign was not aimed at Czech citizens, but above all at victims from the Middle East. The attackers operated from Lebanon and in the Czech Republic in 2017 and 2018 used several servers, the primary function of which was the distribution of a malicious spy application for the Android mobile operating system. In doing so, they used social engineering methods and tried to persuade their victims to install a modified application, pretending to be a legitimate communication program, through the false profiles of attractive women on social networks. After installation, the application began sending sensitive data from the phone to attackers' servers" (BIS, 2019, p. 12).

Terrorism

We can, to limited extent, reflect the assessment of the current situation in the field of terrorism from public sources. The evaluation that presents itself is from 2018 and is based on the annual reports BIS (2019) and NCOZ (2019). Here, is the situation in regard to terrorism and Islamist radicalization in the Czech Republic assessed as calm. Investigations in this area have not confirmed presence of Islamist radicals neither direct security risks. We register similar findings in the area of terrorist financing where the territory of the republic would serve as a logistic base of international terrorism.

In recent years, the monitoring of the Security Information Service has focused mainly on two groups of people. The first were sympathizers of the ideology and activities of IS and other similar organizations. They are mainly younger people and converts. There were only a few of these individuals. *"In most of them, the presented opinions were a manifestation of mental lability, frustration or even illness. None of them had ties to Islamist groups or to any local Muslim community. Muslims living in the Czech Republic, with a few exceptions, have publicly condemned IS activity."* The second group of monitored persons consisted of those who traveled from the Czech Republic to Syria with the intention of joining terrorist organizations, especially the IS. *"There was a total of seven people from the Islamic world who stayed in the Czech Republic for a short time. The return of these persons to the EU would pose a serious security threat in terms of participation in terrorist attacks"* (BIS, 2015, p. 13).

The Security Intelligence Service (2017, 2018, 2019) has long pointed to a certain risk of radicalization in a part of the Kazakh community whose members are asylum seekers. Their integration seems very problematic due to cultural differences and especially the highly specific form of Islam, which has a very strict and radical interpretation of religious principles, which manifests itself, among other things, in hostility towards Czech society. Its secrecy and separation within the wider Muslim Czech community poses a latent security threat. The Maghreb community also shows some radicalization potential without the existence of authorities to prevent radicalization. As in the case of the Kazakh community, risk indicators are a lack of interest in integration into the majority, as well as criminal activity, purposeful marriages and financial distress.

As in previous years, efforts to spread extremist ideological influences on our territory, mainly Salafism continue. People with war injuries from abroad who come to the Czech Republic for treatment pose a risk. These persons often use Schengen visas of another EU member state and travel to the Czech Republic with their entourage. Due to the absence of proper security clearance of such persons, it cannot be ruled out that potentially dangerous persons or persons involved in terrorist activities in conflict areas could be among them (NCOZ, 2019, p. 24).

In terms of the perpetrators of terrorist attacks carried out on the EU territory, it shows that these are mostly self-radicalized individuals, for whose

actions a specific terrorist organization later claimed to be responsible. From a societal point of view, the radicalization of people on the Internet or in prisons remains a significant security risk (NCOZ, 2019, p. 25).

In this context, attention is also focused on financial support for terrorist organizations, which are concentrated in the Czech Republic. An illustrative example is the case of former Prague imam Samer Shehadeh, who was in February 2020 sentenced to 10 years for helping to join a terrorist group and finance terrorism, by allowing his brother and his wife⁸ (a Czech convert) travel to Syria to join the terrorist group Jabhat an-Nusra.

Conclusion

In the area of integration, we can state that the Czech Republic has a consistent integration policy, which is strengthened in legislation, system and capacity. The sustainability of the monitoring and early warning system is being strengthened by expanding the network of regional centers to support the integration of foreigners and their new financing from the state budget. Local cooperation of the public administration with the non-profit sector and foreign communities is supported through a number of projects. The majority of the long-term and permanent resident foreign population does not show any socio-pathological phenomena. Despite a strong majority prejudices against immigrants, there are no significant or widespread conflicts between minorities and the majority. The shared values of both minorities and the majority for successful integration are knowledge of the Czech language and employment. Family backgrounds, employment and socio-economic life stability are proving to be key tools for solving some integration problems on the part of foreigners. However, the threat of medium intensity (high community latency with the first social manifestations at the local level) is registered in the Kazakh community, which shows an extremist anti-liberal orientation of Islam - Salafism. Measures to prevent the further ideological development of this community should primarily aim at promoting an unorthodox interpretation of the faith through moderate clergy or preventing the influence of radical clergy from abroad. The role of adaptation courses, which should draw the attention of migrants to the risks arising from manifestations of Salafism in the Czech Republic, is crucial, especially for people from the Islamic cultural circle. The threat of high intensity is the increasing radicalization of the majority observed in the virtual environment of social networks, particularly in the area of prejudiced hatred. Prevention should avert the transfer of this phenomenon from the Internet to physical space, especially in the form of violent crimes.

⁸ Omar and Fátima (born Hudková) Shehadeh sentenced to 11 and 6 years in prison in absentia. They are currently missing.

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ANALYSIS OF THE PARTICIPATION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Róbert Tomášek¹, Dominika Černáková²

ABSTRACT

Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic have participated in more than thirty peace and military operations and missions of the international crisis management under the auspices of the UN, NATO and the EU. In addition to credibility, respect and new skills and experience, the participation of members of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic in these operations has contributed maintaining peace in various parts of the world. It is important for the Slovak Republic to broadcast to different regions of the world and to join international crisis management for several reasons. The aim of this paper is to point out the importance and development of the participation of the AF SR in peacekeeping missions and operations.

Key words: *Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic, international crisis management, operations, missions, peacekeeping, UN, NATO, EU*

Introduction

The security environment of the Slovak Republic since its formation in 1993 has been influenced by the high dynamics of change, complexity, interdependence of actors and processes and instability in the global security environment. This development also adversely affected the implementation of the security interests of the Slovak Republic. During its existence, the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic (hereinafter referred to as AF SR) guaranteed the defense of the state and the security of citizens as their main mission, while at the same time are fulfilling tasks arising for the Slovak Republic from international agreements in the field of defense. To achieve the ability to perform these tasks, AF SR underwent a fundamental transformation, from a large army of offensive type to the defense-oriented armed forces of a democratic state. The goal of their transformation was to build a relatively small, well-armed and well-trained armed forces capable of fulfilling its current and future tasks. (White Paper on the Defense of the Slovak Republic, 2013)

AF SR have been involved in the activities of the international community within their capacities. These were military operations as well as peacekeeping missions of international crisis management, by which the AF SR fulfilled the

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priorities of foreign and security policy. As stated by the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic (hereinafter referred to as MoD SR), through membership in the European Union (EU), NATO and the United Nations (UN), Slovakia has gained many benefits, but also obligations that arise from individual memberships. The ambition to be not only a consumer but also an active contributor to international security is also realized through military contributions to operations and missions. It is also a manifestation of our country's active contribution to not only global but also domestic security. Participation in operations and missions and an initiative effort to resolve crisis situations beyond our borders contribute to the security of every citizen of the Slovak Republic and improve our position within the international community. The involvement of the AF SR in operations and missions has undergone a gradual qualitative development. At the beginning, AF SR participated only in UN missions, but later the participation expanded to financially, personnel- and quality-demanding operations under NATO and EU. (Foreign operations, 2020)


