



# SECURITY FORUM 2022

CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS FROM  
THE 15<sup>TH</sup> ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE,  
FEBRUARY 9<sup>TH</sup>, 2022

MATEJ BEL UNIVERSITY, BANSKA BYSTRICA, SLOVAKIA

*Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica  
Faculty of Political Science and International Relations  
Center of Crisis Management at MBU Banská Bystrica  
Armed Forces Academy of gen. M.R.Š. in Liptovský Mikuláš  
University of West Bohemia in Pilsen  
Higher School of Public and Individual Safety –  
APEIRON in Krakow  
Institute of National and International Security in Belgrade  
Kazimierz Wielki University in Bydgoszcz  
Police Academy of Czech Republic in Prague  
Metropolitan University in Prague  
University of Security Management in Košice  
Faculty of National Security of National Defence Academy  
in Warsaw  
International and Security Studies Institute  
and  
INTERPOLIS*

# **SECURITY FORUM 2022**

*15<sup>th</sup> Annual International Scientific Conference  
February 9<sup>th</sup>, 2022  
at Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, Slovakia*

*Conference Proceedings*

**Banská Bystrica, Slovakia 2022**

**International Scientific  
Board and Reviewers:**

doc. Mgr. Jaroslav Ušiak, PhD.  
*(Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, Slovakia)*

doc. PhDr. Rastislav Kazanský, PhD., EMBA  
*(Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, Slovakia)*

doc. PhDr. Branislav Kováčik, PhD., EMBA  
*(Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, Slovakia)*

Dr.h.c. prof. Ing. Pavel Nečas, PhD., MBA  
*(Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, Slovakia)*

prof. Ing. Vojtech Jurčák, CSc.  
*(Armed Forces Academy of gen. M. R. Štefánik in Liptovský Mikuláš, Slovakia)*

prof. Ing. Ladislav Hofreiter, CSc.  
*(University of Žilina, Slovakia)*

Dr.h.c. prof.h.c. prof. Ing. Marián Mesároš, DrSc. MBA LL.M.  
*(The University of Security Management, Košice, Slovakia)*

prof. Želimir Kešetović, PhD.  
*(University of Belgrade, Serbia)*

prof. Ing. Jana Müllerová, PhD.  
*(Police Academy, Bratislava, Slovensko)*

prof. nadzw. dr hab. Donat Mierzejewski  
*(Stanisław Staszic University of Applied Sciences in Piła, Poland)*

doc. Ing. Dr. Štefan Danics, Ph.D.  
*(Police Academy, Prague, Czech Republic)*

doc. PaedDr. Milan Vošta, Ph.D.  
*(Metropolitan University in Prague, Czech Republic)*

doc. Ing. Josef Abrhám, Ph.D.  
*(Metropolitan University in Prague, Czech Republic)*

prof. Ing. Pavel Otríšal, Ph.D., MBA  
*(Defence University, Brno, Czech Republic)*

doc. Vasyl M. Zaplatynskyi, PhD.  
*(Academy of Security and Health Protection in Kiev, Ukraine)*

dr.h.c. prof. nadzw. dr hab. Antoni Olak  
*(University of Public and Individual Security "APEIRON" in Cracow, Poland)*

Siposné prof. Dr. Kecskeméthy Klára ezredes  
*(National University of Public Service, Budapest, Hungary)*

Assist. Prof. Dr. Joseph Jon Kaminski  
*(International University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina)*

dr hab. Henryk Spustek prof. UO  
*(Opole University, Opole, Poland)*

COL Assoc. Prof. Tomasz Kośmider  
*(National Defense Academy, Warsaw, Poland)*

PhDr. Pavel Hlaváček, Ph.D.  
*(University of West Bohemia, Pilsen, Czech Republic)*

Assoc. Prof. Juliusz Piwowarski  
*(University of Public and Individual Security "APEIRON" in Cracow, Poland)*

prof. dr. Sead Turčalo  
*(Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina)*

prof. Darko Trifunović  
*(Institute of National and International Security, Belgrade, Serbia)*

Assoc. Prof. Łukasz Jureńczyk, PhD. DSc  
*(Kazimierz Wielki University, Bydgoszcz, Poland)*

Assoc. Prof. Paweł Malendowicz, PhD. DSc  
*(Kazimierz Wielki University, Bydgoszcz, Poland)*

Kamila Sierzputowska, PhD.  
*(Kazimierz Wielki University, Bydgoszcz, Poland)*

prof. Dr. Manuela Tvaronavičienė  
*(The General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania, Litva)*

**Organizers:**

PhDr. Dagmar Nováková, PhD.	Mgr. Jozef Michal Mintal, PhD.
Mgr. Lucia Husenicová, PhD.	Mgr. Pavol Michalisko
Mgr. Dávid Kollár, PhD.	Mgr. Tomáš Beňuška
PaedDr. Zuzana Horváthová, PhD.	Assoc. Prof. Łukasz Jureńczyk, PhD. DSc

**Editors:**

doc. Mgr. Jaroslav Ušiak, PhD.  
Mgr. Dávid Kollár, PhD.

**Cover:**

Mgr. Michaela Melková, PhD.

*Paper have been double-blind reviewed before the final submission to the conference. Initially, papers abstracts were read and selected by the conference international scientific board for submission as possible papers for the conference.*

*Many thanks to the reviewers who helped to ensure the quality of the full papers.*

*The autors of the articles are responsible for the content and language form of the individual articles.*

© Interpolis, 2022  
Banská Bystrica, Slovakia

**ISBN 978-80-973394-7-0**

## CONTENT

<b>Oliver Andonov: REGIONAL POLICY AND OPPOSITION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS</b> .....	8
<b>Andrzej Dyszkiewicz: CRISIS, FIELD OPERATING ROOM WITH A STERILIZATION SYSTEM POWERED BY AN ACCIDENTAL WATER INTAKE</b> .....	20
<b>Libor Frank: CRISIS COMMUNICATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND ITS IMPACT ON PUBLIC ATTITUDES DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC</b> .....	27
<b>Pavel Hlaváček – Matěj Boček: INTERPRETATIONS OF MUNICH AGREEMENT, POLICY OF APPEASEMENT AND THEIR UNDERSTANDING</b> .....	35
<b>Martin Horemuž: SOME ISSUES OF THE CURRENT SECURITY POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION</b> .....	44
<b>Damir Ilić - Tatjana Ilić-Kosanović: CHALLENGES RELATED TO THE USE OF LOITERING MUNITION</b> .....	53
<b>Tomáš Jakabovič: THEORETICAL AND LEGAL BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION</b> .....	60
<b>Andrej Kolárik: CONFESSIONAL FACTOR AND INVOLVEMENT OF FOREIGN ACTORS IN LEBANESE INTERNAL POLITICS</b> .....	71
<b>Božena Konecka-Szydelko: CYBERSECURITY AND ITS CURRENT TRENDS</b> .....	79
<b>Tatjana Ilić-Kosanović - Katarina Štrbac: WOMEN IN CYBER SECURITY JOBS</b> .....	90
<b>Svetozár Krno - Beáta Izsófová: CANARDS AND HOAXES</b> .....	98
<b>Luka Latinović - Vladimir Tomašević: RUSHING TOWARDS RENEWABLES IN SERBIA – ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY, AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS</b> .....	105
<b>Olexander Lysenko - Serhii Chumachenko - Olena Tachinina - Andrii Tureichuk - Valeriy Novikov - Ihor Sushin: JUSTIFICATION OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SENSOR NETWORK OF INFORMATION SUPPORT OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY SYSTEM OF A DISTRIBUTED MAN-MADE OBJECT</b> .....	114
<b>Paweł Malendowicz: LOCAL SECURITY: DEMANDS AND CHALLENGES FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH</b> .....	124

<b>Maciej Maruszak – Dávid Kollár:</b> THE ASSOCIATION OF STATES IN AN ORGANIZATION TOWARDS SHAPING THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY .....	133
<b>Antonín Novotný:</b> THE STRATEGIC COMPASS AS A TOOL TO INCREASE THE EUROPEAN UNION'S DEFENCE CAPABILITIES .....	153
<b>Antoni Olak - Božena Konecka-Szydelko:</b> DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC MIGRATION IN POLAND AND UKRAINIAN MIGRANTS. ....	160
<b>Jelena Rajković - Ana Jurčić:</b> THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS .....	172
<b>Silvia Ručinská – Ondrej Mitaľ – Miroslav Fečko – Katarína Miňová:</b> DISINFORMATION AS A THREAT AND CHALLENGE FOR MUNICIPALITIES AND THEIR COMPETENCIES .....	184
<b>Jozef Sabol:</b> IMPACT OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC ON THE ILLICIT DRUG MARKET, CHANGES IN THEIR SMUGGLING, AND DRUG IDENTIFICATION OPTIONS .....	199
<b>Jozef Sabol – Ján Nejedlý:</b> TEACHING AND RESEARCH AT UNIVERSITIES DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: NEGATIVES AND SOME PROS.....	207
<b>Kamil Samiczak – Marcin Szymczak:</b> THE ACTIVITY OF THE POLISH POLICE IN THE FIELD OF COUNTERACTING TERRORISM AND CYBER-TERRORISM IN THE CONTEXT OF CONTEMPORARY THREATS OF THE 21ST CENTURY .....	215
<b>Vesna Stanković Pejnović:</b> “SOFT POWER“ INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND SERBIA TOWARD KOSOVO ...	231
<b>Břetislav Štěpánek – Pavel Otrřisal:</b> KEY ASPECTS OF SECURING THE REQUIRED QUALITY OF DECISION-MAKING .....	242
<b>Richard Stojar:</b> SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE WESTERN BALKANS IN THE SHADOW OF A GLOBAL PANDEMIC .....	247
<b>Katarina Štrbac - Damir Ilić - Branislav Milosavljević:</b> PUBLIC HEALTH MANAGEMENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC.....	254
<b>Božena Konecka-Szydelko - Dagmar Nováková:</b> DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS AND THE ARMED CONFLICTS VERSUS GLOBAL CHANGES.....	261
<b>Tomáš Škurka - Pavel Otrřisal - Břetislav Štěpánek:</b> PROBLEMS OF VIOLENCE AND ITS MANIFESTATIONS IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF KOJETÍN AND ITS SURROUNDINGS .....	283

<b>Srdjan Tomić – Stanko Bulajić: CYBER SECURITY AND IMPLEMENTATION OF ISO STANDARDS IN ONLINE BANKING .....</b>	<b>296</b>
<b>Katerina Veljanovska Blazhevska: SECURITY ASPECTS OF MIGRATION CHALLENGES INITIATED BY ECOLOGICAL MIGRANTS AND SOCIETAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS.....</b>	<b>307</b>
<b>Mohamed Badine El Yattioui - Dusko Tomic - Eldar Saljic: CHALLENGES FOR MOROCCAN’S ECONOMY AFTER COVID-19, BETWEEN NECESSARY REFORMS AND MAINTAINING POLITICAL STABILITY .....</b>	<b>317</b>
<b>Krzysztof Żolyniak: HE SECURITY SYSTEM OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND AS AN ANSWER FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION REQUIREMENTS .....</b>	<b>326</b>

# REGIONAL POLICY AND OPPOSITION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Oliver Andonov<sup>1</sup>

## ABSTRACT

*The relations between the states within the regional geopolitics are filled with mutual contradictions and resistances. Undoubtedly, these oppositions and resistances are the result of cross-national interests that are in conflict with each other. In terms of interests, the interests of the great powers in the region have an additional impact, but most of the opposition and resistance are the result of mutual neighborly policies that burden the relations between the countries. In this paper we will make a theoretical review of the creation of opposition and resistance in regional politics according to the matrix of global-world politics, but to avoid a purely theoretical approach to this issue we will briefly address the mutual oppositions of the Balkan countries, i.e. countries in the environment of Macedonia, and through the case of mutual relations between Macedonia and Bulgaria. Through this approach, the paper in front of you acquires the character of a theoretical analysis of a case study, which has an impact on regional relations and European Union policy with strong security implications creating a source of threat, threats, and risks to European security. The different national interests and the influence of the national romanticism from the 19th and 20th century in the neighboring countries of Macedonia, as well as the completely appropriate influence in Macedonia are the basis on which the national interests of the Balkan states are still defined. Unfortunately, the spirit of the Balkan wars still lives on in the national strategies, interests and ideologies of all Balkan countries. This fact, combined with weak and corrupt state institutions, a weak economy, and no offer to its citizens for a better future, increases the opposition and resistance in each other's neighborly relations. This behavior or opposition of states in their mutual relations in practice raises the theoretical approach to their sovereignty. Undoubtedly, sovereignty or the role of sovereign has a key or decisive contribution to the situation in the states, their strategies, government and policies, which is a key notion for the behavior of states in regional politics and mutual opposition. The sovereign is the one who decides on the exceptional situation, and in modern politics it is not only the state as an international legal entity, but also the citizens from whom it originates, sovereignty is drawn.*

**Key words:** *sovereignty, sovereignty, neighborly relations, regional policy, opposition*

## Introduction

Opposition between states, within the framework of regional policy or in neighborly relations, is part of policymaking, i.e., trivially speaking, the creation of enemies, which is the basis for constituting a lasting political position. If we translate this approach of Carl Schmidt into the 21st century and connect it with modern theories of framing security, we can see its modernization within the Copenhagen School and Ole Weaver through the existence of "Securitization" as

---

<sup>1</sup> Oliver Andonov, Assoc. Prof., Military Academy „General Mihailo Apostolski“, Str. Vasko Karangeleski BB, 1000 Skopje, andonov.oliver@yahoo.com



a modern term that helps constitute of a stable - justified political position. If we add to that the fact that states (small or large) are international legal entities formally legally equal on the international stage, as well as that international security is only a synonym that does not exist in practice, but only in practice there is national security, and it exclusively depends on the interests and goals of the state or its political elite, of course the political position that is sustained and justified in addition to its basic internal political purpose has a foreign policy or in the first place inter-neighborly use value.

Hence, the position of opposition of the states in the regional policies is nothing more than a simple "securitization" of a certain political challenge through which a solid political position is created whose public basis is a certain security threat to the vital interests of the state. In fact, this is a pragmatic everyday political approach in modern society characterized by the fragmentation of the sub-political existence in the country. It is characteristic not to take any ideological political responsibility, but to transfer politics to an individual and sub-individual level.

It is in fact the avoidance or disappearance of politics from the real world, and knowing that the creation of a political position in classical politics depends on political ideology or classical political theories, we come to the conclusion that opposition within regional politics and neighborly relations is not conditioned by real disputes between states, but from the individual political level of existence of political leaderships, which on the basis of the expressed created securitization or hostility (political-security-vital) provide exclusively and exclusively personal political existence. Whether this political existence-survival and the created securitization will cause threats and thus risks to regional security, these phenomena are constantly present in political relations, and are not perceived as a real security challenge but simply as a political game. at different levels with extremely high levels of significance.

It is not usual to present concluding views in the introduction but based on theoretical considerations we will have to defend this "conclusion" on the example and role of sovereignty, is the sovereign who decides on the political views of his country, and thus on behavior in neighborly relations. Regarding the resistance of the states in the neighborly relations and the regional policy and its securitization (creating enemies in this context) as a vital national interest, the sovereign has a key role, and hence sovereignty as a modern phenomenon. It is the sovereign who, in order to be able to show (in some form to be used) his key role in the creation of state policy in relation to resistance within regional politics, often has to rely on the ideological basis of the state (the ruling party).

There are countless historical examples, but is that so in modern times?

This is not a conclusion but a question that should lead us to a very important answer, which refers to the state ideology as a factor in inciting resistance or the decision of the sovereign to protect vital interests and resistance, outside the established ideological matrix which lasted throughout the twentieth

century and where resistance and wars were largely the result of ideological conflicts between states. Modernity in the 21st century is increasingly moving away from political ideologies, because neither liberalism nor conservatism in all their forms are strong enough or attractive to the citizens, which would ideologically lead to regional political disputes or neighborly relations of resistance. Simply, we do not see the states in the 21st century as international legal entities anymore as ideological creations, but only as communities of citizens (sovereigns) who are united around the idea of statehood, and where for their common language, culture, history and tradition is taken the heritage of the most numerous people with admixtures and characteristics of all other nations, while creating a nation based on the sovereign right of the citizens. In that context, human rights and freedoms, the economy and entrepreneurship, education and health or the corpus of personal and public security of the citizens above the one of the state security are of exceptional importance.

Thus the classical sources of threat are reduced and the new risks and threats are asymmetric and relate to everyday life with a reflection on long-term economic, political, environmental, social, social and human security. Hence, resistance within regional politics and neighborly relations is deeply rooted in human rights and freedoms, and not on any ideological basis or national-state ideology to be defended. In the paper before you we will try to explain this phenomenon of changing interests in resistance, as well as the role of the sovereign and his interests due to which countries resist in regional politics and neighborly relations, which is extremely tumultuous and characteristic. on relations in the Balkans.

## **1 Politics as resistance and challenge to regional policies**

In the theoretical approach to resistance, some authors within the conceptualization of politics as a constant struggle for power between sovereign states and war as the final and worst result of this struggle, dwell on the dichotomous explanation of resistance. Namely, the policy as resistance and as management in its action should result in specific new or favorable conditions for the state. There are three vital components to any policy action (Armstrong et al., 2009): conflict, relations and power, and some form of collective action. Collective action by state or non-state actors is crucial. Hence the role of politics in civil relations or civic interaction according to Kenny or the so-called coexistence that we often use in Macedonia.

It is this coexistence that is the decision of the sovereign and his role in dictating (consciously or unconsciously, consciously or emotionally) the political movement. At this point of thinking we have the beginning of the creation of the state policy and here we enter into several possible open theoretical discussions on how the creation of the state policy is encouraged on a regional-international level, with what goals and interests and at what time. In order to design politics at

the international level, of course, it must undoubtedly rely on group interests and the power that the state has in the region, but it must be promoted through the values, ethics and political and cultural identity of the state (sovereign). Political and cultural identity are based on values and ethics, and they in turn arise from the tradition, history, level of education and modern development of the leading people in the country and the sovereign as an individual.

The sovereign as an individual has the indisputable right and capacity to engage himself as a human subject in action on behalf of interests, beliefs, values and feelings. Of course, actions, intentions and consequences cannot be fully predicted and it is equal to the well-known view that there is no one hundred percent certainty of risk and threat to security, but politics manages to resist its conceptualization and therefore all tendentious actions and concrete motivations must be taken into account and the consequences of the same must be analyzed or in the context of the risks these are the possible damages to the state.

Due to this approach to politics and its management and resistance, it is a challenge in regional politics within which it is necessary to anticipate the consequences of securitizing a particular political issue and raising it to an issue of vital interest to the state and the nation. In the context of this approach, a very essential question arises that is interesting for the topic we are dealing with. Namely: "Is politics primary for the preservation of our interests as individuals or political groups or is it equivalent to defending - promoting our values, beliefs, political identity, cultural identity or different ways of existence?" (Armstrong et al., 2009, pp. 19)

Exactly this issue, which is not rhetorical at all, introduces us to the essence of the resistance in the regional policy, and especially in the neighborly relations and explicitly in the issue of the conflict between Macedonia and Bulgaria. If we add to this the role of the power of politics and its influence on shaping some dominant political logic in the international relations of the state towards its neighbors, then we have a very clear picture of the fundamental imperatives for the often irrational behavior of political leaderships and tendentious actions translated into conflicts. No matter how we try to explain this in practice, we will see that politics governs resistance, whether that resistance in regional politics and neighborly relations is logical or worthwhile for both sides. The problem with creating conflicts, using power and relations, and even more so with managing resistance (this can also be synonymous with conflict management) is political actors (we tend to use "political" rather than political) because they do not they manage the resistance, but on the contrary they are participants in the resistance (participants in the conflict). While the politicized actors who are the participants in the resistance in the improper management of the resistance become uncontrollably marginal, and the politicizing actors themselves due to their tendentious action which they are unable to manage become subject to the influence of other stronger centers of power over regional politics. Thus, we come to the conclusion that the conflict of interest approach created by the political

actors actually pretends that the interests can be negotiated or markets with a tendency to play more or less profit or loss for one of the parties. Instead of managing the resistance to values, cultural and political identity (national identity can also be placed under political identity, because the nation is a political construction) as well as convictions, in the wrong foundation of the resistance and the political actors who should govern it we have the abuse of politicized actors and an open space for the involvement of other centers of power with stronger relations and influences.

The damage that will be suffered both at the regional level and in the neighborly relations and in the long run will be visible and long-lasting in terms of the still unresolved issue of values, beliefs and cultural and political identity, which is why securitization has been used as a mobilizer. a tool in achieving political goals.

The issue of individualism, which causes sub political behavior in politics, is much more pronounced, especially through political actors who reduce politics to a more individual level, thus preventing institutional political management of the resistance, but emphasizing personal perceptions, ie personal interests and the resources of the state and the sovereign are used.

This is where the role of the sovereign begins, which will specifically point out where political actors have erred in managing the dispute by failing to protect its values, beliefs and identities and bargaining for interests that the sovereign does not recognize as vital. interests, but are the political interests of the political elites. The values, beliefs, and interests of the sovereign will be discussed in the next chapter. Although, I must mention that the role of securitization is precisely to present the interests of political actors as vital interests of the sovereign, because of which the sovereign will relinquish his beliefs, values and identity or find an enemy that threatens his values, beliefs and identity. This is simply a political game of creating public support for a political market with the interests of managing the resistance, and through the illusion of threat.

## **2 The values, beliefs, identity and role of the sovereign as a policy**

Values, beliefs and identities are related to interests, but they can be manipulated politically for different interests and it is usually very difficult for them to be fully and clearly expressed by the sovereign, without political leaderships applying methods of determination and adjustment. to their interests. This is a feature of the Balkans and has a direct impact on the politics and management of the resistance, especially on the creation of politicized actors within the resistance. As a feature we can mention the impact of the configuration of power, which does not always arise from the political, military, economic or other power of the state, but simply it is an abuse of power gained through international institutions and membership in various alliances, especially as is the case with NATO and the EU. This diffusion of power through international

organizations or alliances is the expansion of a new form of real politics in international relations defined as global politics that directly affects regional and interstate bilateral relations in all aspects. Hence the role of the sovereign (in terms of the constitutional bearer of sovereignty - the citizens, the people) is questioned, because the influence of global centers of power through international organizations and membership in various alliances emphasizes the role of government or political leadership in relation to the sovereign, especially in the creation and management of regional relations. In this context, the values, beliefs and identity that are extremely important for the sovereign are brought to a state of relativity in relation to political interests. That is why the possibility of trading in values, beliefs, culture and identity is completely open as political issues that are easier to resolve, than as identity and cultural, religious issues that are unequivocally impossible to trade.

This change in the concept of approach to resistance management in international politics, especially in interstate and regional relations, is a relativization of the role of the sovereign and the question of sovereignty. Therefore, knowledge, empiricism, historical memory, especially the collective one are extremely important for the sovereign and his political survival as an internal political factor that transmits its political power, and through social knowledge and cognition, the state reflects in its international relations. From this point of view, the existence of a structured society is simply extremely important, a society that is framed, legally regulated and in which there are indigenous political structures capable of preserving the interests of the sovereign through resistance in international relations and regional policies. Of course, those political structures framed in the state system under the threat of losing their political positions will have to disagree with trading in values, beliefs and identities even under the pressure of a global center of power. This is possible to implement in practice exclusively in regulated state structures with a built political and legal system. Because the structure is a component that extends throughout the system and allows the system to be thought of as a whole. (Waltz, 2009) That goal should be regulated and harmonized at the highest level.

For this reason, in international relations, i.e. international politics, the domestic political structure should first be examined in order to be able to draw a distinction between the expectations of possible behaviors, and thus outcomes in domestic and foreign policy. This approach when entering into conflict or resisting in interstate relations must be observed by every state if it has an organized and strong state-political structure. It is the assessment of one's own internal political structure and its behavior as well as the assessment of the adversary's internal political structure that is an introduction to certain possibilities for successful resistance. Especially for the pre-defined weakness, this is crucial in policy making, especially the internal mobilization policy through securitization of the sovereign. This mobilization to resist, especially in

neighborly relations, uses the issue of protection of values, beliefs and identity as a strong motivation.

### **3 Mutual resistance in the Macedonian-Bulgarian dispute (case study)**

The Macedonian-Bulgarian dispute is an obvious example of mutual resistance in the mutual relations between Macedonia and Bulgaria, against the political processes with regional influence and influence on the EU as a global actor. At the same time, this resistance has its values, beliefs and identity at its core, which is why managing it, even with an external mediator in the form of the EU or the US, is a great challenge and can create additional resistance.

The role of the sovereign in both countries is crucial, but at the same time the sovereign is maximally securitized, due to which the solution of this resistance requires parallel action within the intensive process of desecuritization of the sovereign and specific political procedures in removing or bypassing the disputed points, which cause resistance on the part of the parties.

It is through these procedures that the pitfalls of threats and risks that will jeopardize the dispute resolution process should be avoided. In fact, especially in this case study, the resistance has a historical dimension, it is related to historical events, connections, conflicts and contradictions between the two countries and peoples. Threats to historical issues are therefore pitfalls that produce a risk that will increase resistance.

Human civilization is undergoing a far more extensive, comprehensive and profound change, in many directions and on many levels of structural transformation of the system, related to security, political, economic-financial structure, energy, ecological and information connection, social, cultural and religious structure. These epoch-making changes and this ethical transformation have four main measurements that can be talked about in the analysis of the quality of the new type of society, namely: globalized society, postmodern society, infrastructure and information society and risk in society. (Slatinski, 2019)

It is these changes in the understanding of modern civilization changes in the structure of the system, as Slatinski says, that we consider that can be taken as levels of measurement in resistance in this case study. Namely, both the Macedonian and the Bulgarian society are with a pronounced social risk, but not from the mutual endangerment, but exclusively from the internal political situation and the social role of the political elites. In this context, it is the globalization of society that imposes the involvement of mediators in resolving the dispute and reducing resistance. In fact, it is the mediator who makes the connection (networking) of the two societies and reduces the risk by directing the solution towards strengthening the cooperation in other fields and building a common interstate structural system in the economy, energy, infrastructure, social

and culture, avoiding the risk of encouraging historical issues and thus avoiding the debate on the values, historical beliefs and identities of both parties.

Our case study as a basis for resistance in world political processes through interstate relations, and thus the assumption that that resistance will continue, has precisely the values, beliefs and identity through the prism of historical issues and disagreements between the two countries and peoples (sovereign). Hence, if we continue with the current model of encouraging historical issues, including the role of Bulgaria in World War II, as well as issues of Macedonian identity and its historical connection with Bulgarian identity through the prism of the role of the Orthodox Church, its schools, fighters for national freedom of the Macedonian people or the issues of the Macedonian language and its semantics, then surely no solution will be reached. On the contrary, the resistance, especially in Macedonia, will increase, not only in relation to Bulgaria but also to the EU.

Therefore, the behavior of Slovakia and the Czech Republic on the issue of the draft negotiating framework submitted to the EU by Bulgaria and its blocking is completely understandable (although Macedonia and Bulgaria did not understand that). The diplomats of both countries, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, fully understood the absurdity of establishing a negotiating framework proposed by Bulgaria on resolving historical issues between the countries. They undoubtedly correctly assessed the risks posed by the adoption of this framework by the EU for the future in relation to the resistance of other EU member states to the accession of new members (for example the case of Croatia and Serbia), and even the relations between the countries. EU member states. Such a framework would raise additional questions among EU Member States regarding the historical chapters that are considered completed and that each country interprets in its own way, but does not link them to the present and does not allow them to influence contemporary relations between countries in EU or bilaterally. It is quite clear that in Europe there are no two countries, especially neighbors that do not have a negative historical experience and which if they enter into a discussion on historical topics and events will never agree with each other which will activate a dispute in mutual relations and thus resistance to political processes in the Union or globally. In such a case, the survival of the European Union is put at complete risk, and because of issues that in essence cannot change anything in the present nor contribute to improving the future, especially the preservation of values, beliefs and identity.

Exactly the issue of changing the present and the impact on the future is what is crucial in the dispute between Macedonia and Bulgaria and which maintains the resistance in the mutual relations and in the political processes of interest to the EU and both countries. Namely, both sides have their own interests and goals that through the prism of "victory" over the other side will enable a dramatic change in the situation in the future based on historical "facts". This approach only intensifies the resistance of each side and increases the risk to the entire European Union. But at the heart of this behavior is mistrust of the Union's

future. The states in dispute and the states in the Balkans in general think that one day the European Union will cease to exist and that now is the time to use the power given by EU membership to establish historical dominance in the Balkans and establish their own national interests as strong, and dominant in the region.

This approach applies to both Macedonia and Bulgaria. Basically, if the historical approach is realistically perceived and used, until the second half of the 19th century, more precisely until 1870 and the joint Macedonian-Bulgarian formation of the Bulgarian Exarchate as a local Orthodox Church which at that time was not the national church of the Bulgarians, but the desire of the Slavic population in the Ottoman Empire to get rid of the spiritual power of the Greek Patriarchate in Constantinople, we cannot find an organized political struggle to create a state and state institutions neither in Bulgaria nor in Macedonia. The basis of the organization is the linguistic proximity through the Church-Slavic language and thus the Orthodox Church is a unique institution. In fact, in the Ottoman Empire, the important social institutions towards which the non-Islamic population was oriented were shaped by the personal connection with the household and the kin group, with the only depersonalized institution being the church. Only after the creation of the first states in the Balkans and thus the need to build institutions that provide access to government resources appears the interest of the Bulgarian state in the territories and population of Macedonia. This is where the modern dispute between Macedonia and Bulgaria begins historically, because until 1878 the struggle was based on the Slavic initiative against the Greek Church for the ecclesiastical domination of Constantinople and the class-religious struggle against the Ottoman Empire. (Kaser, 2001)

In modern conditions, both countries have their own goals related to history, but although they are not crucial for the current situation, they are extremely important for their national interest, especially in relation to the environment in the Balkan region and in their mutual relations.

Macedonia believes that now is the last moment when the existence of the Macedonian people should be confirmed through the long historical struggle in which it was disputed. This confirmation should not refer only to Macedonia, but also to the territories where the Macedonian people exist in neighboring countries with all the attributes of a people (language, culture, history), full acceptance of the uniqueness of the Macedonian identity as special in the Balkans, including the acceptance of the minority rights of Macedonians in neighboring countries.

Bulgaria, on the other hand, believes that the historical injustice inflicted on it since 1878, when the Bulgarian state was established after the San Stefano Peace Treaty, and was revised by the Berlin Congress, especially in the territorial sense towards Macedonia, should be corrected. For Bulgarian political strategists, it is best if Macedonia is forced to make a historical revision of its identity, language, culture, beliefs and values by accepting the definition of 19th-century identity in the Ottoman Empire related to church activity, and how Bulgarian. In this way, Bulgaria expects that in the future it will be able to claim Macedonia as



a territory that historically belonged to Bulgaria and that today's Macedonians are in fact historical Bulgarians. Then, it is very easy for the Bulgarian political elite in the near or distant future to refer to what is documented through an agreement, the "self-denial" of the Macedonian people of their Macedonian identity and the acceptance of the Bulgarian identity. When it comes to the historical fears of Bulgaria, of course we must not forget the impact of the Bucharest Agreement of 1913, and later confirmed as a historical fact the cultural autonomy of the Macedonians in Bulgaria (Pirin Macedonia) in the period after World War II. until 1965 for which there are documents and facts.

Unfortunately, in practice, the European Union itself has for a long time in the last thirty years encouraged this model, perhaps unknowingly creating risks and threats to its own security. Allowing Moldova to be transformed into a second Romanian state, Cyprus into a second Greek state, and Republic of Srpska into a second Serbian state, the EU has in practice instructed Bulgaria to pursue a policy that is not European, democratic, modern, good-neighborly and which, by creating resistance to the political processes of EU enlargement, destabilizes the Balkans and the EU through the state relations between Bulgaria and Macedonia.

Understandable is the tendency of Bulgaria, which if it succeeds in forcing Macedonia to "recognize" its "Bulgarian roots" and revise its history, including the role of Bulgaria in World War II, will secure its influence in Macedonia versus Serbia and Greece. From this point of view, although Bulgaria considers itself a dominant and powerful or stronger side in relation to Macedonia, it is politically short-sighted, because at some point neither Greece nor Serbia will allow Macedonia to be under the control of Bulgaria (or a second Bulgarian state), as imagined by the political elite in Sofia. Of course, this would create an extremely high risk in the Balkans that could raise many issues related to Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia, and that would mean a problem in the European Security Area.

The question of Bulgaria's role in World War II is historically problematic. This is not a question exclusively related to Macedonia and whether the Bulgarian army occupied Macedonia or "liberated" it from the Serbian occupation. It is a question of the de facto participation of Bulgaria at that time on the side of fascism as an ally of the fascist coalition. It is anti-fascism that is at the core of Europe and its values and beliefs, and if a revision of the historical facts about fascism is made, then European values move, and that is already a serious problem not only for the survival of the EU but of every member state. most of which were created precisely on anti-fascist grounds. On the other hand, it would be a historical revision in the direction of relativizing totalitarianism against democratic values, which is certainly not in line with the modern political processes that Europe aspires to.

Therefore, the active involvement in the settlement of the dispute and the practical management of the resistance in the mutual relations between Bulgaria and Macedonia by the United States and the indirect reaction of Slovakia and the

Czech Republic is a necessary mediation to resolve this dispute. The approach to highlighting global connectivity, networking, infrastructural connectivity, and cultural rapprochement is in fact a definite and planned avoidance of the risks of getting stuck in historical and identity issues that the mediators have seen.

In practice it remains to be seen how the dispute will end, primarily due to the complexity of the process of desecuritization of sovereignty in both countries, and what may cause some political elites to cause a change in the real political structure in both countries or in one of the countries and with to prolong or even strengthen the position of resistance. In such a situation, managing the resistance would be almost impossible because any intensification of the resistance would be based on additional ethno-political mobilization and securitization of the sovereign, which would prolong and complicate the process of de-securitization and convince the sovereign that the solution was not the mediator's will. on both sides.

Hence, directing the dispute to non-historical issues is an exceptional opportunity for a speedy resolution.

## **Conclusion**

Focusing on scientific and professional analysis as a case study in relation to the mutual relations between Macedonia and Bulgaria and the creation of a practical emergence of resistance in the relations between the two countries, and thus including the potential for managing this resistance by a mediator, in this case at the diplomatic level it is the United States, we can say that the tendency of labor is not finding a solution in relations between the two countries. Simply, through this paper we have only opened the perspective for finding a solution, and using the opportunities for managing the policy of the two countries despite their mutual resistance.

In fact, we can clearly conclude that despite the existence of pronounced risks and threats to security in the region, and as a result of the dispute, there are extremely important points of contact that can contribute to reducing mutual resistance and resolving the dispute. Of course, those points are not the values, beliefs and identity, although in the end the goal to be achieved, defined as unblocking Macedonia's path to full EU membership, means accepting and promoting common European values and beliefs while preserving the identity.

However, the tendency of the dispute management and political process for Macedonia's full membership in the EU and the resistance offered by Bulgaria shows a strong capacity if the focus shifts from historical issues as key to infrastructural, economic, financial, social and cultural issues for mutual cooperation. The shift of focus provides an opportunity, although it does not guarantee that there will be desecuritization of both societies in relation to this dispute and the historical, especially identity issues related to the language and nation of the Macedonians.

If we think about why there would be no guarantee of desecuritization, we can say with great confidence that due to the already encouraged securitization and setting this problem at the level of a vital state and national issue, the political elites who securitize it will least want to desecuritize it. In this political-pragmatic behavior there is only internal political logic of these political elites, because if they actively participate in the desecuritization of the dispute they will have to explain to their own people why, for what reason they previously securitized it. Additionally, the question will have to be answered: "What has changed in the dispute and have the established vital national interests that were determined to be endangered been realized?"

The answer to this question is extremely difficult for both sides in the dispute and with extremely high potential for political losses in domestic politics for political actors. For these reasons, we can expect that this will be the most difficult part of the desecuritization and return of the political process for full membership of Macedonia in the EU with a strong positive role and support from Bulgaria. Both sides, ie political elites will have to give an explanation within the domestic policy for the time and resources spent at such a visible opportunity for not moving this dispute at all and creating resistance by influencing the region.