AF SR and the Peacekeeping

Since the establishment of an independent Slovak Republic in 1993, its armed forces have participated in more than thirty foreign operations and missions led by UN, NATO, EU or within international coalitions in various countries on three continents. These participations have an extraordinary contribution not only to the international credibility of the Slovak Republic in terms of fulfilling the obligations to maintain peace and stability in the world, but also strengthens its influence in promoting its own foreign policy goals. The Euro-Atlantic security environment, of which the Slovak Republic is a part, has had a decisive influence on the reaction of the international community since 2001 to the activities of militant extremist groups using terrorist methods on an international scale. The nature of combat operations in international crisis management operations has increased the pressure to develop new capabilities of the members of armed forces, with an emphasis on deployability and sustainability in operations far from Europe. In response to these developments, NATO and the EU are taking a comprehensive approach using a wider range of tools and mechanisms, including the development of new, highly sophisticated and resource-intensive defense capabilities. (White Paper on the Defense of the Slovak Republic, 2013)

Compared to the European Defense Agency (EDA) countries, Slovakia is above average in the number of troops sent to International Crisis Management Operations (ICMO). While the number of troops at the UN has been stable since 2008, the number of troops at NATO is declining. Participation in missions and operations is a manifestation of the willingness and ability of the state to use its defense potential in practice. Decisions to join the ICMO must therefore take into account not only the cost of deployment, but also foreign policy priorities and the importance of missions and operations for the development of the armed forces.

Decision-making on the allocation of mandates for missions can be made more efficient by creating an index of transformation potential, which the ICMO has for the development of the AF SR. In order to ensure the course of missions and operations in the future, it is also necessary to effectively manage funds in the foreign exchange account of the MoD SR so as not to jeopardize the course of missions in the event of a UN payment deficit or reduction of budgetary resources for ICMO for a given year. In the number of soldiers deployed in the ICMO, Slovakia is comparable to the reference countries (Graph No. 1). In 2017, 1.9% of members of the AF SR were deployed abroad, compared to 2.4% of EDA soldiers. In the years 2009-2012, the share of deployed soldiers of the AF SR was even above average in comparison with the EDA states. Since 2012, Slovakia's contribution to the ICMO has been declining, reflecting a change in operational needs in connection with the termination of the NATO ISAF operation in Afghanistan (Slovakia: 2004-2014). The contributions of the number of soldiers for the AF SR to the ICMO are stable. (Graph No. 1) This can be understood as a positive sign - declaration of interest in actively contributing to international security), but also as a negative one - stable numbers of seconded troops indicate less ability of the state to respond to "ad hoc" requests to join the ICMO. (Hrozenská, 2020)

Graph no. 1: The average number of soldiers in the ICMO in the ratio to the number of AF SR members (in %)



e (estimate) – the figure for 2017 is an estimated rate

Source: Hrozenská, 2020

As we can see, the participation of members of the AF SR in ICMO missions has not just a "supplementary" nature. Interoperability, flexibility and willingness to learn and acquire new skills and experience are qualities thanks to which members of the AF SR gain recognition from their partners as well as from the international community.

Peacekeeping operations are of legitimate importance. Since the end of the horrors of the World War II., the international community has been trying to find

adequate and effective means to be able to prevent or end the conflicts. As security challenges and scientific and technological developments gradually evolve and change, so do the tools and resources of the international community.

Participation of the AF SR in Peacekeeping Operations

Members of the AF SR have participated in more than three dozen ICMO operations since 1993. In individual missions and operations, they performed the necessary tasks, faced various requirements from actors in the conflict, and had to adapt to different climatic, social and religious environments.


MoD of SR lists the following important ICMO missions and operations carried out under the auspices of the UN, EU or NATO, in which members of the armed forces have participated:

- *United Nations Guard Contingent in IRAQ 1991 – 2003*
- *United Nations Protection Force 1992 – 1995*
- *United Nations Observer Mission Uganda – Rwanda 1993 – 1994*
- *United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda 1993 – 1996*
- *United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia 1993 – 1997*
- *United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium 1996 – 1998*
- *United Nations Mission of Observers in Angola 1997-1999*
- *United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, 1998 – 2008*
- *United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 1999 – 2005.*
- *United Nations Missions in Ethiopia and Eritrea 2000 – 2004*
- *United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor) 2001 – 2003*
- *ENDURING FREEDOM, Kuwait, 2003*
- *CONCORDIA, Macedonia, 2003*
- *OPERATION IRAQUI FREEDOM 2003 – 2007*
- *AMIS II Sudan/Darfur 2005 – 2006*
- *European Union Training Mission MALI 2016*

Currently, members of the AF SR participate in two NATO-led operations (Operation RS in Afghanistan and within NATO Headquarters in Bosnia and Herzegovina), in two operations and missions under EU command (Operation EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina and EUMM in Georgia) and in two UN missions (UNFICYP in Cyprus and the UNTSO observation mission in Israel and Syria) (Foreign Operations, 2020)

The number of members sent to operations under the auspices of the UN fluctuated in the range of 100-600 members of the AF SR, while for comparison the number of members sent to operations under the auspices of the EU has been stable since 2006. (see Graph No. 2)

Graph No. 2: Average number of personnel of AF SR in ICMO under UN, NATO and EU



Source: Hrozenská, 2020

The numbers of troops sent to the UN ICMO for the Slovak Republic are very stable in comparison with other countries - in comparison with NATO member states, Slovakia sent more troops to the UN ICMO in 2001-2006 on average. (Chart No. 2) After 2006, the rate levelled off and currently the Slovak Republic reaches the average number of soldiers sent than most of the NATO countries. This increase was also caused by the assumption of responsibility for the 4th sector by the Slovak Republic in 2018. The number of troops sent to the ICMO NATO until 2010 increased, after 2014 decreased significantly. In 2009-2015, the number of troops in the NATO ICMO was even higher than in the UN. Decline after 2014 is caused due to the termination of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan. Currently, the number of troops in the ICMO is declining due to their withdrawal due to the Covid-19 pandemic. (Hrozenská, 2020)


It follows that current missions and operations conducted under a UN and EU mandate are a priority in ensuring security within the ICMO. Following the end of the ISAF operation in 2014 and the subsequent planning of a new non-combat NATO operation in Afghanistan (Resolute Support) aimed at fulfilling training, assistance and advisory tasks for the Government of Afghanistan, including the Afghan National Security Forces, the number of AF SR personnel sent to NATO, which was gradually reflected in the budget costs of the Slovak Republic.