In the end, we can conclude that even within the movement of other points of contact in relation to the dispute, which do not cause mutual resistance, we cannot be completely sure of full success, but it is necessary to move the other points of the long-term touch on historical issues.

The role of the EU through the use of soft power and positive influence on the behavior of sovereigns that need to be desecrated is great and is a unique chance for the Union to close a significant chapter in the Balkans by bringing together Macedonia and Albania.

Regarding Macedonia, the role of Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland, as well as Slovenia and Croatia, can be extremely important in ensuring that Bulgaria does not use historical issues as part of the framework for Macedonia's full EU membership negotiations.

## References

- ARMSTRONG, D., FARRELL, T., MAIGUASHKA, B. 2009. Governance and Resistance in World Politics. Skopje: Magor, 2009
- KASER, K. 2001. *Friendship and Fellowship in the Balkans*. Klagenfurt / Celovec: Wieser Verlag, 2001
- WALTZ, K. 2009. *Theory of International Politics*. Skopje: Magor, 2009
- SLATINSKI, N. 2019. *Risk: the new name of security*. Sofia: East-West, 2019

# CRISIS, FIELD OPERATING ROOM WITH A STERILIZATION SYSTEM POWERED BY AN ACCIDENTAL WATER INTAKE

Andrzej Dyszkiewicz<sup>1</sup>

## **ABSTRACT**

*Laboratory experiments on animals that are often deliberately infected pose specific dangers for the experimenters. This problem became the driving force behind innovative activities that led to the construction of a device that effectively protects scientists against the product of their own experiments. With significant successes in the implementation of laboratory sterilization systems, they were also used with good results to protect the dentist working in the dentist's chair. At present, implementation works are underway on the use of the device for supplying the field operating room with sterile water obtained from any field intake, creating a sterile atmosphere inside the tent and sterilizing the liquid residues of treated infected wounds in order to exclude the field operating room as a potential source of infection.*

**Key words:** ultraviolet water and air sterilization, sterilization of media in dentistry, crisis field operating room,

## **Experiments on laboratory animals**

Animal experiments used in medicine cause a number of technical problems related to the small dimensions of the operated organs, the need to maintain asepsis in the operating field and to stabilize the temperature of the operated animal. Instrumental maladjustment in this respect may cause unsuccessful treatments, often affecting the entire research program. The existing prior art does not cover the above-mentioned technical problems in a simultaneous and sufficient way in hardware. The protection of the experimenter himself is also insufficient. (Dyszkiewicz, 2000)

---

<sup>1</sup> Andrzej Dyszkiewicz, Higher Technical School in Katowice, ul. Rolna 43, Katowice, Poland, andrzej@labio.pl




Fig 1. Chamber for sterile laboratory preparation according to PL 56118 (Dyszkiewicz, 2000)

A practical solution to this problem is a chamber for experimental laboratory preparation made of transparent material and equipped with manipulation holes for introducing hands, internal lighting, operating table with a water jacket connected to a thermostat, an operating microscope and a connection to an external sterilizer air and fluids. The prototype device has four control circuits coordinated with a microprocessor system. The first is the sterilization circuit in which air is forced through a chamber with an ultraviolet radiator at a regulated speed under the control of electronic flow sensors. The second is a thermostat circuit that maintains a constant temperature of the operating table plane. The third circuit is the coupling of the lighting inside the chamber with the operating microscope and a TV camera connected to it and a digital vision converter. The fourth circuit is sterilization of the excreta from the chamber using a UV lamp covered with a reflector, in which the microprocessor controls the speed of forcing the infectious material from the operation along the axis of the radiator, with a speed adjusted to its degree of turbidity.

The prototype device is very universal. The system enables comprehensive biotechnological, microbiological and microsurgical preparation in conditions of full air sterility, while isolating the experimenter from the research material, meeting the criteria of environmental protection by sterilizing excreta from the chamber. The device extends the possibilities of the operator thanks to the smooth adjustment of the microscope magnification and the registration of various stages of the experiment using a vision track and a computer. Traditional sterilizers operate with the use of energy-intensive thermal processes, ionizing radiation, ultraviolet radiation or chemicals with a bactericidal effect. The proposed solution uses an ultraviolet radiator operating in a tube that acts as a photon multiplier.

Additionally, there are quartz tubes in the pipe for pumping the liquid and guides, which cause air turbulence. The sterilization process consists in forcing

air through the photon multiplier tube with the use of a fan, the efficiency of which is modified by a microcomputer based on the flow sensor indications and the appropriate software option. The effectiveness of the sterilization process of the liquid forced through the tubes depends on the degree of turbidity of the liquid and the transmission of ultraviolet radiation. A photoelectric sensor is located at the input of the circuit, which assesses the degree of turbidity of the liquid. The information obtained is a control parameter for the microcomputer modulating the speed of the water pump. The prototype device opens up completely new perspectives for effective sterilization of air and liquids in glove chambers without restrictions for people, eliminating the risk of eye and skin damage occurring with open sources of UV radiation. (Emanuels, Hollema, Koudstaal, 1994, Garcin, Bergeaud, Joly, 1998)




Fig. 2 Flow-through air and fluid sterilizer: (1) device diagram; (2) a prototype cooperating with a laboratory glove box, according to PL 164635

### Dental application

A useful and even expected implementation was: (1) application of the device according to the patent PL164635 to the doctor's guard next to the dentist's chair during treatment of a patient in the oral cavity with purulent inflammation; (2) protecting the patient's sensitive, bleeding gum tissue from inhaled air that may contain pathogenic microorganisms; (3) protection of wastewater against infectious, purulent excretions from the oral cavity of patients during treatments on bleeding oral mucosa. (Henzler, Kaiser, 1998)




Fig. 3 Three air and fluid sterilizer circuits coupled to dental chair instrumentation.

### Field application prospects

The evolution of the geo-political situation of the 20th century caused a rapid change in the specifics of the operation of military units. In the theater of the Second World War, the positional activities based on separated structures of the hinterland dominating in World War I, and under the influence of increasingly mobile means of transport, gave way to the concept of a maneuver war in the theater of World War II.

This exacerbated the problems of relocating the demand for consumables and forced a change in the method of distribution of injured and damaged equipment. The contemporary situation, illustrated with examples of the conflict in Afghanistan, resulted in an even greater discretization of military operations, which meant that many functions of the back office had to be performed within individual units operating in isolation.

The new situation forced a greater range and reliability of the means of communication guaranteeing the synchronization of supply discharges and receiving the wounded. The operation of the unit in unpredictable conditions and the forced use of various water intakes carries the risk of food infections, which may unpredictably change the combat value of the unit within a few hours. Performing life-saving operations in the field requires a sterile atmosphere above the operating field and access to microorganism-free water. It is quite difficult to meet these conditions without a well-organized back-up facility, but by

interpolating the existing, modern laboratory equipment, it is possible to build a system that will meet medical expectations even in difficult field conditions.

### Approximation of a laboratory solution in field conditions.

Taking into account the good results of the application of the above laboratory solution for sterilization of air and fluids in a dentist's office in conditions of repeated droplet infections from patients, a thesis was made about its usefulness in field conditions, after introducing minor modifications:

- the use of a light tent that acts as an isolation of the operating field, which can be quickly erected in any terrain conditions near any water intake
- adaptation of the air inlets of the laboratory sterilizer to work with the tent, and the liquid sterilization circuits for water application
- designing a voltage converter that enables powering the apparatus from a car or combustion engine alternator, or a portable power generator.

The envisaged modifications, especially in terms of power supply, do not pose a major technical problem, due to the low energy consumption and relatively high efficiency. The application of the photon multiplier idea for a 30W UV burner means that, using an appropriately efficient water pump, it is possible to obtain up to 2,500 l of microbiologically sterile water within an hour, which was initially contaminated with bacteria in the  $10^6$  titer. 150-200 m<sup>3</sup> / h, achieving its full sterility. Therefore, taking the energy of driving the road lights from the car alternator / approx. 100-150W / you can sterilize the atmosphere of an operating tent with a volume of 50 m<sup>3</sup> / e.g. 5x5x2m /, providing 2500l of water for washing the hands of staff and injured bodies. For certain applications, these values can be significantly increased. (Mervine, Temple, 1997, Nardell, 1995, Pamphilon, 1998, Pankhurst, Hohnson, Woods, 1998, Rahmatulla, Almas, al-Begieh, 1996)






Fig. 4 NPA 37T tents with plating from a flame material with a weight of 650g.m<sup>2</sup>: (1) Sterilization circuit a field source of microbiologically contaminated air; (2) sterilization circuit a field source of microbiologically contaminated water; (3) sterilization circuit microbiologically active water and air after hygienic and medical treatment of patients

## Conclusion

Taking into account the very high efficiency of the presented system in sterilization of water and air in laboratory conditions and after use in a dental clinic, it should be concluded that the result of application in field conditions should not significantly differ from the laboratory results. The only factor to be corrected will be (probably) the power and the related performance of the devices presented. The practical use of a field operating tent in conditions of natural disasters, local armed conflicts or field operations of isolated units may contribute to the improvement of the effectiveness of medical activities. (Steuer, 1994 Strus, 1997, Taylor, Bannister, Leeming, 1995 )

## References

- DYSZKIEWICZ A. Komora do preparatyki substancji toksycznych. UPRP- PL-56118
- DYSZKIEWICZ A. Sterylizator przepływowy powietrza i płynów. UPRP- PL 164635
- DYSZKIEWICZ A. Komora do jałowej preparatyki eksperymentalnej. UPRP- PL 62773
- DYSZKIEWICZ, A., KOPROWSKI, R., WRÓBEL, Z. 2000 General purpose sterylizier for flow sterylisation of air and fluids. The World Congress Biotechnology, Berlin 3-8.09.2000
- DYSZKIEWICZ, A., KOPROWSKI, R., WRÓBEL, Z. 2000. General purpose chamber for the experimental, laboratorial work. The World Congress Biotechnology, Berlin 3-8.09.2000
- DYSZKIEWICZ, A., KOPROWSKI, R., WRÓBEL, Z. 2000. The chamber to preparing toxic substances. Konf. Biocyb Bioinż, Warszawa 2000, 146
- DYSZKIEWICZ, A., WRÓBEL, Z. 2001. Flow and modulated sterilisation system for air, liquids, and colloidal waists in outpatient and hospital health care. European Congress of Biotechnology, Madrid 2001
- EMANUELS, A., HOLLEMA. H., KOUDSTAAL, J. 1994. Autoclave heating: an alternative method for microwaving? Eur J Morphol 1994, 32, 337
- GARCIN, F., BERGEAUD, Y., JOLY, B. 1998. Efficacy of an ultraviolet device for the disinfection of radiology cassettes. Pathol Biol Paris 1998, 46(5), 325

- HENZLER, H., KAISER, K. 1998. Avoiding viral contamination in biotechnological and pharmaceutical processes. *Nat Biotechnol* 1998, 16(11), 1077
- HURE, P., LEPRINCE, A., MACREZ, A. 1995. Focus on the role of ventilation and ultraviolet rays in preventing nosocomial transmission of tuberculosis in health care facilities. *Rev Pneumol Clin* 1995, 51(1), 13
- ISKE, U., NELLE, T., OBERG, C., RUDOLPH, K., HAUCK, S. 1996. Hygienic, chemical and ecotoxicological aspects of the disinfection of biologically treated waste water by ozone and UV light. *Zentralbl Hyg Umweltmed* 1996, 198(3), 226
- KRZYWICKA, H., JANOWSKA, J., ZARZYCKA, E. 1997. The action of ultraviolet radiation on microorganisms found in air] *Rocz Panstw Zakl Hig* 1997, 48(3), 269
- MACGREGOR, S., ROWAN, N., MCLLVANEY, L. 1998. Light inactivation of food-related pathogenic bacteria using a pulsed power source. *Lett Appl Microbiol* 1998, 27(2), 67
- MANDAL, S., SRIMANI, B. 1987. Jute fiber as a filter medium in microbial air filters. *Ann N Y Acad Sci* 1987, 506, 682
- MERVINE, J., TEMPLE, R. 1997. Using a microwave oven to disinfect intermittent use catheters. *Rehabil Nurs* 1997, 22(6), 318
- NARDELL, E. 1995. Interrupting transmission from patients with unsuspected tuberculosis: a unique role for upper-room ultraviolet air disinfection. *Am J Infect Control* 1995, 23(2), 156
- PAMPILION, D. H. 1998. The treatment of blood components with ultraviolet-B irradiation. *Vox-Sang.* 1998; 74 Suppl 2: 15-9
- PANKHURST, C., JOHNSON, N., WOODS, R. 1998. Microbial contamination of dental unit waterlines: the scientific argument. *Int Dent J* 1998, 48(4), 359
- RAHMATULLA, M., ALMAS, K., al-BAGIEH, N. 1996. Cross infection in the high-touch areas of dental radiology clinics. *Indian J Dent Res* 1996, 7(3), 97
- RAMES, J., CHALOUPECKY, V., SOJKOVA, N., BENCKO, V. 1997. An attempt to demonstrate the increased resistance of selected bacterial strains during repeated exposure to UV radiation at 254 nm. *Cent Eur J Public Health* 1997, 5(1), 30
- STEUER, W. 1994. Responsibilities of UV facilities and monitoring of UV disinfection from the viewpoint of the public health authority *Gesundheitswesen* 1994, 56(6), 353
- STRUS, M. 1997 Action of physical agents on microorganisms. *Rocz Panstw Zakl Hig* 1997, 48(3), 263
- TAYLOR, G., BANNISTER, G., LEEMING, J. 1995. Wound disinfection with ultraviolet radiation. *J Hosp Infect* 1995,30, 85

# CRISIS COMMUNICATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND ITS IMPACT ON PUBLIC ATTITUDES DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

**Libor Frank<sup>1</sup>**

## **ABSTRACT**

*In the Czech Republic, as in the vast majority of European countries, COVID-19 gradually became an important political topic. Originally predominantly a health problem, due to its economic, social and security aspects and the long duration of the pandemic, it became strongly politicized. The approach to dealing with the pandemic and adopting or rejecting anti-pandemic measures established an important cleavage line, in the Czech Republic clearly manifested in the relationship between the government and the opposition. The perception of the COVID-19 problem, the degree of urgency and the assessment of the adequacy of government measures were, of course, also reflected in the attitudes and moods of the public, as it was captured by public opinion research agencies in the course of the pandemic. Public attitudes to the pandemic, acceptance of various restrictions and the need for testing and vaccination evolved over time and, to a large extent, they were influenced by the method, intensity and content of the government's communication with the public. The paper covers the period 2020-2021.*

**Key words:** communication; COVID-19; pandemic; opinion polls; government.

## **1 COVID-19 as a political topic**

Covid-19 became a political and also an important public issue in the Czech Republic at the beginning of 2020, when the topic was discussed for the first time in the Chamber of Deputies, and the then Minister of Health Adam Vojtěch was questioned about the state's readiness for prospective introduction of the coronavirus into the Czech Republic. The following weeks, months and years showed not only the considerable unpreparedness of the state for the pandemic of extraordinary scale and significant duration, but also the importance of understandable, continuous and coherent communication of government measures to the public. After years of economic growth and the achievement of an extraordinary security standard, an extraordinary phenomenon appeared that would change everything. (Bízík & Kříž, 2020) In the past two years, the coronavirus was not only successfully securitized in the Czech Republic and became the number one security threat from the point of view of the public, but it also ceased to be perceived as a purely health topic -

---

<sup>1</sup> Libor Frank, PhD, Head of the Department of Security and Defence Studies, Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies, University of Defence, Kounicova 65, 662 10 Brno, Czech Republic, [libor.frank@unob.cz](mailto:libor.frank@unob.cz)

it became a security, economic, social and, increasingly, a highly political topic.

## **2 The course of the pandemic in the Czech Republic, the government's response and communication**

On Sunday, March 1, 2020, the first three cases of COVID-19 are confirmed in the Czech Republic; random checks at the borders are initiated as early as on March 9, and all schools get closed as of March 11, 2020. The situation becomes more dynamic a day later, when the government declares the state of emergency for the first time, which is originally supposed to apply for 30 days, but later it is gradually extended until May 17, 2020. With reference to the emergency, the government restricts the movement of people, establishments and shops are closed (except for part of grocery stores, pharmacies, petrol stations, etc.). The Central Crisis Staff, headed by the Minister of the Interior, Jan Hamáček, is activated, while some municipalities with a high incidence of coronavirus become closed. On March 23, 2020, in his speech to the nation, Prime Minister Andrej Babiš states: *“As the Prime Minister of the country, I am, of course, personally responsible for all crisis measures. And I assume full political responsibility.”* (Bohuslavová, 2021)

In April 2020, the Czech Republic is still in the state of emergency and under a hard lockdown. Curfew applies, citizens can only go to work, shops and home. At the end of the month, the government presents a schedule of relaxing the measures, which the country follows until the end of May 2020. Although there is considerable concern in society about the pandemic, at the same time, a large degree of civic solidarity (sewing masks) and the determination to respect the imposed restrictions are increasing, whereas the level of trust in the government is at 40%. May becomes the month of relaxation. Restaurants, establishments, services reopen and even children start to return to school. On May 18, 2020, the Minister of Health Adam Vojtěch declares: *“We have managed to cope with this crisis without any problems for our health care system. The COVID crisis is over and we need to look at what is ahead.”* (Bohuslavová, 2021)

In June, gradual relaxation continues, opportunities for travelling are opening up - the government presents the so-called travel traffic light. The government presents the pandemic as a solved problem. Prime Minister Andrej Babiš says about the Czech Republic: *“We are the best in COVID”* and downplays the possibility of a second wave: *“Our main task is to manage the economic crisis. I do not understand what kind of plan the opposition wants from us. We try to be prepared in case the second wave comes. But we should not become scared of the second wave. If there is an increased incidence, we will react quickly, but it will never be a blanket measure anymore,”* said the Prime Minister. (Bohuslavová, 2021)

In the summer months of 2020, only some measures remain in force, most of them being abolished. The cancellation of measures and the application of traffic lights are accompanied by confusion on the part of the government and its experts; the government is underestimating the risk of a possible next wave of coronavirus. At the end of the summer, COVID statistics begin to deteriorate significantly, the government reacts confusingly and inconsistently, the statements of both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Health change rapidly (e.g., when it comes to reintroducing masks, government regulations switch to the opposite overnight), the public is more and more confused. The dramatic consequences of the summer relaxation, downplaying the second wave, and the Prime Minister's unwillingness to revisit unpopular restrictions rapidly lead to high daily increases in the numbers of infected, amounting to around 10,000 cases per day in October-November. In September, after a series of mistakes and as a result of his failure to manage the situation, the Minister of Health Adam Vojtěch is dismissed, the government proceeds to re-announce the state of emergency and another hard lockdown in October. In October 2020, the new Minister of Health Roman Prymula is also dismissed after a few weeks in office - at a time of tightening measures and hard quarantine for the whole country, he has a meeting with the head of the MPs of the government movement ANO in a restaurant. The public and the political opposition see this as unacceptable arrogance and an example of double standards at the time of lockdown. Jan Blatný is appointed Minister of Health.

In November 2020, the pandemic in the Czech Republic is at its peak, as many as hundreds of people die every day, and the country has the highest number of deaths in the world. The Czechs are closed at home, but the numbers do not fall as quickly as in the spring and stay an order of magnitude higher. There is fatigue from endless and ever-changing constraints. Many citizens no longer respect anti-pandemic regulations so strictly. Prime Minister Andrej Babiš is angry about people not understanding and respecting his call not to meet each other. In mid-November, the pandemic culminates, with the Czech Republic recording more than 8,000 hospitalized and more than 5,300 dead. Despite the subsequent slight improvement in the situation, the government decides on relaxing the measures for political-populist reasons (Christmas is approaching). However, the numbers of infected and hospitalized people do not fall, on the other hand, in the last days of the year they rise again dramatically. The vaccination, which is launched on December 27, 2020, raises great hopes, but the lack of vaccines is significant, the vaccination is not accompanied by any information campaign, the vaccination schedule is not clear, etc. The repeatedly extended state of emergency continues to apply.

At the beginning of 2021, vaccination of the most at-risk groups of the population, especially the elderly, is started, while other age cohorts gradually get in line in the coming months. However, pandemic numbers steadily deteriorate, the government does not come up with a clear plan to address the

situation (except for vaccination), and only seeks to continuously prolong the emergency. In February 2021, the situation is so bad that there are almost 7,000 patients in hospitals - 1,500 of them at ICUs, and the government announces a hard lockdown for three weeks since March. Three districts (Cheb, Sokolov, Trutnov) are closed. The opposition in the Chamber of Deputies is no longer willing to support the indefinitely prolonged state of emergency, but the government finally declares it again at the request of the Governors. The state of emergency and the absence of a government strategy to deal with the pandemic are becoming important polarizing factors that undermine the existing government's support in the Chamber of Deputies and, at the same time, divide public opinion even more sharply.

In April 2021, Jan Blatný is dismissed from the post of the Minister of Health due to disagreements with the Prime Minister and is replaced by Peter Arenberger, who, however, remains in office only a few weeks before being forced to resign due to discrepancies regarding his property. Both the emergency and the curfew are over. In May, Adam Vojtěch takes up his position again. During the seven months of the worst phase of the pandemic, five Ministers of Healths (including Adam Vojtěch 2x) have exchanged in Babiš's government! This signal was also perceived by the public and political opponents of the government as a sign of low competence and insufficient managerial qualities of the Prime Minister. During the period of Andrej Babiš in office, approximately 32,000 people with COVID-19 died and the fact raised the question whether this figure could not have been lower.

Since May 2021, government measures have been slowly loosening, the obligation to wear masks and respirators in public is changing, services, restaurants, part of school facilities are gradually reopening, there are growing numbers of people who are vaccinated or who are able to prove they are infection-free. At the same time, the Omicron variant is entering the Czech Republic, quickly displacing the previous Delta variant of COVID-19. Because the new variant is more contagious, albeit with a lighter course of illness, the numbers of infected people are increasing again over the coming months, yet, with much less impact on the health system. The unpopular massive testing in schools and companies is implemented, there is confusion in the way of reporting infection-free condition, the rules change often, especially for positively tested people. The public becomes sceptical about the measures and subject to disinformation, the increasing rate of vaccination and personal experience with undergoing the disease weaken confidence in government measures and their meaningfulness and correct timing. For example, it is not until November, i.e. almost 11 months after the beginning of vaccination, that Babiš's government launches a campaign in the media in its support. However, it is not only insufficient, but a part of the public perceives it as brutal and tacky.

### 3 Public attitudes to government's anti-pandemic measures

Moreover, government recommendations, let alone a campaign, seem to play little or no role in citizens' decisions to be vaccinated or not. According to the latest available public opinion survey conducted by the Public Opinion Research Centre (CVVM) at the end of 2021, the level of willingness to be vaccinated within the Czech population was high. More than a tenth (12%) of respondents expressed their willingness to be vaccinated against COVID-19, more than a fifth (21%) took a negative position and less than two-thirds (63%) of respondents had received at least their first dose of vaccination at the time of the survey. The remaining 4% of citizens hesitated. Respondents who wanted to be vaccinated or who had already been vaccinated stated that they wanted to stay healthy, to protect themselves from the COVID-19 disease they were concerned about, or to prevent the serious progression of the disease (48%). Other reasons for vaccination included the protection of their relatives, their surroundings, being able to meet the family (10%), life without restrictions and benefits for the vaccinated (9%), trust in vaccination in general (8%), vaccination requirement at work (5%), etc. In contrast, the recommendations of the government, or doctors and family, were cited by only 3% of respondents as the motive for vaccination. Respondents who did not want to be vaccinated at all cited distrust in the vaccine's effectiveness and distrust in vaccination as the most common reasons. (Čadová, 2022a)

Over the course of the pandemic, public confidence in the effectiveness of government anti-pandemic measures (testing, wearing respirators, restrictions on gathering, education, services, etc.) gradually changed and decreased. According to one of the latest CVVM surveys, in autumn 2021, the majority of citizens of the Czech Republic considered the measures promoted by Andrej Babiš's government to be ineffective (56%), and only about a third (37%) of the respondents rated them effective. (Čadová, 2022b). Public opinion on the effectiveness of the state's measures against the spread of the coronavirus underwent a very dynamic development since spring 2020. In May and early June 2020, more than four fifths of respondents (86%) were convinced about the effectiveness of the state's measures against the spread of the coronavirus, while only a tenth of respondents were of the opposite opinion. During the summer of 2020, however, this significant prevalence of beliefs in the effectiveness of measures gradually eroded and in September 2020, when the onset of the second wave of the COVID-19 epidemic was already evident, it dropped to 48% (at the same time, 44% of respondents already considered the measures ineffective). Although the number of people who positively assessed the measures increased (+7%) in the short term at the end of 2021, there was another decrease in the following months at the beginning of 2021. In February 2021, 32% of respondents considered government measures effective, but record 63% of respondents were of the opposite opinion. In April

2021, the situation improved somewhat for the government, when the share of those who assessed the measures against the spread of the coronavirus as effective increased by eight percentage points (from 32% to 40%) and the opposite opinion recorded a six-point decrease (from 63% to 57%). However, despite this improvement, the opinion on the ineffectiveness of the measures continued to prevail. The survey by CVVM of July 2021 then marked a turning point, when the share of people convinced about the effectiveness of the measures increased significantly (by 24 percentage points) and thus significantly outweighed the opposite opinion that the measures were not effective (a decrease by 28 percentage points). This change can be related to the relaxation, continued vaccination and a decreasing number of COVID-19 patients and deaths. However, the question is whether lower numbers of infected people and victims can only be attributed to governmental measures, or rather, to establishment of herd immunity and high rate of vaccination in the population. However, in the November 2021 surveys, the number of respondents convinced about the effectiveness of the measures again decreased significantly (by 27 percentage points) to 37% and the share of those according to whom the measures were not effective (also by 27 percentage points) increased significantly to 56%! (Čadová, 2022b).

The government's anti-pandemic measures and or its overall approach to dealing with the pandemic in 2020-2021 received increasingly intense public and, in particular, political criticism. Inconsistent, confused and often changing statements by the Prime Minister, some ministers and other representatives of the executive towards the public and the media, and some downright populist actions raised doubts about the government's ability to handle the situation. (Smolík & Dordević, 2020)

All too often, the measures taken were characterised by poor quality and insufficient support in the legislation in force. A number of measures of the Ministry of Health were retroactively annulled or declared illegal by the Supreme Administrative Court - together with the judgments of the common courts, there were dozens of cases where the government issued and enforced measures in violation of the law. (Saitzová, 2021)

The dramatically rising expenses of the state budget associated with COVID-19 also attracted public and political attention. The Supreme Audit Office (NKÚ) stated in its annual opinion on the draft state final account for 2020 that the state's economy ended with a deficit of CZK 367.4 billion in 2020. It was the highest deficit in the history of the independent Czech Republic. According to NKÚ, only CZK 218.1 billion was related to the COVID-19 pandemic based on the statements of the Ministry of Finance. (Nováčková, 2021) The debt ratio of the Czech state was increasing rapidly at an unprecedentedly dynamic pace and the growing state debt was one of the big topics of the pre-election struggle in 2021.



## Conclusion - political implications for the government

The low level of trust in the government of Andrej Babiš and in its ability and competence to cope with the ongoing pandemic was clearly reflected in the results of the parliamentary elections held on 8 to 9 October, 2021. In the elections to the decision-making lower chamber of the Parliament of the Czech Republic (Chamber of Deputies), the current ruling ANO movement led by Prime Minister Andrej Babiš remained the strongest political entity in the Chamber (72 seats out of 200 possible), having weakened slightly (lost 6 seats). More importantly, however, the current government and coalition partner - the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) - did not enter the Chamber of Deputies, having recorded a historical decline in preferences. The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM), which was not part of the government coalition, but supported the government, also remained outside the Chamber. It is the first time since the fall of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia in 1989 that the communists have not made it to the Parliament. After the elections, the current ruling ANO movement remained in opposition with the fascist and anti-immigration Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) while the hitherto opposition came to power. The new government, led by Petr Fiala, consists of representatives of five political parties. It is based on a parliamentary majority of 108 mandates and was appointed by the President of the Czech Republic on December 17, 2021.

## References

- ČADOVÁ, N. 2022a. *Nový typ koronaviru – očkování a testování – listopad/prosinec 2021: Tisková zpráva*. Centrum pro výzkum veřejného mínění. Retrieved March 20, 2022, from [https://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/media/com\\_form2content/documents/c6/a5497/f77/oz220201.pdf](https://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/media/com_form2content/documents/c6/a5497/f77/oz220201.pdf)
- ČADOVÁ, N. 2022b. *Nový typ koronaviru – zájem, obavy a očekávání české veřejnosti – listopad/prosinec 2021: Tisková zpráva*. Centrum pro výzkum veřejného mínění. Retrieved March 20, 2022, from [https://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/media/com\\_form2content/documents/c2/a5490/f9/oz220117.pdf](https://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/media/com_form2content/documents/c2/a5490/f9/oz220117.pdf)
- BOHUSLAVOVÁ, R. 2021. *Rok s koronavirem: Připomeňte si zlomové okamžiky od prvního případu po tisíce obětí*. CNN Prima News. Retrieved March 20, 2022, from <https://cnn.iprima.cz/prehledne-jak-sel-cas-s-koronavirem-v-cesku-pripomente-si-s-nami-prelomove-udalosti-roku-2020-15346>
- SAITZOVÁ, H. 2021. *Nejvyšší správní soud již zrušil řadu vládních protiepidemických opatření*. Advokátní deník. Retrieved March 20, 2022,

from <https://advokatnidenik.cz/2021/07/27/nejvyssi-spravni-soud-jiz-zrusil-radu-vladnich-protiepidemickych-opatreni/>  
NOVÁČKOVÁ, I. 2021. *NKÚ zhodnotil hospodaření státu za rok 2020: rekordní schodek, rychlé zadlužování ale také nízká nezaměstnanost a menší propad ekonomiky: Tisková zpráva*. Česká republika: Nejvyšší kontrolní úřad. Retrieved March 20, 2022, from <https://www.nku.cz/cz/pro-media/tiskove-zpravy/nku-zhodnotil-hospodareni-statu-za-rok-2020:-rekordni-schodek--rychle-zadluzovani-ale-take-nizka-nezamestnanost-a-mensi-propad-ekonomiky-id12035/>  
BÍZIK, V., KRÍŽ, Z. 2020. Žijeme v době bezprecedentního míru?: Steven Pinker a jeho percepce v odborné literatuře. *Obrana a strategie*, 20(1), 57-70. <https://doi.org/10.3849/1802-7199.20.2020.01.057-070>  
SMOLÍK, J., DORDEVIC, V. (2020). Media and Populism in Central Europe: Revisiting the Case of the Czech Republic. *POLITICKÉ VEDY*, 23(4), 65-86. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.24040/politickevedy.2020.23.4.65-86>

# INTERPRETATIONS OF MUNICH AGREEMENT, POLICY OF APPEASEMENT AND THEIR UNDERSTANDING

Pavel Hlaváček<sup>1</sup> - Matěj Boček<sup>2</sup>

## **ABSTRACT**

*The outbreak of tension between Ukraine, Russia and NATO countries has led to the re-emergence of publications and statements in which the authors refer to the Munich Treaty and the policy of appeasement. Our aim is to show that the interpretations of the Munich Conference, its participants, as well as the effectiveness and legitimacy of the use of appeasement policy are very different. Any analogies can be very misleading, because history never repeats itself. However, it seems that the Munich analogy will stay with us for a long time.*

**Key words:** *Munich Agreement, Appeasement, Chamberlain, NATO, Russia, V. Putin*

## **Introduction**

The main inspiration for this contribution was the deepening conflict between Russia, Ukraine and NATO countries. From the moment the dispute received wider media attention, we began to observe with some amazement how politicians (but also journalists, academics or various think tanks) make comparisons between the security situation in Europe today when describing or analyzing the conflict. with that of the second half of the 1930s, ie the time when the Versailles order was falling apart and the aggressive policies of Nazi Germany culminated. The fact that we encounter such a historical parallel would not be so startling in itself: since the end of World War II, we can hear (or read) them from selected representatives of many countries. They have been used by most American presidents since the end of World War II, but also by Prime Ministers **M. Thatcher**, **T. Blair** and many others, including all three presidents of the Czech Republic: **V. Havel** (2008), **V. Klaus** (1998) and **M. Zeman** (2019).

However, this time, in the context of the current situation in Ukraine, the "Munich analogy" is invoked not only by representatives of Western countries - those countries that can make a link in their foreign policy to the conference in the Bavarian capital - but also Russia. or, for example, Estonia. Since 2014 at the latest, we have seen one recurring pattern of behavior: invoking a "lesson" from

---

<sup>1</sup> Pavel Hlaváček, PhD., Assistant Professor, University of West Bohemia, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Jungmannova street 1090, Pilsen, 301 00, Czech Republic, hlavacek@kap.zcu.cz

<sup>2</sup> Bc. Matěj Boček, MA student, University of West Bohemia, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Jungmannova street 1090, Pilsen, 301 00, Czech Republic, matejbocek@seznam.cz

Munich (1938) or a supposed "lesson" of appeasement policy or other verbal expressions of the same meaning that are formulated to justify selected foreign policy interests at the end of the second decade of the 21st century. In all cases, it is a selective manipulation with history that is supposed to attract the current audience.

In our paper, we will try to show that strategies in which individual actions are legitimized by reference to a historical analogy can be potentially highly misleading. In this sense, our contribution is by no means revealing. Philosophers in ancient times already knew that "No man ever steps in the same river twice, for it's not the same river and he's not the same man. " However, the current developments (not only) in Ukraine confirm that it is appropriate to remember this because some politicians today tend to forget the wisdom of ancient times.

Our goal is not to reveal exactly what happened at the Munich Conference or whether appeasement policy can be understood as a standard foreign policy tool. We do not intend to correct untruths, misleading claims or completely uncovered propaganda here. These things are undoubtedly very interesting and it is in Czech (and Slovak) history that they will certainly continue to gain their place. For us, the process of purposeful abuse of history is essential, i.e. the effort to adjust history so that it meets current requirements. Our attention is drawn to the contrast between our knowledge and how it is interpreted. On the one hand, historians (or experts in related disciplines) have developed three basic interpretations since the second half of the 20th century, in which they differ widely on the basic questions of what happened in September 1938 and what preceded it. Yet only one of them still dominates the political discourse. But why this happens remains somewhat obscured. So we ask ourselves the following question: why do politicians - whether in the USA, Russia or the Czech Republic - still offer us the same narrative? What makes "Munich" and appeasement so engaging?

We will proceed in three steps to answer these questions. First of all, let us recall the very statements of Western or Russian politicians, who are currently using the "Munich analogy". In the second part, we will show that historians' debate on the "Munich events" has, unlike politicians, shifted. We would like to briefly summarize the three developments in the interpretation of the Munich Conference (orthodox, revisionist and post-revisionist) and the two basic goals that the policy of appeasement is to meet. With the help of this content "framework", we will finally conclude why "Munich" and "appeasement" still live their lives and why - we are afraid - they will continue to be used (or abused) in the same way in the near future: to purposefully justify current needs and interests.

## **1 Invoking "Munich": two current perspectives**

The "Munich analogy" is a linguistic turn in which we create similarities between the state of international relations before World War II and what is

happening today. The Munich Treaty went down in history as an example of exemplary "betrayal": a moment when the leaders of the democratic European powers (Britain, France) decided to meet the demands of Nazi Germany and wanted to ensure stability and peace through concessions in Europe. However, as it soon turned out, this effort did not achieve its goal: the war eventually broke out and the aggressor entered it precisely thanks to these concessions, even stronger.

The results achieved at the Munich Conference were rather satisfying immediately after its conclusion, but this perception soon changed. After the outbreak of World War II, the public began to look for the causes of the collapse of the interwar order. The Munich Agreement became the target of criticism; on the one hand, as an embodiment of the policy of appeasement, which did not work, but also as the last possible moment where wars could have been prevented if there was a will (Shachtman, 2013). Since then, "Munich" and "appeasement" are often considered as "the dirtiest words... synonymous with naïveté and weakness, and signifying a craven willingness to barter away the nation's vital interests for empty promises" (Logevall, Osgood, 2010, pp. 14; cp. McLoughlin, 2008, p. 543). According to **Paul Kennedy** (2010, p. 7) "Nothing so alarms a president or a prime minister in the Western world than to be accused of pursuing policies of appeasement. Better to be accused of stealing from a nunnery, or beating one's family. "

When the analogy between today's situation and that of 1938 is used, it is indicated that we are currently witnessing some form of betrayal. The warnings about the ongoing "betrayal" are intended to attract attention, because no one wants a repeat of World War II. However, who betrays or, conversely, who is being betrayed depends on the context in which the analogy is to take place.

**Vladimir Putin**, for example, invoked the alleged "Munich betrayal" in his speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2020. "Today", he said "European politicians, and Polish leaders in particular, wish to sweep the Munich Betrayal under the carpet." One of the reasons for this is that "it is kind of embarrassing to recall that during those dramatic days of 1938, the Soviet Union was the only one to stand up for Czechoslovakia". Using a historical analogy at the Munich Conference, **Vladimir Putin** seeks to defend the USSR's actions before World War II in order to preserve the USSR's legacy as a country that he said did not collaborate with the Nazis. And from these positions, he declares that it is in the Russian national interest to maintain the status quo that corresponds to the results of World War II. The message **Putin** is telling us is clear: by rewriting history, you are betraying. The traitors here are Western leaders who question the role of the USSR as the liberator of fascism. The Ukrainians or Poles or the public media are selectively portrayed as the aggressors. Russia is placed in the role of a "Munich" victim. **Putin** styles himself in the role of "**Winston Churchill**", who as one of the few has managed to raise his voice and warn against the policy of

concessions. **Putin**, resp. Russia intends to prevent this, even if it is by military force. This is the only way to avoid a repeat of World War II.

**Marko Mihkelson**, head of the foreign affairs committee of Estonia's parliament, thinks about the Munich Agreement in a completely opposite "guard". He spoke to the Financial Times in December of 2021 about the security situation in Ukraine. Fearing that the country might be sacrificed to Russia's power interests, he said (The Financial Times, December 10, 2021), "I hope I'm wrong but I smell 'Munich' here". And he warned NATO not to act with Russia from a position of weakness and not to engage Russia in the European security architecture: "this is completely the wrong way and will ignite appetite for further aggression".

British Defense Minister **Benn Wallace** spoke almost in the same vein as **Mihkelson**, when he warned (The Sunday Times, February 13 2022) that the situation on the Russian-Ukrainian border was very serious and many still did not realize: "there is a whiff of Munich in the air from some in the West", he claimed. Finally, a group of Republican Party leaders in the United States have gone a step further. In their statement (Republican Leadership's Statement on Russia's Invasion of Ukraine, 2022) they argue that "President Biden consistently chose appeasement and his tough talk on Russia was never followed by strong action". This statement is interesting because it explicitly suggests that President **Biden** is **Chamberlain** today, while **Putin** is playing the role of today's **Hitler**.

## 2 The Munich Agreement and the Evolution of its Interpretation

As with each historical phenomenon, there has been a gradual development in the way the Munich agreement was perceived. Without any simplification, it can be said the Munich agreement was a byproduct of a policy of appeasement, performed by politicians with significant power during that period. Most notably, it was **Neville Chamberlain**, the prime minister of the UK during the 1930s, whose decision was part of the cascade of miscalculated acts leading to the second world war. Moreover, his role during the "Munich betrayal" was criticized by some with even more serious note. Nevertheless, it was not only the role of **Neville Chamberlain**, but also the process of signing the Munich treaty, and the politics of appeasement itself, which was part of an academic discussion and observation from the post-1945 period onwards.

In general, there are three main currents regarding the interpretation of the Munich agreement legacy that can be traced back from the late 1940s up until nowadays. Each of the current views the Munich agreement as morally affected, however, they differ in several other aspects. Namely, one of the most important aspects is the role of **Neville Chamberlain** and whether his decision to accede to **Hitler's** and **Mussolini's** demands can be justified given the historical context? Furthermore, by what attributes can we name appeasement politics? Is it a helpful tool and part of a rational foreign policy strategy, or a symbol of naivety and

cowardness? As we will see further in the text, the three currents establish their arguments along these questions and make distinctive statements based on their longstanding observation and critical analysis.

## 2.1 Orthodox Perspective

The first established interpretation of the Munich agreement was formed right after World War II. Unofficially, it was the publication named *Guilty Men* from 1940 which laid the groundwork for the so-called orthodox view. In *Guilty Men*, the authors known as Cato (pseudonym for three journalists), concluded that prime ministers such as **Neville Chamberlain**, **Ramsey Macdonald**, and **Stanley Baldwin** were all politically weak and failed in the face of the upcoming threat of German Nazism (Aster, 2008, p. 444). Moreover, the political dimension was also followed by the moral layer that was always associated with appeasement politics and which was also the subject of intense criticism.

According to “ortodox perspective”, appeasement does not lead to peace, it is quite the opposite; it serves only to stimulate the aggressor's ambition making more offensive actions. The orthodox view was also reinforced by **Winston Churchill** (1991) who argued in his war memoirs that World War II could have been prevented in the early 1930s. Unfortunately, his words: “*There never was a war in all history easier to prevent by timely action than the one which has just desolated such great areas of the globe. It could have been prevented in my belief without the firing of a single shot*” during the *Sinews of Peace* speech (1946) became quite prophetic.

## 2.2 Revisionist Perspective

Contrary to the prevailing view during the 1940s and 1950s, the perception of appeasement politics and the Munich agreement was enriched by new historical insights. This new current, known as revisionist, argued the Munich treaty was a climax of British foreign policy and there is nothing morally wrong with it. In a similar tone, **A. J. P. Taylor's** publication *The Origins of the Second World War* (1996) claimed that neither the appeasement politics nor **Neville Chamberlain** himself were to be labeled as “foolish”, “naive” or “morally irresponsible”. Additionally, others, such as **Martin Gilbert** (2015; 2000) or **Richard Gott** (2000), tried to show that **Neville Chamberlain** and other pro-appeasement politicians did their best to avoid the war. The Munich treaty was therefore a rational strategy on how to prevent any major escalation in Europe, and under the circumstances of 1938, it was more or less a realistic policy decision that had to be made.

## 2.3 Post-Revisionist Perspective

From the 1980s onwards, however, the revisionist perspective started to fade. With a new generation of historians and under a somewhat relaxed political climate, the legacy of the “1938 event” started to be revised again. This new approach, named as post-revisionist, shared the same principle in analyzing the Munich treaty as revisionist view. However, they adopted some critical elements from the orthodox perspective as well. Concretely, the Munich treaty was a mistake with its consequences, but under such circumstances that **Neville Chamberlain** and his team acted, it is understandable. **Chamberlain** himself was a product of a morally doubted appeasement politics and his sense of smelling the threat was far from perfect, the war was inevitable. Post-revisionists, such as **R.A.C. Parker** (1993) pointed out that **Chamberlain** lacked any realism about German foreign policy, overestimated German military power and manipulated the British public to support the appeasement policy.

Finally, the post-revisionists argued that appeasement politics is rooted in the foreign policy of the UK since imperial times. Moreover, the appeasement politics should be, under certain conditions, taken as an efficient tool to meet state's interest abroad.

## 3 Policy of Appeasement and Framework for its Interpretation

Just as historians do not have a clear view of the role of Prime Minister **Chamberlain** and the reasons why he signed the Munich Treaty, so do the interpretations of the very essence of appeasement policy. However, we believe that we can distinguish appeasement according to the declared goals into two general categories. According to the first interpretation, the appeasement is conducted in such a way that the concession to the aggressor contributes to the achievement of lasting peace and / or stability. According to the second concept, it is exactly the opposite: the main goal is to enter the war on more favorable terms, and concessions are only a way to "buy" time to arm.

### 3.1 Long Term Peace and Stability

One of the first authors to interpret the policy of appeasement in a positive light was the British historian **Paul Kennedy**. According to his findings (1976, p. 195; c.p. to Kennedy, 2010), appeasement was a standard instrument of British foreign policy from the middle of the 19th century at the latest. Until the Munich Conference (1938), the word "appeasement" had a strictly neutral meaning in the dictionary of international relations. For Britain, which at the time was one of the most powerful states in the world, it proved quite advantageous to make small concessions. It was an effective way to prevent wars. Moreover, as **Graham Allison** (2017) shows, this approach could, under certain circumstances, make



your enemy your ally. This is the case in the United States, which got into disputes over spheres of influence in the Western Hemisphere during the 19th century. The British understood that they could hardly win in an open conflict with the United States. And so they gave in to American pressures, resolving mutual disputes through arbitration, but never by arms. And this approach has paid off. America and Britain eventually entered into a joint alliance against the Central Powers during World War One.

### 3.2 “Buying Time”

The policy of appeasement does not have to be driven by the pursuit of peace and stability. According to **Norrin M. Ripsman** and **Jack S. Levy** (2008), Prime Minister **Chamberlain** sought concessions to gain the time Britain desperately needed to complete the armaments process. Both authors reviewed both the government's official document and the private correspondence of their representatives. They conclude that no one had the illusion before 1939 that **Adolf Hitler** could be reconciled or deterred. The fatal problem was that German military force far exceeded British and French capabilities. Western democracies found themselves in a desperate situation: they could not afford war in these circumstances. However, the goal was not to surrender to Germany. The initiators of the concessions believed that the time gained would be used for rapid rearmament. It was expected that as early as 1939, Britain could be strong enough to defend itself.

### Conclusion

The Munich Conference is an event that took place more than eight decades ago, yet its legacy remains very much alive in the current political debate. The reasons for attracting so much attention are not entirely clear. But we can say with certainty that the legacy of this conference is "revived" quite one-sidedly. The correct question, then, is: why do politicians choose only one interpretation?

Our conclusions are not entirely clear here, but we believe that one of the reasons for the frequent use of the "Munich analogy" is its readability and easy to grasp. The voter does not have to be an expert on history to understand that efforts to create stability and lasting peace in Europe and the world have failed. The Orthodox interpretation offers clear and direct answers: Czechoslovakia would be a victim, Britain (with France) a traitor, appeasement was wrong, and the entry into the war against **Hitler** was noble, resp. the only possible. In this respect, both revisionists and post-revisionists require much greater knowledge of the second half of the 1930s, and the conclusions reached by the authors are less clear. We have no clear traitors or victims. It leaves the reader uncertain in their uncertainty. From a political point of view, such an interpretation is inapplicable because we

cannot expect the voter to be an expert on international relations in the first half of the 20th century.

The same can be said about appeasement policy. If those who like to invoke the "Munich analogy" accepted **Paul Kennedy's** interpretation, they would have to admit that a negative assessment of appeasement did not appear until after World War II. In other words, appeasement was a standard foreign policy tool. And if they accepted the interpretation from **Ripsman** and **Levy**, they would have to admit that **Chamberlain** was not a naive statesman. And above all that the alleged betrayal of Czechoslovakia are simply exaggerated terms.

We do not, however, expect any major changes in this regard. Orthodox interpretation will continue to be dominant, at least in the discourse of politicians. The Munich Conference (1938) is such a powerful moment in our history that its legacy will continue with us in the near future. We will continue to "step in the same river" in spite of all the historical inaccuracies and purposeful misinterpretations that we are able to identify but we are unable to prevent from their undying popularity.

## References

- ALLISON, G. 2017. *Destined For War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?* Boston. Mariner Books, 2017. 384 p. ISBN 0544935276.
- ASTER, S. 2008. Appeasement: Before and After Revisionism. In *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, Vol. 19, No. 3, September 2008, ISSN 0959-2296, pp. 443-480.
- The Financial Times, December 10, 2021. Biden reaffirms US's 'unwavering commitment' to Ukrainian sovereignty. Available on internet: <https://www.ft.com/content/6835ea18-0085-4deb-8ff8-78d185f36beb>
- GILBERT, M. 1966. *The Roots of Appeasement*. New York. RosettaBooks, 2015. 243 p. ISBN 978-0452250246.
- GILBERT, M - GOTT, R. 2000. *The Appeasers*. Phoenix. Phoenix Publishing House, 2000. 464 p. ISBN 1842120506.
- Republican Leadership's Statement on Russia's Invasion of Ukraine, February 23, 2022. Available on internet: <https://scalise.house.gov/media/press-releases/house-republican-leadership-s-statement-russia-s-invasion-ukraine>
- HAVEL, V. 2008. ČTK News: Havel: Sarkozy mluví rychleji, než myslí. Lidové noviny, 24. 11. 2008.
- CHURCHILL, W. 1948-1951. *Memoirs on the Second World War*. London. HoughtonMifflin. 1991. 1065 p. ISBN 0395599687.
- CHURCHILL, W. 1946. *The Sinews of Peace Speech*. Available on internet: <https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1946-1963-elder-statesman/the-sinews-of-peace/>.
- KENNEDY, P. 1976. The Tradition of Appeasement in British Foreign Policy 1865-1939. In *British Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 3

October 1976, pp. 195-215.

KENNEDY, P. 2010. A Time to Appear. In *The National Interest*, No. 108 July/August 2010, pp. 7-17.

KLAUS, V. 1998. Leták "Mobilisace" (podepsaný V. Klausem) před volbami do Poslanecké sněmovny v roce 1998. Ukázka: <https://nazory.aktualne.cz/ods-20-let-archiv-1998/r~i;photo:367680/>

LOGEVALL, F. - OSGOOD, K. 2010. The Ghost of Munich: America's Appeasement Complex. *World Affairs Journal*, Vol. 173, No. 2 JULY/AUGUST 2010, pp. 13-26.

McLOUGHLIN, K. 2008. Voices of the Munich Pact. In *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 34, No. 3, Spring 2008, pp. 543-562.

MERRY, R. W. 2015. Ukraine Is Not Munich. In *The National Interest*, February 18, 2015. Available on internet: <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/ukraine-not-munich-12271>

OWEN, F. - HOWARD, P. 1940. *Guilty Men*. London. BiteBack Publishing, 2017. 176 p. ISBN 0571270204.

PARKER, R. A. C. 1993. *Chamberlain and appeasement : British policy and the coming of the Second World War*. Palgrave Macmillan. London. 1993. 388 p. ISBN 0333417135.

RIPSMAN, N. M. – LEVY, J. S. 2008. Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s. In *International Security* Vol. 33, No. 2, Fall, 2008, pp. 148-181.

SHACHTMAN, T. 2013. It's Time to Abandon Munich. *Foreign Policy*, September 29, 2013. Available on internet: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/09/29/its-time-to-abandon-munich/>

TAYLOR, A. J. P. 1961. *The Origins of the Second World War*. Simon & Schuster. New York, 1996. 320 p. ISBN 0684829479.

The SUNDAY TIMES, February 13 2022. Ukraine crisis: 'Whiff of Munich' warning from Ben Wallace. Available on internet: <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ukraine-crisis-whiff-of-munich-warning-from-ben-wallace-b7mjflxn>

ZEMAN, M. 11. března 2019. Rozhovor prezidenta republiky pro ČTK. Available on internet: <http://www.zemanmilos.cz/cz/clanky/rozhovor-prezidenta-republiky-pro-ctk-97025.htm>

# SOME ISSUES OF THE CURRENT SECURITY POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

**Martin Horemuž<sup>1</sup>**

## **ABSTRACT**

*The aim of the paper is to approach and analyse selected issues and contexts of the contemporary security policy of the Russian Federation. The events connected to illegal annexation of Crimea and the military support of Moscow to the separatists in eastern Ukraine are fundamental and determining factors that define the current security policy as well as foreign policy development of Russia. As a result Russia has found itself on the international stage in strong and deep international, political and economic isolation. Moreover this isolation is enhanced by Moscow's open and ongoing confrontational policy and its unacceptable international political behaviour. This behaviour is reflected on a practical level in the hostile even more aggressive steps that have been taken place in recent years: the attempt to poison S. Skripal and opposition politician A. Navalny, interference in elections in some states, disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, etc. These steps taken by Russia lead to its further international-political isolation. For European (regional) security environment this means a decline or even a loss of mutual trust, growing geopolitical tensions and undoubtedly higher destabilizing and conflicting potential and the associated increase in security threats and risks. However, this seems to be what Russia has been striving for through its non-cooperative behaviour in the last 5 years. This is documented not only by the events in Ukraine, Belarus but also by Russia's foreign and security policy in wider regional and international security environment, in events where Moscow is exposed in various degrees and forms: Iran's nuclear programme, civil war in Syria and Libya, Russian involvement in Iraq but also in Africa, etc. The new Russian National Security Strategy published in the beginning of July 2021 has also the spirit of escalation. Unlike the past it pays more attention to non-military threats in the context of the processes of current changes in the modern world, on the other hand it further emphasizes security threats for Russian state and its national interests by the USA possibly of the western world at all.*

**Key words:** Russia, National Security, Security Policy

## **1 Initial Assumptions and Geopolitical Context**

The decisive and fundamental foreign-political, military-secure, economic and in the broadest sense geopolitical factor that currently determines the direction of the security policy of the Russian Federation is undoubtedly the overall development and crisis in Ukraine. Until the annexation of Crimea in 2014 Russian foreign and security policy focused on systematic consolidation and fixation of positions in the regional (post-Soviet) but also broader the international political framework, for what Russia considered as important regions (Syria,

---

<sup>1</sup> Martin Horemuž, PhD., assistant professor, Faculty of Humanities, University of Žilina, Univerzitná 8215/1, 010 26 Žilina, martin.horemuz@fhv.uniza.sk

Libya). The global economic and financial crisis in 2008, together with the launched EU policy in the form of the so-called "Eastern Partnership" has further intensified the aforementioned process from Moscow's side. On the other hand, it meant drawing particular attention to the increasing Russian economic performance and economic share in global and international trade. Especially after 2012 (note "the third presidency of **V. Putin**") the focus was on practical steps and measures in the economic field which would lead to a significant strengthening of Russia's economic power in the global political system. The definition of these goals as well as tools was reflected in President **V. Putin's** Decree no. 605 of May 2012 "*On measures to realize the foreign policy course of the Russian Federation*". This decree implicitly emphasized the importance of the economic dimension of foreign policy as well as the economic integration project in the form of Eurasian economic integration (Customs Union, Eurasian Economic Union).<sup>2</sup> At the same time the decree was an overture of the Russian Federation's Foreign Policy Concept adopted in 2013. The foreign policy concept as with the decree pointed for the first time to the role of "soft power" as an integral part of a wide range of instruments to achieve the foreign policy goals. Public and cultural diplomacy was to become part of soft power helping to shape Russia's positive image in the world. Incorporating the tool in the form of "soft power" also represented a pragmatic and targeted shift in the intensification of Russia's foreign and security policy. This shift was mainly based on a deep reflection as well as an analysis of the dynamically ongoing development in international (economic) relations. Among these the economic as well as the cultural factor not only becomes increasingly relevant but also represents in terms of efficiency (costs incurred and benefit achieved) a more effective and generally accepted tool than traditional power ("hard power"). For Russia however its own concept of "soft power" has become one of the possible (and other) tools for how to balance and at the same time respond to the perceived threat in the form of EU soft power (Solík, 2020). The EU as well as its Eastern Partnership policy is one of the key instruments of "soft power" for selected post-Soviet republics outside the EU (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine) who are offered participation in EU economic areas as well as deeper political cooperation. The aim of the Eastern Partnership policy which together with the European neighbourhood cooperation policy is not only a political and institutional platform for mutual dialogue and relations development but also serves as a framework for

---

<sup>2</sup> In recent years the legal framework of the Union has also been expanding: a number of agreements have been signed in various areas of economic activity (transport, industry, agriculture, subsidies, competition, energy, digitalization, labeling of goods, traceability system, etc.). Programs for the formation of a common electric power market (on May 29, 2019, the Protocol on Amendments to the Treaty on the EAEU regarding the formation of the electric power market was signed), common markets for gas, oil and oil products of the EAEU are being implemented. (Karpovich - Davydova, pp. 317-318: 2021) The key objective of the EAEU is to create a common market for goods, services, capital and labor by 2025.

a process of political affiliation and the deepening of economic integration between the EU and countries engaged in the Eastern Partnership policy. Moscow has long considered the Eastern partnership policy to be a tool to disrupt its own dominant "geopolitical" position in post-Soviet territory. The EU's soft power is perceived by Russia as an immediate (non-military) security threat as it creates preconditions for the processes of political, economic as well as socio-cultural "Europeanization" and "westernization" of the post-Soviet space. Russia views the Europeanization of selected post-Soviet states together with the expanding soft power of the European Union in this area at the level of power and at the level of influence which should lead to the weakening of its (geo)political, economic position. Not only a security threat but also a major geopolitical challenge. Looking at Moscow's deeprooted tendencies and schemes to perceive the current processes through a geopolitical and power perspective it is therefore logical that Russia considers such development to be a serious security threat. In this context it is necessary to assess the geopolitical clash between the further direction and foreign policy orientation of Ukraine. This collision started by the non-signing of the Association Agreement by President **V. Yanukovich** at the end of 2013, subsequent protests, which became an initiating impulse for Russia's military intervention in support of Crimea occupation of and the outbreak of civil war in eastern Ukraine.

## **2 The Ukrainian Crisis and its Consequences**

The events in Ukraine in 2014, the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and Russia's involvement in the military support of pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine ended a period of general cooperation in West-Russia relations, and inevitably led to a serious deterioration in relations at all levels. Recognizing the eastern Ukrainian separatist republics (Donetsk, Luhansk) and the subsequent direct military attack on Ukraine in February 2022, have led Europe to one of the most serious security threats since the end of World War II. The annexation of the Crimean Peninsula together with the support of pro-Russian separatists in the east Ukraine had already had serious economic and social consequences for Russia, which effectively "buried" the achievement of the goals defined by **V. Putin** in 2012 (especially Russia's inclusion in the top five largest economies by 2015). The economic problems of the Russian economy after 2014 thus really undermined, resp. prevented the wider use and application of soft power instruments in the framework of foreign and security policy. The sanctions imposed on Russia by the Western events (EU, US and other democracies) as a result of Ukraine's events have had a very negative effect on the Russian economy and the social sphere. The problems of the Russian economy in 2015-2016 were further accentuated by the fall of energy raw materials on world markets. One year after the annexation of Crimea, Russia's GDP fell by 2%, but after some stabilization of the economy in 2017-2019, there was a sharp decline in 2020 (as

in other countries of the world) due to the COVID-19 pandemic (Russia GDP...., 2021). Apart from the pandemic factor, which has affected economic indicators in the last two years, the Russian economy has not shown the required GDP growth of at least 3% per year for a long time. Only annual GDP growth at this level allows us to keep pace with the most advanced economies in the world. The robust rise in oil and gas prices in the second half of 2021, together with the economic recovery (after the slump in 2020), meant a sharp rise in Russia's state budget revenues, but on the other hand pointed to structural weaknesses in the economy associated with high and chronic export dependence on minerals and energy, especially oil and gas. That is also why the sanctions imposed by the West on Russia are aimed primarily at the energy and raw materials sectors. Combined with the limited access of Russian banks and companies to Western financial and capital markets, they mean a significant burden (overpricing) of financing demanding investment and development energy projects, and thus also their implementation.

The economic problems associated with the sanction regime also directly affected the security area, namely in the sector of the military-industrial complex. Undoubtedly, the most significant impact are the restrictions or total ban in the form of supplies of military equipment and dual-use devices, as well as access to key technologies in the energy and industrial sectors. US sanctions adopted in several stages after 2014 were related not only to events in Ukraine, but also to other unacceptable (hostile) activities of Russia (election interference, hacker attacks, targeted disinformation campaign, hybrid war, assassinations of political opponents, even abroad, outside of Russia, etc.). On the other hand, economic sanctions have allowed Russia to launch a massive policy aimed at replacing not only Ukrainian, but also any foreign military, as well as civilian production (mainly from agriculture and food). To support its own economy and economic sectors, Moscow has introduced state measures in the form of an incentive program, the so-called "Import mix", financed through the Industrial Development Fund. Despite measures to eliminate the effects of the sanctions regime on the economy, as well as on the security sector, sanctions present a number of logistical problems, manifested in significant delays in several arms production projects, together with the chronic non-compliance with military supply deadlines. A more serious threat to the Russian military-industrial complex is the denial of access to technology and some key components needed for the production of military equipment (turbines and engines to power ships, electronics). The most pronounced technological complications are manifested in the segment of shipbuilding (naval), but also in the aviation industry. According to Ministry of Defence, there are 10 crucial technological areas which play a pivotal role in ensuring a high quality of military products and their competitiveness. They include: new material technologies, microelectronic, nano electronic, radio-electronic, laser, electro-optical, computer, propulsion systems; industrial equipment; unique experimental testing facilities (Gregova et al.,

2021).<sup>3</sup> The problems of the Russian military-industrial complex are also documented by data on the decline in sales of weapons and military equipment in 2020. Sales of Russian arms companies peaked in 2017. Since then, their volumes have only been decreasing. Compared to 2019, arms were sold 1.8 billion less. The fall was 6.5%. In 2020, Russian arms manufacturers also faced other difficulties, associated with a sharp decline in the Russian currency, but also with a growing shortage of qualified and age-appropriate personnel. (Sales of Russian..., 2021).

On the global stage, Russia has found itself in strong international, political, but also economic isolation, which in the last five years has been a direct consequence not only of events in Ukraine, but also of Moscow's openly confrontational and unconstructive policy, accompanied by unacceptable international political behaviour. As a result of this behaviour, Russia was excluded from the G8, which unites the most economically advanced countries in the world, and at the same time it was suspended – regarding the entry to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. As a result of the annexation of Crimea and the aggression in eastern Ukraine, Russia's voting rights in the Council of Europe were also suspended, to which Moscow responded by stopping contributions to the international organization, which also focuses on protecting human rights, pluralist democracy and the rule of law. The threat of Russia's complete withdrawal from the Council of Europe, which would mean, among other things, that Russian citizens could not turn to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg due to violations of their rights, led to the return of voting rights in mid-2019. Nevertheless, Russia continues to increase confrontation and tensions in regions where it has a permanent presence or national and security interests. This was also reflected in Russia's response to the domestic political unrest that erupted in early 2022 in Kazakhstan. The "peacekeeping" mission through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which actually takes place under the "baton" of Moscow, aimed to eliminate a possible political change in Kazakhstan in the form of another "colour" revolution. Russia has used the international political isolation of Belarus and the regime of President **A. Lukashenko**, which has persisted since the suppression of large-scale protests after the presidential elections in August 2020, to strengthen Minsk's political, security and economic "attachment" to Moscow, resp. to further deepen the already existing dependency of the Belarus regime. Belarus, no doubt with the tacit consent of Russia, intensively and purposefully destabilized the EU

---

<sup>3</sup> In a study ("Actual problems and limiting factors in the development of the Russian military-industrial complex") by **E. Gregova** et al., they assess Russia's position in the market for high-tech products and services based on an analysis of priority areas in the defense industry, including: aircraft, aerospace, armaments and shipbuilding. In this regard, the authors note the negative dynamics of the index of production of high-tech economic activities, which include the production of electronic and optical products, aircraft, including space, electrical products and industrial equipment (Gregova et al., 2021).



during 2021 through an artificial "migration crisis" on the borders with Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, but also by providing Belarusian territory for the presence of Russian troops and military equipment to increase political and security tensions, as well as the escalation of the crisis in Russia-Ukraine relations. In the subsequent military invasion in February 2022, Minsk allowed its territory to be used for a military attack on Ukraine.

In terms of the current security environment, as well as the overall security structure of Europe, which was formed with the participation of Russia after the Cold War (transformation of the CSCE to the OSCE, NATO-Russia Council), the annexation of Crimea represents the international political recognition of the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republic, as well as a direct military attack on the entire territory of Ukraine its most serious undermining and disruption. The special relations between Russia and NATO, the constitution of which took place in the 1990s at a very difficult time (the process of NATO enlargement to include Central European countries, Russia's internal and economic crisis after the collapse of the USSR), due to the Russian aggression in Ukraine, they actually went back institutionally to the 1990s. In real terms, this means that the mechanisms of mutual functioning in the form of regular meetings and exchanges of information to build trust, prevent crises and eliminate the escalation of potential tensions are not working. The NATO-Russia Council meeting, resumed in January 2022, after more than two and a half years, in connection with Russia's security requirements, was the result of feverish diplomatic activity in the West at a time of already unstoppable escalating crisis.

Russia's terminated participation in the March 2015 Convention on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) can also be included in the overall context of the deliberately undermined security environment in Europe. Following US allegations that Russia was not complying with and violating the Medium- and Short-Range Missile Disposal Treaty by developing missiles that violate the treaty, the United States terminated the treaty in 2019. In response, Moscow made the same decision and suspended the contract, respectively later formally resigned it. Deepening tensions and mistrust in US-Russia relations also led in 2020, respectively 2021, to withdraw from the Open Skies Agreement on both sides. The agreement, signed after the end of the Cold War in 1992, allowed the countries involved in the agreement to conduct unarmed exploratory and control flights over the entire territory of its signatory states, which was supposed to help build mutual trust. Russia's isolation was further deepened by the Kremlin's long-term measures leading to the destabilisation of selected states in Western Europe, but also in the United States in the form of hybrid operations (spreading of disinformation, cyber-attacks, influencing elections). Russia's international image does not even benefit from the support of authoritarian, but advantageous and allied regimes for Russia. In addition to the already mentioned Belarus, these are traditional "allied" states such as Iran, Venezuela and Syria. The US and the EU have long criticized the activities of Russian mercenaries from

the so-called "Wagner Group", backed by people linked to Kremlin (an oligarch close to **V. Putin, J. Prigozhin**), who are on the EU's sanctions list. This group is directly involved in the fighting in Ukraine, but also in Syria. However, its operations are linked to wider Russian activities in several African countries: Mozambique, the Central African Republic, Sudan, Libya and Mali.

Intelligence actions and the assassinations of political opponents have also become serious security threats in Western European countries, only confirming the continuing unacceptable international political behaviour of the Russian regime. An attempt by the assassination of former Russian (double) agent **S. Skripal** and his daughter in March 2018 in Great Britain provoked the most serious reaction in the West. Members of the Russian military intelligence GRU tried to poison him with a nerve-paralytic substance (Novichok). Although the assassination of Chechen of Georgian descent **Z. Changoshvili** in Berlin in August 2019 did not attract such attention, it again pointed to the liquidation of uncomfortable people in Kremlin, executed by people directly connected to the Russian secret service environment. It is also possible to include in this list the conclusions of the investigation of the Czech security forces in the case of the explosion of the army warehouse in Vrbětice (Czech Republic) from 2014 published in April 2021.

The internal escalation of tension and fixation in Russian society throughout the Western world, and especially the United States as Russia's enemy, is also greatly aided by the domestic political situation (Trenin, 2021). The Russian regime perceives the Western democracies and the values on which it is built, not only as decadent, but also as a direct threat to the projection of the "Russian world" - i.e., to promote the influence of Russian soft power. Such an approach is also mentioned in the Russia's new National Security Strategy of July 2021. Unlike in the past, it draws attention to the non-military threats it perceives in the context of the current changes in the modern world. It considers values incompatible with Russia's national identity to be harmful and threatening its sovereignty and spiritual nature. According to this document, the US and its allies are actively attacking traditional Russian spiritual, moral, cultural and historical values (Russia's National..., 2021).

## **Conclusion**

Despite the existence of several security interpretations and (geo) political approaches to Russia's open and direct military aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, it is irreversible that current developments will have far-reaching implications and consequences to the geopolitical configuration not only of the whole post-Soviet space, but above all of the European security system and order. The source of Moscow's current non-cooperative and aggressive behaviour is inherently embedded in the undemocratic and highly authoritarian nature of the Russian political system, its political institutions and structures, ideologically

constructed on the "artificially" fabricated (pseudo) history of the Russian state full of heroism and purposeful myths (Švec, 2021). They become an integral part of Russian nationalism and, in combination with imperial power (geo) political traditions, highlighting the peculiarities of the Russian world and Russian "mission" in the world, "superior" Russian spiritual values, testify to the symptoms of current Russian foreign and security policy. Excessive geopolitical vision emphasizing the traditional - imperial (power) view and thinking leads in foreign policy exclusively to realistic approaches. Team Russia remains in a strong captivity of the old thinking of "past times", based on the division of the world (states) into spheres of influence and interests. This is one of the reasons why the rational definition of Russia's current national interests, as in the past (the Soviet era and the ideological view of security issues and international relations), is severely limited by power thinking and the view of international political events. The decisive structural problem of carrying out any fundamental internal reform (transformation) of Russian society, which would lead to a substantial qualitative change in Russia's behaviour in the system of international relations and return to respect its norms, is the current undemocratic nature of the Russian state, political system and its individual segments.

Regardless of other events and their development, i.e. whether Russia will embark on a path of intensification as the military solution in Ukraine or further aggression (outside Ukraine), there is no doubt that its international-political and global economic (self) isolation will only deepen. For the European security environment Russia with its current foreign policy and security direction will present a huge destabilizing and confrontational potential, full of real and open security (military and non-military) threats and risks. However, it seems that Russia is striving for such a scenario and development with its aggressive and non-cooperative behaviour. This is confirmed not only by the events in Ukraine, Belarus but also by the wider regional and international security environment in which Russia is involved to various degrees and forms (Iran's nuclear program, civil war in Syria and Libya, Russian involvement in Iraq, but also in Africa etc.).

## References

- GREGOVA, E., TULYAKOVA I., DENGGOV, V. 2021. Actual problems and limiting factors in the development of the Russian military-industrial complex. Available from:  
[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/348463682\\_Actual\\_problems\\_and\\_limiting\\_factors\\_in\\_the\\_development\\_of\\_the\\_Russian\\_military-industrial\\_complex](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/348463682_Actual_problems_and_limiting_factors_in_the_development_of_the_Russian_military-industrial_complex) [accessed Feb 21 2022]
- KARPOVIC, O., DAVYDOVA A. 2021: Современные векторы российской дипломатии на постсоветском пространстве. Available from:  
<https://doi.org/10.24975/2313-8920-2021-8-3-315-330> [accessed Feb 20 2022]

*Russia GDP Annual Growth Rate. 2021.* Available from:  
<https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/gdp-growth-annual>. [accessed Feb 18 2022]

*Russia's National Security Strategy 2021: the Era of "Information Confrontation.* 2021. Available from:  
<https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/blog/russias-national-security-strategy-2021-era-information-confrontation> [accessed Feb 21 2022]

*Sales of Russian weapons on world markets have declined. What awaits the military-industrial complex next.* 2021. Available from:  
<https://en.newizv.ru/article/general/08-12-2021/sales-of-russian-weapons-on-world-markets-have-declined-what-awaits-the-military-industrial-complex-next> [accessed Feb 19 2022]

SOLÍK, M. 2020. Social-Conservative Russian soft power: A traditional agenda and illiberal values as a source of attraction or coercion? A case study of Slovakia. Available from: <http://www.unisci.es/social-conservative-russian-soft-power-a-traditional-agenda-and-illiberal-values-as-a-source-of-attraction-or-coercion-a-case-study-of-slovakia/> [accessed Feb 19 2022]

ŠVEC, J. 2021. On the Problems of the Limitation of Individual Freedom in the Context of the History of Selected Authors of Social Liberalism. *Filozofia*, 76, 8, 624-635.