Costs for Participating

The UN is the only organization to reimburse its member states for compensation for sending troops to the ICMO. Neither NATO nor the EU reimburses states from participating in missions and operations. The participation of the AF SR in the UN ICMO is thus financed from two sources: budgetary resources (operations outside the territory of the state) and extra-budgetary resources (Account of the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic for funds from the UN). Slovakia contributes a fixed share to the UN budget at the ICMO - for 2019 it was 0.0918% of the UN budget at the ICMO (approximately 6 million EUR). Neither the EU nor NATO has a similar budget to cover operational expenditures - they are paid by states directly (in NATO, general expenditures on the ICMO are paid to a certain extent from the military budget, to which relatively all states contribute). Contributions to these common budgets at the ICMO for the Slovak Republic are small in comparison with contributions to the budget at the UN ICMO, therefore they were not included in the calculations. The budget for the UN ICMO for 2019/2020 is 6.52 billion USD (July 1, 2019 - June 30, 2020). The state contribution ratio is set by a UN General Assembly resolution depending on political and economic indicators (in addition to the UN budget, operations may also be funded directly by countries that have requested UN operations, such as UNYOM in Yemen, funded by Saudi Arabia and Egypt). Of these contributions, military and civilian ICMO are reimbursed (Slovakia was involved in Operation MINUJUST Haiti in 2019 - 2 members of the Police). (Hrozenská, 2020)

As the expenditures of the AF SR on the UN ICMO are permanently higher than the revenues from the UN (for UNFICYP), the costs of sending to the UN ICMO are paid mainly from the current budget of the MoD SR. When converted to one soldier, the average annual costs paid from the budget resources of the Slovak Republic for participation in the ICMO of all three organizations (UN, NATO, EU) are balanced (Chart No. 3). (Hrozenská, 2020)

Graph no. 3: Average annual budget costs per soldier in the NATO, UN and EU ICMO³



Source: Hrozenská, 2020

Conclusion

We agree with Hrozenská (2020) that in terms of increasing the transformation potential of the AF SR, greater diversification of missions and operations, it is important for the Slovak Republic to broadcast to different regions of the world, to join ICMO with different focus, different demands or requirements for military equipment. The participation of the Slovak Republic in the ICMO is declared for four reasons. First, foreign and security policy priorities. Second, the commitment of UN, EU and NATO membership to be an active contributor to international security. Thirdly, an initiative effort to resolve crisis situations beyond

³ "UN a" - decentralized expenditures are included in the budget costs of the UN ICMO - Operations outside the territory of the state, personal expenditures and central expenditures - logistical support

"UN b" - in addition to "UN", the budget costs of the UN ICMO also include the annual contributions of the Slovak Republic to the UN budget at the ICMO paid through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Council of the Slovak Republic. Although the UN budget for the ICMO is intended to reimburse the ICMOs regardless of their classification (military and civilian missions), Slovakia's contribution to this budget was included in the graph for military missions, as Slovakia has civilian (police) UN missions in terms of number of missions. Members of the Police (compared to the number of troops sent to military operations) involves only minimal (for the period 2015-2019 from the UN civilian missions only MINUSTAH / MINUJUST mission Haiti - 6, later 2 members of Police and UNFICYP - an average of 7 members of Police).

our borders, which improves Slovakia's position within the international community. Fourth, the development of the AF SR - involvement in the ICMO has a transforming effect on the development of the armed forces (working with new technologies, getting to know regions). Africa will be the future trend in terms of the geographical direction of the ICMO in the world. Missions and operations are going to be focused mainly on the training of local armed forces. The deployment of members of the AF SR in this region could bring a synergistic effect from operating in the same space within the ICMO EU and the UN.

In the future, increased pressure is expected on NATO and EU member states in the context of participation in missions and operations in Africa and the Middle East (post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction of the security environment after the eventual end of the conflict in Syria). This fact will also need to be taken into account when planning future ICMOs with the participation of the Slovak Republic (which will probably also take place in connection with the gradual reduction of the UNFICYP operation in Cyprus). The concept of the MoD SR on the involvement of members of the MoD SR and the AF SR in operations and missions abroad from 2019 proposes to consider at least symbolic participation in these missions and operations in cooperation with our regional partners (V4) or with states that have been involved for a long time (France, Germany, Italy). At the same time, France can perceive our involvement in Africa as an essential element of the quality of bilateral relations, given its extensive activities in the region. Another expected trend will be an increase in the emphasis on the rapid deployment of members of the AF SR to the ICMO abroad. An example is France's request for a contribution to the EUTM Mission in Mali under Article 42.7 of the EU Treaty (Slovakia contributed 5 troops to EUTM Mali in 2016). NATO deploys the deployability and sustainability of members of the AF SR in missions and operations abroad as one of the important indicators of their contribution to the common defense. (Hrozenská, 2020)

In the area of EU activities, the Defense Ministers in November 2020 focused in a joint discussion on Operation IRINI and the situation in Libya, while were also discussing the need for an early resumption of EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali for the European Union's overall efforts in the country. The interest in the active participation of members of the AF SR represents a positive sign not only for the members of the AF SR, but also for the Slovak Republic as a partner who is aware that without joint efforts and activities to support security and cooperation in the world the global security situation will deteriorate, what can directly or indirectly endanger all of humanity.

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CYBERSPACE AND OUTER SPACE IN JAPANESE STRATEGIC THINKING

Róbert Vancel¹

ABSTRACT

In the last decade, the importance of "non-traditional" domains of power competition between actors in international relations has grown significantly. The two most frequently mentioned domains are cyberspace and outer space. These changes are also reflected in Japanese strategic thinking, through significant changes in strategic documents. In the article, the author analyses these changes in the context of the changing security environment in Japan, while also examining the specific impact of the changes on the development of selected state defence capabilities.

Key words: Japan, security policy, cyberspace, outer space

1 Theoretical basis for the study of cyberspace and outer space in the context of state security policy

In order to examine the issue of cyberspace and outer space, it is necessary to define both terms. Cyberspace is currently used to be described as "*a virtual world made up of computers, and with the creation of the Internet, cyberspace has expanded to the level of a global computer network.*" (Fabián, Melková, 2016) Most of the additional definition according to Fabián and Melková focus on the movement and exchange of information. This is, of course, a fundamental characteristic of cyberspace, but we believe that it is currently another area in which actors of international relations can operate. This represents an interesting change as it is the first time that international relations have moved into a sphere that has no physical determinants, such as traditional spaces - earth, sea, air and space. At the NATO Summit in 2016, cyberspace was recognized as the fifth "*operational domain of the functioning of state and non-state actors in times of peace and war*" (Fabián, Melková, 2016). As a result of the sharp expansion of ICT technologies in the last two decades, there has been securitisation of cyberspace space at all levels - from the individual to the state. In terms of international relations, cyberspace is seen primarily as an area of conflict, while profiling specific forms of phenomena that we know from the traditional domains of international relations. Examples include cyberterrorism, cyber espionage, cyber conflict, and others. (Ebert, Maurer, 2017)

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The Japanese government defines cyberspace in the *Cybersecurity Strategy* (2013) through the huge potential it offers. The Internet of Things is becoming an essential part of everyday life. Cyberspace is key to the growth of the Japanese economy. With its expansion, however, there is also an increase in vulnerability at all levels. The document describes a clear shift in the development of cyber-attacks, from those targeting individuals to those that show signs of military operations. (Cybersecurity Strategy 2013)