TRENIN, D. 2021. Russia's National Security Strategy: A Manifesto for a New Era. Available from: <https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/84893> [accessed Feb 11 2022]

# CHALLENGES RELATED TO THE USE OF LOITERING MUNITION

**Damir Ilić<sup>1</sup> - Tatjana Ilić-Kosanović<sup>2</sup>**

## **ABSTRACT**

*In recent years, we are aware of the increased use of so-called loitering munition in conflicts around the world. Unlike land mines and cluster munition, the problem of loitering munition is obviously neglected. With the current trend of miniaturization of this hybrid of drones and cruise missiles and with the reduction of their price and the possibility of use in the form of swarm, their potential on the battlefield of tomorrow is gaining in importance. The strategy of their use is also changing. The focus from the air defense means is changing and their direct use against the enemy's manpower is becoming more and more obvious. Due to the combat use, which is increasingly autonomous and implies a man out of the loop concept, a justified question of the ethics of their use arises. This paper will present a retrospective of their combat use with a focus on future trends in the development of this type of munition.*

**Key words:** *loitering munition, combat use, ethics*

## **Introduction**

In recent local conflicts, we have witnessed the increasing use of the combat system created by the further transformation of unmanned aerial vehicles. The mentioned combat systems called loitering munition are a low cost combat system consisting of an unmanned aircraft equipped with a warhead whose purpose is to destroy enemy equipment and manpower (Voskuijl, 2021). Loitering munition is a type of hybrid between a drone and a cruise missile whose purpose is to strike at enemy targets beyond line-of-sight (PAX, 2018). This hybrid form is best observed during a certain phase of flight. In the phase of cruising and searching for potential targets, loitering munition has all the features of a drone. During launch and during the attack phase on the detected target, the loitering munition takes the form of a cruise missile (Zhang et al. 2020). Unlike guided missiles, loitering munition is not launched at a pre-selected target, but into the area where it is searching for a potential target (Scharre & Horowitz, 2015). Based on the construction of the aircraft, six types of loitering munition stand out: fixed-wing, canard configuration, delta wing, cruciform wing, tandem wing and rotorcraft (Voskuijl, 2021). A typical mission of the loitering munition system

---

<sup>1</sup> Damir Ilić, MSc, Department of Industrial Engineering, School of Engineering Management, University Union – Nikola Tesla, 43 Vojvode Mišića blvd., 11000 Belgrade, Serbia, damir.ilic@fim.rs

<sup>2</sup> Tatjana Ilić-Kosanović, PhD, Department of Industrial Engineering, School of Engineering Management, University Union – Nikola Tesla, 43 Vojvode Mišića blvd., 11000 Belgrade, Serbia, tatjana.ikosanovic@fim.rs

consists of several phases and they include: launch phase, loitering phase during which information gathering is performed, target selection and tracking phase, and finally they can interrupt the mission, or execute the attack on selected target (Zhang et al. 2020).

## **1 Development**

Loitering munition is a technology that was first introduced in the late 1980s in the form of the Israeli Harpy kamikaze drone, the forerunner of today's Harop kamikaze drone (Gilli & Gilli, 2016). Harpy was intended to attack enemy air defense positions by autonomously locating and conducting attacks on radar installations. In the early 2010s, a whole new generation of aircraft appeared and systems manufactured in Israel and the United States dominated the market. Currently, the mentioned technology is being developed by numerous other countries, such as Iran, Poland, Turkey, and others (Boulanin & Verbruggen, 2017). Prominent representatives of the loitering munition system include systems such as: Coyote, Dominator, Battlehawk, Cutlass, Nemesis, SkyStinger, Terminator, Switchblade, Low Cost Autonomous Attack System (LOCAAS) (USA), Harop, Harpy, Harpy NG, Hero 30, Hero 70, Hero 120, Hero 250, Hero 400, Hero 900, Orbiter 1K Kingfisher, Rotem L, SkyStriker, Sparrow (Israel), CH-901, WS-43 (China), Warmate (Poland), XQ-06 Fi (Turkey), Fire Shadow (UK), Devil Killer (South Korea), etc, (Holland & Gettinger, 2017). The increased interest in loitering munition is due to the fact that the mentioned systems combine the advantages of several classes of weapons at the same time (Top War, 2022).

## **2 Loitering munition in combat missions**

Harop loitering munition system belonging to the Azerbaijani Armed Forces was first seen April 4, 2016 during the attack on Armenian targets (Holland & Gettinger, 2017). The biggest threat is loitering munition systems when used in the form of swarm. During 2018, the Russian base in Syria was attacked with ten primitive drones armed with a small amount of explosives (De Cubber, 2019). On 14 September 2019, Houthi rebel group based in neighboring Yemen attacked two major oil plants in Saudi Arabia with primitive drones equipped with explosives, causing great economic damage (Prabhu, 2020). In March 2020, loitering munition was used during an attack on the convoy of the Libyan National Army of Khalifa Haftar in which several people were killed (Atherton, 2021). During the armed conflict between September 27 and November 10, 2020, between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed area Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijani forces actively used loitering munition, mostly Israeli-made systems such as Harop, Orbiter 1K, Orbiter-3 and SkyStriker (Postma, 2022).

### **3 Man in the loop and man out of the loop**

*Man in a loop* is a term used to describe a connection of a man with some physical system. *Man in the loop* refers to the circumstance where the machine is completely or partly controlled by man (Mabrok et al. 2020). The *man in the loop* mode is in most cases used to perform operations against high-value targets. Loitering munition use their sensors to search, locate, and track targets during the loitering phase. The human operator has several options. He/she has the ability to order the system to self-destruct, return to loiter mode, or return to base (Boulanin & Verbruggen, 2017).

There is a prediction that future systems will be able to perform operations completely autonomously (*man out of the loop*). Autonomy implies that the system has the ability to make decisions without human direct involvement. This includes the detection phase, the targeting phase, as well as the decision to open fire completely independent of human (Wagner, 2011).

### **4 Advantages and disadvantages of loitering systems**

The advantages of the loitering system are reflected in the fact that it is a potentially very precise and low cost system. It is very difficult to detect the places from which they are launched and they are difficult to detect during loiter phase. During the realization of missions, they can be used autonomously or with *man in the loop* mode (Katoch, 2020). The operator has the ability to monitor the situation in real time and very accurately attack any Non-Line-of-Sight target. The operator can also choose the location, time and direction of the attack (Voskuijl, 2021). The advantages are reflected in the ability to react quickly after detecting a potential target and they are very accurate and deadly weapons. Also, these weapons provide the operator with an opportunity to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants during the attack (Defence24, 2021). The advantages of loitering munition are reflected in the possibility of attacking mobile targets that stay in the zone of action for a short time, ease of use, small size, and weight and can be used by units on the front line (Reim, 2019).

The disadvantages of loitering munition are reflected in the fact that there may be a lack of complete control in certain environments and the system is highly dependent on software that can lead to errors when selecting targets. Some highly sophisticated systems are expensive (Holland & Gettinger, 2017). Due to the limited range and small mass warhead, loitering munition system may appear inferior to other systems. For these reasons, despite many advantages, loitering munition cannot completely replace other systems (Top War, 2022).

## 5 Moral dilemma

According to the claims of the Armenian Ministry of Defense, the bus with pro-Armenian volunteers was attacked and destroyed by Harop loitering system in 2016. Seven people lost their lives in that attack (Gibbons-Neff, 2016). The possibility of combat use of loitering munition in *man out of loop* mode with the possibility of autonomous target selection is a cause for concern. What is also a big cause for concern is the possibility of their use in the form of swarm (Holland & Gettinger, 2017). There are aircraft that are of great concern among analysts. Turkish light loitering munition system the Kargu-2 can stay airborne for 30 minutes, reach speeds of 90 mph, and be equipped with sophisticated facial-recognition technology to perform precise attacks on people of interest. The system can be used in the form of swarms of 20 units (Reed & Rife, 2022). Gradually autonomous machines begin to make decisions about life and death without any human intervention (Bode & Huelss, 2021). The use of autonomous loitering munition leads to the treatment of man as an object. The victim is reduced to a simple figure in automated killing. The loitering system itself has no idea what that really means to eliminate the human being (Rosert & Sauer, 2019). Use of fully autonomous drones targeting individuals without human approval is questionable from a moral point of view. The use of autonomous systems for the warfare can be problematic, but in the same time it imposes certain strategic challenges, due to large differences compared to existing proven combat systems (Mayer, 2015). Autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles that can loiter for a long time and choose their own targets without human interaction could greatly worsen the ethics of the conflict. If it proves to be militarily useful to keep a *man out of the loop* as in cases where there is no possibility to maintain a radio or satellite connection, then all actors in the conflict will want to use the mentioned systems (Sharkey, 2010). We are witnessing exponential progress in terms of computer development, data warehousing and communication systems. As long as collateral damage is not expected through the use of the system and as long as there are realistic expectations that military action will result in a concrete military advantage, there is currently no legal obstacle to the use of autonomous weapons systems (van den Boogaard, 2015). Uncertainties about the term autonomy in terms of autonomous weapons systems should not be overemphasized. The notion of autonomy is gradually losing its meaning compared to the new term called meaningful human control (Amoroso & Tamburrini, 2018). Killer robots seem to be a very unreasonable idea, but over time they can become an unacceptable reality. It is time to take global action to stop the spread of this technology, which brings with it a great danger to humanity (Garcia, 2015). There are certain advantages to using autonomous weapons system compared to human soldier. However, it should be noted that proportionality is very conditioned by time and context (van den Boogaard, 2015).



## Conclusion

The use of loitering munition has gained in intensity in conflicts that are taking place across the planet. There are four very important reasons for great concern when it comes to the use of loitering munition. First, its use in the context of *man out the loop*, where the drone autonomously searches the battlefield, selects a target for the attack and finally attacks the selected target. Second, the use of loitering munition in the form of swarm, which increases the lethality of the system and the possibility of simultaneous attack on multiple targets. The third reason for concern is the size of the system, which goes in the direction of miniaturization, which makes it difficult to detect the loitering system before the attack. The fourth reason is the price of the system and it is a matter of time before it becomes acceptable to move from attacks on high-value targets (radar systems, air defense means, combat vehicles, etc.) to direct attacks against fortified enemy infantry units. What is especially worrying is the possibility of creating autonomous loitering munition, which combines all these factors. So there is the possibility of designing low cost autonomous system of small dimensions, that can act in the form of swarm. The question is, where is that imaginary line that must not be crossed?

## References

- AMOROSO, D., TAMBURRINI, G. 2018. *The Ethical and Legal Case Against Autonomy in Weapons Systems*. Global Jurist, 18(1), N.PAG.
- ATHERTON, K. 2021. *Loitering munitions preview the autonomous future of warfare*. Brookings. Retrieved from: <https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/loitering-munitions-preview-the-autonomous-future-of-warfare/>
- BODE, I., HUELSS, H. 2021. *Artificial Intelligence, Weapons Systems and Human Control*. E-International Relations. Retrieved from: <https://www.e-ir.info/2021/02/16/artificial-intelligence-weapons-systems-and-human-control/>
- BOULANIN, V., VERBRUGGEN, M. 2017. *Mapping the development of autonomy in weapon systems*. Retrieved from: <https://www.sipri.org/publications/2017/other-publications/mapping-development-autonomy-weapon-systems>.
- DE CUBBER, G. 2019. *Explosive drones: How to deal with this new threat?*. International workshop on Measurement, Prevention, Protection and Management of CBRN Risks (RISE), Belgium. <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.2628752>

DEFENCE24. 2021. *Loitering ammunition in Special Operations Forces*. DEFENCE24. Retrieved from: <https://defence24.com/technology/loitering-ammunition-in-special-operations-forces>

GARCIA, D. 2015. *Killer Robots: Why the US should Lead the Ban*. Global Policy, 6(1), pp.57–63.

GIBBONS-NEFF, T. 2016. *Israeli-Made Kamikaze Drone Spotted in Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict*. The Washington Post. Retrieved from: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/04/05/israeli-made-kamikaze-drone-spotted-in-nagorno-karabakh-conflict/>

GILLI, A., GILLI, M. 2016. *The diffusion of drone warfare? Industrial, organizational, and infrastructural constraints*. United Kingdom Armaments, 44.

HOLLAND, A. M. & GETTINGER, D. 2017. *Loitering Munitions*. The Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College. Retrieved from: <https://dronecenter.bard.edu/loitering-munitions-in-focus/>

KATOCH, P. 2020. *Loitering Munitions – advantage plus*. IDR. Retrieved from: <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/loitering-munitions-advantage-plus/>

MABROK, M. A., MOHAMED, H. K., ABDEL-ATY, A.-H., ALZHRANI, A. S., FAROUK, A. 2020. *Human models in human-in-the-loop control systems*. Journal of Intelligent & Fuzzy Systems, 38(3), 2611–2622. <https://doi.org/10.3233/JIFS-179548>

MAYER, M. 2015. *The new killer drones: understanding the strategic implications of next-generation unmanned combat aerial vehicles*. International Affairs, 91(4), pp.765–780. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12342>

PAX. 2017. Where to draw the line. PAX. Retrieved from: <https://paxforpeace.nl/media/download/pax-report-where-to-draw-the-line.pdf>.

POSTMA, J. 2021. *Drones over Nagorno-Karabakh*. Atlantisch Perspectief, 2021, Vol. 45, No. 2, Nieuwe uitdagingen? (2021), pp.15-20 <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/48638213>

PRABHU, R. 2020. *Loitering Munitions: Bridging Sensor to Shooter Voids in Artillery Fires by Precision*. CLAWS Journal, vol. 13, no. 2, 2020, pp.190-202.

REED JR., C. A., & RIFE, J. P. 2022. *New Wrinkles to Drone Warfare*. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, pp.50–54.

REIM, G. 2019. ANALYSIS: *Lethal UAVs are loitering with intent*. Flight Global. Retrieved from: <https://www.flightglobal.com/analysis/analysis-lethal-uavs-are-loitering-with-intent/132083.article>

ROBERT, E., & SAUER, F. (2019). *Prohibiting Autonomous Weapons: Put Human Dignity First*. Global Policy, 10(3), pp.370–375.

SCHARRE, P., & HOROWITZ, M.C. 2015. *An Introduction to AUTONOMY in WEAPON SYSTEMS*. Retrieved from: [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/188865/Ethical%20Autonomy%20Working%20Paper\\_021015\\_v02.pdf](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/188865/Ethical%20Autonomy%20Working%20Paper_021015_v02.pdf).

- SHARKEY, N. 2010. *Saying “No!” to Lethal Autonomous Targeting*. *Journal of Military Ethics*, 9(4), pp.369–383.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/15027570.2010.537903>
- TOP WAR. 2022. *Loitering Ammunition Development Trends*. *Top War*. Retrieved from: <https://en.topwar.ru/191076-tendencii-razvitija-barrazhirujuschih-boepripasov.html>
- VAN DEN BOOGAARD, J. 2015. *Proportionality and Autonomous Weapons Systems*. *Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies*, 6(2), pp.247–283.
- VOSKUIJL, M. 2021. *Performance analysis and design of loitering munitions: A comprehensive technical survey of recent developments*. *Defence Technology*.  
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dt.2021.08.010>
- WAGNER, M. 2011. *Taking humans out of the loop: Implications for international humanitarian law*. *Journal of Law, Information and Science*, 21(2), 155–165. <https://doi.org/10.3316/informit.034566717698837>
- ZHANG, Z., LI, J., YANG, Y., YANG, C., & MAO, R. 2020. *Research on Speed Scheme for Precise Attack of Miniature Loitering Munition*. *Mathematical problems in engineering*, 2020, 4963738. <https://doi.org/10.1155/2020/4963738>

# THEORETICAL AND LEGAL BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION

Tomáš Jakabovič<sup>1</sup>

## **ABSTRACT**

*Scientific article focuses on International Police Cooperation, which is a key tool in terms of ensuring national as well as regional security. Although a highly sought-after instrument, it is not sufficiently developed in legal and security theory and practice, and is not explained in connection with international judicial cooperation in criminal matters. In the scientific article, we therefore elaborated its basic theoretical and legal background, its legislative and institutional aspects, the principles in the context of international law and international relations, and the adoption of scientific reduction (European Union). In the scientific article we have applied more than 12 years of experience in the field of international cooperation (strategic, operational and combined).*

**Key words:** *International Police Cooperation, method and forms, principles, EU criminal law, International Relations*

## **Introduction**

Today's world, including national and regional security, faces many challenges (serious and organised crime) and tensions (illegal migration) that require its control and elimination (fight) through transnational cooperation.

In this global and interconnected world and very dynamic time is a crucial to cooperate. It is also a reflection of how states can advance their own, national interests and their sovereign power.

It is characteristic of the present<sup>2</sup> that the more these entities (countries, regions) are interconnected (networked), the more they pursue common, mutual goals. One of these interconnected goals is growth and prosperity (economic, social, cultural), not excluding security. We are convinced that this is not just one common goal - economic growth (so typical of the European Union), but also *security* (internal and external), which guarantees the development of individual entities and supranational entities.

In the scientific article we focused on the area of international police cooperation. Its theoretical and legal definition is a prerequisite for a successful understanding of both the theory and practice itself. However, by using a literature

---

<sup>1</sup> Tomáš Jakabovič, JUDr. et JUDr., PhD., assistant professor, Investigation Department, The Academy of the Police Force in Bratislava, Sklabinská 1, 835 17 Bratislava, Slovenská republika, tomas.jakabovic@akademiapz.sk.

<sup>2</sup> Despite the change in the world order and the gradual creation of a multipolar world. However, it is a process that takes a long time in the long run.

search we found that *there is no legal definition* of the concept of international police cooperation.

We have therefore used the *analogy* of the most closely related discipline, which in this case is the discipline of sociology.

According to the online dictionary of the Slovak language of the Ľudovít Štúr Institute of Linguistics of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, *the term cooperation means the joint work of two or more persons, agents, joint participation in an activity, to establish close cooperation with someone.* Cooperation can be realized in different areas, e.g. cultural, economic, international.

According to the online synonymic dictionary of the Slovak language of the Ľudovít Štúr Institute of Linguistics of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, the term *cooperation* means *joint work of two or more persons or institutions, joint participation in the same activity.* Furthermore, we know synonyms for the term *cooperation*, namely partnership (to establish a partnership), co-operation (cooperation of enterprises), synergy, coaction (to do something in mutual co-operation, co-operation of many circumstances), collaboration (cooperation with a political enemy).

*The opposite of cooperation is competition.* According to the online short dictionary of the Linguistic Institute of Ľudovít Štúr Slovak Academy of Sciences, the term *competition* means economic rivalry between companies, states, also competitive company, competitor, also competition, rivalry, but also in the sense of being excellent, not having an equal opponent.

On the basis of the concepts defined above, it is clear that there is either cooperation or competition. The fundamental difference lies in the way in which *common or individual interests, goals or plans* are sought and realised.

In relation to trying to define what *international police cooperation* means, we start from the basic concept of defining the term cooperation. We will enrich the general definition thus given in relation to the subject, which in this case is a *special subject*. This special subject in *a broad sense* is a *law enforcement authority*, in *a narrower sense* it will be a police authority or a customs authority (in the conditions of the Slovak Republic).

There is no legal or other sufficiently widely accepted definition in terms of public international law or EU law (including EU criminal law).

## **1 International cooperation and its potential for use in the fight against crime (strategic, operational and combined cooperation)**

The basic question is: *How can international cooperation be used in the fight against crime?* There are basically three answers that come to mind on this occasion:

1. Strategic.
2. Operative.

### 3. Combined.

*Strategic international cooperation* is primarily based on the *principle of legality*, i.e. that there is a valid and effective agreement (e.g. an intergovernmental agreement) between two or more entities, which is concluded with the aim of *establishing a strategic partnership on a security issue*, with the intention of strengthening international cooperation in a specific area.

Strategic cooperation can be concluded at *bilateral* (between two entities) or *multilateral level* (by two or more entities). There are many forms of implementation of specific processes within the framework of international cooperation, the most frequent being agreements aimed at the exchange or sharing of information of strategic importance or nature (*positive definition*). Strategic contracts do not allow for the exchange of personal data (*negative definition*). As a rule, they contain a well-defined range of cases (areas of criminal activity) which imply the mutual exchange of strategic information. However, they may also contain a non-exhaustive list.

An example of explicit strategic international cooperation is the agreement on strategic cooperation signed between EUROPOL<sup>3</sup> and the People's Republic of China under the name of *Agreement on Strategic Co-operation between the European Police Office and the Ministry of Public Security of the People's Republic of China*.<sup>4</sup> The subject of strategic cooperation is mainly the exchange of special knowledge, reports of a general nature, the results of strategic analyses, information concerning investigative procedures, methods used in the field of prevention, participation in training and exchange activities, as well as the provision of advice and support in individual investigations.<sup>5</sup>

*Operational international cooperation* is also based on the *principle of legality*, i.e. in this case we also assume an existing legal framework (treaty, agreement) that authorises specific entities, under the conditions set out in the treaty or agreement, to generally exchange criminal or intelligence information containing personal data from cases of suspected commission or perpetration of specific criminal activities.

---

<sup>3</sup> EUROPOL's power to negotiate and approve contracts derives both from EUROPOL's very status as an EU agency and its legal personality under Article 62(1), and from its power to negotiate working arrangements with defined entities under Article 23(1). 4 under Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL), replacing and repealing Council Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA (OJ L 135, 24.05.2016).

<sup>4</sup> European Parliament legislative resolution of 04 October 2016 on the proposal for a Council implementing decision approving the conclusion by Europol of the strategic cooperation agreement between the Ministry of Public Security of the People's Republic of China and Europol (OJ C 215, 19.06.2018).

<sup>5</sup> Article 4 of the Agreement on Strategic Co-operation between the European Police Office and the Ministry of Public Security of the People's Republic of China.

Operational international cooperation differs fundamentally from strategic cooperation in that it regulates the possibility of *parties legally exchanging or sharing personal data with each other*.<sup>6</sup>

*Combined international cooperation* is a combination of strategic and operational international cooperation, but set out in a single binding document, which is an agreement or treaty.

A typical combined international cooperation in the field of police cooperation is the Agreement on Operational and Strategic Co-operation signed by EUROPOL<sup>7</sup> and the Republic of Serbia under the name of *Agreement on Operational and Strategic Co-operation between the Republic of Serbia and the European Police Office*.<sup>8</sup>

A typical combined international cooperation in the field of police cooperation is an intergovernmental bilateral agreement, e.g. the *Treaty between the Slovak Republic<sup>9</sup> and the Czech Republic on cooperation in the fight against crime, in the protection of public order and in the protection of the state border*.<sup>10</sup>

## 2 Forms of International Police Cooperation

International police cooperation is primarily focused on operational and intelligence activities, which in the conditions of the Slovak Police Force concerns the criminal police service. The essence of the criminal police service is, from a criminal procedural point of view, the activity aimed at the stage of criminal proceedings relating to *pre-trial proceedings*, namely *the procedure prior to the initiation of criminal prosecution*. Within this stage, the main task of the criminal police service is the activity aimed at the covert acquisition of information (criminal, intelligence), using basic methods and means of operational and investigative activity, which are directed or not directed towards suspicion of the commission of a specific criminal activity by specific suspects (i.e. persons who,

---

<sup>6</sup> E.g. Article 25(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL), replacing and repealing Council Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA (OJ L 135, 24.05.2016).

<sup>7</sup> In the case of agreements concluded between EUROPOL and third parties, we have given only an exemplary list. A complete list of all valid agreements concluded between EUROPOL and third parties can be found on EUROPOL's official website at: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/partners-agreements>.

<sup>8</sup> EUROPOL. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/partners-agreements/operational-agreements?page=1>. 31.01.2022.

<sup>9</sup> The treaties concluded between the Slovak Republic and other countries were only an exemplary list. A complete list of all valid agreements can be found on the official website of the Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic at the following address: <https://www.minv.sk/?medzinarodne-zmluvy>.

<sup>10</sup> Notification of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic No. 35/2005 Coll.

from the criminal procedural point of view, are in the procedural position of a suspect).

According to the online dictionary of the Slovak language of the Ľudovít Štúr Institute of Linguistics of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, the term "*form*" means a *way of acting, expression, a set of external requisites*. In our opinion, the term form of international police cooperation means the external manifestation of this cooperation in the real world. We consider the most significant form of international police cooperation to be the mutual exchange of information, which is usually based on the *principle of reciprocity*.<sup>11</sup>

Other forms are the implementation of joint training and exercises, exchange of practical experience, coordination of procedures in specific police operations, joint performance of duties, etc. However, the above forms are only a *demonstrative list*. In practice, other forms of international police cooperation are also applied, which are implemented in accordance with the conditions laid down in specific international treaties and conventions.

### **3 Legislative and Institutional arrangements for International Police cooperation**

International police cooperation depends on two key aspects (instruments), namely *legislative and institutional arrangements*. International police, as well as judicial, cooperation has its legal basis, from which its various external as well as internal processes, such as the above-mentioned forms but also specific measures and operations, are derived.

International police cooperation is an absolutely broad and wide-ranging concept. Therefore, with a view to defining also the legal environment, expediency and efficiency, in the case of legislative provision, we have defined the EU legal environment in which transnational organised crime operates.

From the perspective of EU primary law, where the founding treaties belong, the area of police cooperation is regulated in Chapter 5 under the heading "*POLICE COOPERATION*" of the *Treaty on the Functioning of the EU* (hereafter "TFEU"). Chapter 5 consists of Articles 87, 88, 89.

Article 87 (1) TFEU provides for a platform for the development of police cooperation involving all competent authorities of the Member States, including police, customs and other law enforcement authorities specialised in the prevention or detection and investigation of criminal offences. The first paragraph thus defines international police cooperation in a framework in terms of the relationship between the law and the position of the EU and the EU Member States.

---

<sup>11</sup> The principle of reciprocity is based on the mutual provision and sharing of criminal information.



The second paragraph specifies the measures that the European Parliament and the Council, in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, may lay down in three areas:

- a) *collecting, storing, processing, analysing and exchanging relevant information;*
- b) *Support for staff training, as well as cooperation on staff exchanges and research in criminalistics;*
- c) *common investigative techniques in the detection of serious forms of organised crime.*

Article 88(1) TFEU describes EUROPOL's mission, which it defines as supporting and strengthening the activities of the police and other law enforcement authorities of the Member States, their cooperation with each other in preventing and combating serious crime involving *two or more Member States*, terrorism and forms of crime affecting a common interest covered by EU policy. Here we would like to underline that police cooperation, from the perspective of EU primary law (TFEU), automatically implies an obligation on the part of EUROPOL to support or reinforce the activities of the entities concerned when serious crime involves two or more Member States. This formulation expresses a feature of danger that implies a higher form and therefore seriousness for the society, the EU Member State (internal or external security of the EU).

The second paragraph obliges the European Parliament and the Council to determine the institutional aspect through regulations under the ordinary legislative procedure:

- Structure;
- functioning;
- area of operation;
- EUROPOL's role.

Interesting is the third paragraph, which states that '*Any operational activity of Europol must be carried out in conjunction with and with the consent of the authorities of the Member State(s) whose territory is concerned. The application of enforcement measures shall be the exclusive responsibility of the competent national authorities.*' (Negative definition). The interpretation of this provision is significant in terms of the division of competences between EUROPOL and the law enforcement authorities of EU Member States. This provision is an expression of the division of powers to act in order to ensure the internal and external security of the EU. Compared to the past and the new legislation, EUROPOL has a stronger position in the hierarchy of EU bodies, but it does not have the power to detect and investigate serious and organised crime. This power is exclusively vested in the law enforcement authorities of the EU Member States.<sup>12</sup> However, they do not exercise this power alone, but together with other actors involved in

---

<sup>12</sup> The power to confer the status of a body, by which we refer to a law enforcement authority, is vested exclusively in the EU Member States by means of a general binding legal provision.

any way in the process. EUROPOL's main role remains its support to the national law enforcement authorities of the EU Member States and their investigations in the broadest sense. EU Member States thus have a key role to play in ensuring security.

Institutional arrangements for international police cooperation are based on the existing legal basis, most often in the framework of the transfer of information of an operational or strategic nature between different entities for the purpose of detecting or investigating, preventing or preventing serious or organised crime. However, cooperation can also take place in the field of education, exchange of personnel.

While the legislation provides the basic legal framework for EUROPOL's activities, its very functioning has the effect of directly or indirectly influencing the work of other European bodies (development and design of European security policy), law enforcement authorities of Member States conducting investigations into serious or organised crime (support or coordination of a case or cases).

In today's dynamic and fast-changing world, staying up to date is essential. For this purpose, CEPOL was therefore created, providing more opportunities for education and mutual exchanges.

As the so-called first *front line* is represented by national authorities enforcing the law of EU Member States in the fight against serious and organised crime, the most important issue remains the *determination of the operational environment in which they operate and the limitation of the conditions for the performance of their activities*. To what extent are law enforcement authorities able to carry out their primary and secondary role in ensuring the internal security of an EU member state and, at the same time, the internal security of the EU?

### **3 Principles of International Police Cooperation in the context of Public International Law and International Relations**

The effort to define the basic principles of international police cooperation is based on almost 12 years of experience of author in the field of implementation of international police cooperation in the capacity of various entities. In this case, the basic causal link related to trust between partners or partner services and what has been agreed (*consensus*) applies. Exceptions are situations that are determined by factors (external, internal) that are unforeseeable or caused by the intervention of a so-called force majeure (*vis maior*).

Since the issue of international police cooperation is not elaborated at such a level that would provide at least the so-called *minimum theoretical-practical standards*, we have used in this case an analogy with another field, which is closest to the subject matter. We have therefore identified the analogy in the field of public international law and international relations. With respect to the field of public international law, we would point specifically to Article 26 of the Vienna

Convention on the Law<sup>13</sup> of Treaties, which concerns the observance of treaties established on the basis of the principle of *Pacta sunt servanda*, and is set out as follows: "*Every valid treaty binds the contracting parties and must be performed by them in good faith.*"

In our view, the above principle could be transferred to the field of international police cooperation, precisely because international police cooperation is about regulating relations between countries represented by law enforcement authorities.

In this context, we believe that the term "*valid treaty*" can also be understood as an *agreement on a common course of action in a case*, which has been concluded at a joint operational meeting and which usually constitutes the minutes of such a meeting in the presence also of representatives from EUROPOL as a coordinating body (such an analogy could also be used in relation to international judicial cooperation, or in relation to EUROJUST as a coordinating body in relation to investigations into the commission of cross-border or international serious or organised crime, i.e. in terms of its mandate).

As serious or organised crime is committed in the territory of several EU Member States (at least two), the basic question arises as to which law enforcement authority (i.e. which EU Member State) has the competence or obligation to deal with the complaint, suspicion or suspicions. Which country is to investigate such a suspicion as a primary country, which as a secondary country. If crimes are being committed in the territory of more than one country, there is thus potentially evidence in each of those countries that needs to be secured in a timely and legal manner so that, for example, at the time of arrest, such evidence is already procured and not on its way (because of the possible custodial prosecution of the individuals, which is significant from a tactical perspective).

*The architecture of international police cooperation* should therefore, in our opinion, be based on fundamental pillars (*principles*) from which the implementation of international police cooperation should be based.

According to the online dictionary of foreign words of the Ľudovít Štúr Institute of Linguistics of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, the term *principle* means the *basic, main idea, rule, law for knowledge and action, basis, origin* (philosophically - *that from which the interpretation or construction of a certain system is based*).

*The minimum standards* mentioned above should also be based on the principles.

We have divided the architecture of international police cooperation between areas, namely *general principles, specific principles and specific aspects*.

---

<sup>13</sup> Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (Decree of the Minister of Foreign Affairs No. 15/1988).

Among the *general principles (mandatory)* we have included the following principles that apply *in general*:

- *Respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms* (implementation of detection and clarification of criminal activities related to illicit drug trafficking in the Slovak Republic under the obligatory condition of respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms).
- *Respect for International and European law* (respect for and application of public international law and European law, or other types of international treaties and agreements).
- The principle of *cooperation* (although this principle might seem unnecessary or redundant, practice shows that cooperation itself can be a fundamental obstacle to (police and judicial) law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters). The principle of cooperation could be further developed into a combination of words such as *active cooperation* or *effective cooperation*.
- Principle of *education* (systemic measures should include the provision of adequate education as an obligatory part of the implementation of international police cooperation, including the possibility of further education in relation to foreign languages).

Among the *specific principles*, we have included those that derive from specific legal acts, organizational rules of specific institutions, analysis of cases from practice, customs and practices:

- The principle of *priority* of international police cooperation over domestic cases (requests from abroad should take precedence over domestic requests or cases).
- The principle of *dealing quickly with a request or complaint (ASAP, which means As soon as possible, or as quickly as possible)*.<sup>14</sup>
- Reporting principles of "*need to know*" and "*need to share*". There is a balance to be struck here between whether we want to protect or share criminal information or information. If to share, then to what extent, with what subjects.
- Principle of *specialisation* (it is necessary to ensure specialisation of the Police Force, especially in terms of the National Drug Unit, including

---

<sup>14</sup> The above-mentioned ASAP principle is based, for example, on an EU legal act, namely Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the European Union (OJ L 386, 29.12.2006), which has been implemented in national legislation by Act No 491/2008 Coll. amending Act No 171/1993 Coll. of the National Council of the Slovak Republic on the Police Force, as amended, and amending and supplementing certain acts - also known as the "*Swedish Initiative*" or Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime (OJ L 210, 06.08.2008).

law enforcement agencies, i.e. investigator and prosecutor, so that they are adequately trained and prepared to implement or carry out international cooperation in criminal matters).

- Principle of *individuality of the case and its assessment* (despite possible general conclusions, it must always be borne in mind that each case is individual and must be assessed as such).

*Specific aspects* are related to case organisation, case management or application in practice in the framework of cooperation at national, European or global level:

- *Institute of preliminary assessment* at the stage before deploying own capabilities *in concreto* (within this institute it is necessary to assess individual criminal information and cases from abroad in the context of the security environment and interests of Slovakia, with regard to the state and development of the drug scene in the territory of the Slovak Republic, defined priorities with a medium- or long-term time span, with regard to a specific partner from abroad, the expected or pursued goal, but also the currently available capacity).
- *The institute of conducting a proactive investigation* (law enforcement taking a proactive approach to the investigation being conducted).
- *Implementation of the so-called case management institute* (the purpose is to manage a specific investigation so that the pursued goal is achieved using all legal possibilities, methods and means).
- *Ensuring a continuous transition* from international police to international judicial cooperation (this is an expression of the complementary relationship between international police and judicial cooperation).

## Conclusion

International Police Cooperation is one of the key tools in ensuring not only national but also supranational (regional or international) security. However, it is not a single comprehensive system. It is a decentralized, unfinished topic in legal and security theory and practice, but it has its obligatory determinants as a legislative and institutional aspect, basic principles and its interdisciplinary character (connection with international law and international relations).

Given the set scope of the expert article, we focused on the security environment of the Slovak Republic and the European Union, which mainly affects us from a regional point of view, using scientific reduction. We prepared a scientific article based on more than 12 years of application of strategic, operational and combined international police cooperation.

One of the aims of choosing this topic (agenda setting) is to encourage the further development of the system of international cooperation (police and

judicial) in order to promote it properly, efficiently and effectively and to motivate others to develop the issue.

## References

Act No. 491/2008 Coll. amending and supplementing Act No. 171/1993 Coll. of the National Council of the Slovak Republic on the Police Force, as amended and supplementing certain acts.

Agreement on Strategic Co-operation between the European Police Office and the Ministry of Public Security of the People's Republic of China : Legislative resolution of the European Parliament of 04 October 2016 on the proposal for a Council implementing decision approving the conclusion by Europol of the Agreement on Strategic Co-operation between the Ministry of Public Security of the People's Republic of China and Europol (OJ C 215, 19.06.2018).

Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the European Union (OJ L 386, 29.12.2006).

Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime (OJ L 210, 06.08.2008).

<https://www.europol.europa.eu/>. 31.01.2022.

Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL), replacing and repealing Council Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA (OJ L 135, 24.05.2016).

Treaty between the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic on cooperation in the fight against crime, protection of public order and protection of the state border (Notification of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic No 35/2005 Coll.).

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ C 326, 26.10.2012).

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (Decree of the Minister of Foreign Affairs No. 15/1988).

# CONFESSIONAL FACTOR AND INVOLVEMENT OF FOREIGN ACTORS IN LEBANESE INTERNAL POLITICS

Andrej Kolárik<sup>1</sup>

## **ABSTRACT**

*The confessional factor has been a key component of Lebanese politics ever since the signing of the National Pact and the conclusion of the Taif Agreement. The specifics of the Lebanese political system have allowed foreign governments to gain influence in Lebanon through proxies, based on common confessional identity. Furthermore, the political spectrum is polarized into two rival blocks: the pro-Syrian and pro-Iranian Shia-led March 8th Alliance and the anti-Syrian pro-independence Sunni-led March 14th Alliance. The Maronite political scene is similarly polarized into these blocks. The paper will examine foreign influence among the Lebanese Sunni, Shia, and Maronite politicians. The aim of the paper is to identify the extent in which foreign powers hold sway over the three major denominations, employing the method of an empirical survey.*

**Key words:** Hezbollah, Iran, Lebanon, Maronites, Middle East, proxy, sectarianism, Sunni, Shia.

## **1 Confessional Breakdown of Lebanon**

Lebanon is a unique country in the contemporary Middle East due to its confessional pluralism – the country acknowledges 18 distinct sects or denominations. Due to the sensitive nature of demographic data, Lebanon has not held an official census since the year 1932. The data from 2011 reveals a total of 3,334,672 registered voters, with 922,125 Sunni Muslims (27,65%), 912,025 Shia Muslims (27,35%) and 702,291 Maronite Christians (21,71%) being the three largest denominations (IFES, 2011, p. ii), making up together 76,71% of all registered voters in the country. They are followed by the Greek Orthodox (7,34%), Druze (5,74%) and Greek Catholics (4,8%).

In the parliament, however, the proportions are slightly different, as there is a principle of parity between Christian and Muslim MPs, resulting in the Sunni and Shia being underrepresented (27 seats each), while the Maronites (34 seats) and the Greek Orthodox (14 seats), as well as other Christian denominations are being slightly overrepresented. Therefore, the three largest denominations – the Sunni, Shia and the Maronites elect together 88 MPs (68,75%) out of a total of 128 seats in parliament.

---

<sup>1</sup> Andrej Kolárik, Mgr., PhD Candidate, Faculty of Political Science and International Relations, Matej Bel University, Banská Bystrica, andrej.kolarik@umb.sk

## 2 Political Orientation of the Major Denominations

### 2.1 Sunni Muslims

The most numerous denomination in Lebanon, the Sunni Muslims had supported border changes to reunite the Sunni-majority regions of Lebanon (the city of Tripoli, Minieh-Dennieh, Akkar and parts of the Beqaa Valley) with neighbouring Syria during the interbellum period (Sorby, 2013).

Since then, however, their political orientation has changed completely. The largest Sunni Muslim party is the *Future Movement* (Arabic: *Tayyar al-Mustaqbal*), founded by **Rafic Hariri** and following his assassination in 2005, led by his son **Saad Hariri** is the largest party of the anti-Syrian *March 14<sup>th</sup> Alliance*.

The influence of the Lebanese Sunni has dwindled after the civil war, mostly due to the rise of the Shia. Following the end of the civil war, the Lebanese Sunni have rallied behind the businessman **Rafic Hariri**, who delivered a message of Sunni belonging and had close connections to Saudi Arabia (Meier-Di Peri, 2017). Supported by both Saudi Arabia and France, **Rafic Hariri** sought to re-establish a Maronite-Sunni pact, while hoping to exploit the Shia split between *Amal* and *Hezbollah*. The major weakness in this dimension was the over-reliance of the *Future Movement* on political guidance from Saudi Arabia, which has increasingly alienated their Maronite political partners (Khashan, 2013).

**Rafic Hariri** initially sought to maintain good relations with Syria, however he had a falling-out with Syria and was replaced by the pro-Syrian **Omar al-Karami** in 2004, one year before his assassination in 2005. The assassination of **Rafic Hariri** amounted to a coup, pushing Lebanon firmly into the Iranian-Syrian axis. Since the instigation of armed conflict in Syria, and its spillover into Lebanon, the security climate has resulted in a Maronite-Shia rapprochement, both weary of Sunni Islamism, leading to a historical visit of the Maronite Patriarch **al-Rahi** to Damascus in 2013 (Khashan, 2013) – the first since 1943.

The Lebanese Sunni have been largely sympathetic to the Syrian opposition, calling for support to the Free Syrian Army. Lebanon due to its geographical position has become a support base for both sides to the conflict, with Sunnis blocking supplies for the Syrian government and some Lebanese Sunni joining the opposition fighters (Dettmer, 2013)

More recent tensions erupted into a crisis in 2017, as **Saad Hariri** has declared his resignation during his visit in Saudi Arabia. Apparently, this resignation was declared under Saudi pressure, as had been stated by **Michel Aoun**, who had been president of Lebanon at the time (Qiblawi, 2017). The incident has also seen mentions of a declaration of war between Saudi Arabia and Lebanon. Following pressure from France as well as the Lebanese political scene, Hariri left Saudi Arabia for France, where he reconsidered his resignation.



## 2.2 Shia Muslims

The Lebanese Shia constitute the second most numerous denomination in Lebanon, residing mostly in the south of the country (Tyre, Sidon, Nabatieh) and northern parts of the Beqaa Valley (Baalbek and Hermel districts). The two largest Shia political parties – *Amal Movement (Herakat Amal)* and *Hezbollah* form the basis of the pro-Syrian and pro-Iranian March 8<sup>th</sup> Alliance together with the Maronite *Free Patriotic Movement (at-Tayyar al-Watani al-Horr)* of **Michel Aoun**.

The Lebanese Shia have historically had close ties to their coreligionists in Iran and Iraq. **Ismail Shah** of the Safavid dynasty (regnabat 1501-1524) had invited Lebanese Shia clerics to convert Iran to Shia Islam (Algar,2012). Links with the Iraqi Shia are strengthened by the **Sadr** family tracing its origins from the Prophet Muhammad himself. **Imam Musa as-Sadr** was born in the Iranian city of Qom, studied in Najaf, Iraq and had founded the *Amal Movement*. His cousin's grandson, **Moqtada as-Sadr** is a prominent Shia religious scholar and political leader of the *Sadrism Movement*, while another cousin of **Musa as-Sadr** named **Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr** was a high-ranking Shia cleric and ideologue of the *Islamic Dawa Party* in Iraq. In the October 2021 the *Sadrism Bloc* and the *State of Law* coalition, which includes the *Islamic Dawa Party* have won 73 and 35 seats out 328 in the Iraqi parliament, respectively, with the Sadrism being the largest party (Blanchard, 2021).

Ties towards Iran are even more pronounced in the case of *Hezbollah*. The founding of *Hezbollah* itself in 1985 was with Iranian assistance (Gebelt, 2016). *Hezbollah* itself is both a political party and a militant organization and can be described as a state within a state. It has never shied away from its ideological affiliation with Iran (Hammoura, 2019).

*Hezbollah* is perceived to be the westernmost outlet of a geopolitical formation known as the *Shia Crescent*, a term first employed by the Jordanian king Abdallah II (Balanche, 2018) to describe the pro-Iranian orientation of *Hezbollah*, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia's Shia minority as well as the Houthis of Yemen. While the accuracy of the term has been questioned by some (Hermann, 2016), this alliance, alternatively described as an *Axis of Resistance*, consists of Iran, *Hezbollah*, Syria, Iraqi Shia *Popular Mobilization Units* and Yemeni Houthis. *Hezbollah* fighters have participated actively during the Syrian Civil War on the government side, especially in the provinces of Damascus and Homs adjacent to the Beqaa valley, namely in Qusayr (Meier,2014), but also in the Shia-majority towns of Aleppo province. *Hezbollah* has thus managed to effectively limit the spread of the conflict into Lebanon (Balanche, 2018), while making use of Syria to increase its strategic depth (Meier, 2014). For many Lebanese Christians, *Hezbollah* has shielded them from the fate suffered by their coreligionists in Iraq and has thus become a warrant of stability (Balanche, 2018).

The *Amal Movement* on the other hand has had close ties with Alawite elites in Damascus, being even described as its proxy in Lebanon (Khashan, 2013). It was indeed **Imam Musa as-Sadr**, who issued a *fatwa* declaring the Alawites of Syria to be Muslims in 1947 (Gebelt, 2016). Syria continued to back the Amal Movement after the signing of the Taif Accord, ensuring that Amal remains a relevant political force (Ash, 2019)

### 2.3 Maronites

The Maronites constitute the confessional group with the largest (34) number of MPs in the Lebanese parliament, living chiefly in the central parts of the country the governorates of Mount Lebanon, the recently split governorate of Keserwan-Jbeil and the southern parts of the North governorate of Lebanon.

The borders of Lebanon itself are the result of the demands of Maronite nationalists' aspirations to secure a Greater Lebanon, that would guarantee food security after experiencing the Great Famine (Kafno) during the World War I period.

The Lebanese Maronites have a deep historical connection towards France as their foreign ally and benefactor. Connections towards Western Europe can be traced as back as the time of the Crusades, when the Maronites have recognized the supremacy of the Roman Pope. The ties with France, from where the bulk of the Crusaders have been recruited, have remained ever since, and France has put pressure on the Ottoman Empire to recognize the autonomy of the Mutasarrifate of Mount Lebanon. Following the end of World War I, the Maronite Patriarch **Elias Peter Hoayek** have petitioned the French to allow for a creation of a Greater Lebanon, which was established in the proposed borders.

French language is widely used in Lebanon, and cultural attraction towards France has manifested itself by many Maronites taking up French first names, such as Antoine, Émile, Étienne, Michel, Pierre, or Philippe. The *National Pact* has however restricted the possibilities of the Maronites in seeking assistance from Europe, as it has clearly stated that Maronite Christians not seek Western intervention and subscribe to an Arab identity of Lebanon.

The Maronites had sought to secure their political ascendancy during the late 1960s by establishing the *Help Alliance* (*al-Hilf al-thulathi*), also referred to as the *Tripartite Alliance*, consisting of the three largest Maronite political parties: *Kataeb* of **Pierre Gemayel**, the *National Liberal Party* (*Hizb al-Wataniyyin al-Ahrar*) of **Camille Chamoun** and the *National Bloc* of **Raymond Eddé**. The first two parties would come together to create the *Lebanese Front* in 1976.

Currently, however the Maronite political scene is divided between the March 8<sup>th</sup> and March 14<sup>th</sup> blocks, with Maronite politicians associated with the March 8<sup>th</sup> Alliance nicknamed "Shias" and Maronite politicians associated with the March 14<sup>th</sup> Alliance nicknamed "Sunnis" by their fellow Maronite voters (Gebelt, 2016).

The largest “Shia” Maronite party is the *Free Patriotic Movement* of **Michel Aoun**. The only other pro-Shia Maronite party is the *Marada Movement (Tayyar al-Marada)* of **Suleiman Frangieh** active in the area of Zgharta in the country’s north. The election of **Michel Aoun** as president in 2016 was interpreted as a victory of Hezbollah, and consequently as a geopolitical victory of Iran over Saudi Arabia (Balanche, 2016).

The “Sunni” Maronite parties include the *Lebanese Forces* and the *Kataeb*. The *Lebanese Forces* were originally the name of the armed wing of the Lebanese Front during the civil war of 1975-1990. The Lebanese Forces transformed into a political party in 1990 under the leadership of **Samir Geagea**. The party was marginalized during the first decade after the end of the civil war as **Samir Geagea** was arrested due to indications of murder committed during the civil war. The Lebanese Forces had thus found themselves in the anti-Syrian camp.

The *Kataeb* is a smaller, socially conservative right-wing party associated with the **Gemayel** surname, which can be translated as *Phalanges*. The name of the party suggests inspiration from authoritarian regimes of southern Europe during the interbellum, namely Francoist Spain and Fascist Italy.

### 3 Geopolitics

The geographical position of Lebanon has made it a target of geopolitical interests in the wider region. As **Bashir Gemayel** had put it, “*All the world forces are settling their scores on our ground!*” and has warned that the fragile balance between Lebanese denominations has made it an arena of proxy conflict “*We will not have the problems of the Middle East settled over our dead bodies, nor the settlement of these problems drawn on the map of our country*” (Gemayel, 1982). Despite his rejection of this phenomenon, Lebanon plays more often the role of the chessboard rather than the chess player.

Most importantly, the regional rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia is portraying itself closely in the country. Post-revolutionary Iran has established its sphere of influence in the wider region by supporting largely Shia militias and political parties, such as Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), the Houthis of Yemen and Lebanese Hizballah. The notable exception are Iranian ties to Hamas, which is a Sunni Palestinian organization in the Gaza Strip. Thus, Iran has been able to project its influence westwards via Iraq and Syria into Lebanon.

Countering Iranian influence is Saudi Arabia, which is however losing its influence on the country. After **George Kordahi**, a Maronite Christian nominated by the *Marada Movement*, criticized Saudi campaigns against the Yemeni Houthis at a television show in 2021, it led to a breaching of relations between Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, as well as a ban of Lebanese imports into the monarchy (Bassam-el Daham, 2021). Saudi Arabia sought to put pressure on Lebanon to curb Iranian influence by establishing an economic blockade on the country.

The third country with a significant influence over Lebanon is of course Syria. The two countries share a 394 km long land border and has traditionally sought to project its influence into neighbouring Lebanon (Sorby,2011). Syria has intervened in the Lebanese Civil War, and since 1989 until 2005 it had occupied the northern (mostly Sunni) and eastern (largely Shia) parts of the country. The role of Syria in Lebanese politics has pronounced itself namely in the polarization of the Lebanese political scene into a pro-Syrian March 8<sup>th</sup> Alliance and an anti-Syrian March 14<sup>th</sup> Alliance.

Since the start of the war in Syria, its effects have pronounced themselves in neighbouring Lebanon most importantly in the form of Syrian refugees, who in the year 2014 number over 1,1 million, mostly Sunni (Meier, 2014). While being a large humanitarian issue, the large number of Sunni refugees in Syria risks also to shift the scales in the vulnerable equilibrium between the various denominations in the country, like how the large number of Palestinian refugees ignited the spark that resulted in the Lebanese Civil War.

## **Conclusion**

The influence of foreign powers in Lebanon is thus pronounced both among the Sunni and the Shia political representation. The Sunni ties have now shifted to an intensive pro-Saudi orientation, namely with the Saudi connections of the **Hariri** family, to make up for a gradual loss of Sunni influence over the country.

On the Shia side, the ties are both towards Iran and Syria. Out of the two major Shia parties in Lebanon, Hezbollah has a more pronounced pro-Iranian orientation while the Amal Movement has a pro-Syrian alignment. There are also personal connections between the Amal Movement and the Shia political scene in Iraq. Syria can also rely on the Lebanese branch of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party to support its cause in Lebanon. The differences are nuanced, as both Syria and Iran are allies, and Hezbollah has intervened in neighbouring Syria to support the government forces in the country. As such, Hezbollah can project power outside of the country and plays therefore an active role as an actor of international relations, while the Future Movement on the other hand has been criticised for its over-reliance on Saudi support.

France, which has been the traditional protector of the Maronite Christians, appears to be a more neutral power broker in the contemporary period, not outspokenly favouring neither denomination but rather playing a constructive role in attempting to stabilize the Lebanese political system.

## References

- ALGAR, Hamid, 2012, *Religions in Iran*, Encyclopaedia Iranica, Available online: <https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/iran-ix1-religions-in-iran-pre-islamic>
- ASH, Konstantin, 2019 *Post-Conflict Processes and Religion: Lebanon* In: *Oxford Encyclopedia of Politics and Religion*, 2020 Oxford University Press, ISBN 9780190614379
- BALANCHE Fabrice., 2018 *From the Iranian Corridor to the Shia Crescent*, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 2018, 10p.
- BASSAM, Laila and Maha el DAHAM, 2021 *Saudi-Lebanon Diplomatic Crisis Worsens as Envoy Expelled, Imports Banned*, Reuters, cit. 02.02.2022, Available online: <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-expels-lebanese-ambassador-bans-all-imports-lebanon-2021-10-29/>
- BLANCHARD, Christopher, 2021, *Iraq's October 2021 Election*, Congressional Research Service, 3p., Accessible online: <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11769>
- DETTMER, Jamie, 2013 *Lebanese Factions Deepen Involvement in Syria*, Voice of America, cit. 10.2.2022, Available online: <https://www.voanews.com/a/lebanon-syria-stealth-war/1640955.html>
- GEBELT, Jiří. *Ve stínu islámu : menšinová náboženství na Blízkém východě* . 1. vyd. Praha : Vyšehrad, 2016. 444 s., [16] s. fotogr. příl. ISBN 978-80-7429-692-5.
- GEMAYEL, Bashir, 1982, *Domestic Affairs and Foreign Policy*, official website of Kataeb Party, Available online: [http://www.kataebonline.org/BASHIR\\_domestic.html](http://www.kataebonline.org/BASHIR_domestic.html)
- HADDAD, Simon, 2009 *Lebanon: From Consociationalism to Conciliation in Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 2009, London: Routledge, ISSN 1353-7113 p. 398-416
- HAMMOURA, Joe, 2019 *Revival of the Lebanese Shiite Community and Hezbollah's Beginnings (1982-1990)*, Middle East Institute for Research and Strategic Studies, 7p., Available online: [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331688593\\_Revival\\_of\\_the\\_Lebanese\\_Shiite\\_Community\\_and\\_Hezbollah's\\_Beginnings\\_1982-1990](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331688593_Revival_of_the_Lebanese_Shiite_Community_and_Hezbollah's_Beginnings_1982-1990)
- HERMANN Rainer 2016 *Konečná stanice Islámský stát: Selhání státu a náboženská válka v arabském světě* (český překlad J. a P. Kučerovi), Praha: Academia, 2011. ISBN 978-80-200-2607-1
- IFES, 2011 *Elections in Lebanon* , International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 34p., Available online: <https://qifanabki.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/ifes-lebanon-electoral-districts-2011.pdf>
- KHASHAN, Hilal, 2013: *The Political Isolation of Lebanese Sunnis*, Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2013, pp 69-75.

MEIER, Daniel, 2014 *Lebanon: The Refugee Issue and the Threat of a Sectarian Confrontation*. Oriente Moderno, Istituto per l'Oriente C.A. Nallino, 2014, 94 (2), pp.382-401. ff10.1163/22138617-12340063ff. fffalshs-01338257

MEIER, Daniel, DI PERI, Resetta, 2017 *The Sunni Community in Lebanon: From "Harirism" to "Sheikhism"* In: *Lebanon Facing the Arab Uprisings*, University of Toronto, 25 p. DOI: 10.1057/978-1-352-00005-4\_3. Available online:  
[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/310492522\\_The\\_Sunni\\_Community\\_in\\_Lebanon\\_From\\_Harirism\\_to\\_Sheikhism](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/310492522_The_Sunni_Community_in_Lebanon_From_Harirism_to_Sheikhism)

QIBLAWI Tamara, ALKSHALI Hamdi, 2017 *Lebanese PM Held "Captive" in Saudi, President Says*, CNN, cit. 02.02.2022 Available online:  
<https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/15/middleeast/lebanon-saudi-arabia-hariri-aoun/index.html>

SORBY, Karol R., 2013 *Arabský Východ (1918-1945)*, Bratislava: Slovak Academic Press, 468 p., ISBN: 978-80-89607-15-0

SORBY, Karol R. a Karol SORBY ml., 2011 *Blízky východ v medzinárodnej politike (1971-1990)* Bratislava: Vydavateľstvo Ekonóm, 2011. 266s. , ISBN 978-80-225-3227-3

# CYBERSECURITY AND ITS CURRENT TRENDS

Bożena Konecka-Szydełko<sup>1</sup>

## **ABSTRACT**

*Cyberspace protection has become one of the most discussed security topics. The purpose of these considerations is to identify current threats to cyberspace in the European Union and in the world. The article presents the main trends observed in the landscape of cyber threats in the period from January 2019 to April 2020, and problematic issues related to the virtual space covered by the report of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA). The functioning of ICT systems increasingly affects the economies, institutions and external actions of the EU. The reliance on digital technologies was particularly pronounced during the pandemic, as 40% of EU workers have switched to remote work and the increase in internet traffic (up to 60%) has exacerbated attacks on users. This not only posed a threat to the security of systems and information, but also caused financial losses. States, international organizations and other non-state actors have realized that the stability of the functioning and development of the global information society depends on an open, reliable and, above all, safe cyberspace.*

**Keywords:** *cyberspace threats, cybersecurity, European Union Agency, trends*

## **Introduction**

Cyberspace protection has become one of the most frequently discussed security topics. States, international organizations and other non-state actors have realized that the stability of the functioning and development of the global information society depends on an open, reliable and, above all, safe cyberspace. Raising awareness in this regard goes hand in hand with the sharp increase in the number of computer incidents and new types of threats.

The intensive development of information and telecommunications systems in the last three decades meant that cyberspace has become an important factor supporting and stimulating the economic development of countries, especially highly developed countries. However, the high level of computerization contributed to the increase in countries' dependence on their correct and undisturbed operation. The evolution and progressive expansion of cyberspace have determined previously unknown threats, such as cybercrime and cyberterrorism (Bielski, 2015).

In the information state, where all areas of life are based on information sources concentrated in computer systems, disruption of their functioning means disorganization of the life of the state and society. The consistent and ever stronger boom in the virtual economy over the last few years has resulted in the

---

<sup>1</sup> Bożena Konecka-Szydełko, MA, Provincial Sanitary and Epidemiological Station in Rzeszow, 35-959 Rzeszow, ul. Wierzbowa 16, Poland, bozena.konecka@wsse.rzeszow.pl  
ORCID number: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8018-6973>

digital space having an increasingly strong influence on such areas of life as production, trade, education and law. The development of the information society, combined with the expansion of the Internet, is accompanied by the penetration of other aspects of human activity into cyberspace. The global reach and the possibility of immediate access from almost any place on Earth, combined with low operating costs, made more and more entities (governments, institutions and companies), as well as individuals decide to transfer various elements of their daily activities to cyberspace.

The term cyberspace was created and disseminated already in 1984 by William Gibson, author of the cult cyberpunk novel *Neuromancer*. In his literary vision, he defined cyberspace as (...) *a consensual hallucination experienced every day by billions of authorized users in all countries, by children taught mathematical concepts (...). Graphical representation of data from banks of all computers in the world. Unimaginable complexity (...)* (Gibson, 1999).

In the literature on the subject, cyberspace is defined as the totality of connections virtual ("non-spatial" in the physical, non-material sense) created and existing thanks to their physical manifestations (computers, telecommunications infrastructure) (Madej, 2009).

Generally speaking, it can be said that cyberspace is (...) *the entirety of connections of human activity with the participation of ICT (Information and Communication Technology - author's note)* (Bogadoł-Brzezińska, Gawrycki, 2003). In other words, (...) *cyberspace is a network connecting computer systems including central units and their software, but also data, methods and means of their transmission. Cyberspace includes Internet connection systems, ICT services and systems ensuring the proper functioning of the country, i.e. transport and communication systems, energy, water and gas infrastructure systems or health care* (Tekielska, Czekaj, 2014).

Cyberspace has become - as defined in the American National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace - "the state's nervous system": (...) *our economy and national security have become fully dependent on technology and information infrastructure. The functioning of the critical infrastructure depends on the efficiency and security of cyberspace* (International Strategy, 2011).

On a global scale, the resilience of almost any large country or organization can be put to a severe test. In a climate of uncertainty, volatility and systemic risk unfavorable factors can significantly change the present landscape. Possible scenarios include a massive financial and monetary crisis, a wide-ranging pandemic, a large-scale energy crisis, and a conflict in the Asia-Pacific region.

Positive factors are also possible, sometimes in response to threats - for example, the inclusive digital revolution, a major energy revolution, a shift in transatlantic relations, a revival of multilateral cooperation, and a renewed European Union.



The purpose of these considerations is to identify the current threats to cyberspace in the European Union and in the world.

The article presents the main trends observed in the cyber threat landscape in the period from January 2019 to April 2020, problematic issues related to virtual space covered by the report of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA). The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) is the EU agency working to achieve a high overall level of cybersecurity across Europe. Created in 2004 and strengthened by the Cybersecurity Act, the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity contributes to the EU's cybersecurity policy; increases the credibility of products, services and information and communication processes thanks to cybersecurity certification systems; cooperates with the Member States and EU bodies and helps prepare Europe for future cyber challenges. By sharing information, building capacity and improving knowledge, the Agency works with key stakeholders to increase confidence in the connectivity economy and the resilience of EU infrastructure, and ultimately to ensure digital security for Europe's society and people (Enisa Threat Landscape, 2021).

The results presented in this article are based on publicly available sources of information, mainly of a strategic nature and concern more than one sector, technology or circumstances of events.

## **1 Cyberspace as a source of a new dimension of state security**

The importance of cyberspace for the modern state and society means that the problem of its security is becoming more and more important. As stated by Bogusław Pacek and Romuald Hoffman, (...) *cyberspace security (...) can be defined as no risk of losing information data in cyberspace (...) It is clear that the resource we protect is information* (Pacek, Hoffman 2013). The cited authors clearly place the issue of cyberspace security in terms of information warfare and war, which makes it necessary to adopt as a starting point for further considerations of state information security as an integral part of national security, and then information threats (Sienkiewicz 2022, p. 373-374).

It is not without reason that the concept of information warfare is becoming more and more popular. Nor should it be surprising that it comes from military science. As emphasized by Piotr Sienkiewicz and Halina Świeboda, there is no single, agreed definition of information warfare, but most of the proposed developments of this term contain common content. They all boil down to viewing information warfare as a conflict in which information is both a resource, an object of attack and a weapon, and at the same time the conflict involves the physical destruction of the infrastructure used by the enemy for operational activities.

*Currently, it is rightly believed that information warfare, cyberterrorism, information warriors, information domination, defense in cyberspace, or*

*information chaos are just neologisms, referring to the same, but very broad, concept of the information age war* (Sienkiewicz, Świeboda 2009, p. 80).

Therefore, cyberspace should be treated as a new operating environment in which the full range of information warfare is carried out with the help of digitized information. You can deal here with espionage, crime (attacks on bank accounts, extortions, fraud, etc.), terrorism (fortunately - still theoretically) and actions requiring cyberspace to be treated as the fifth - after land, sea, air and space - environment fighting.

Cyberspace is in the form of a virtual space that is used for communication, and not a materialized separate physical space, but it must be remembered that its essence as an area of information exchange depends on the existence of technical devices of a physical nature, located in the territory of a specific country, sometimes even belonging to specific institutions public. Therefore, it is also impossible to deprive it of the nature of a kind of component of the state space, where the state performs its functions, if the cyberspace is made up of ICT systems subject to the jurisdiction of that state due to their location on its territory or the fact that they are at the disposal of the authorities belonging to it. (Czyżak 2017).

The specificity of this issue was also expressed in an interesting way by Radosław Bania: *“Cyberspace has undoubtedly entered the field of issues related to the broadly understood concept of national and international security. (...) becomes an area in which various types of conflicts are transferred and which is in particular open to various types of attacks, directed not only against civilians, but already largely against essential elements of the critical infrastructure of individual countries”* (Łakomy 2015, p. 106). *These threats have become multidimensional and multifaceted. Thanks to its unique properties, cyberspace has become a sphere since the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, in which new threats to national and international security appeared”* (Łakomy 2015, p. 103, 113).

## **2 The role of the European Union in the field of cybersecurity**

The functioning of ICT systems increasingly affects the EU's economies, institutions and external activities. The reliance on digital technologies was particularly pronounced during the pandemic, as 40% of EU workers switched to remote work, and the increase in web traffic (up to 60%) exacerbated attacks on users. This created a threat not only to the security of systems and information, but also caused financial losses - it is estimated that the cost of attacks on a global scale amounted to last year. 5.5 trillion euro (Kozioł 2021, p. 1).

Providing open access to the Internet and the security of digital technologies requires international cooperation, which is hampered by the actions of authoritarian states. They often support hacker group initiatives or use their own special military forces to fight online.

In December last year for example, the European Medicines Agency was attacked, from which hackers - possibly related to Russia and China - stole data on vaccines against COVID-19. However, difficulties in identifying the perpetrators make it difficult to react, which has so far imposed sanctions for cyber-attacks by the European Union only twice, covering several entities from Russia, China and North Korea.

Digital security is an important element of the Union's external action. Cyberspace as an operational sphere influences the conduct of EU missions and operations and is also important for global security. The main goals and tasks are to be set out in the EU Digital Capacity Building Program, which will be supported by the EU Digital Capacity Building Council.

The EU is also considering setting up an informal digital diplomacy network to promote a secure cyberspace. Activities would focus on deepening cooperation with partners, incl. NATO and the promotion of security standards in the digital sphere within international organizations, such as the United Nations and the Council of Europe. To become a leader in cybersecurity will require the EU to be more innovative and technological competitiveness in the global market.

To this end, in April 2021, the Council authorized the establishment of a Cybersecurity Competence Center for industry, technology and research. It is to connect public and private centers dealing with cybersecurity issues at the EU level, as well as ensure cooperation with a network of specially established national coordination centers (Kozioł, 2021, p. 2).

### **3 Cyber threats in 2019-2020**

In 2019, the European Commission prepared a special Eurobarometer survey to understand awareness, experiences and opinions about cybersecurity (Special Eurobarometer 2020).

While these results are encouraging, many users still fall victim to scams websites and phishing emails. This reveals that perpetrators of malicious activities use advanced attacks that are difficult to detect and avoid. Therefore, prevention strategies must be regularly updated to take into account the latest intelligence data (CTI) on attack techniques.

The years 2019 and 2020 saw significant changes in the cyber threat landscape. Two separate facts contributed to these changes: the historically unique forces of lightning-fast transformation unleashed by the 2019 coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19), and the continuing upward trend in adversary's advanced capabilities for threat writers. The COVID-19 pandemic has forced a large-scale deployment of technology to tackle various critical aspects of the crisis, such as coordination of healthcare services, international response to the spread of COVID-19, implementation of remote work systems, distance learning, interpersonal communication, control of measures to block the economy, teleconferences and much more. Faced with this situation, company leaders

assessed the newly created risks with rapid introduction of (technical) changes resulting from the transformation forced by the COVID-19 pandemic. (COVID-19 Risks Outlook 2020). The cybersecurity space faced a contradiction: transformation came with both challenges and opportunities. The implementation of new digital technologies is of great added value for economies around the world. According to estimates, artificial intelligence will increase global GDP by 2030 by \$ 13 trillion, representing an annual growth of approximately 1.2% (McKinsey and Company), while the 5G network will generate \$ 3 trillion between 2020 and 2035 (IHS Markit). Competition between world powers in the field of technology turned out to be a turning point in the second decade of the 21st century. It directly influences building advantage in the social, economic and military dimensions (Albrycht et al., 2019).

Changes forced by the information technology (IT) landscape weakened existing cybersecurity measures, making their rapid implementation a challenge. At the same time, cybersecurity is a factor that facilitates the development of trust in the case of new digital service use cases and therefore may facilitate transformation. When working remotely, cybersecurity specialists have had to adapt existing security measures to the new infrastructure paradigm in an attempt to minimize exposure to a variety of new types of attacks where the access points are internet-connected employees working in homes and other smart devices. At the same time and under pressure, they had to implement solutions based on components that had previously been less trusted, such as remote access using the public Internet, cloud services, unsecured streaming services, as well as mobile devices and applications. (Śledziwska, Włoch, 2020, p.35-40).

The necessary ways of responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, which were aimed at ensuring safety and at the same time reducing its impact on the operations of companies, forced companies to extreme efforts to respond to changes. In addition, numerous modes of operation were quickly adapted to changing modes of operation, and safety professionals quickly discovered that they had reached their limits.

With a very short lead time, IT security specialists had to react quickly to the challenges that arose with the introduction of work from home, such as enterprise data transfer in cases where employees use a home internet connection to access cloud applications, firmware, videoconferencing and file sharing (Śledziwska, Włoch, 2020, p.41-54).

With the COVID-19 pandemic not yet fully contained and we do not know what the future holds, it is predicted that cybersecurity professionals will still have to face the challenges. Moreover, given the time it takes from an incident to its detection and analysis, this situation will leave a mark on the threat landscape for a long time to come. The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed that the perpetrators of harmful activities have the ability to quickly adapt to these changes.






In 2019-2020, the ways in which opponents operated focused on personalizing attack vectors. Advanced credential theft, credential stuffing

attacks, carefully targeted phishing attacks, advanced social engineering attacks, advanced malware stealth techniques, and greater penetration of mobile platforms were major adversaries' achievements during the reporting period. If cyber criminals start combining this news with artificial intelligence and machine learning, in the future we will experience an increase in the number of successful attacks and undetectable campaigns (Grzebielec, 2020).

#### 4 Main trends in the landscape of cyber threats

Table 1. below summarizes the main trends observed in the cybersecurity landscape covered by the reports of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA). Mapping the threat landscape is increasingly difficult. Criminals are developing new techniques to avoid security systems, but the complexity and precision of the threats associated with targeted attacks is increasing.

Table 1. Main trends in cyber threats by of the ENISA 2020 report “The year in review from” January 2019 to April 2020.

<b>Danger</b>	<b>Trends</b>	<b>Description</b>
		<b>The perpetrators are likely to be:</b>
Attacks against human rights and democratic systems		Continue to use cyberspace for attacks against the election process that threaten democratic systems and human rights in other countries.
Attacks against human rights and democratic systems		Continue harassing the opposition and tracking citizens by manipulating information using social media platforms, in conjunction with campaigns that use spyware.
Disinformation campaigns		Conduct advanced disinformation campaigns aimed at influencing perceptions or manipulating opinions in favor of certain political ideas or goals related to financial speculation.
An uncontrolled race of cyber weapons		Accelerate the cyberspace race by attempting to develop opportunities in cyberspace. As cyberspace is considered a site of hostilities, state authorities will search for cyber weapons through sponsored agents in preparation for cyberspace warfare.
Data theft		To pursue strategic goals such as: acquiring industrial secrets using espionage, gaining an advantage related to making political decisions, financing regimes through financial

		fraud, conducting information operations in cyberspace, as well as weakening opponents or their morale through disruptive or destructive activities.
Blackmailing via photos or videos (webcam blackmail)	➔	Continue to endanger teens and young people by attempting to blackmail with photos or videos (webcam blackmail), which can have a psychological and ultimately physical impact on victims.
Cyberbullying	↙	Increase incidents of cyberbullying during and after the COVID-19 epidemic among adolescents using digital platforms for private (more) or educational purposes.
Deepfake	↙	Increase the use of artificial intelligence-based tools to create highly credible counterfeits (video, audio and video), commonly referred to as deepfakes, in order to defraud companies.
Exposure to business processes	➔	Master your tactics to compromise your business processes and gain a financial advantage.
Break-in into the business mail	➔	Hit one level in your organization's structure - below management - to jeopardize your work e-mail.
Malicious software	➔	Increase the use of managed service providers to distribute malware.

Source: ENISA 2020 Threat Landscape” The year in review from January 2019 to April 2020; p. 14-16. <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/year-in-review> (access: 30.01.2022).

In the ENISA 2021 report, the following list summarizes the main trends observed in the (cyber) threat landscape 2021 (ENISA Threat Landscape, 2021).

These are:

- Ransomware (malware attacks on networks and data blocking with ransom demands);
- Malicious software (malware);
- Cryptocurrency theft (cryptojacking - the criminal uses the victim's computer to generate cryptocurrencies);
- The dangers of e-mail;
- Data attacks (data breach, data leakage);
- Threats to data availability and integrity (eg DDoS attacks - that is, blocking access to services by artificially generating increased traffic);
- Disinformation - fake news;

- Threats other than malware - human errors, incorrect system configurations, accidents affecting IT systems;
- Attacks on supply chains.

The ENISA 2021 report, in particular, draws attention to the increase in related risks with ransomware. This trend is fueled by the progressive digitization of society as well as companies that are moving from traditional infrastructure to online solutions. During the reporting period, ENISA also observed increased attempts by cybercriminals to attack critical infrastructures. In 2021, these were ransomware attacks that disrupted public health facilities, including hospitals, emergency services, and the transport and energy sectors. ENISA also draws attention to attacks on supply chains, which are not a new trend, but during the period under review this type of attack reached a high level of impact. Given that attacks on supply chains can have catastrophic consequences, ENISA has published a special report on the threat landscape for this particular threat category (Threat Landscape for Supply Chain Attacks, 2021).

In addition, the report presents cybercrime "as a service" which is increasingly becoming part of organized crime. Hackers for hire are increasingly joining the ranks of cybercrime companies.

In this way, new models of criminal activity began to function - they include, for example:

- ransomware as a service,
- phishing as a service,
- disinformation as a service.

It is worth noting that disinformation appeared for the first time in the ranking, as one of the most important threats according to ENISA. Fake news and fake news campaigns are becoming more common and our increasing participation in social media, which is a great channel for disseminating information, contributes to this. Campaigns based on fake news or disinformation are often part of hybrid attacks and support other threats by creating distrust and confusion (ENISA Threat Landscape, 2021).