The outer space represents a domain whose importance arose and then grew sharply after World War II. The result of Germany's loss was not the dominance of another state in the field of missile technology, but the rivalry of two nuclear superpowers - the United States of America and the Soviet Union. The launch of Sputnik in 1957 is considered the beginning of space races. The initial dominance of the Soviet Union, based on the research support system, markedly "*disrupted America's perception of its own technological superiority as a nation.*" (Moltz, 2011, p. 91) As a result of the increase in outer space activities, there has been a need for legal limitation of activities of global interest. An example would be the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater. (Treaty Banning Nuclear..., 1963) The fundamental international law document regarding the outer space is however 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Despite many positives, the Treaty faces criticism for vague definitions, but also for a limitation of weapons in outer space, which concerns only weapons of mass destruction. (Hrozenský, 2013) Another milestone in the development of the perception of outer space as a dimension of strategic thinking is the Gulf War 1990-1991. This was the first military conflict to exploit almost the full potential of satellites. (Anson, Cummings, 1991)

The increasing importance of outer space has also transformed into the interest of international relations theorists in this domain. They then examine it through the narratives of individual theories. Hrozenský (2013) considers Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age the most beneficial work, dividing cosmic space into 4 astropolitic regions:

- Planet Earth with its atmosphere up to the lowest possible orbit (100 km)
- Cosmic space of Earth, reaching to geostationary orbit (36 000 km)
- The lunar cosmic space ending beyond the Moon's orbit
- Solar cosmic space encompassing everything in the Solar system beyond the orbit of the moon.

For the purposes of this publication, only the first two astropolitic regions, ie 100-36,000 km, will be perceived as outer space.

In the context of the exploration of outer space is also to realize the difference between militarization and weaponization. Militarization means the presence of devices performing military functions. Weaponization would mean placing destructive weapons aimed at space objects or ground targets. (Sheenan 2007)

2 Japanese strategic documents 2010 - 2018: characteristics of the security environment

In 2013, the Japanese government undertook a drastic change in the area of updating strategic security documents. It was decided that the National Defense Program Guidelines would be published every 5 years and the National Security Strategy every 10 years, or more frequently, as needed. This step allows us to examine changes in Japanese strategic thinking, especially when comparing the National Defense Program Guidelines of December 2010, 2013 and the National Defense Program Guidelines of 2018.

We consider the National Defense Program Guidelines to be a reflection of developments in Japanese strategic thinking. This can generally be defined as highly reactive, closely linked to American interests, both globally and especially regionally.

Japan's strategic thinking between 2010 and 2020 is largely stable and conservative. It is mainly affected by general global threats and developments in the region of East and Southeast Asia. The pattern that is repeated across all three documents is, on the one hand, a reflection of American activity in East Asia, Chinese power growth and the related effects on the regional order. However, they also emphasize North Korea's aggressive policy, which poses a serious threat to the nuclear arsenal at the disposal of the dictatorship. Despite the clearly deteriorating security environment in the region, but also globally, Japan declares its determination to maintain the policy of a pacifist actor in international relations.

Another significant concern highlighted in all three analysed documents are the so-called gray zones - situations which, by their unprecedented nature, pose a risk of transformation into a serious conflict. These are mainly disputes or confrontations over territory, sovereignty, or economic interests. (National Defense Program Guidelines, 2010) As stated in NDPG 2018, *"hybrid warfare methods are used, which intentionally blur the boundaries between the military and non-military realms"*. (National Defense Program Guidelines, 2018, p. 3)

Geographical determinants and a high degree of dependence on imports, especially of oil and energy raw materials, contribute significantly to the general importance of open and free maritime routes. In this context, it should be borne in mind that Japan is sensitive to China's assertiveness in the South China and East China Seas, but also to piracy in the Indian Ocean. For a long time, therefore, Japan has focused not only on building a more deterrent military force, in order to defend Japanese territories. At the same time, it is building a strong navy that will be able to project force beyond Japanese waters, in order to protect the vital interests of the state. (National Defense Program Guidelines, 2013)

Strategists are also responding to the demographic crisis, which threatens Japan's security. The fastest aging nation in the world will be forced to rationalize the number of Self-Defense Forces personnel. In 2013, the response to the clear

trend was to increase the attractiveness of the service in Self-Defense Forces and more efficient recruitment, including for women. (National Defense Program Guidelines, 2013) In the latest National Defense Program Guidelines (2018), the use of AI and technologies, which will enable the rationalization of the use of human force in all areas of state defense, is added to the more effective recruitment and attractiveness of the service.

3 Issues of cyberspace and space in Japanese strategic documents 2010-2020

At the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, Japan lagged in terms of high-tech as well as exports of software and IT services, despite the image of a global ICT power. (Morgerstern, Kenevan, Naeher, 2011) In 2010, terms such as outer and cyber space appear only marginally in the National Defense Program Guidelines, without a detailed description of the situation in the given areas. Although there has been a global reassessment of the importance of new types of threats following the cyber-attacks on Estonia in 2007, this aspect is not, in our view, sufficiently emphasized in the 2010 NDGP. The document states: *“SDF will respond to cyber-attacks by operating functions necessary for defending the information system of the SDF in an integrated manner. ... SDF will contribute to the government-wide response to cyber-attacks.”* (National Defense Program Guidelines, 2010) The issue of outer space is completely ignored.

In 2013, there is a significant shift in the issue of outer and cyber space. Already in the National Defense Program Guidelines- II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan is a significant space dedicated to both spheres with an emphasis on *“... securing the stable use of outer space and cyberspace as global commons ...”* (National Defense Program Guidelines, 2013, p. 2) Both spheres are perceived in the context of the dissemination and development of technologies such as guided ammunition, stealth capabilities, etc., which will determine military strategies and balancing the forces of individual actors. According to the Japanese, the challenges for regional security will increasingly take place in *“non-traditional”* spheres, but they do not explicitly mention either cyber or outer space. In the key chapter of the document-Japan-U.S. Alliance: Strengthening and expanding cooperation in a wide range of fields, explicitly express the need to ensure world stability, namely the Pacific region, namely *“not only in the fields of anti-piracy efforts, capacity building, ... counter terrorism but also in maritime affairs, outer space and cyberspace.”* (National Defense Program Guidelines, 2013) New areas of state security policy are the topic of the section on the development of defense forces. The primary goal is to build the IRS's enduring capabilities to prevent the Self-defense Forces from being compromised. The growing dependence of society on outer and cyberspace is also recognized. Therefore, in order to safeguard its own interests, Japan will develop cooperation with relevant organizations and contribute to comprehensive wide-government initiatives. (National Defense Program Guidelines, 2013)

Cooperation with the United States will be key to developing capabilities for obtaining information from satellites. Its goal will be to primarily secure the outer space so that the satellites can continue to operate. Priorities have been set for cyberspace to develop capacity and capabilities. However, threats related to cyberspace are still perceived through the paralysis of the Self-defense Forces.

Despite a very limited perception of the importance of cyber and outer space, 2013 represents a turning point in Japan's strategic thinking on security in the outer, but especially in cyberspace. This is evidenced by documents issued by the Japanese government that year - International Strategy on Cybersecurity Cooperation (2013) and Cybersecurity Strategy (2013). The basic document is the Cybersecurity strategy, as it was published earlier and represents the basis for a document focused on international cooperation in the field. At the beginning of the document, the emphasis is again on the Internet of Things, while information security is essential from the point of view of the state, but also the everyday life of ordinary people. The document re-emphasizes the importance of new technologies for ensuring the economic growth of the state. Japan re-declares its goal of becoming the "*world's most advanced IT nation*". (Cybersecurity Strategy, 2013, p.3) The introduction also emphasizes that it is important not only the security of each cyberspace user, but also his contribution to ensuring such security.