## **Conclusion**

Mature cybersecurity policies will provide the necessary security opportunities at all levels of society: from government structures to critical infrastructure, businesses, the service sector and individuals.

Security opportunities need to be effective and flexible to meet new challenges as they arise. In view of the growing vulnerability to attacks, it will be crucial to quickly adopt regulations on information security and cybersecurity rules to be applied by EU bodies (their implementation is to be supported by enhanced CERT-EU). Greater attention should also be paid to the coordination of civil, defense and space aspects of cybersecurity.

Separate projects are currently being developed in the EU, for example, the GOVSATCOM secure government satellite communication system (Kozioł, 2021, p. 2).

Understanding how cybercriminals think and act, what their motivations are and goals, is an important step towards a more effective response to cybersecurity incidents. Monitoring the latest advances in cybercriminal tactics and techniques is critical to an effective defense in today's cybersecurity ecosystem. This risk assessment will allow you to prioritize security controls and develop an appropriate strategy based on the potential impact and probability of materialization of threats.

## References

- ALBRYCHT, I., KRAWCZYK, M., SIDUK, R., ŚWIĄTKOWSKA, J., SIMONA, A., MARCZUK, P., GĘBORYS, P., MEDNISB, A. 2019. *Challenges in Cyberspace, Examples of Solutions, Threats, Regulations*. 2019 Report, Kraków, Kościuszko Institute, <https://ik.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/wyzwania-w-cyberprzestrzeni.-przyklady-rozwiazan-zagrozenia-regulacje.pdf> (accessed: 30/01/2022).
- BIELSKI, K. 2015. *Cyberterrorism - A new threat to state security in the 21st century*, 2015, Scientific Papers of the University of Szczecin No. 889. Acta Polityka No. 34, pp. 95-101, ISSN 0867-0617.
- BÓGDOŁ-BRZEZIŃSKA, A, GAWRYCKI, M. F. 2003. *Cyberterrorism and information security problems in the modern world*, Warsaw 2003, p. 37. ISBN 83-89050-09-9.
- COVID-19 Risks Outlook. 2020. *A Preliminary Mapping and its Implications*. May 19, 2020. WEF. [https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF\\_COVID\\_19\\_Risks\\_Outlook\\_Special\\_Edition\\_Pages.pdf](https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_COVID_19_Risks_Outlook_Special_Edition_Pages.pdf) (access: 30/01/2021).
- CZYŻAK, M. 2017. Legal protection of state cyberspace, "Security Horizons" 8 (2017), Opole, p. 7, 9, University of Opole, ISSN 2543-6090
- ENISA. 2020. Threat Landscape” They & ar in reviev from January 2019 to April 2020; p. 14-16, <https://www.emsa.europa.eu/publications/year-in-review> (access: 30.01.2022).
- Enisa Threat Landscape. 2021, April 2020 To Mid-July 2021, October 2021, European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), 2021, s.l ISBN: 978-92-9204-536-4 <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-threat-I-Landscapes-2021> (accessed: 30.01.2022).
- ENISA Threat Landscape for Supply Chain Attacks, July 2021. <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/Dublicationis/threat-landscape-for-supply-chain-attacks> (accessed: 30/01/2022).



GIBSON, W. 1999. *Neuromancer*, Poznań 1999, Książnica Publishing House, p. 53, ISBN 9788324577750.

GRZEBIELEC, Sz. 2020. *Analysis of the vulnerability of IT system users to a phishing attack*, (2020) Journal of Computer Sciences Institute, Publishing house of the Lublin University of Technology, pp. 164-167, ISSN 2544-0764.

*International Strategy for Cyberspace. Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World* (online), May 2011, <http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=5665> (access: 30.01.2022).

KOZIOŁ, A. 2021. *Strengthening the role of the EU in the field of cybersecurity*, Bulletin of the Polish Institute of International Affairs, No. 115 (2313) June 14, 2021 pdf, pp. 1-2, [https://www.pism.pl/publikacje/Wzmarzenia\\_rol\\_Ue\\_w\\_zakresie\\_cyberbezpieczenstwa](https://www.pism.pl/publikacje/Wzmarzenia_rol_Ue_w_zakresie_cyberbezpieczenstwa) (accessed on: 30.01.2022).

ŁAKOMY, M. 2015. *Cyber space as a new dimension of rivalry and cooperation between states*, Publishing House of the University of Silesia, Katowice, p. 103-113, ISBN 978-83-8012-358-8.

MADEJ, M. 2009. *The IT revolution - the essence, manifestations and impact on the perception of state security and the international system*, in: ICT security of the state, M. Madej, M. Terlikowski (eds.), Warsaw 2009, Polish Institute of International Affairs, p. 28. ISBN 978-83-89607-71-3.

PACEK, B., HOFFMAN, R. 2013. *Activities of the armed forces in cyberspace*, Warsaw 2013, p. 85, ISBN 9788375232707.

SIENKIEWICZ, P. 2022. *Visions and models of information warfare* (online), <https://winntbg.bg.agh.edu.pl/skrypty2/0095/373-378.pdf>, p. 373-374, (access: 30/01/2022).

SIENKIEWICZ, P., ŚWIEBODA, H. 2009. *ICT networks as an instrument states – the phenomenon of information warfare*. In MADEJ, M., TERLIKOWSKI, M. (eds.), *ICT security of countries*. Warsaw: Polish Institute of Affairs International, pp. 75-94, ISBN 978-83-89607-71-3

Special Eurobarometer 499. 2020. *Europeans' attitudes towards cyber security*". 29 January 2020 [https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/S2249\\_92\\_2\\_499\\_ENG](https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/S2249_92_2_499_ENG), (accessed: 30/01/2022).

ŚLEDZIEWSKA, K., WŁOCH, R. 2020. *Digital economy. How new technologies are changing the world*, 2020 Warsaw, University of Warsaw Publishing House, Wyd. 1, pp. 35-40. ISBN 978-83-235-4186-8.

TEKIELSKA, P., Ł., CZEKAJ, Ł. 2014. *Activities of services in the European Union implementing tasks for cybersecurity*, in: *Cybersecurity as the basis of a secure state and society in the 21st century*, M. Górka (ed.), Warsaw 2014, p. 163.

# WOMEN IN CYBER SECURITY JOBS

Tatjana Ilić-Kosanović<sup>1</sup> - Katarina Štrbac<sup>2</sup>

## **ABSTRACT**

*Cybersecurity is a major concern of governments, corporations, and researchers. It is expected that cybersecurity job openings are going to grow in the following years, especially because the increase in work from home and the use of internet due to Covid 19 pandemic. Talent shortage and, especially, underrepresentation of women in cybersecurity workforce is becoming a key question. This issue is even more important for the emerging economies like the one of the Republic of Serbia. In the first part, this paper examined the existent literature on the talent issues in cybersecurity, especially the representation of women. In the second part, the results of semi structured interviews of experts and the scholars in the field of cybersecurity have been presented. At the end of the paper, conceptual model for involving women in cybersecurity workforce in the Republic of Serbia has been engineered.*

**Keywords:** *Cybersecurity, workforce, women.*

## **Introduction**

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century cybersecurity is starting to be a major concern for governments, and companies, same as for professional researchers. Nevertheless, this interesting and significant issue is not very often in the focus of academic researchers. The number of job openings in various fields of cybersecurity (state, military, businesses, etc.) is constantly on the rise. Looking for the best talent is becoming one of the prerequisites of fighting cyber crime, because many companies and other organizations are reporting serious shortage of employees with cybersecurity skills. Moreover, lack of women at cybersecurity workforce corresponds to the underrepresentation of women in information technologies' jobs.

This paper examines the existent literature on the talent issues in cybersecurity, especially the (under)representation of women. In the second part, the results of semi structured interviews of faculty and professionals in the field of cybersecurity from Republic of Serbia is presented and conceptual model for future involving more women at cybersecurity workforce.

---

<sup>1</sup> Tatjana Ilić-Kosanović, PhD, Associate Professor, School of Engineering Management, University „Union – Nikola Tesla“, Bulevar vojvode Mišića 43, 11000 Belgrade, tatjana.ikosanovic@fim.rs

<sup>2</sup> Katarina Štrbac, PhD, Associate Professor, School of Engineering Management, University „Union – Nikola Tesla“, Bulevar vojvode Mišića 43, 11000 Belgrade, katarina.strbac@fim.rs

## 1 Literature review

States, businesses, and individuals in the 21<sup>st</sup> century face a new challenge: cyber attacks and cybercrime that can cause huge damage to their finance and infrastructure. It is same even for individuals; women are also often victims of cyber crimes (Brown, Pytlak, 2020). Organizations have to put serious effort in employing professionals in the field of cyber security as there is a considerable adequate skills shortage in the industry (Peacock, Irons, 2017). National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) stated in 2019 that the United States faced a shortage of almost 314,000 cybersecurity professionals (Crumpler, Lewis, James, 2019). One study states that cybersecurity workforce has to increase by 145% to meet the demand (Spataru, 2021).

There are estimations that the most advertised job positions in cybersecurity are in lower and upper professional ranks. The most considerable shortage is among the job positions in the “frontline” of fighting cyber attacks (Caldwell, 2013). Ten years ago many companies stated the importance of solving lack of talent in information technologies and cybersecurity, nevertheless, new research shows almost the same problem: lack of talent amid the increase of cyber attacks and other problems related to cybersecurity (Manuel, 2020). The second observed problem is the lack of cybersecurity courses at information technologies’ higher education programs, like it is shown in a USA study (Crumpler, Lewis, James, 2019). There are also not enough IT courses in high schools. Some teachers complained that their initiatives were neglected with the explanation of the lack of interest; however, if nobody knew about an initiative, nobody would have shown an interest (Dallaway, 2014).

Female representation in cybersecurity workforce is one of the main problems; there are various estimations of the number of female workforce in information technologies (around 17%) and in cybersecurity ranging from 7% to 11% (Caldwell, 2013; Peacock, Irons, 2017). Some studies show that gender diverse organizations considerably outperform male-only organizations, with gender diverse companies outperform those with male-only employees by up to 26% (Caldwell, 2013).

A decade ago, number of women in cybersecurity job trainings was very low, with decreasing tendencies. (Caldwell, 2013). And ten years later situation in many countries is not much better. Some countries, like UK, report relatively high levels of female representation in the cyber security field, about 31% - research by KPMG (2020) and other research state 16% of all recruits are women (McHenry, Borges, Bollen, 2021), emphasizing narrow recruitment pools (mostly word of mouth and recommendations) as a primary source, which don’t reach potential candidates like women or people with disabilities or neurodivergent candidates. Also, there is a gender gap in cybersecurity salaries that is further dissuading women to choose careers in cybersecurity (Khan, 2020; PM Network, 2017). Some research related to women in cybersecurity stated: lack of self

confidence, impostor syndrome, male dominating organizational cultures, and less recognition from senior management (Wise, 2021).

Even though the number of female students is on the constant rise, female students are still less choosing STEM fields than their male counterparts from various reasons, this is especially case for information technologies. Parents often have important role in dissuading female children from choosing STEM fields, especially information technologies field, perceiving it as exclusive male domain. Similarly, teachers often don't support female students in elementary and secondary education in taking more interest in formal courses and informal education in information technologies. One of the explanations is that cybersecurity is not clearly advertised field for potential students (Caldwell, 2013). Nevertheless, there are some initiatives, like female students' information technologies clubs, or programs for attracting high school female students to information technologies' higher education programs (Dallaway, 2014). The most important initiatives include reengineering information technologies courses, especially for high school students (Costanzo, 2017).

## **2 Materials and methods**

### **Research methodology**

Semistructured interviews were used to assess the attitudes on the issues of women in cybersecurity and information technologies. Two open questions were given to the participants:

1. Why are there not enough women at information technologies' jobs?
2. What possibilities exist for introducing more women at cybersecurity jobs?

### **Sample**

The sample consisted of twenty participants from Belgrade, Serbia – professionals and faculty in the fields of information technologies, security studies, and general management. Interviews were held from January 24 to 28, 2022. Participants were contacted through academic and project networks. Majority of participants were male (n=14) and only six (n=6) participants were female. Gender distribution of the participants already shows a gender problem, even though interviewees are selected from various fields.

Table 1. Demographic variables

Code Name	Position	Gender	Type of institution/Field of expertise
P1	Full professor	M	Faculty/Security
P2	Full professor	M	Faculty/Security
P3	Associate professor	F	Faculty/Security
P4	Associate professor	F	Faculty/Security
P5	Assistant professor	F	Faculty/ Information technologies
P6	Associate professor	M	Faculty/Information technologies
P7	Associate professor	F	Faculty/Human resources management
P8	Manager	M	IT company/Management
P9	Analyst	M	Security company Risk Management
P10	Chief information technologies officer	M	IT company/Information technologies development
P11	HR manager	F	IT company/Human resources management
P12	Risk manager	M	International company/Information technologies
P13	IT engineer	M	IT company/Information technologies
P14	IT engineer	M	Insurance/Information technologies
P15	Associate	M	Public company/Water supply and distribution
P16	Associate	M	Public company/Electricity
P17	PhD student	M	Faculty/Security management
P18	PhD student	M	Faculty/Security management
P19	PhD student	M	Faculty/Security management
P20	PhD student	F	Faculty/Engineering management

(Source: authors)

P1, P5, P17, P18 (male) and P4, P6, P20 (female) all agree that female students in STEM were less inclined to enroll in information technologies master programs often choosing project management or human resources management in information technologies courses or programs like their primary area of interest.

P11 (female) who is a human resources manager at information technologies' company states that there is no problem in finding suitable candidates for various information technologies positions, but that competent candidates for cybersecurity are very difficult to find. Her company invests in training for cybersecurity tasks and female candidates would be appreciated, because of the commitment to company, but from their already small female workforce only one employee would be interested in a cybersecurity training

program. Participants P16 (male), and P5 (female) state that their female friends who chose to pursue degrees in information technologies, electro technical, or mechanical engineering often had problems in finding a job after graduation, even though they completed their studies at top 10-20% of the class and that many of their female friends with STEM degrees had to look for job opportunities in other fields (general management, project management, human resources management, finance, etc.). They also state that most of their female friends who actually found a job in information technologies could chose from a very narrow selection of jobs and that most often were offered jobs in tech support (phone support), or management.

Participants P8, P12, P13, and P14 state one more intriguing problem, namely information technologies' managers and professionals even with adequate female candidates would rather employ a male candidate believing that female candidates wouldn't perform their tasks well, wouldn't be able to further develop their skills, would leave for maternity leave and wouldn't fit organizational culture. Participant P8 stated that he wouldn't look for a gender of a potential candidate but that many of his colleagues would and that he had positive experience with female employees who tend to stay longer, and work harder than their male counterparts. Nevertheless, he stated that he would hesitate in investing in cybersecurity training programs or cybersecurity mentoring for female employees.

P9, P10, P12 state the importance of internship programs targeting not only the best possible talent, but also focusing on recruiting female talent for information technologies and after assessment of internship results, and their final employment, would add development in the field of cybersecurity. P9 states this as a long term strategy that is very risky, because from six months to a year would be spent on a internship and at least one more year on training in the field of cybersecurity and that companies have to put very strong contractual obligations so that trained employees wouldn't leave, but that even more important would be creation of an environment promoting diversity and cooperation in the organization regardless of gender.

## **Model**


According to the results of interviewees, we propose a 3, 4, or 5 step model of increasing more women at cyber security jobs and define time as the crucial element. "Shortest" term strategy cycle would include steps 4 and 5, namely the identification of female cyber security professionals and information technologies' professionals with high level competencies and their linking to the companies that would employ them and include them in the programs of further training in the field of cybersecurity. The crucial part in this program would be on professional associations of the companies.

Short term strategy cycle would include steps 3, 4, and 5 and would include programs for supporting current female information technologies students in choosing cybersecurity as their primary area of interest, especially the best female students at final years of their higher education. In this stage crucial role belong to career development centres at STEM faculties, same as to teachers at courses related to cybersecurity and information technologies.

Medium strategy cycle would include steps 2, 3, 4, and 5 and would include attracting female candidates from technical schools and other high schools with interest in information technologies to STEM higher education, especially information technologies faculties. The crucial part in this belong to higher education hiring teams and career development centres.

Long term strategy cycle would include more information technologies courses for the children (both genders) on both, elementary education level (grade 1 to 8 in Serbia) and high school education level (grade 1 to 4), so that after the full cycle of twelve years of education on elementary and high school level, they would posses strong information skills and motivation for STEM studies. The crucial part in this belong to the state educational system, and schools.

Figure 1. Proposed model of increasing female candidates at cybersecurity jobs  
(Source: Authors)



(Source: Authors)

### 3 Limitations of the study and implications for further research

The sample of the research was quite small and additional studies including empirical research is needed to further explore this topic.

## Conclusions

Talent shortage in cybersecurity is becoming very important question in preventing cyber attacks that can have dire consequences for states, business, and citizens alike. One of the key questions in bridging a talent gap is including more female participants in the cybersecurity workforce.

Interviewed professionals and faculty from the Republic of Serbia stated main problems in employing female workforce as reluctance in recruiting and training female candidates, but recognizing their potential.

Based on the interviews, conceptual model for involving women in cybersecurity workforce in the Republic of Serbia has been engineered including short term to long term cycles of promotion of information technologies to female students that would include state, school on all levels and higher education development centres.

## References

- BROWN, D., PYTLAK, A. 2020. Why Gender Matters in International Cyber Security. Women's International League for Peace and Available at Freedom and the Association for Progressive Communications.  
[https://www.apc.org/sites/default/files/Gender\\_Matters\\_Report\\_Web\\_A4.pdf](https://www.apc.org/sites/default/files/Gender_Matters_Report_Web_A4.pdf)
- CALDWELL, T. 2013. Plugging the cyber-security skills gap. *Computer Fraud & Security*. 2013. 5–10. 10.1016/S1361-3723(13)70062-9.
- COSTANZO, J. 2017. Bridging the cybersecurity talent gap in Hampton Roads. Hampton Roads Cybersecurity Education, Workforce, and Economic Development Alliance (HRCyber) Available at
- CRUMPLER, W., LEWIS, JAMES. A. 2019. The Cybersecurity workforce gap, Washington: Centre for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)
- Dallaway, E. 2014. "Closing the Gender Gap in Cybersecurity" CREST [Online] Available at <https://www.crest-approved.org/wp-content/uploads/CREST-Closing-the-Gender-Gap-in-Cyber-Security.pdf>
- KHAN, M. K. 2020. Overcoming Gender Disparity in Cybersecurity Profession. Available at <https://www.g20-insights.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/OVERCOMING-GENDER-DISPARITY-IN-CYBERSECURITY-PROFESSION.pdf>
- KPMG. 2021. Decrypting Diversity: Diversity & Inclusion in Cyber Security. KPMG. Available at <https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/pdfs/report/decrypting-diversity-2021-diversity-and-inclusion-in-cyber-security.pdf>
- LINGELBACH, K. K. 2018. Perceptions of Female Cybersecurity Professionals Toward Factors that Encourage Females to the Cybersecurity Field. Doctoral dissertation. Nova Southeastern University. Retrieved from NSUWorks, College



of Engineering and Computing. (1056)  
[https://nsuworks.nova.edu/gscis\\_etd/1056](https://nsuworks.nova.edu/gscis_etd/1056).

MANUEL, D. 2020. The Australian cyber security skills and jobs: NSW study. Sydney: Australian Information Security Association. Available at [https://www.aisa.org.au/Public/News\\_and\\_Media/News/Research/AISA-Australian-Cyber-Security-Skills-and-Jobs-NSW-Study-2020.aspx](https://www.aisa.org.au/Public/News_and_Media/News/Research/AISA-Australian-Cyber-Security-Skills-and-Jobs-NSW-Study-2020.aspx).

MCHENRY, D., BORGES, T., BOLLEN, A. 2021. Cyber Security Skills in the UK Labour Market 2021: Technical Report Ipsos MORI (Firm), Great Britain. Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport. Available at [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/1042429/Cyber\\_skills\\_in\\_the\\_labour\\_market\\_report\\_v6\\_.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1042429/Cyber_skills_in_the_labour_market_report_v6_.pdf)

PEACOCK, D., IRONS, A. 2017. *Gender Inequality in Cybersecurity: Exploring the Gender Gap in Opportunities and Progression*. International Journal of Gender, Science and Technology, 9 (1). ISSN 2040-0748

PM Network. 2017. Cyber Gender Gaps: Women Are Underrepresented In The Cybersecurity Sector—And Paid Less Than Their Male Colleagues. *PM Network*, 31(12), 8. Available at <https://www.pmi.org/learning/library/cyber-gender-gaps-women-cyber-security-10996>

RAFFETY, A., COSTANTINI, L. P. 2021. A Guide for Public Utility Commissions: Recruiting and Retaining a Cybersecurity Workforce. The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners Center for Partnerships and Innovation. Available at <https://pubs.naruc.org/pub/EB929186-155D-0A36-31C7-4D616E6A1008>

SPATARU, D. 2021. Emerging tech widening cyber skills gap. Can women help close it? Data, Cybersecurity & Privacy 10-2021

WISE. 2021. Addressing the Cybersecurity Gap in the UK. Available at [https://www.wisecampaign.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/WISE\\_Addressing-the-Cybersecurity-Skills-Gap-in-the-UK\\_Report\\_v3.pdf](https://www.wisecampaign.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/WISE_Addressing-the-Cybersecurity-Skills-Gap-in-the-UK_Report_v3.pdf)

# CANARDS AND HOAXES<sup>1</sup>

Svetozár Krno<sup>2</sup> - Beáta Izsófová<sup>3</sup>

## **ABSTRACT**

*In their study, the authors deal with the genesis of the term canard. They point to the intentions of its disseminators, whose primary concern was not to pursue political, economic or worldview interests by deliberate deception. The authors pay special attention to the concept of hoax. They mention common, but particularly different features with the term canard. Their short historical excursion indicates that it has its roots in past centuries and that socio-political, but especially technological development does not hinder them, but only provides new opportunities to operate.*

**Key words:** *canard, hoax, trick, deception, witches*

The information society also brings with it a more sophisticated form of misinformation, of which the neologism *hoax*<sup>4</sup>, i.e. deliberate, thought-out misleading the public with false information in order to promote their political, geopolitical, military, ideological, macro- and microeconomic (e.g. frequently in advertising) and other interests at the expense of competitors, has become a stable component. This term is often used very loosely, contradictorily and purposefully, in a similar way to the other words that reflect the conflict of the mentioned interests. New words arise and pervade public communication so that we can name and explain the reality around us more precisely. However, in many cases they serve the opposite – they make it easier to mislead recipients.

The term literally translated as *journalistic duck* in many languages (see below) appeared in Europe much earlier than *hoax*. Opinions about its origin are various. Most often cited source is the *Agricultural Newspaper*, which in 1775 published an article about a new way of catching wild ducks. According to the author, hunting will be most successful when an acorn cooked in a laxative and

---

<sup>1</sup> This scientific paper was prepared within the framework of APVV project ID APVV-20-03341/0149/19 "This is not true, but it could be: Conspiracy theories and hoaxes in the modern development of Slovakia in the European context". The grant was provided by the Slovak Research and Development Agency, Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport of the Slovak Republic.

<sup>2</sup> Svetozár Krno, Prof. PhDr., CSc., professor, Head of the Department of Political Science and Eurasian Studies, Faculty of Arts of the Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Boženy Slančíkovej 1, 949 74 Nitra, Slovakia, skrno@ukf.sk.

<sup>3</sup> Beáta Izsófová, PhDr., internal PhD student, Department of Political Science and Eurasian Studies, Faculty of Arts of the Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, Boženy Slančíkovej 1, 949 74 Nitra, Slovakia beata.izsofova@ukf.sk.

<sup>4</sup> The second volume of the latest representative *Dictionary of the Contemporary Slovak Language* (Bratislava: VEDA Publishing House of the Slovak Academy of Science, 2011, 1089 p.) covering 25, 418 entries with the initial from H through L does not include this term.

tied to a fishing line is used as bait. When the duck devours this bait, thanks to the laxative, the bait leaves the duck's body very quickly and becomes food for the next duck, repeating the process, until the whole flock is strung on a thread in a row like beads. (Fučík, Pokorný, 2009)

More than a century ago, German publishers referred to fantastic, dubious and unverified reports with the initials N.T., which is an abbreviation of the Latin *non testatum*, i.e. unverified. The term *die Ente* is German for *duck* which lead to dubious unverified reports being referred to as *Ente* (ergo, *duck*) instead of the acronym NT. This was subsequently followed by borrowing of the term in several languages and, hence we have *Zeitungsentente* in German, *novinářská kachna* in Czech, *novinárska kačica* in Slovak, *kaczka dziennikarska* in Polish, *hírlapi kacsa* in Hungarian, *газетна качка* in Ukrainian, *газетная утка* in Russian, as well as *canard* in French, from which the English took over the expression. Moreover, the French expression *donner des canards* (literally *to give ducks*) means in a figurative sense *to lie* whereas *vendre des canards à moitié* (literally *to sell half a duck*), again, in a figurative sense, *not to tell the whole truth*.

The aim of canards was not to pursue political, economic or worldview interests by deliberate deception. Their creators and disseminators sought to be the most original, catchy, and prompt in the competitive mass media environment. Many unverified texts with a sensational or scandalous touch achieved their goal even at the cost of later shaking their own reputation. New Year's Eve and other humorous editions of printed periodicals, for instance, became a special type of canards, bringing various fictional stories that already declared clear literary fiction in addition to being printed in italics. It was evident to the educated reader that they did not offer a purely factual account. Hence, it was not a deception, but a fair and open effort to entertain the recipient.

Considering the term *hoax*, it also has older roots, although it was not frequently used until the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It was used as a verb at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century and as a noun at the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Hornby – Oxford, 1991; *Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English*, 2006; *The Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, 2004). From an etymological point of view, it was probably a contraction of the word *hocus* (ibid). In his publication *A Glossary; Or, Collection of Words, Phrases, Names, and Allusions to Customs, Proverbs, &c. which Have Been Thought to Require Illustration, in the Works of English Authors, Particularly Shakespeare, and His Contemporaries* from 1822, **Robert Nares** explains the meaning of the term *hocus* as “*to cheat, to impose upon; from hocus-pocus, the jargon of pretended conjurers; the origin of which, after various attempts, seems to be rightly drawn from the Italian jugglers, who said Ochus Bochus, in reference to a famous magician of those names. [...] Mr Malone considers the modern word hoax, as made from this; and, indeed, between hoccus'd and hoaxt there is hardly any difference, and I prefer this derivation to those that are more learned. [...] It is a strong confirmation of this origin, that hoax is not a word handed down to us from our ancestors, but very lately*

introduced, by persons who might have retained hocus, a word hardly obsolete, but could know nothing of Saxon, or the books in Lambeth Library” (Nares, 1822, p. 235).

With regards to the phrase *hocus-pocus*, the following are the explanations of its meaning in various dictionaries: *Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary* describes it as “*language or behaviour that makes no sense and is intended to hide the truth from people*” (Hornby – Oxford, 1991, p. 592), *Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary* as “*tricks used to deceive, or words used to hide what is happening or make it not clear; words said by a magician (= a performer who pretends to do magical things) when they are doing a trick*” (Anon., 2005, p. 608), *Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English* as “*a method or belief that you think is based on false ideas*” (Anon., 2006, p. 679), *Macmillan English Dictionary for Advanced Learners* as “*an activity or a belief that you think has no value and is intended to trick people*” (Anon., 2007, p. 719), and *Merriam-Webster Dictionary* as “*1 sleight of hand; 2 nonsense or sham used especially to cloak deception*” (Anon., 2004, p. 341).

Originally the English term *hoax* has the form of a noun and a verb.

Dictionary	noun	verb
<i>Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary</i> (Hornby – Oxford, 1991, p. 592)	an act intended to make somebody believe something that is not true, especially something unpleasant	to trick somebody by making them believe something that is not true, especially something unpleasant
<i>Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary</i> (Anon., 2005, p. 608)	a plan to deceive someone, such as telling the police there is a bomb somewhere when there is not one, or a trick	to deceive, especially by playing a trick on someone
<i>Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English</i> (Anon., 2006, p. 679)	1 a false warning about something dangerous; 2 an attempt to make people believe something that is not true	
<i>Macmillan English Dictionary for Advanced Learners</i> (Anon., 2007, p. 719)	a trick in which someone deliberately tells people that something bad is going to happen or that something is true when it is not	to trick someone deliberately with a hoax

<i>Merriam-Webster Dictionary</i> (Anon., 2004, p. 341)	1 an act intended to trick or dupe: imposture; 2 something accepted or established by fraud or fabrication	to trick into believing or accepting as genuine something false and often preposterous
<i>The Oxford English Reference Dictionary</i> (Pearsall, Trumble, 1996, p. 671)	a humorous or malicious deception; a practical joke	to deceive (a person) with hoax
<i>Collins Writer's Thesaurus of the English Language</i> (Brookes, 2010, p. 325)	joke, fraud	to swindle, ruse, canard, fast one

Hoaxes spread all the more effectively when their disseminators are convinced of their truth. The well-known work *Malleus Maleficarum* (usually translated as the *Hammer of Witches*, 1486), written in Latin by Dominicans, university professors, leading scholars of their time **Heinrich Kramer** (under his Latinised name Heinrich Institoris, ca. 1430–1505) and **Jacob Sprenger** (ca. 1436–1494) with the best of intentions. By the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century alone, this publication had 29 editions. It provides a theological explanation of dark supernatural forces with an emphasis on witches. For three centuries, it became a guide on how to fight the forces of hell. “Screenwriters”, “directors” and “actors” in court cases with the so-called witches relied on this publication.

Even the prominent French humanist thinker **Jean Bodin** (1529–1596), who was one of the first to develop the concept of human rights and the rule of law long before the Thirty Years’ War on religious tolerance, believed in the existence of spells, unclean spirits, and witches. He himself, on the other hand, suggested that boxes be placed in churches in which believers would place pieces of paper with the names of people suspected of witchcraft. In his famous book *Of the Demon-mania of the Sorcerers* (*De la démonomanie des sorciers*, 1580), which in a short period of time (1580 to 1600) recorded ten French editions, he advised how to expose and prosecute those who became possessed by the devil. According to him, women that are said to be gullible, curious, hypersensitive, angry, vindictive, and garrulous are more prone to witchcraft. They are often a “Satan’s arrow” and a “hell guard”. They do not deserve forgiveness during the interrogation, and afterwards they do not even deserve a reduced sentence. (Bodin, 1580)<sup>5</sup>

Not only Catholics hunted witches. It is estimated that a third of the trials took place in a Protestant environment. **Martin Luther**, not the first but perhaps most famous reformer, initially criticized the fanatics who saw the handwriting of

<sup>5</sup> This book has been translated into many other languages (e.g. Latin and Italian).

the witches behind almost every bad event. Later, in August 1538, he declared: “*We must have no mercy on them. I would burn them myself. [...] With such [witches] they should hurry and punish them by death. Lawyers want too much evidence.*” (Hansen, 1898)

The target of targeted dishonour was also **Vlad III Dracul**, Voivode of Wallachia (also known as Vlad Țepeș or Vlad the Impaler, 1431–1476). (Krno, 2018) The reputation this ruler acquired inspired **Bram Stoker** (1847-1912) after more than four centuries. In 1897, this Irish novelist placed a substantial part of the story of his famous novel far from the “*peaceful good old*” part of Europe and into the Balkans – in the heart of Transylvania<sup>6</sup>. On the negative hero, Count Dracula, he painted the so-called little civilized nation somewhere in the wilderness, in a forgotten corner of the old continent. Thus the Romanians<sup>7</sup> have wrongly opposed the Western Europeans, who in the form of a trio of English lawyer Jonathan Harker, English doctor John Seward and Dutch scientist Abraham Van Helsing are trying to rid the civilized world of the Balkan monster. (Krno, 2016) This marketing ploy worked out for **Stoker**. The literary weakness, moreover copying the geographical area in the five-year-old and artistically valuable novel *The Carpathian Castle (Le Château des Carpathes, 1892)* by **Jules Verne** (1828–1905), became the source for many commercially successful films. **Stoker** struck the consciousness and subconscious much more than the pedantic **Verne**, who knew the Romanian mountainous countryside well from literature and whose characteristics of the mountaineers did not age even after a century. The fact that we are willing to accept the sensations of greedy fiction more than reality also helps with the spreading of current hoaxes.

However, even fantasy-based artwork, whose authors follow the intentions of the hoax creators, can have similar effects. **Herbert George Wells** (1866–1946), known as the English Jules Verne, wrote in 1898 the science fiction novel *The War of the Worlds*, which consists of two parts: *Book One: The Coming of the Martians* and *Book Two: The Earth under the Martians*. Four decades later, on October 30, 1938, CBS broadcast a dramatization of the novel. The radio play, directed by **George Orson Welles** (1915–1985), caused panic in the United States, which affected about a sixth of the estimated six million listeners. Many

---

<sup>6</sup> He also obtained ethnographic data from the well-known Orientalist, a supporter of Turanism, **Ármin Vámbéry** (1832–1913), a native of Svätý Jur near Bratislava, on whom **Stoker** based the novel character of the vampire hunter Abraham Van Helsing. Nevertheless, he portrayed life in Transylvania in a much distorted way.

<sup>7</sup> “*Now and again we passed a leiterwagon – the ordinary peasant’s cart – with its long, snake-like vertebra, calculated to suit the inequalities of the road. On this were sure to be seated quite a group of home-coming peasants, the Cszeks with their white, and the Slovaks with their coloured sheepskins, the latter carrying lance-fashion their long staves, with axe at end. [...] With joy I hurried to the window, and saw drive into the yard two great leiter-waggons, each drawn by eight sturdy horses, and at the head of each pair a Slovak, with his wide hat, great nail-studded belt, dirty sheepskin, and high boots. They had also their long staves in hand.*” (Stoker, 1994, pp. 17, 58)

in mass hysteria believed that the Martian invasion, coupled with militant targets, had suddenly become a reality. According to additional research, people with lower education, superstitious, inclined to fundamentalism, and believing in authorities were the most subjected to collective hysteria. As sociologist **Ján Sopóci** wrote, “*mass psychogenic diseases occur mainly in people performing boring, routine, repetitive work. [...] They are usually a collective response to stress caused by job dissatisfaction, poor working and living conditions, or feelings of alienation*” (Sopóci, 2001).

In Slovak politics, the first major hoax struck **Vavro Šrobár** (1867–1950), who remained in top politics for half a century. A modern legend arose around him, according to which Count Franz-Joseph von Seefried shot a brown bear in the Skalnô valley near the village of Liptovské Revúce (another source mentions the forests above Šrobár’s native village of Lisková). The foresters threw a skinned, emptied and straw-filled hull into the river. The omnivore’s body was carried away by water, until it was fished under the Čebrať hill in the bend of the Váh River by the rafters from Lisková. The consultation of three doctors from Ružomberok stated the violent death of a large, healthy man who had long been an abstinent, non-smoker and vegetarian, and who had recently stayed in the mountains for a long time, as only wild strawberries and raspberries were found in his stomach. And thus identified the deceased of an unknown religion found himself on July 13, 1908 in the cemetery for suicides, which was located in the western part of the current textile factory in Rybárpole, part of Ružomberok. When the truth came out, the people of Ružomberok were given the derogatory nickname *bear leaders*. And the local defenceless doctor **Vavro Šrobár**, who was in prison in Szeged<sup>8</sup> at the time of the famous hunt and not in the commission that was supposed to examine the bear’s body, wrongly gained from his enemies the reputation of a medical dilettante. This humorous, innocent incident proved to be one of the first, if not the first, example of effective negative political advertising based on a lie that incorrectly portrays a person, even long after his death. (Bohúň, 1960)

Hoaxes, which have been discussed more intensively in recent years in the general public, but also in professional circles, have their roots in old times. Socio-political, but especially technological developments do not hinder them, but only provides them new opportunities to operate. This makes it all the more important to research them and then respond to them accordingly.

---

<sup>8</sup> **Vavro Šrobár** learned about the incident with the bear from the press. As evidenced by the postcard he sent, they had a good laugh in the prison.

## References

- BODIN, J. 1598. *De la Démonomania des Sorciers*. Paris: chez Estienne Prevosteau, 1598. 604 p.
- BOHÚŇ, E. 1971. *Ružomberský medved' I. a II.* In *Zaprášené histórie*. Bratislava: Tatran 1971. 485 p.
- BROOKES, I. ed. 2010. *Collins Writer's Thesaurus of the English Language*. Glasgow: HarperCollins Publishers, 2010. 779 p. ISBN 978-0-00-741251-8.
- Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary*. 2005. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 1572 p. ISBN 978-0-521-84378-2.
- FUČÍK, B. – POKORNÝ, J. 2009. *Zakopaný pes aneb O tom jak, proč a kde vznikla některá slova, jména, rčení, úsloví, pořekadla a přísloví*. Praha: Albatros, 2009. 248 p. ISBN 978-80-00-02281-9.
- HANSEN, J. 1898. *Zauberwahn, Inquisition Und Hexenprozess Im Mittelalter: Und Die Entstehung Der Grossen Hexenverfolgung*. In *Historische Zeitschrift*. München: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 1898. pp. 385–412. ISSN 0018-2613.
- HORNBY, A.S. – OXFORD. 1991. *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. 1579 p. ISBN 0-19-431167-8.
- KRNO, S. 2018. *Divá Nemíra*. In *Dvetisíc kilometrov od Železných vrat po Devín*. Bratislava: Karpaty-Infopress, 2018. 272 p. ISBN 978-80-971256-9-1.
- KRNO, S. 2016. *Východ a Západ*. In *Studia Politica Slovaca. Časopis pre politické vedy, najnovšie politické dejiny a medzinárodné vzťahy*, Volume IX, 1/2016. Bratislava: Ústav politických vied SAV, 2016. pp. 113-125. ISSN 1337-8163.
- Longman dictionary of contemporary English*. 2006. Harlow: Longman, 2006. 1949 p. ISBN 978-1-405-86221-9.
- Macmillan English Dictionary for Advanced Learners*. 2007. Oxford: Macmillan Publishers Ltd, 2007. 1748 p. ISBN 978-1-4050-2628-4.
- NARES, R. 1822. *A Glossary; Or, Collection of Words, Phrases, Names, and Allusions to Customs, Proverbs, &c. which Have Been Thought to Require Illustration, in the Works of English Authors, Particularly Shakespeare, and His Contemporaries*. London: R. Triphook, 1822. 583 p.
- PEARSALL, J. – TRUMBLE, B., eds. 1996. *The Oxford English Reference Dictionary*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. 1765 p. ISBN 0-19-860050-X.
- SOPÓCI, J. 2001. *Bojíte sa hovädzieho?* [online]. [cit. 01.03.2022]. Available online: [https://www.noveslovo.sk/c/21639/Bojite\\_sa\\_hovadzieho](https://www.noveslovo.sk/c/21639/Bojite_sa_hovadzieho).
- STOKER, B. 1994. *Dracula*. London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1994. 449 p. ISBN 978-0-14-062339-0.
- The Merriam-Webster Dictionary*. 2004. Springfield, Mass: Merriam-Webster, 2004. 939 p. ISBN 978-0-87779-930-6.



# RUSHING TOWARDS RENEWABLES IN SERBIA – ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY, AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS

Luka Latinović<sup>1</sup> - Vladimir Tomašević<sup>2</sup>

## **ABSTRACT**

*As a candidate country for joining the European Union, Serbia is obliged to implement reforms, which, among other things, imply the increased share of renewable energy sources in total energy consumption. While this is fully in line with the sustainability goals, the end result does not necessarily have to be positive in all of the aspects, as each country has specific economic, environmental and energy security circumstances. A comprehensive review of the relevant academic literature showed that the hectic pace of the introduction of renewable sources in Serbia might have certain negative implications for energy security and economy, similar to the way it happened in Germany, with the phase-out of nuclear power plants. However, Serbia's current strategic moves such as investments in coal-fired power plants are not sustainable, and there is strong evidence to suggest that nuclear energy should be considered as the source that could reconcile the economic, environmental and energy security spheres in Serbia.*

**Key Words:** Energy and environmental security, Base power production, Renewable energy sources, Nuclear energy.

## **Introduction**

Renewable Energy Directive, the Directive (EU) 2009/28/EC (RED) implied 20 % for the overall share of energy from renewable sources in the EU's gross final consumption of energy by the end of 2020. In January 2020, the European Parliament adopted its recast, emphasizing the need for more ambitious action to address climate change and meet environmental objectives. The new Renewable Energy Directive, the Directive (EU) 2018/2001, (REDII), established a binding target of 32 % by the end of 2030. As **Zygierewicz and Sans** noted, *the resolution highlighted the essential role of energy in the transition to a net-zero greenhouse gas emissions economy, and particularly the importance of decarbonising the energy system* (Zygierewicz & Sans, 2021, p. 1). If Serbia is to continue with European integration, such European policies related to the use of renewables will have to be implemented. Despite that, the Government of Serbia is investing in the construction of new coal-fired power capacities, and more of such are planned (Todorović, 2020). Although this seems justified from the

---

<sup>1</sup> Luka Latinović, MSc, Teaching Fellow, Department of Industrial Engineering, School of Engineering Management, University Union – Nikola Tesla, 43 Vojvode Mišića blvd., 11000 Belgrade, Serbia, luka.latinovic@fim.rs

<sup>2</sup> Vladimir Tomašević, PhD, Full Professor, Head of Belgrade Security Institute, Dean of School of Engineering Management, 43 Vojvode Mišića blvd., 11000 Belgrade, Serbia, vladimir.tomasevic@fim.rs

perspective of Serbia's energy security, that is not the case. Pollution in Serbia has far exceeded critical levels thus, environmental security must become an imperative. On the other hand, the example of Germany showed that renewables, with the elimination of base load power production capacities, lead to an increase in energy prices, which would have extremely negative consequences for the Serbian economy. Given the abundance of conflicting facts, this paper tries to find a solution that is sustainable for Serbia in the long run. To this end, all of these factors were considered through economic, and ecological and energy security perspectives.

## 1 Energy Security

The word security is one of the most frequent and exploited terms today. Still, efforts to define the phrase 'energy security' becomes aggravated by the fact that there is no generally accepted definition of the term *security* itself. Moreover, there are numerous different theoretical approaches in defining the term 'security'. In the colloquial understanding, it is a state of non-existence of threats, characterised by the absence of danger and fear with achieved stability and safety (Милосављевић, Томић & Мандић, 2016). Analogously to general security, energy security is a complex, comprehensive and indivisible. According to the **World Energy Council**, energy security *measures a nation's capacity to meet current and future energy demand reliably, withstand and bounce back swiftly from system shocks with minimal disruption to supplies* (Gadonneix, 2022). The **International Energy Agency** (IEA) defines energy security as the *uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price*, further explaining that *long-term energy security mainly deals with timely investments to supply energy in line with economic developments and environmental needs*, while the *short-term energy security focuses on the ability of the energy system to react promptly to sudden changes in the supply-demand balance* (IEA, 2019). Russian author **N. Kaveshnikov** extended the scope of energy security considering it from three different perspectives: consumer, supplier, and transit countries. The author argues that *energy security should be defined as the elimination of a threat that in the longer run would become a potential barrier to the economic development of a country* (Kaveshnikov, 2010, p. 587). Given that energy security is in the general interest of all entities in the energy market, the conclusion can be drawn that integration and achieving a balance of interests of all entities is necessary in order to ensure a stable state of energy security. Another Russian author, **Boris Sergeevich Lushkin**, also sees energy security a complex, open and organised system, consisting of different interconnected and conditioned subsystems. **Lushkin** argues that it is a complex concept that includes: stability of energy supply; formation of adequate prices; prevention of sabotage of energy infrastructure facilities; and minimizing environmental risks and threats (Лушкин, 2011). Serbian authors, **Милосављевић** et al., define energy security

as continuity, stability, reliability in energy supply, with price acceptability (from the consumer's point of view), as well as energy demand stability and price predictability (from the producer's point of view) (Милосављевић et al., 2016, p. 115), where all the aforementioned authors, despite minor or major differences in the definitions of energy security, have a common position that in order to achieve energy security, it is necessary to achieve diversity of energy demand and/or supply, while paying attention to environmental impact.

## 2 Phasing-Out Nuclear Power Plants – The Case of Germany

Nuclear reactors powers around 10 % of the global energy demand (Figure 1), while in 90's, it was almost 20 % (IEA, 2021). Still, majority of citizens, regardless the country, are often uninformed of this statistic. There has long been a social stigma to move away from nuclear power because of infamous past meltdown incidents, even in academic circles. Despite that, it is far safer energy source than society generally thinks (Moniz, 2011).




Figure 1: Percentage of the Global electricity generation by fuel, from 1979-2019. Datasource: (IEA, 2021).

Nuclear energy has the capacity to produce more energy with more efficiency, than any other alternative energy solutions, at the same time, leading to a far smaller number of fatalities per TW.yr<sup>3</sup> of generated electricity than other energy sources (Figure 3). Moreover, during the energy generation phase, it does not produce any carbon-based emissions of greenhouse gases, a rising concern among the public in many world nations. Still, the rising prevalence of global

<sup>3</sup> One TW.yr is the amount of electricity used by the world in about five months (World Nuclear Association).

warming in developed world, public opinion and jobs created by the renewable energy sources economy were the impetus for the Germany to start phasing-out nuclear power plants. In 2000, the German government decided to enforce a nuclear phase-out by 2022 as part of a coalition agreement between the ruling Green and Socialist party (Rüdig, 2000; Mez & Piening, 2002). However, as Bruninx et al. observed, *the combination of the ambitious German greenhouse gas reduction goals in the power sector and the nuclear phase-out have raised many questions concerning the operational security of the German electricity generation system* (Bruninx et al., 2013, p. 251).




Figure 2: Figure 2: Fatalities per TW.yr<sup>3</sup>. Source: Paul Scherrer Institut. Data for nuclear accidents modified to reflect UNSCEAR findings/recommendations 2012 and NCR SOARCA study 2015

Renewables, such as wind and solar power, are variable sources. At dusk, for example, there is a steep jump in electricity consumption and also a relatively steep drop in the amount generated from photovoltaic sources. Therefore, it is necessary to have a certain base level of production that can balance these oscillations. The scenario analysis conducted by Bruninx et al. in 2013. assumed that nuclear generation, will be replaced mainly by coal- and lignite- based generation. It turned out that in recent years, Germany has made efforts to build gas power plants whose supply was to be provided by the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. In light of the unfortunate development of the situation between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, the question of supplying Germany with additional quantities of gas is also called into question, which will have a further negative impact on the price of energy in that country. Through the years, with nuclear power phasing-out and introduction of renewables, energy price in Germany already ramped-up several times-fold (Gillissen et al., 2019). If

Germany had kept some nuclear power plants online, it would have mitigated these effects. Either way, gas plants are now needed to cover the peak loads, but this has led to another issue.

In the past, nuclear, lignite and coal power plants were typically operated as base-load capacity. An increase in load cycling has a detrimental effect on a conventional power plant's life, resulting in poor financial performance, and leading to increased emissions from a power plant (Keatley, Shilbi & Hewitt, 2013). All operating regimes result in consumption of power plant service life through a combination of creep, fatigue, erosion, corrosion and other damage mechanisms which accumulates over time. Generating units intended for a base load regime operate most efficiently in the steady state conditions in which load, and therefore temperature, pressure, stress and fluid flow rates remain more or less constant over long periods of time (Holdsworth, 2011). The increased number of starts and ramps indicate a significantly increased cycling operation for the thermal plants. The average load factors, indicating the power supplied by each unit, are increased despite the higher renewable penetration (Keatley et al., 2013). As **Keatley et al.** observe, *in many power systems large thermal generating units, which were primarily designed to resist creep damage caused by base load operation throughout an effective service life of more than 40 years, are being operated cyclically as a result of market liberalization and the rapid expansion of intermittent renewable energy sources* (Keatley et al., 2013). This type of off-design operation results in accelerated rates of life consumption due to the initiation of fatigue-related damage mechanisms which these units were not designed to withstand. This issue is of particular concern to the owners and operators of thermal generators because of the significantly increased levels of cycling duty that their units will be required to perform as a result of plans to integrate very high levels of wind power and solar power. The impacts of cyclic operation on unit operating costs, scheduling and availability have largely been overlooked in renewable energy integration studies.

### **3 Energy Development Strategy – The Case of Serbia**

On December 4<sup>th</sup>, 2015, the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia adopted the Energy Development Strategy of the Republic of Serbia until 2025 with projections until 2030. (RS, 2015). As **Latinović et al.** sum up, *according to the strategy, the strategic development of the Serbian energy sector should be based on establishing the balance between energy production from available sources, energy consumption with market and social sustainability, along with more efficient production and use of cleaner energy from renewable sources* (Latinović et al., 2020). The strategy prioritises several key points such as: ensuring energy security, reducing import dependence, building new electricity capacities, while establishing a sustainable energy sector through the use of renewable energy sources and the application of environmental protection

standards and the reduction of adverse impacts on climate. (RS, 2015; Latinović et al., 2020).

Despite that, the Government of Serbia has announced investments in the opening of new coal-fired power plants (Todorović, 2020). Although at first glance this seems to contribute to energy security, production of electrical energy from coal sources, widely available in Serbia, is certainly not sustainable in the long run (Korać, Mićin & Čupić, 2019). Moreover, in the case of Serbia, it should be regarded as highly concerning.




Figure 3: SO<sub>2</sub> Emissions in tons in 2019. Datasource: (EEA, 2021; EPS, 2021)

Serbian coal-fired power plants are one of the Europe's biggest emitters of sulphur-dioxide (SO<sub>2</sub>) (Figure 3), for which Serbia's public electricity company faced court challenges by Renewables and Environmental Regulatory Institute (RERI, 2021). According to estimates, over 700 people die prematurely in air pollution in the three most populated cities alone (Todorović et al., 2019), while according to the WHO, at the Serbian level, that number is over 3,500 lives (World Health Organization, 2019). The question can rightly be asked: if Serbia has not been able to implement filtration systems on existing coal-fired power plants for decades, will it be able to adapt new power plants to environmental standards?

## Conclusion

Coal is certainly not a sustainable solution in the long run, and based on all of the above, the arguments speak against such a solution. All the more, they speak against rushing towards renewables, also. The example of Germany has shown that the elimination of the base level of electricity production inevitably leads to an increase in energy prices and dependence on other types of energy such as gas. Based on the same example, it was shown that the coal-fired power plants are not

not cost-effective even in cyclical use as a supplement to renewables. If Serbia wants to avoid German mistakes, it should carefully consider nuclear energy. Given that modern nuclear technology is safe, although not so perceived by the general population, and that there are already several nuclear reactors in Serbia's immediate vicinity, Serbia should try to find partners and build a nuclear power plant. In the long run, it should slow down the rise in price of electricity, while enabling energy export. Furthermore, it would provide a high base levels of energy production which, supported by renewables, would enable the decommissioning of Serbian coal-fired power plants and their relocation to history, where they belong.

## References

- BRUNINX, K., MADZHAROV, D., DELARUE, E., D'HAESELEER, W. 2013. Impact of the German nuclear phase-out on Europe's electricity generation-A comprehensive study. *Energy Policy*, 60. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.05.026>
- EEA. 2021. *Industrial Reporting database*. Available at: <https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/data/industrial-reporting-under-the-industrial-4/eu-registry-e-prtr-lcp/industrial-reporting-database-v5-december-2021>
- EPS. 2021. *Report on Environmental State 2020*. Available at: <http://www.eps.rs/eng/Documents/PE%20EPE%20Report%20on%20Environmental%20State%202020.pdf> Accessed on 24<sup>th</sup> February 2022.
- ESER, P., SINGH, A., CHOKANI, N., ABHARI, R. S. 2016. Effect of increased renewables generation on operation of thermal power plants. *Applied Energy*, 164, 723–732. <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.APENERGY.2015.12.017>
- EU. 2018. Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources. In *Official Journal of the European Union* (Vol. 2001).
- GADONNEIX, P., SAMBO, A., GUOBAO, Z., KIM, Y. D., TEYSSEN, J., LLERAS, J. A. V., NAQI, A. A., MEYERS, K., SHIN, H. C., NADEAU, M.-J., OTHERS. 2022. *World Energy Issues Monitor 2022*. Available at: [https://www.worldenergy.org/assets/downloads/World\\_Energy\\_Issues\\_Monitor\\_2022\\_-\\_Global\\_Report.pdf?v=1643913176](https://www.worldenergy.org/assets/downloads/World_Energy_Issues_Monitor_2022_-_Global_Report.pdf?v=1643913176) Accessed on 23<sup>rd</sup> February 2022.
- GILLESSEN, B., HEINRICHS, H., HAKE, J. F., ALLELEIN, H. J. 2019. Energy security in context of transforming energy systems: a case study for natural gas transport in Germany. *Energy Procedia*, 158, 3339–3345. <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.EGYPRO.2019.01.966>
- HOLDSWORTH, S. 2011. *Creep-fatigue interaction in power plant steels*. *Materials at High Temperatures*, 28(3), 197–204. [doi:10.3184/096034011x13123676](https://doi.org/10.3184/096034011x13123676)

IEA. 2019. *Energy Security – Areas of Work – IEA*. Available at: <https://www.iea.org/areas-of-work/ensuring-energy-security> Accessed on 23<sup>rd</sup> February 2022.

IEA. 2021. *World electricity generation mix by fuel, 1971-2019*. Available at: <https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/world-electricity-generation-mix-by-fuel-1971-2019> Accessed on 2<sup>nd</sup> February 2022.

KAVESHNIKOV, N. 2010. *The issue of energy security in relations between Russia and the European Union*. *European Security*, 19(4), 585–605. doi:10.1080/09662839.2010.5317

KEATLEY, P., SHIBLI, A., HEWITT, N. J. 2013. *Estimating power plant start costs in cyclic operation*. *Applied Energy*, 111, 550–557. doi:10.1016/j.apenergy.2013.05

KORAĆ, S., MIĆIN, M., ČUPIĆ, D. 2019. *Sustainable development: Going over to Green Economy-security implications*. *Serbian Journal of Engineering Management*, 4(1), pp.22–34. <https://doi.org/10.5937/SJEM1901022K>

LATINOVIĆ, L., STOJIC, N., LATINOVIĆ, J. 2020. *Important factors in the revival of the biodiesel industry in Serbia - progress or pitfall?*. *Serbian Journal of Engineering Management*, 5(2), 1-19. <https://doi.org/10.5937/SJEM2002001L>

ЛУКШИИ, Б., С. 2011. *Военно-политические аспекты обеспечения энергетической безопасности государства*, (Doctoral dissertation). Available at: <https://cheloveknauka.com/v/463755/d/?#?page=1> Accessed on May 2018.

МИЛОСАВЉЕВИЋ, С., ТОМИЋ, Д., МАНДИЋ, Г. Ј. 2016. *Покушају теоријског одређења појма енергетске безбедности као чиниоца детерминације међународног политичко-безбедносног система*. *Vojno delo*, 68(5), 106-123. <https://doi.org/10.5937/vojdelo1605106M>

MEZ, L., PIENING, A. 2002. Phasing-out nuclear power generation in Germany: Policies, actors, issues and non-issues. *Energy and Environment*, 13(2). <https://doi.org/10.1260/0958305021501155>

MONIZ, E. 2011. *Why we still need nuclear power: Making clean energy safe and affordable*. *Foreign Affairs*, 90(6).

RERI. 2021. *Serbia's public electricity company faces court challenge for breaching toxic emissions limits*. Available at: <https://www.reri.org.rs/en/serbias-public-electricity-company-faces-court-challenge-for-breaching-toxic-emissions-limits/> Accessed on 24<sup>th</sup> February 2022.

RS. 2015. *The Energy Development Strategy of the Republic of Serbia until 2025 with projections until 2030* (In Serbian). Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije 101/2015.

RÜDIG, W. 2000. *Phasing out nuclear energy in Germany*. *German Politics*, 9(3), 43–80. doi:10.1080/09644000008404607

TODOROVIĆ, I. 2020. *Termoelektrana Kolubara B na mreži 2024. godine, gradi je PowerChina*. Available at:



<https://balkangreenenergynews.com/rs/termoelektrana-kolubara-b-na-mrezi-2024-godine-gradi-je-powerchina/> Accessed on 27<sup>th</sup> February 2022.

TODOROVIĆ, M. N., RADENKOVIĆ, M. B., RAJŠIĆ, S. F., & IGNJATOVIĆ, L. M. 2019. *Evaluation of mortality attributed to air pollution in the three most populated cities in Serbia*. International Journal of Environmental Science and Technology. doi:10.1007/s13762-019-02384-6

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION. 2019. *Health impact of ambient air pollution in Serbia: a call to action*. No. WHO/EURO: 2019-3543-43302-60694. Available at: [https://serbia.un.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/Health-impact-pollution-Serbia\\_0.pdf](https://serbia.un.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/Health-impact-pollution-Serbia_0.pdf) Accessed on 21<sup>st</sup> January 2022.

ZYGIEREWICZ, A., SANS, L. 2021. *Renewable Energy Directive: Revision of Directive (EU) 2018/2001*. European Parliamentary Research Service, nd, 10.

# JUSTIFICATION OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SENSOR NETWORK OF INFORMATION SUPPORT OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY SYSTEM OF A DISTRIBUTED MAN-MADE OBJECT

Olexander Lysenko<sup>1</sup> - Serhii Chumachenko<sup>2</sup> - Olena Tachinina<sup>3</sup> -  
Andrii Tureichuk<sup>4</sup> - Valeriy Novikov<sup>5</sup> - Ihor Sushin<sup>6</sup>

## ABSTRACT

*The article is devoted to the development of methodological support of the conditions for increasing the objectivity of environmental monitoring of the terrestrial ecological system of a distributed technogenic object based on the integrated use of information obtained from wireless sensor networks, the sensors of which monitor biotic and abiotic factors. Taking into account the accumulation of pollution in the environment that occurs in the process of functioning of a distributed man-made object*

**Key words:** *wireless sensor network, man-made object, primary information sensor, monitoring*

## Introduction

Historically a significant part of the territory of Ukraine has been transformed as a result of the long-term activity of man-made objects. At the same time, almost no complex measures for the ecological examination of the

---

<sup>1</sup> Olexander Lysenko, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor, Professor of Telecommunication dep., Educational and Scientific Institute of Telecommunication Systems, National technical university of Ukraine, Igor Sikorsky Kyiv polytechnic institute, Peremohy Ave., 37, Kyiv, 03056, Ukraine, lysenko.a.i.1952@gmail.com.

<sup>2</sup> Serhii Chumachenko, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Senior Research Fellow, Head of Information Systems dep., Faculty of Automation and Computer Systems, National University of Food Technologies, Volodymyrs'ka St., 68, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine, sergiy23.chumachenko@gmail.com

<sup>3</sup> Olena Tachinina, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Docent, Professor of Avionics Department, Faculty of Air Navigation, Electronics and Telecommunications National Aviation University, Lyubomyra Huzara Ave., 1, Kyiv, 03058, Ukraine, tachinina5@gmail.com

<sup>4</sup> Andrii Tureichuk, Candidate of technical sciences, Professor of Combined Arms Disciplines dep., Ukrainian Military Medical Academy, Moskovs'ka St., 45/1, Kyiv, 01015, Ukraine, a\_tureychuk@ukr.net

<sup>5</sup> Valeriy Novikov, Senior Lecturer of Information and Communication Technologies and Systems Department of the Educational and Scientific Institute of Telecommunication Systems, National Technical University of Ukraine, Igor Sikorsky Kyiv polytechnic institute, Peremohy Ave., 37, Kyiv, 03056, Ukraine, novikov1967@ukr.net

<sup>6</sup> Ihor Sushin, PhD Student of Telecommunication Dep., Educational and Scientific Institute of Telecommunication Systems, National Technical University of Ukraine, Igor Sikorsky Kyiv polytechnic institute, Peremohy Ave., 37, Kyiv, 03056, Ukraine, rubin268@ukr.net

environment of these objects were carried out. More than 2 thousand km<sup>2</sup> of these lands belong to the IBA-territories (Important Bird Area - areas important for the existence of birds) (5).

Under distributed man-made objects (DMMO) we mean man-made objects with a significant spatial extent and adjacent territories - test sites, mines, nuclear power plants, territories for the disposal of pollutants and production wastes, natural disaster zones, etc. (1-4).

In the process of DMMO functioning are created significant amounts of environmentally polluting wastes and various kinds of impacts that change the local microclimate. In this case, about 80 specific contaminants are formed (9-15).

Analysis of the survey results of the DMMO territories allows us to conclude that the pollution level of 18% of all DMMO's is very high, 24% is high, 38% is medium and 20% is weak (3-8).

At present, the systems for increasing the level of environmental safety and improving the state of the environment have not received significant development due to the fact that full-fledged systems for supplying primary information on the state of the environment have not been deployed. Such systems can be wireless sensor networks (WSN), which allow obtaining qualitative and quantitative information about the environment. WSN will allow objective, accurate, reliable and economical use of resources allocated for environmental protection and protection of the environment from the impact of DMMO. Therefore, the formulation of requirements for WSN is an urgent task.

The result of the analysis of the provision of DMMO environmental monitoring systems with primary information sensors (PIS) indicates the impossibility of performing effective observation and/or measurement (hereinafter referred to as observation) and control without the use of WSN (13-21).

The foregoing allows us to conclude that the issue of organizing effective environmental monitoring of DMMO is relevant. But the solution of this issue is hindered by a number of reasons, one of which is the lack of a methodology for assessing and predicting changes in the state of the DMMO terrestrial ecosystem, which makes it possible to substantiate the requirements for the WSN for information support of the system for assessing and predicting the state of the natural environment of territories of distributed man-made objects.

To implement a comprehensive assessment and forecasting of the impact of technogenic activities on the state of the DMMO ecosystem, it is proposed to apply the decomposition method using simulation modeling and information support of monitoring algorithms obtained from a wireless sensor network specially deployed for this DMMO (1-12).

## **Mainpart**

Taking into account the applied (physical) formulation of the problem of assessing and predicting the state of the DMMO ecological system (13), we

specify the stages of a complex index-bioindicator methodology for substantiating the requirements for the sensor network of information support for the environmental safety system of a distributed technogenic object:

1. Study and determination of the environmental characteristics of DMMO.

The **DMMO ecosystem** is a complex, multi-mode, dynamic, evolving object with different rates of development of processes. A key role in the study of the DMMO ecosystem and the management of its state is played by primary information on the parameters of the DMMO: data on accumulated pollution; physical and geographical characteristics; climatic conditions; socio-ecological and economic situation in the region of location, etc.

2. Functional zoning DMMO. For optimal use, management of the DMMO ecosystem and forecasting its response to anthropogenic impact, it is necessary to perform a spatial decomposition - functional zoning of the DMMO. Structural zoning of DMMO occurs as territorial zoning into functional objects, zones of distribution and accumulation of pollution, external and internal sanitary zones. As a rule, certain types of testing and support activities of the DMMO are concentrated in certain parts of its territory. Accordingly, the consequences of functioning do not spread evenly throughout the territory, but are localized in certain sections of it - separate functional zones.

**Functional zones** are separate components of the DMMO that intended, allocated and specially equipped to provide the main and auxiliary types of human activity. The functional zoning map of the DMMO contains information about all functional objects, sensitive areas of ecosystems and the corresponding restrictions associated with the functioning of the DMMO.

3. The conceptualization of the structure of observation consists of biological and technical aspects.

To implement the biological aspect, it is necessary to identify a finite number of properties and processes in the DMMO mesoecosystems that are most important for solving the problems of monitoring, predicting and managing the state of the DMMO ecosystem.

The technical aspect of the conceptualization of observation consists in limiting and concretizing the directions for studying the state of the ecosystem and choosing technical (hardware) and algorithmic means (information processing).

The conceptualization of observation begins with the identification of external relations (influences) with respect to the DMMO ecosystem, which are subject to control (measurement).

Then a conceptual model (or scenario) is constructed for monitoring the state of DMMO mesoecosystems at a qualitative level. The place of mesoecosystems in the general landscape of DMMO is determined as a system of a higher level of hierarchy. The inputs and outputs are set, subject to control (measurement, calculation or algorithmic measurement), connections with neighboring DMMO mesoecosystems.

Under the functioning (behavior) of a separate terrestrial ecosystem (mesoecosystem), DMMO is understood as the process of changing the properties of its elements over time due to the reaction to the action of external factors and the interaction between the internal components of the ecosystem. The complex of internal connections and external influences must be controlled with the help of technical and biotic (bioindicators, biosensors) PIS.

4. Specification of measured components, inventory of environmental anomalies. For each functional object from the composition of the DMMO, it is necessary:

- to determine the composition of the set of input variables and state variables of the mathematical model (MM) of the ecosystem;
- set the structure of the MM for the transformation of input variables into output variables and the vector of observations.

At present, the basis of the structure of dynamic models of ecosystems with "n" state variables is "n" differential (difference) equations expressing the law of change of each of the variables over time, taking into account static constraints in the form of equalities or inequalities

5. Planning of experimental studies. Based on the results of the specification and guided by the conceptual structure of observations, observations are planned for the dynamics of the properties of the studied ecosystem and environment (input and output variables of the ecosystem, state vector)

6. Choice of types of PIS. The main task of this stage is to select primary information sensors that will ensure the measurement (control) of the entire complex of external influences and internal communications (point 3 of the methodology), will allow to control the spread of pollution in the territory of the DMMO and beyond. At the same time, it is necessary to pay attention to the mobility of the selected PIS, which will affect the efficiency of monitoring the state of the environment.

7. Construction of a graph (cyclogram) of observations (measurements) inside the DMMO, consistent with observations (measurements) from outside the DMMO. The concept of observations inside and outside the DMMO reflects the fact of the spatial location of the places where the corresponding measurements are made. The need for consistency in the monitoring system for the local DMMO ecosystem, which is part of the regional ecosystem, is explained by the openness of local systems for energy resource and information interaction (exchange) with external systems.

We will consider external measurements taken at the outer border of the sanitary zone. These measurements consist of measurements taken with the help of PIS and observations of animal migration.

We will consider as internal all measurements made at the internal points of the DMMO (internal boundaries of the sanitary zone, functional object, meso-ecosystem of the DMMO).

8. Construction and verification of the model (scenario) of observations

(measurements). After understanding the composition of the state vector of the ecological system and the structure of observations and the composition of the PIS set, the hardware-algorithmic and ecosystem capabilities of identifying the parameters of the ecosystem MM and monitoring its state vector are evaluated. The choice of the territorial-spatial location of technical PIS and observation points for bioindicators is carried out. Scenarios (cyclograms) of observations and algorithms for their change are developed, suitable for the subsequent analysis of alternatives.

There are three main types of observation (measurement) scenarios: synchronous; asynchronous; combined.

The essence of the **synchronous scenario** of observation is that observation at all points of location of the PIS and bioobservers occur strictly in accordance with the specified time, while synchronous single-stage and synchronous multi-stage methods of observation can be used.

The **asynchronous scenario** of observation consists in the fact that observation and / or measurement at given points of the DMMO are performed not at given points in time, but under the most convenient external conditions, but the place of observation is clearly fixed.

The **combined scenario** is a combination of the positive qualities of synchronous and asynchronous methods of observation and allows you to get the best overall measurement efficiency result.

9. Direct observation of the dynamics of the ecosystem. In accordance with the plan of experimental studies, the developed cyclograms and the scenario of observations, with the help of the selected PIS, the dynamics of the ecosystem is monitored (measurement of certain parameters). At this stage, indicators of the components of the terrestrial ecosystem are determined, the weather and climate impact is specified (data of meteorological services). The results of the observations are included in the interactive procedure for clarifying the conceptual structure of the observation, and are also used in the algorithms for identification and verification (validation) of the MM ecosystem of the DMMO.

10. Study of the system of primary information support on the model. Consists of two sub-stages:

a) verification of the adequacy of the MM ecosystem DMMO and the observation system;

b) study of the system properties of the MM for monitoring the state vector of the DMMO ecosystems.

When **checking the adequacy of the MM**, its predictive abilities are analysed, it turns out how the model is able to reproduce the behaviour of the original system.

In accordance with the method of system dynamics, the final answer about the complete suitability of the MM can never be obtained. However, a practical conclusion can be drawn with some certainty based on a certain amount of comparison of the results of experiments with the results of modelling, and at the

same time, MM can be used in an adaptive mode (self-tuning mode for newly obtained measurements).

In accordance with existing methods, information sufficient to assess the level of adequacy of the dynamic model can be obtained from a limited amount of preliminary information based on a comparison of the calculated (model) values of the dynamics of the state variables of the Ecosystem MM of the DMMO  $X(t_i)$  and (or) the initial coordinates  $Y(t_i)$  at times  $t_i \in [t_0, t_f]$ ,  $i \in \{0, 1, \dots, N\}$  with experimental data. If there is a good agreement between the calculated and experimental values at the corresponding time points, it is assumed that the model results do not contradict the observations, and thus there is no basis for viewing the structure or parameters of the model. If the match is unsatisfactory, then a return to the identification stage is carried out to refine the MM.

Most often, to assess the adequacy of the MM of the original object, the following signs of the coincidence of the simulation results with empirical data are used:

- number of extremum points;
- distribution of extreme points in time;
- sign of the increase in extremums in time;
- in-phase occurrence of oscillations and their amplitude;
- trends (average values of variables approximately coincide, prediction error at control points forms a process close to discrete white noise with minimal variance);
- simultaneous achievement of extreme values for different variables;
- reaction to known probing (typical) influences.

Due to the multi-step procedure for refining the structure and parameters of the MM, it is necessary to achieve a practically acceptable result and proceed to the next sub-stage.

The process of **studying the system properties of the MM** includes the following steps:

- study of the general features of the behaviour of the trajectory  $\hat{X}(t)$ ,  $t \in [t_0, t_f]$  under ordinary disturbances (existence and uniqueness, limitedness, periodicity, stability of the process at the output of the MM observer of the state of the ecosystem of the DMMO);
- studying the dependence of the solution of the observation problem on the initial state (zero approximation to the assessment of the state of the ecosystem), the structure of the ecosystem MM of the DMMO and the vector of measurements;
- study of the sensitivity of the observation process to the inaccuracy of setting the characteristics of the observer of the state of the DMMO ecosystem.

11. Optimization (selection of the best option) of the structure and characteristics of the system for monitoring the state of the DMMO ecosystem. The indicators of the quality of the functioning of the surveillance system are the completeness and accuracy of information; reliability; efficiency and price.

The dimension and type (linear or non-linear) of equations describing the input-output relationships are used as the optimized parameters of the structure of the MM of the system for monitoring the state vector of the ecosystem of the DMMO.

The following are considered as parameters of the monitoring hardware: PIS type and accuracy characteristics; the number of PIS and their spatial arrangement; price; mobility; polling time intervals; the type of information received; efficiency of computer-algorithmic processing of observation results.

12. Final synthesis of the observation system (decision-making stage). The stage of optimization of the structure and parameters makes it possible to build interactive procedures for developing the structure of candidate models, to select the best values of the quality index of these models on given classes of structures, and to automate the process of choosing the best model. However, in its content, the task of choosing PIS for the system of primary processing of information about the state of the ecosystem is multi-criteria and complex. To make a decision on the choice of the structure and parameters of the PIS, it is necessary to return to the optimization procedure and use additional information.

13. Assessment of the state of the ecosystem of the DMMO. Based on the obtained results of observations (stage 9 of the methodology) and data on the negative impact of the process of the DMMO functioning, a generalized pollution index is calculated, and the renewing effect of environmental protection measures (natural and artificial) is determined. After that, the parameters of the DMMO ecosystem MM are specified. Based on the results obtained, the state of the DMMO terrestrial ecosystem is assessed.

To assess the state of the DMMO as a whole, a more sensitive element of the ecosystem is determined. The assessment of its state characterizes the general state of the ecosystem. The definition of a sensitive element is made by constructing digraphs of a trophic multilevel structure.

14. Prediction the state of the DMMO ecosystem. Using the results obtained in paragraph 13 of this methodology, the state of the DMMO terrestrial ecosystem is predicted for up to 10 years. The data obtained are used to correct the plans for the operation of the DMMO to reduce the anthropogenic load and plan restoration (rehabilitation) and environmental measures.