Cyberspace is currently undergoing a transformation that has caused it to overlap with the real world. It is an "*indispensable brain and nervous system*" for almost every socio-economic and governmental activity. (Cybersecurity Strategy, 2013, p.4) This transformation will continue and deepen the dependence of human activity on cyberspace. In addition to security challenges, this will also bring opportunities for economic growth, which is a key issue for Japan in pairs with so-called lost decades. The anonymity and global nature of cyberspace contributes to an exceptionally high level of risk. In addition to the transformation of space itself, there is also a cybercrime transformation. Since the first cyberattacks, which were a form of verification of the attacker's abilities, attacks on central government have now increased. These are aimed at gaining information or destroying critical infrastructure and data. At the same time, the attacks are significantly more complex and sophisticated. Until the 21st century, natural disasters posed the greatest risk to the ICT infrastructure, which could lead to physical damage and information leakage caused by authorized persons. However, in the light of current trends, there has been a change that far exceeds expectations. In connection with the attacks, the category of serious risks is written about attacks on warning systems for the population. An example is the attack on display devices in the United States when a message with the text "*Zombies Ahead*" appeared. Of course, such an attack can be considered relatively harmless, but Japan is a country with a high incidence of natural disasters, and early warning systems play a key role in saving lives. They are also used in North Korean nuclear and missile tests. An attack on this type of infrastructure could

therefore lead to *"obstruction of communications, transportation disorder, blackouts and other large-scale social turmoil and even possible deaths"* in the future (Cybersecurity Strategy, 2013, p. 9). smartphones and other devices, poses a risk of attack on the devices of selected groups of individuals. This could primarily jeopardize the safety of the individual. Indirectly, however, an attack on a group of civil servants could lead to a leak of information that poses a risk to the state. Examples are attacks on devices with cameras, or scanners and copiers.

The document briefly describes the institutional support for ensuring cybersecurity in selected countries - United States of America, Germany, United Kingdom, South Korea, France. Procedures at the level of the United Nations and the European Union are also evaluated. For the purposes of further investigation, it is important to note that all Japanese-selected states not only have the institutional and strategic basis to ensure the security of cyberspace, but have also declared their commitment to global cooperation in this area.

The basis of Japanese policy for cyberspace is *"to construct a world-leading, resilient and vigorous cyberspace and to incorporate this cyberspace as a social system to realize a cybesecurity nation as a society that i strong against cyber-attacks, full of innovation and of which its people will be proud."* (Cyberspace Strategy, 2013, p.19) To this end, Japan will seek free flow of information. This will be achieved by creating an interoperable cyberspace without unnecessary regulation. It will also respond to the growing risks associated with the use of the Internet and cyberspace as such. Therefore, they will move from an individual solution to specific problems to a systemic, multi-layered solution. In this context, communication and cooperation between CSIRT² units of individual actors and international CSIRT units will be key. In addition, it will be necessary to ensure the exchange of information between the governmental, public, academic, private and economic spheres of the state. All spheres will have to contribute to cyber hygiene space - proactively and responsibly.

The role and solution of the critical infrastructure issue is based on the identification of critical infrastructure providers - *"information and communications, finance, aviation, railways, electricity, gas, government and administrative services, medical services, water, logistics"* (Cybersecurity Strategy, 2013, p.24) An attack on the ICT of these critical infrastructure sectors would pose a threat to economic interests or even a threat to human lives. Therefore, it is crucial that the government takes measures that significantly eliminate the vulnerability of their own infrastructure.

If NATO defined cyberspace as a "new" domain of rivalry between actors in international relations in 2016, Japan did so in 2013. At the same time, however, in line with Japan's security policy, there is no counter-measure dimension. The government commits the Self Defense Forces to create a new unit

² CSIRT- Computer Security Incident Response Team

- the Cyber Defense Unit³, which will deal primarily with cyber-attacks as part of an armoured attack.

In the Cybersecurity Strategy (2013), the Japanese government is fully aware that the global issue of cyberspace can only be addressed through cooperation with states and regional groupings that share certain values. These include respect for democracy, fundamental human rights and the rule of law. It is necessary to promote the creation of legal instruments on the ground of international organizations and to monitor compliance with them. As a commitment to the world, the Japanese declare their willingness to help build national CSIRTs around the world.

Following the Cybersecurity Strategy, the International Strategy on Cybersecurity Cooperation was also adopted. This is a logical extension of the section on international cooperation in building secure and resilient cyberspace. The priority areas of the document are the implementation of dynamic responses to cyber incidents, building up fundamentals for dynamic responses, international rulemaking for cybersecurity. (International Strategy on..., 2013) In these areas, Japan declares goals that should be the goals of all global actors. At the same time, it describes its own contribution and solutions by which it can contribute to the achievement of goals. In this section, the document recalls the open call for other actors to join or coordinate activities, taking into account the competencies and opportunities of other actors. The document defines two strategic geographical regions, respectively areas for cooperation - South-East Asia, more broadly the East Asia-Pacific region and the United States of America, together with the European Union. ASEAN plays the most important role for the Asia-Pacific region, with Japan developing a wide range of activities that contribute to increasing the level of cyberspace security. Cooperation with other regional actors who are not members of the association will take place primarily at the bilateral level. The United States, as the guarantor of Japanese security, has developed good cooperation with Japan in this area. This is reflected in the existence of several platforms for information sharing, but also in the coordination of activities in cyberspace. Similarly, Japan is trying to build cooperation with European states. There are several platforms, but cooperation takes place primarily at the bilateral level.

An important part of Japan's foreign policy is involvement in international organizations. The same goes for cyberspace. Initiatives are planned to create new international legal standards that reflect the situation and the rapid development of technologies in the field of ICT. Japan will also use its influence in international trade organizations to take remedial action in the event of violations of current preferential trade standards in relation to cyber space activities. (Cybersecurity Strategy, 2013)

³ Temporary name

In 2018, the latest version of the National Defense Program Guidelines is published so far. In the field of cybersecurity and outer space, it is an absolutely revolutionary strategic document that reflects to an unprecedented extent the shift from conventional security thinking to new domains. The introduction to the document states that there are changes not only in the balance of power, but also growing uncertainty about the stability of the current international order. The authors claim that there is a "*rapid expansion in the use of the new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum ...*" This condition automatically causes a "*change of the existing paradigm of national security, which has prioritized responses in traditional, physical domains, which are land, sea and air.*" (National Defense Program Guidelines, 2018, p.1) Japan, despite its determination to remain a peace-loving nation, is forced to strengthen defense capabilities in order to protect populations, territories, waters, airspace, as well as sovereignty and independence. Of course, given the nature of the international environment today, but also the reality of Japan's foreign security policy, strengthening the alliance with the United States remains at the heart of Japan's security policy. However, this applies in particular to cooperation in the protection of "traditional" domains. Regarding new domains, "*it is essential that Japan achieve superiority ...*" (National Defense Program Guidelines, 2018, p.2) On the one hand, this transformation of the security environment implies long-term concepts and ideas based on the traditional division of security domain perceptions. On the other hand, it is an opportunity for Japan. The island nation is currently facing a demographic crisis and financial difficulties. Therefore, the development of cyberspace and outer space capabilities does not necessarily impose a significant burden, especially on the quantity of human resources.

A significant shift in the understanding of cybersecurity compared to the 2013 directive is the perception of influencing public opinion through social networks. This, as it turns out, poses a major security risk. The Japanese therefore decided to include such a risk in so-called grey zone situations. A hybrid method of combat that "*intentionally blurs the boundaries between the military and non-military realms are forcing affected actors to take complex measures not limited to military ones.*" (National Defense Program Guidelines, 2018, p. 3) The importance of cyberspace and outer space for civil purposes determine the need for its stability and security.

In assessing the situation in the region, they focus primarily on China's efforts to build "world-class forces". Like Japan, China is seeking dominance in new domains of warfare. To this end, they develop skills that have disrupt opponent's command and control. In the area of developing outer space capabilities, the Japanese are particularly concerned about anti-satellite weapons. Development in these areas is enabled mainly through civil-military partnerships.

In the introduction to the document, the northern part of the Korean Peninsula is written only briefly, but a large part of the text is devoted to units for conducting asymmetric combat, especially cyber units.

The development and building of the Japanese security architecture is to lead in compatibility and security capabilities to perform so-called cross-domains operations. This way of ensuring overcoming of inferiority in the individual domain. At the same time, they want to build Self Defense Forces that will be able to constantly monitor events in new domains, collect and analyse available data. At the same time, however, they will be ready to respond to the attack, whether in cyberspace or risky situations in outer space.

The above-mentioned ability to perform cross-domains operations is a key factor in prioritizing capability development. It is the building and strengthening of capabilities in cyberspace, outer space and electromagnetic domains. Appropriate allocation of financial resources in combination with the use of the Japanese technological and scientific level. In the outer space, they focus primarily on capacity building for information gathering and communication. At the same time, however, they build capabilities aimed at interrupting communication and command, as well as the flow of information to a potential opponent. The main partner of Self Defense Forces in this area will be JAXA-Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency. (National Defense Program Guidelines, 2018)

The field of cyberspace is crucial for Self Defense Forces. An attack on ICT can seriously hamper the SDF's ability to defend itself. For this purpose, continuous monitoring of cyberspace activities will be performed. At the same time, the entire infrastructure will be strengthened against such attacks. Emphasis will also be placed on the ability to quickly restore communication and repair damage. Contrary to Japanese doctrine, cyberspace defense capabilities will be developed, including the ability to disrupt an attacker's cyber-infrastructure and disrupt an attack on Japan. (National Defense Program Guidelines, 2018)

Discussion

From the above, it is evident that the new strategic domains have become an integral part of current strategic thinking in the region of East Asia. It is understandable that a region with such a significant accumulation of military as well as economic power will not lag behind the rest of the world. However, precisely in view of the important role of individual regional actors in today's globalized world, there is a growing concern about the effects of a potential conflict, which would probably take place in the new strategic domains.

Japan, as a specific player in the region, is aware of the importance of capacity and capacity building in new domains. At the same time, however, it is limited by the pacifist constitution and the resulting anti-militarist foreign and security policy. Operations, especially in cyberspace, are characterized by high intensity and relatively short duration, causing extensive damage. In this regard, it is questionable to what extent it is possible to safely identify the attacker and then take the necessary countermeasures. At the same time, there is the issue of a pre-emptive attack by Japan in a situation where the infrastructure of the Self

Defense Forces would be endangered. In addition, Japan is a potential target for other regional actors, namely the DPRK and China. Both states have the capabilities and capacities to hit the critical infrastructure of the state and cripple either the economy, the state apparatus or the defense of Japan. From the analysis of the documents, it is evident that Japan will also rely in this area not only on cooperation with the USA, but also on other actors in international relations with similar interests, especially the EU, ASEAN, etc.

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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE THREAT TO THE PROPER FUNCTIONING OF THE CONTEMPORARY FAMILY. ANALYSIS OF THE PHENOMENON ON THE EXAMPLE OF KROŚNIEŃSKI DISTRICT IN THE YEARS 2016-2019

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ABSTRACT

In common knowledge family is a synonym of harmony and love and it should be. Nevertheless, there are more and more cases which denote that family is also a place of acute tensions, mental torments and physical abuse. Experiencing violence in family generates a number of negative effects not only for victim, but also for the whole family. The article analyzes the situation of violence in family and attempts to show destructive influence of this phenomenon on its proper functioning. It reveals also the persistence of domestic violence in Krośnieński district in the years 2016-2019 in view of the statistical data acquired from Municipal Family Support Centre in Krosno. The article indicates also issues connected with process of counteracting domestic violence, promotes actions towards people entangled in violence.

Key words: family, violence, dysfunctionality, victim, offender

Introduction

Family plays an enormous role in people life and is recognised as a part of development. It should be the source of mutual love, respect and solidarity. At present, however, Polish family has to function in a very difficult time. The fair value hierarchy was undermined, material status of a large number of families was declined, ethical and moral standards as well as emotional bonds between members of family were weakened (Świądrak, 2007, pg. 164).

Social pathology phenomena have an influence on family dysfunctionality which leads to heavily appreciable love and membership, security, care, support and freedom needs failure (Świądrak, 2007, pg. 164). One of such phenomenon which pose a threat to proper family functioning is domestic violence. The first part of the article presents the definitions of family and marriage as well as the concept of violence. On the other hand, the scale of the phenomenon of violence will be discussed on the basis of the Krosno powiat, using statistical data obtained from the Municipal Family Support Center in Krosno.

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1 Family as Original Cell of Social and Familiar Life

In sociological theory family is a group of directly related people, which members take responsibility for childcare. In turn, marriage is credited and approved social sexual relations of two adults (Giddens, 2007, pg. 194). N. Goodman, presenting theoretical family analysis, opposes opinions of functionalists and conflict theory supporters. According to him, functionalists underline positive functions of family some of which are: regulated sexual life, exchange of members of society in subsequent generations, socialization, social positioning as well as privacy and partnership. Conflict theory supporters, in turn draw their attention to dysfunctions such as: female subordination to male, family violence, strengthening of existing social divisions and depreciation of distinct life styles (Goodman, 1997, pg. 189-190).

There is one thing different family definitions have in common- they highlight its importance, both in individuals as well as society life. Family is a „vital environment for almost everyone. It can provide integral part of any society, simultaneously its smallest and particular unit. It is the most crucial social group, in which human comes into the world and with which has manifold bonds till the end of life. Family is a small, original group, personal ties advantage, it should be of intergenerational and multigenerational solidity of relationship, and membership in it is authentic, optional and basically inseparable (except for abandonment, divorce)” (Kawula, Brągiel, Janke, 2014, pg. 49).

Frequently, family for some reasons is not able to implement its roles. In such cases the problem of dysfunctionality occurs. M. Ryś believes that: „family dysfunctionality, that is defective functioning, concerns more or less a lot of families. Easier dysfunctions do not disqualify family. If the dysfunctions exceed certain limits, serious emotional problems, addictions, personality disorders or at the worst violence occur” (Ryś, 2003, pg. 85). In this context, it is worth to analyse violence as one of the forms of family dysfunctions that threaten its proper functioning.

2 Violence as a Phenomenon That Threatens Family Proper Functioning

Family plays a major role in human life and is considered as a part of his development. Violence has got crucial influence on family functioning. Nowadays, the term of violence is reduced only to the destructive aspect. However, in only this approach we can find various definitions. They all can be concluded in one statement: violence is defined as action or undertaking which aims at another person or living being suffering or damage of a thing (Portmann, 2006, pg. 11).

According to Irena Pospiszyl, violence is „not accidental act infringing personal individual's freedoms, which contribute to physical or psychological harm of another person and goes beyond social norms of mutual contacts between

people” (Pospiszyl, 1999, pg. 16-17). Anna Lipowska-Teutsch relates following definition: „violence is a group of affecting, supervising and controlling behaviours, including physical, sexual and emotional violence. It is coherent whole, sequence of behaviours in of intended and instrumental nature that aims to victim enslavement, elimination of his or her sovereign thoughts and actions, subordination to offender needs” (Lipowska-Teutsch, 1998, pg. 10-11).

Family violence is rarely revealed to people from outside the family due to intimidation, shame or stereotypes existence in society. Certain of them: no one should interfere in personal family matters, family violence affects only people from the social margins, maltreatment is only temporary loss of the control or when woman is beaten she apparently deserves it. Such a social permission for violence causes that it is quite common phenomenon (Pospiszyl, 1998, pg. 17-18). Irena Pospiszyl underlines that human creativity in the scope of hurting others seems to have no limits, and thus induces a sad reflection. Violence „extends from „innocent” mockery to sophisticated self-esteem destruction, from „benign” nudging to savage murder, from oblivion to conscious preventing of basic life needs meeting” (Pospiszyl, 1998, pg. 93).

Violence may appear in every family, it is not connected with material situation or cultural area and religion. It generates a wide range of physical and psychological suffering, taking a revenge, hate, as well it precludes proper growth of children. It is undeniable that experiencing family violence, thus in the habitat which should be a beacon of safety and should provide a decent standards of living and growing, has further particularly severe consequences. After all, domestic violence is not only physical abuse about weaker family members, much worse than bruises or fractures are psychological harms. Offenders use a lot of methods in order to hold a control over victim. This includes: bullying, social isolation, and psychological bullying. Victim is often abused and his or her human worth is lowered. There also appears forcing to unconditional following instructions and obedience. Victim over time becomes totally enslaved because he or she thinks about himself or herself as about human of second- worse category, experiences anxiety and helplessness (Bednarski, 2012, pg. 145). It is related to the fact that offenders are well- known people to victims (parents, grandparents, siblings, relatives), and victims are people who should have special care (children, disabled people, elderly people). It is widely believed that violence is used not only by members of pathological families but this phenomenon affects various families (Młyński, 2012, pg. 146).

Characterising the problem of marriage relations it should be deduced that love and violence are phenomena which occur quite often. In accordance with United Nations Declaration for the elimination of violence among women of 1994, violence among women is an act of violence connected with being woman. As a result of such act there are physical, psychological or sexual harms for women (Makara-Studzińska, Grzywa, Turek, 2005, pg. 131).

Wanda Badura-Madej presents four models explaining why maltreated women do not leave marriage. First of them, is a model of „psychological trap”, in which woman feels responsible for the quality of relationship and tries to justify her time and effort into its maintenance. In a model of „situational trap” women decide that advantages of being in relationship are higher than advantages of leaving. Woman invested a lot in the relationship, she feels lack of alternatives and is afraid of retaliation. In anxiety trap, in turn maltreated woman has got unreal or excessive image about what will happen in case of leaving. The fear of the unknown is bigger than suffering with partner. In „learned helplessness” model, however, women lose the ability to predict or undertake actions, which have to change their situation (Badura-Madej, 1999, pg. 121).

Victims of domestic violence are mostly children. Violence towards children should be understood as intentional or unintentional actions of adults, institutions or society which have negative impact on health or physical growth. Parents are mainly children offenders. The reason for that is according to Irena Jundziłł fact that child does not meet their expectations. Parents are disappointed because their child is not like they want to have (Jundziłł, 1993, pg. 60).

It is worth to say that women are also willing to be aggressive to their men. She usually uses domestic violence in self-defence, but frequency of man domestic violence is higher because of physical strength advantage. In comparison woman has got low ability to relieve from harmful husband. However, this does not change the fact that women take an active participation in domestic disputes, it is at a similar level to men's participation or even higher. In general it is true that in marriages with domestic violence approx. one quarter of them are marriages in which man suffers from domestic violence. (Olak, 2007, pg. 50).

3 The Range of Domestic Violence in Krośnieński District in the Years 2016-2019

While analysing the source literature we can say that the range of domestic violence is controversial because it is hidden and information about it could go to the law enforcement agencies and other organisations only in extremely difficult circumstances. It is hard to assess, as not of all cases are known from conviction statistics or research connected with this issue and therefore data can be different from the reality. The scale of violence is definitely bigger than statistical data because of that victims have got many obstacles with confessing to experiencing harms, they often justify behaviour of offender, blaming themselves for this situation as well as they are not aware of their rights and can not appropriately find themselves with this situation (Kałdon, 2012, pg. 187).

From the analysis of number of cases reported by Municipal Family Support Centre in Krosno comes up that the problem of violence is still serious danger for proper functioning of families in the area of district.

Table 1 The frequency of domestic violence occurrence

year	Frequency of occurrence in families		
	Once a year	from 2 to 5 times a year	6 times and more
2016	106	44	1
2017	93	43	1
2018	68	110	1
2019	154	15	0
Total	421	212	3

Source: own elaboration on the basis of data provided by Municipal Family Support Centre in Krosno

Data summarized in Table 1 show that violence should not occur in any family, in the analyzed period the prevalence of domestic violence definitely prevails only once a year. As Table 1 illustrates, in 421 cases violence occurred only once a year, in 212 cases we can say about violence that occurred from two to five times a year, in turn in three families it occurred 6 times or more.

Table 2 Number of victims in order to domestic violence

Victims/ years	Total	Women	Men	Children
		Total	Total	Total
2016	226	183	40	3
2017	137	115	22	0
2018	192	160	24	8
2019	185	138	32	15
Total	740	596	118	26

Source: own elaboration on the basis of data provided by Municipal Family Support Centre in Krosno

During the period considered there were 740 victims of domestic violence, the lowest number in 2017- 137, but in 2016- 226 victims. Therefore, as can be seen that during the period of one year the decline of rate of domestic violence victims was significant. In 2018 the number of victims increased by 55 in relations to 2017, in 2019 decrease of domestic violence victims was noted to 185. While analysing Table 2, it can be claimed that victims are often mainly women. In 2016 it was 183, which made up almost 81% of the whole. In 2017 this number significantly decreased to 115 people. One year later it was more than 83% (160 women). In 2019 there was a decrease according to 2018. The number of women-victims of domestic violence amounted to 138 which is more than 74,5% of the whole victims. The number of men constitutes lower percentage of victims of domestic violence. During analysed period it was 16% of victims (118 men). In 2019 the number of men who were victims of domestic violence was 32. It was

slightly more than 17%. In previous years, in 2018 and 2017 this number was insignificantly lower- in 2018 24 people, and in 2017 22, which constitutes 16% of whole victims. The highest percentage of men who are domestic violence victims was registered in 2016. It was 40 men, 17,7% of whole. As can be seen from Table 2, children were insignificant percentage of domestic violence victims. During discussed years it was slightly more than 3,5% of victims (26 children). The biggest number of children as victims was in 2019 and estimated 15, but in 2017 there was no child as victim of domestic violence. In 2018 the number of children was 8, which was slightly more than 4%, and in 2016 only less than 1,5% of whole.

The consequence of domestic violence is the implementation of Blue Card procedure. In Table 3 there are data illustrating the number of prepared Blue Cards.

Table 3 Domestic violence victims in the years 2016- 2019 indicated in „Blue Card” procedure

year	Number of prepared „Blue Cards”
2016	105
2017	190
2018	63
2019	84
Total	442

Source: own elaboration on the basis of data provided by Municipal Family Support Centre in Krosno

In 2016- 2019 there were 422 Blue Cards implemented. In 2017 – 190 Blue Cards and it was the highest rate during the considered period. In comparison to 2016 the number of Blue Cards increased by 85. On the other hand, the least Blue Cards were in 2018. Then, their number reached the level of 63. After 2017 the number of Blue Cards started decreasing. Contrary to 2016 and 2017, in 2019 there were significantly less Blue Cards, only 84 but in relation to 2018 there was an increase.

Considering the frequency of domestic violence occurrence it is worth to analyse how often it was applied for Blue Cards. This procedure is claimed as a model of intervention- supportive proceeding, indicated by the amended in 2010 the act of counteracting domestic violence and the rules of Cabinet of the Ministers of 13 September 2011(the rules of Cabinet of the Ministers of 13 September 2011 on the procedure of Blue Card and model forms of Blue Cards (Dz. U. 2011 No. 209 item 1245). It is realised by different units (among others: police, municipal social welfare centres, municipal committee for solving alcohol problems, educational establishments and health care) in cases of suspicion that given family may be forced with the problem of domestic violence. In such cases those units have to initiate Blue Card procedure. Its main objective is violence identification and improving of help offered by representatives of different units

in the local environment but also creating the conditions for systemic, interdisciplinary model of working with family. The key element of procedures efficiency and offered help is the cooperation between representatives of units in favor of victims and offenders. It is treated as a signal, peculiar impetus for representatives of support services to check the alarming situation (Grzeško, 2016, pg. 154).

The procedure of Blue Card is not always initiated when domestic violence is identified. Let us see how the number of Blue Cards relates to Blue Cards in relation to confirmed domestic violence. The correlation is illustrated in Table 4.

Table 4 The frequency of domestic violence occurrence and number of prepared Blue Cards in particular years

Year	Number of „Blue Cards”	Frequency of domestic violence occurrence		
		Once a year	from 2 to 5 times a year	6 times and more
2016	105	106	44	1
2017	190	93	43	1
2018	63	68	110	1
2019	84	154	15	0
Total	442	421	212	3

Source: own elaboration

Analysing Table 4, we can say that it includes very interesting data because it can be analysed multidimensional. As we can see, in 2016 there were 198 Blue Cards on 138 confirmed cases of domestic violence. In 2018 there were 63 Blue Cards and 179 cases. In 2019 there were 169 cases of domestic violence and 84 Blue Cards. Analysing the data from Table 4 it can be concluded that the least number of prepared Blue Cards (63) was in the case when domestic violence occurred from 2 to 5 times a year. On the other hand, the highest number of Blue Cards, 190, noted when domestic violence appeared once a year. Next cardrelationship, that can be seen in Table 4, the higher frequency of domestic violence occurrence the less Blue Cards. In the case of rare violent situations occurrence the number of Blue Cards grows. In families where domestic violence occurs quite often (from 2 to 5 times a year), victims may are not courageous enough to ask for help from institutions which support victims of domestic violence. This is because violence inevitably leads to feel powerless, capabilities disbelief, lack of belief in finding solution for this situation, and sometimes conviction that family situations should be solved within four walls.

While discussing the issue of domestic violence in the study population, it should be pointed out who is an offender. Data are presented in Table 5.

Table 5 Offenders on the area of Krośniński district in the years 2016- 2019

Year	Number of offenders			
	Total	Women	Men	Minors
2016	221	30	191	0
2017	138	14	124	0
2018	186	20	166	0
2019	177	19	157	1
Total	722	83	638	1

Source: own elaboration on the basis of data provided by Municipal Family Support Centre in Krosno

During the period considered there noted 722 people who may be potential offenders. The least number of offenders was registered in 2017 (138 people). In 2016 there were 221 such cases in 2016 and it was the highest rate of offenders during the period considered. In comparison to 2016, in 2018 there was a decrease in the number of offenders up to the level of 186. One year later (2019) next decrease in the number of offenders in comparison to the previous year. The number of offenders was 177 people. While analysing data from table 5, we can see that men are mainly offenders. It should be noted that from 2016 to 2019 their number placed in sinusoidal shape, however, despite of this they were the majority of whole offenders. In 2016 the number of men who were offenders was 191, representing 86,5% of the overall number. In 2017 there was decrease up to the level of 124. One year later, however, in 2018 this percentage was more than 89% (166 men). In 2019 there was decrease. The number of men- offenders was 157. Women represent a minimal percentage of offenders. During the period considered they were less than 11,5% of whole offenders (83 women). The highest number of women (30) as offenders was registered in 2016, and the lowest number (14) was in 2017. As shown in table 5, from 2016 to 2018 there were no minors as offenders, and in 2019 one minor was registered as offender.

Conclusion

The family home should be safe area, where person is accepted and understood, where grows in strength and enjoys coming back there. However, for many people home is not a valuable heaven, it is dangerous place where they suffer from many physical and emotional sufferings, where are also victims of sexual abuse (Markiewicz-Matyja, 2007, pg. 44-45).

Domestic violence is a serious social and family problem. The destructive power destroys the whole family system, explodes from within, grabs sense of security and possibility of the youngest family members correct growth. The possible risk could be the succession of violence behaviours by children and

duplication of such proceedings in adult life. Non-targeted violence increases, consolidates and escalates, bringing negative consequences for entangled families (The Prevention of Domestic Violence and Protection of Domestic Violence Victims Programme in Municipality of Bielsk Podlaski in the years 2016-2021, pg. 2).

There are not only women and children as victims of domestic violence, but also elderly people or even sometimes men. Victims often stay in toxic relations because of fear of the consequences by the offender, for fear of social reaction or because of the lack of knowledge where they can get some help (Deka, 2018, pg. 79). Shame and fear of condemnation causes that domestic violence becomes secretive and isolated from the external world problem.

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