The implementation of the stages of this methodology allows you to obtain information about the current state of the DMMO terrestrial ecological system and predict the development of the situation, taking into account the intensity of the DMMO functioning and restoration (rehabilitation) measures

## **Conclusion**

The method proposed in the article for substantiating the requirements for information support WSN for systems for assessing and predicting the state of the natural environment of the territories of the DMMO indicates the need to provide



for use as part of the WSN PIS on the state of biotic and abiotic environmental factors of the DMMO.

The use of the WSN, the composition and placement of sensors of which will be justified on the basis of the proposed methodology, will make it possible to apply the concept of an index-bioindicator approach to the construction of an integral assessment of the current and predictive state of the DMMO environment and thereby ensure the objectivity, accuracy and reliability of these assessments.

## References

- SOZINOVA, O., PRYDATKA, V. 2005. *Agrobiodiversity of Ukraine: Theory, methodology, indicators, examples*. Book 1. Kyiv: Nichlava. (In Ukrainian).
- ROMANCHENKO, I., SBITNEV, A., BUTENKO, S. 2006. *Ecological safety: ecological condition and methods of its monitoring*. Kyiv: Polissya. (In Ukrainian).
- KACHYNSKY, A. 2001. *Environmental security of Ukraine: a systematic analysis of prospects for improvement*. Ecological Safety Series, edition 5. Kyiv: NICD. (In Ukrainian).
- ROMANCHENKO, I., SBITNEV, A., CHUMACHENKO, S., SLOBODYANIK, V. 2003. *Methodological approaches to creating a database for the environmental management system in the Armed Forces of Ukraine*. Kyiv: Nauka i oborona, no.3, pp.50-56. (In Ukrainian).
- DUDKIN, O., MYKYTYUK, O. 2001. *National report on the state of IBA territories of Ukraine*. Ukrainian Society for the Protection of Birds. Kyiv, Ukraine. (In Ukrainian).
- SHELYAG-SOSONKO, Yu. 2003. *Conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity in Ukraine: status and prospects*. Kyiv, Ukraine: Khimdzhest.
- MOVCHANA, YA., SHELYAG-SOSONKO, Yu. 2003. *Conservation of biodiversity of Ukraine. Second National Report*. Kyiv, Ukraine: Khimdzhest.
- Galchenko, Yu. 2003. *Methodological approaches to the assessment of technogenic impact through the change in the components of ecosystems*. Kyiv, Ecological systems and devices, no.1, pp.29-37. (In Ukrainian).
- DANILISHIN, B., KOVTUN, V., STEPANENKO, A. 2004. *Scientific bases of forecasting of natural and technogenic (ecological) safety*. Kyiv, Ukraine: Lex House. (In Ukrainian).
- KUCHERYAVYY, V. 2000. *Ecology*. Lviv, Ukraine: Svit. (In Ukrainian).
- LYSENKO, A., CHUMACHENKO, S., CHEKANOVA, I., TUREYCHUK, A. 2002. *Mathematical formulation of the problem of optimal management of the ecological state of man-caused areas. Adaptive automatic control systems*. Dnepropetrovsk: Systemni tekhnolohiyi, no.5(25), pp.45-55. (In Ukrainian).
- LYSENKO, A., CHUMACHENKO, S., CHEKANOVA, I., TUREYCHUK, A. 2005. *Using Lewinber's Observer to Assess and Predict the Status of a Complex*

*Agroecosystem Using Mathematical and Computer Simulation*. Kyiv: Ahrobioriznomanittya Ukrayiny: teoriya, metodolohiya, indykatory, pryklady, Book 2, pp.86-139, (In Ukrainian).

LYSENKO, O., TACHININA, O., NOVIKOV, V., ALEKSEEVA, I., CHUMACHENKO, S. TUREICHUK, A. 2021. *Expert-modeling decision support system for the deployment and management of a wireless sensor network with mobile sensors and telecommunication air platforms*, in Conference Proceedings of 14th Annual international scientific conference Security forum at Matej Bel University, Banská Bystrica, Slovakia, pp. 249-258. ISBN 978-80-973394-5-6. <https://www.fpvmv.umb.sk/drive/2021-11-04/security-forum-2021.pdf>.

BOHOBOYASHCHYY, V., KURBANOV, K., PALIY, P. SHMANDIY, V. 2004. *Principles of modeling and forecasting in ecology*. Kyiv: Tsentr navchal'noyi literatury. (In Ukrainian).

LYSENKO, O., CHUMACHENKO, S. TUREICHUK, A. 2004. *Comprehensive assessment and forecasting of the state of the ecosystem of technogenic-loaded territory with the use of balance equations and Lewinberger's observer*. Kyiv: Systemni tekhnolohiyi, no.6(35), pp. 139-147. (In Ukrainian).

LYSENKO, O., SPARAVALO, M., ROMANIUK, V., VALUISKYI, S. 2019. *Intelligent control system for wsn and manet*. Kyiv: Information and Telecommunication Sciences, Volume 10, no 2, pp. 12-21. ISSN 2312-4121. <http://infotelesc.kpi.ua/article/view/188348>.

LYSENKO, O., ROMANIUK, V., TACHININA, O., VALUISKYI, S. 2020. *Integrated computer technologies in mechanical engineering*. Chapter: The problems of control in wireless sensor and mobile ad-hoc networks, pp. 385-404. Publisher Springer International Publishing. DOI 978-3-030-37618-5\_33.

LYSENKO, O., TACHININA, O. 2020. *Handbook of Research on Artificial Intelligence Applications in the Aviation and Aerospace Industries/ Chapter 14. Methods for the Synthesis of Optimal Control of Deterministic Compound Dynamical Systems With Branch*, pp. 323-351. *IGI Global*. ISBN13: 9781799814153|ISBN10: 1799814157|EISBN13: 9781799814177|DOI: 10.4018/978-1-7998-1415-3, DOI: 10.4018/978-1-7998-1415-3.ch014. Link: <https://www.igi-global.com/book/handbook-research-artificial-intelligence-applications/232757>.

ROMANIUK, A., ROMANIUK, V., SPARAVALO, M., LYSENKO, O., ZHUK, O. 2020. *Synthesis of data collection methods by telecommunication aerial platforms in wireless sensors networks*. Information and telecommunication sciences. - Vol. 11, no. 2., pp.63-73, <http://infotelesc.kpi.ua/article/view/221266>.

NOVIKOV, V., LYSENKO, O., VALUISKYI, S., GUYDA, O. 2020. *Mathematical models, methods and algorithms for optimizing the performance indicators of wireless sensor networks with mobile sensors and telecommunication air platforms*. Scientific journal "Scientific notes of the

Tavria national university named after Vernadsky. Series: Technical Sciences",  
*31(70)(3)*, pp. 54-56. ISSN 2663-5941 (Print). ISSN 2663-595X (Online).  
Retrieved from [www.tech.vernadskyjournals.in.ua](http://www.tech.vernadskyjournals.in.ua). (In Ukrainian).

# LOCAL SECURITY: DEMANDS AND CHALLENGES FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

Paweł Malendowicz<sup>1</sup>

## **ABSTRACT**

*The subject of the article are postulates and challenges for local governments and researchers studying the issue of local security. One of the objectives of the article is to answer the question: what are the determinants of local security? The author also attempted to answer the questions: what are the challenges for local (self-government) policy related to the determinants of local security? and what are the challenges for scientific research in this area? In the author's opinion, only a holistic and interdisciplinary treatment of local security problems by scientists can serve to develop effective diagnoses of local threats in connection with supralocal threats, methods of minimizing threats on the local level and long-term strategies to ensure local security.*

**Key words:** local security, threats, local government, crime, pathology

## **Introduction**

Security is a human existential need, a value, a common good and a goal of human action (Jarmoszko, 2016, p. 33). It affects global space, continental space, countries and regions. It also, and perhaps above all, concerns individuals, their families and neighborhood communities. The latter form local communities (urban, rural, communal). A local community is "a community living in a common territory, relatively self-sufficient, based on a permanent system of social bonds and interactions, characterized by a strong sense of belonging of individuals to the group and identification of individuals with the group" (Olechnicki – Załęski, 1998, p. 201; see also: Pieprzny, 2016, pp. 383-392).

One of the objectives of the article is to answer the question: what are the determinants of local security? Two other problems are connected with the answer to this question: what are the challenges for local (self-government) policy related to the determinants of local security? and what are the challenges for scientific research in this area? In the author's opinion, only a holistic and interdisciplinary treatment of local security problems by researchers can serve to develop effective diagnoses of local threats in connection with supra-local threats, methods of minimizing threats on the local level and long-term strategies to ensure local security.

---

<sup>1</sup> Paweł Malendowicz, Assoc. Prof., PhD. DSc, Kazimierz Wielki University in Bydgoszcz, Poland, Faculty of Political Science and Administration, J. Poniatowskiego 12 St., 85-671 Bydgoszcz, Poland, p.malendowicz@ukw.edu.pl.

Local security can be described as a state of tranquility and the ability to neutralize threats within a geographically bounded communal, urban and rural space. Locality is a social order based on natural relationships between people. Local security in this sense is distinguished in a social space characterized by a common territory that forms the basis of social life. The locality of security is evidenced by its location within territorial and social locations. Local communities as distinct territorial social groups usually have the characteristics of communities, involved in the creation of local development processes. Local security must therefore take into account the spatial and social specificity of the local community, its needs, interests and problems (Drozdowski, 2016, p. 202).

## **1 Challenges for local government policies**

Security threats at the local level include problems that may be specific to a particular community and local space, but may also affect the level of threats in the region and country, and even in the transnational space (examples include environmental threats or epidemics). Social problems, such as unemployment, which influences the development of other social pathologies - alcoholism, drug addiction, hooliganism, common crime - are inherent to local communities. Moreover, we should mention problems that are at the same time determinants of threats, such as:

- anonymity, passivity, lack of responsibility for the common good, creating a climate of silent consent to commit crimes and offences;
- lack of adequate and effective response to notifications of crimes, and in particular to notifications of offenses related to the violation of public order, behavior and pathological acts;
- lack of coordination of activities, passivity and low efficiency as well as lack of cooperation with local communities and organizations of entities responsible for security (police, municipal guard) and public space (e.g. entities responsible for the state of roads, lighting, sanitation, cleanliness and order);
- inappropriate organization and management of public space, fostering antisocial behavior, committing crimes;
- low level of public trust in the police and reluctance to participate in partnerships with the police;
- poor legal regulations making it difficult to fight crime and pathology in cooperation with society;
- social destabilization and lack of social ties, ignorance and lack of interest in security, which affects the ineffectiveness of the security system (Drozdowski, 2016, p. 205).

The analysis of local security, however, cannot be limited to the narrowly understood threats of common crime, pathologies or hooliganism or organized crime. Security includes many areas that affect the quality of human life. It is

therefore necessary to treat security holistically and collectively as public security, military security, energy security, environmental security, health security, cultural security, political security, social security, economic security, communication security and finally local security as an element of national security. This in turn is connected with the analysis of local security, which should take into account the following determinants of the level of real security of the community:

- social and economic (levels of poverty and wealth, number of poor people and relations between the poor and the wealthy, existence or absence of a middle class, supply of jobs, level of unemployment, skills of workers and the unemployed, migration opportunities);
- cultural (traditions and customs concerning maintaining public order, attitude towards strangers, interpersonal cooperation, neighborhood cooperation, cooperation with the police);
- demographic (number of inhabitants, number of visitors, population density in a certain area);
- political (binding the local elites with the voters, compliance of the elected authorities with their pre-election promises, transparency of public life limiting corruption and nepotism, education and competence of the people in power);
- financial (sources of funding for the local government's activities to fight crime, financial resources available to the local government to minimize threats, division of money between prevention, prophylaxis, and repressive activities, the possibility of subsidizing the police or establishing one's own local security formation);
- legal (the quality of the law, the transparency of the law, the speed of the courts, the effectiveness of penalties, the balance between criminal and social prevention laws and the law on repression);
- structural and managerial (quality of spatial and community management, management of police and prevention programs, creation and management of the security system, including law enforcement and prisons, quality of emergence of community leaders);
- institutional (bureaucracy, procedures, cooperation between institutions and organizations working in the field of security as well as between them and local authorities and the society);
- educational (upbringing in the culture of safety in its various fields, treating upbringing and education as basic activities in the field of risk prevention);
- economic (structure of the local economy and the economies of neighboring regions, dislocation of production facilities, size of industry, agricultural economy, types of industry, energy consumption of industry, impact of the economy on the environment, access to jobs, wages, the degree of dependence of the local community on one industry or one corporation or economic diversification);

- energy (energy independence or dependence, energy sources, environmental impact, flexibility of energy supply, possibility of using secondary raw materials in energy);
- geographical (location of the area, connectivity with other spaces - openness or inaccessibility to neighboring regions, type of neighborhood affecting a particular local community, tourist attractiveness conditioning the types of threats that occur);
- architectural and planning (building density, street and square lighting, underground passages, location of parks and recreational squares);
- communication (factors conditioning road traffic safety: road quality, driving culture, vehicle efficiency, pedestrian safety, lighting of streets and sidewalks);
- natural and environmental (impact of climate change on the occurrence of natural phenomena such as floods and fires, safeguards and measures to minimize the effects of natural disasters, e.g., construction of flood barriers, forest land monitoring system);
- ecological (types and saturation of sources of environmental pollution, threats of environmental disasters, waste treatment, access to potable water, use of energy-efficient equipment, including renewable energy, financial assistance for ecological and energy transition, diversity of fauna and flora);
- health and sanitation (impact of pollution on human health, number of doctors, paramedics and nurses, access to health services - hospitals, health centers, emergency medical services, financing of health services, sanitation, health culture and social hygiene, lifestyles, sanitary and epidemiological institutions);
- psychological (degree of community of the local community, interpersonal trust, trust in uniformed services, possibility or lack of possibility to implement the idea of community policing);
- civic (the level of social involvement in social issues, social interest in the neighborhood and its closest surroundings, traditions of civil society, activities of non-governmental organizations and their role in the security system);
- religious (degree of religiosity of the local community, role of religious leaders in the local community).

The aforementioned types of local security determinants make it possible to identify detailed factors that influence security. These factors quantitatively measured and described allow to formulate a diagnosis of local safety, including: types and places of threats occurrence and their level. Knowing the threats, the next stage of building the local security strategy should be defining the possibilities and methods of minimizing the threats and the goal that constitutes the desired security image. However, this is only an outline of the process of building security strategy.

Creating plans and developing local security strategies also requires identifying areas of activity of individual local security entities, and in particular areas of activity of local governments in the field of public security. In one of the publications such exemplary areas were indicated by Katarzyna Sienkiewicz-Małyjurek.

Table 1 Areas of local government activity in public safety

Activities	Specification
Management activities	a public administration authority acting on the principle of authority and consolidation of the civil administrative apparatus in a given area, as well as the authority competent in matters of crisis management, bearing responsibility for actions taken in this area, directing actions carried out to prevent the effects of threats or their removal
Cooperation with entities acting for the benefit of public safety	initiating activities, undertaking joint projects and ventures, financial support of the police
Social policy	taking action against the sources of crime and thus reducing the risk of crime, e.g. promoting actions to change attitudes, organizing and coordinating activities for children and young people, combating social pathologies, free medical care and education
Spatial management	protection and management of public, urbanized space, within the framework of coordination, regulation, and investment activities, e.g. improvement of lighting in public places, removal of manifestations of vandalism and use of vandal-proof elements of small architecture, improvement of road traffic conditions, use of technical safeguards
Planning and prevention activities	monitoring, analysis and assessment of threats, preparation and implementation of management principles, command system, security systems, tools and communication techniques, development of protection plans, scenarios and procedures for operations, securing of resources, specialized training and improvement of skills
Law and order activities	the possibility to establish municipal guards in order to protect public order, issue enforcement regulations if it is necessary to protect life, health or property of



	citizens, protect the natural environment or to ensure public order, peace and security, if these reasons occur in the area of more than one municipality
Opinion and inspection activities	examination of reports on the activities of commune and district authorities, as well as the appointed commissions, the district governor's opinion on the work of the police and other district services, inspections and guards, as well as organizational units performing tasks in the field of public order, opinion on projects of cooperation in the field of public safety

Source: Sienkiewicz-Małyjurek, 2011, p. 142.

Of particular importance for long-term strategic actions in the area of community safety are actions that prevent the emergence and development of threats. Prevention and prophylaxis are those actions whose consequence is to minimize in the future not only the threats but also, what is related to it, the level of repressive actions.

Prevention programs should include the following elements:

- prioritizing the criminological problems in the area;
- defining the target groups;
- defining the objectives of the crime prevention measures to be taken;
- defining the tasks, areas where the activities will be carried out;
- identification of entities interested in cooperation on implementation;
- defining forms and methods of activities and deadlines for their realization;
- developing assumptions for the management system of the prepared preventive program and the motivational system for people who undertake the activities and who are the recipients of the activities;
- developing assumptions for evaluation;
- indicating the directions of media activities;
- estimating the costs of the individual activities and of the program as a whole;
- identifying a person responsible for the development of the prevention program document, carrying out consultations and obtaining the approval of the entities implementing the program (Rozwadowski, 2014, p. 250; Serafin – Parszowski, 2011).

In relation to this, one can say that Edyta Sadowska, who in her doctoral dissertation stated that "Both at the state level and especially at the local level, it becomes necessary to go beyond the stereotypical actions of institutions as ex post - related to intervention. Directly related to the introduction of preventive programs is the need for increased interest on the part of local authorities. It is

directly connected with the activation of self-governmental activities and activation of the society" (Sadowska, 2016, p. 54).

## **2 Postulates and challenges for local security research**

The key demand for local authorities is cooperation with scientific communities. It should include not only security sciences but also other scientific disciplines. Security includes every sphere of human existence. Only a holistic approach to security can contribute to counteracting and minimizing threats. Types of threats are interrelated and often condition each other. It is impossible to talk about effective fight against threats in road traffic without analyzing educational activities of drivers and pedestrians or without diagnosing the state of the road infrastructure. We cannot talk about environmental safety without linking it to economic safety, economic conditions or determinants of consumerist culture in society. One cannot consider threats to public safety without taking into account economic factors and the quality of life of urban and rural residents.

Such a holistic analysis of security should be based on two theoretical perspectives: realism and constructivism (see: Marsh - Stoker, 2010). The first perspective allows for the formulation of objective diagnoses of existing and visible problems, while the second serves to determine their interpretation by individuals and local communities. This is of particular importance in the assessment of threats and their social acceptance or lack of acceptance. Some prohibited acts may be tolerated in some communities, while in others they will cause social reactions aimed at combating them. This involves analyzing various cultural and moral conditions in specific communities. However, it raises problems and challenges for prioritization of goals in planning activities for local security and possible toleration or acceptance of behaviors that are not accepted in other communities.

The primary research method for diagnosing and developing threat minimization goals is quantitative analysis. Quantitative indicators of types of threats, including crime, committing criminal acts, hooliganism, destruction of public facilities and private property, are key to determining the level of local security. This also applies to threats in other areas of security, such as health, economic, and environmental. However, they cannot be analyzed as unrelated to their local conditions. For they are only quantitative indicators. Thus quantitative research combined with qualitative research seems to be an important postulate for local security research teams. At the same time, it is worth linking them to participatory research. Developing security strategies by researchers who are not familiar with local specifics or who know them only from descriptions and reports may be insufficient to implement methods of minimizing threats and achieving desired goals. Hence, it seems so important to create multi-person research and expert teams, consisting of specialists from different fields of science, using different research perspectives and different research methods.

An important factor for effective threat minimization at the local level is the use of knowledge about past threats in other local communities with similar characteristics and the experience of creating security strategies for different local communities. However, it should always be remembered that direct transfer of security strategies from one space to another is not necessarily effective. Each community has its own specifics and different conditions. Nevertheless, it seems advisable to use modeling of security policy, i.e. creating models which allow to disseminate specific methods of diagnosing threats, taking actions minimizing them and setting goals - but always taking into account differences between local spaces and local communities. A model is an arrangement of assumptions made in a given science in order to facilitate the solution of a given research problem. It is a hypothetical mental construction, which is a simplified picture of the studied fragment of reality, in which elements irrelevant for the given purpose are omitted. Models are used to reduce the complexity of the considered phenomena to a degree that allows their cognition, and also facilitate the understanding of past phenomena and allow the prediction of future phenomena (Encyklopedia Zarządzania, 2020).

## Conclusion

Security interpreted as a certain desired state is the goal of human activity, the effect of the realization of human needs and interests. It is also the subject of interest of international, state, private and local government institutions. The state of security, however, is only a goal. In fact, security is a process. That is why it requires continuous action to adjust the conditions of security to the desired goal, understood as the state of security. This requires constant corrections of the adopted strategies, undertaking preventive actions, changes of plans and initiatives. This can be achieved through the cooperation of local government and scientific community, which should continuously monitor threats and challenges to security at the local level, as well as changing security conditions.

## References

- DROZDOWSKI, D. 2016. Podstawowe elementy bezpieczeństwa lokalnego. *Rocznik Bezpieczeństwa Międzynarodowego*, No. 1, Vol. 10, pp. 199–208.
- ENCYKLOPEDIA ZARZĄDZANIA. 2020. *Model*. Available at: <https://mfiles.pl/pl/index.php/Model>.
- JARMOSZKO, S. 2016. Teoretyczne konceptualizacje i sensy bezpieczeństwa w naukach społecznych. In: *Nauki społeczne wobec problemu bezpieczeństwa (wybrane zagadnienia)*. eds. S. Jarmoszko, C. Kalita, J. Maciejewski. Siedlce: Uniwersytet Przyrodniczo-Humanistyczny w Siedlcach Wydział Humanistyczny. pp. 25–92. ISBN 978–83–64415–73–9.

- MARSH, D. – STOKER, G. eds. 2010. *Theory and methods in political science*. Basingstoke – New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978–02–30576–27–8.
- OLECHNICKI, K. – ZAŁĘCKI, P. 1998. *Słownik socjologiczny*. Toruń: Graffiti BC. ISBN 83–900784–1–4.
- PIEPRZNY, S. 2016. Wybrane problemy prawno-socjologiczne kształtowania bezpieczeństwa społeczności lokalnych. In: *Administracja publiczna pod rządami prawa. Księga pamiątkowa z okazji 70-lecia urodzin prof. zw. dra hab. Adama Błasia*. eds. J. Korczak. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego. pp. 383–392. ISBN 978–83–65431–23–3
- ROZWADOWSKI, M. 2014. Bezpieczeństwo społeczności lokalnych oraz działania zmierzające do jego poprawy. *Kultura bezpieczeństwa. Nauka - Praktyka - Refleksje*, Vol. 15, pp. 243–252.
- SADOWSKA, E. 2016. *Realizacja funkcji administracji publicznej w polityce bezpieczeństwa w województwie małopolskim od 1999 roku*. Kraków: Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. Komisji Edukacji Narodowej w Krakowie, Wydział Humanistyczny, Instytut Politologii (PhD thesis).
- SERAFIN, T. – PARSZOWSKI, S. 2011. *Bezpieczeństwo społeczności lokalnych. Programy prewencyjne*. Warszawa: Difin. ISBN 978–83–76414–46–1.
- SIENKIEWICZ-MAŁYJUREK, K. 2011. Zarządzanie bezpieczeństwem publicznym w samorządzie lokalnym – istota i inicjatywy. *Organizacja i Zarządzanie*, No 1 (13), pp. 135-149.

# THE ASSOCIATION OF STATES IN AN ORGANIZATION TOWARDS SHAPING THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY<sup>1</sup>

Maciej Maruszak<sup>2</sup> - Dávid Kollár<sup>3</sup>

## **ABSTRACT**

*In order to fully understand the discussed issues, it is necessary to answer the question whether states today need the support of international organizations in the implementation of their security policy? It is possible to answer this question only by explaining what the security policy of states is, characterizing the role of international organizations, and, consequently, determining the impact of states' affiliation to individual organizations on their security in international relations. Today, states are active participants in international relations. The membership of states in many international organizations has a significant impact on shaping the security of actors in international relations. It should be remembered that international security refers to depicting the security of certain communities or is also equated with the description of the external dimension of security of individual states. Undoubtedly, there is an interdependence between the security of collective and individual subjects of international relations.*

**Key words:** *international organizations, security policy, concept of international security, complexity of contemporary international relations, global environment.*

## **Introduction**

Such a relationship is the result of the active participation of states in the international distribution, because it is most often threats to security that are generated by the external environment, but it can also create conditions for building the unwavering functioning of international entities. The membership of states in international organizations may be the result of states' activities aimed at seeking support in areas that the state, as an independent entity on the international stage, is unable to cope with. A manifestation of cooperation in the field of state security is the search for support in other countries, including in the fight against terrorism, cyber terrorism or the expansion of weapons of mass destruction. (Świderski, Kuźniar, 2017)

---

<sup>1</sup> This article has been published within the project VEGA 1/0774/22 Sovereignty as a factor in the crisis of the liberal world order

<sup>2</sup> Maciej Maruszak, Mgr. Ing., PhD. student, Department of Security Studies, Faculty of Political Science and International Relations, Matej Bel University, Kuzmányho 1, 974 01 Banská Bystrica, Slovakia

<sup>3</sup> Dávid Kollár, Mgr., PhD., Department of Security Studies, Faculty of Political Science and International Relations, Matej Bel University, Kuzmányho 1, 974 01 Banská Bystrica, david.kollar@umb.sk

The exploration of solutions in the field of international crises that affect the security of individual participants in international relations depends on many factors, including from having appropriate material and human resources, and also on the financial potential. Managing all threats individually without the support of other countries is a challenge that countries are unable to deal with. Hence, in order to increase their effectiveness in the fight against threats arising from the external environment on the international forum, countries apply for membership in international organizations, which constitute one of the elements of foreign policy. (Cziomer, 2008) Despite the it should be remembered that organizations are not mechanisms serving to implement the interests of only one state, but they are to serve the purpose of cooperation in achieving common goals of all its members. Sovereign obligations and the affiliation of countries to individual organizations is a deliberate assumption aimed at seeking allies in cooperation in the international environment. In order to diminish the weaknesses of individual countries, it is necessary to form coalitions and combine activities for the realization of common interests.

After the Second World War, the difficult international situation required cooperation and defending the rights regulating the economy, and above all, ensuring security in the world and introducing a new order between states. It was a special time when hitherto enemies undertook cooperation, such as France and Germany.

While implementing policies in their activities, states mainly aimed at minimizing threats and the feeling of uncertainty, and thus increasing the feeling of security. Achieving these goals was possible only with cooperation and support from other countries and through the implementation of security policy. As a result, European countries started economic cooperation that gave rise to the European Union.

The European Union is a good example of an international organization in which European countries have cooperated. However, it is worth remembering that before the Union was established as we know it today, countries have merged into many other organizations in order to be able to collaborate on various levels. First, in Europe, organizations favoring the exchange of goods and trade began to emerge, the first of which was the European Coal and Steel Community, established in 1952. Later, other associations were established under the Treaties of Rome. In 1957, the European Economic Community called EEC and Euratom, i.e. the European Atomic Energy Community, were created. (Byrska, Gawkowski, Liszkowska, 2017)

Initially, the EEC consisted of 6 countries: France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. However, the success of the common market meant that more countries began to join this community. In addition to the economy, they began to cooperate in many other areas: security, culture, and the protection of human rights. In order to make the group run more efficiently, the European Council and the European Parliament were established, which have

grown in importance over time. Ensuring security was of key importance for the countries of Europe, and in 1985 the Schengen Agreement was signed.

It was one of the European priorities. Thanks to the Schengen Agreement, checks at border crossings between the countries belonging to the agreement have been abolished. At the same time, the states collaborated to increase security and asylum policy. The accession to the treaty was also felt strongly for Poland.

Following the history of the deepening integration of European countries, it is worth mentioning the common currency - EURO, adopted in some EU countries, for which the European Central Bank is responsible. I think that everyone traveling around Europe felt the introduction of the common currency, which has a strong position in the world markets. This is the result of a long and deep process of transforming the EEC into the European Union, which was established in 1993 and currently has 27 countries. The stages of tightening cooperation included the adoption of the Single European Act and the agreement on the free movement of goods and capital.

The European Union is just one example of the rise, expansion and deepening of international integration. About other organizations that meet the goals of security and international cooperation further in this paper.

## **1 The concept and essence of international security**

"International security" is part of the broader concept of "security". It comes from the Latin *sine cura = securitas* (security), which means no threat or protection against it. In other words, "security" should always refer to a specific state of the subject, i.e. an individual, social group or state, in which he or she does not feel threatened, or can effectively defend against it. For essentials the security needs of the entities' data include, among others: existence, survival, integrity, identity, possession and certainty of development. (Zięba, 2006)

The above needs and values can be achieved both through internal and external actions. In the first case, therefore, we can talk about national security, and in the second - about international security, which, however, are closely related. In the newer literature on the subject, there is a tendency to broaden the definition of safety. In addition to the aforementioned personal security (national and international), from the point of view of the subject criterion, the following types of security are also distinguished: political, military, economic (with derivatives: raw materials, financial, technological, agricultural, food, social), social, cultural and ecological. (Zięba, 2004)

Security, understood as a kind of process of satisfying specific needs and subjective interests, from the point of view of individual entities or participants in international relations, may additionally be of a subjective or objective nature. Objective security is a real assessment of the actual or potential threat. Subjective safety is hasty or a simplified concept of a state of emergency that may lead to

unfavorable actions for a given participant, several participants or even the entire international system.

In the context of the above definitions, an additional concept of risk emerges, the assessment of which by a given entity allows only to determine the nature of safety. It means the perception of negative phenomena and trends that are assessed as unfavorable to its security and require specific counteraction. They may be imaginary and based on false premises or result from a real assessment of the balance of power and the resulting threats and other implications for the security of a given entity or participant in international relations. It is an extremely difficult matter to be objective determination of the state of a security threat, because it depends not only on the assimilation of the cognizer, but also on the perfection of the instruments and the reliability of the very recognition of overlapping phenomena, tendencies and processes.

Hence, in the science of international relations, an additional term is used - "challenge", which is a term for difficult and complicated situations that do not pose direct threats but require thorough analysis and taking appropriate steps and actions to resolve them. In fact, in most cases, the assessment of threats and challenges is subjective in the initial phase, requiring gradual and reliable verification and taking positive action. Therefore, some authors introduce an additional distinction between the concepts of negative and positive security. The first focuses primarily on the analysis of the dangers and threats to a given participant, and the other seeks opportunities to overcome them through active cooperation and cooperation with other participants in international relations. The interdependence between national and international security has already been mentioned above. It follows from the fact that each national (state) security is also international security, because it determines the state and nature of the state's external activity.

In simplified terms, we can adopt a fairly common definition in Western science that national security is the ability of a nation to protect its internal values against external threats. The basic values of the state's national security may be:

- a) survival, understood as the sovereign existence of the state and nation in various aspects,
- b) territorial integrity,
- c) political independence and freedom of international action,
- d) quality of life, i.e. independent choice of the socio-political and economic system, as well as shaping one's own future on the basis of tradition, culture and other national values. (Cziomer, 2005)

The supreme value is survival, i.e. the lasting existence of the state and nation, because all other values are subordinated to it. To this end, the state's governing centers spare neither energy nor resources, both internally and externally. In practice, a certain "security paradox" of the state consists, among other things, in the fact that by taking certain measures to achieve such a state (e.g. often by additional reinforcement), it objectively undermines it.



Other countries, especially their neighbors, respond to this with another "arms race", which in turn is not conducive to shaping international security.

That is why contemporary security policy is presented in a very complex way: it includes goals, values, interests, as well as strategies and structures, which are used to protect against external threats by means of specific state and allied means. (Wellershoff, 1999)

*The concept of security policy should be understood as the intended and organized activities of individual state institutions aimed at satisfying all components of the values inscribed in the meaning of state security. (Bieleń, 2021)*  
The essence of the security policy should be understood as all activities consisting *in the development of projects, testing and implementation of all security mechanisms, as well as procedures minimizing the possibility of adverse events, methods protecting against their effects, as well as conducting research aimed at determining the mechanisms of mutual impact of threats on the natural environment and civilization environment. (Sulowski, Brzeziński, 2009)*

Belonging to international communities allows for the implementation of an effective security policy but achieving this largely depends on the scope of reconciliation of state interests. However, it should be remembered that with the cooperation of several countries forming a coalition, countries considered to be great powers will always play the most important role. Because it is mainly on them that the elimination of threats and the support of infrastructure depend on the establishment of all kinds of norms, agreements or mechanisms aimed at the development of peaceful relations and the elimination of conflicts. It should be understood that small states are largely dependent on superpowers, which are the creators of security policy. (Kosowska, 2008) Nowadays, states struggle with many problems, which is why it is practically impossible to implement an effective security policy.

The main problem is the state's own resources. Involvement on the part of states in strengthening allied relations and care for international security are conditioned by the desire to achieve benefits on the part of the state. States want to have a guarantee that co-creating a safe international environment will guarantee them the support of their own national security. Often, states identify national security with international security. (Bieleń, 2021)

## **2 Goals and levels of integration.**

As a result of integration, communities of states and regions are formed, the main goal of which is to support individual members. Contemporary international integration takes place in three areas: political, military and economic.

Political integration consists, first and foremost, in pursuing a common policy towards other countries. Its tasks are:

- joint actions towards other countries and organizations;
- and

- joint solving of political problems on a regional and global scale, integration of nations.

Military integration and cooperation are aimed at ensuring the security of the Member States. Its tasks include:

- ensuring the security of the member states;
- conflict prevention,
- as well as conducting conciliation actions and peacekeeping missions.

On the other hand, economic integration is primarily aimed at facilitating trade, which leads to:

- the facilitation of international trade;
- expanding sales markets;
- free movement of capital;
- access to technology and resources;
- as well as cooperation, e.g. in the production of goods and services.

The most common form of cooperation between states is the establishment of various types of international organizations. These organizations may be interstate if they are formed by two or more countries pursuant to intergovernmental agreements.

In turn, non-governmental organizations are created by independent people or groups of people who are not bound by inter-state agreements. Each of the forms can have a global reach, i.e. worldwide or regional.

Examples of NGOs are: the International Committee of the Red Cross, which carries out humanitarian activities; Amnesty International - Human Rights; or Greenpeace, which works to protect the environment.

An example of economic integration is the World Bank, which grants long-term loans to member states and thus combats poverty. It brings together 186 countries, including Poland.

The European Union is an economic and political organization; brings together 27 countries, including Poland. An example of a military organization is NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), whose tasks include ensuring the security and stabilization of member countries, including Poland.

### **3 Typology of international organizations**

On the subject of the considerations concerning the role of international organizations in policymaking, explain in general what international organizations are and describe their typology and functions. This will facilitate the formulation of conclusions on their impact on the policies of the Member States.

In the literature on the subject, it has not been possible to work out a universally binding definition of international organizations so far. International organizations identified with the form of cooperation of entities of international law, established by states, began to function in the theory of international relations

only at the beginning of the 18th century. It was then that the period began in which historical conditions made it possible to organize a gradual development of permanent relations between states encompassing an ever wider catalog of matters of more extensive range. (Morawiecki, 1965) There are many interpretations of international organizations. One of them was proposed by W. Morawiecki, claiming that *We can speak of the existence of international organizations when their members are various actors in broadly understood international relations.* (Morawiecki, 1987) Another concept of international organizations defines them *as institutions that are members of international relations, formed on the basis of a forum for international cooperation of states after transforming from intergovernmental conferences into stable relationships based on multilateral agreements, the most important task of which is to build state cooperation on various levels and in many areas.* (Morawiecki, 1987) On the other hand, in international law, the concept of international organizations *is understood as a permanent association of states based on an international agreement and organized to achieve specific goals in the field of international relations.* (Antonowicz, 2000) Due to the lack of an unambiguous and universally binding definition of an organization, it is possible to specify its characteristic features on the basis of a few definitions cited above:

- it is made up of secondary actors in international relations;
- give the character of institutional forms of cooperation between various subjects of international relations;
- planned and methodical activities aimed at maximizing the needs and interests of a certain group of states or all other partners in international relations;
- striving to integrate within the existing international order into one whole or in its individual elements, or to change it to some extent.

In order to subdivide international organizations in detail, they can be classified according to several criteria. Nevertheless, the most universal criterion is the division according to the nature of their members. Within this criterion, two dominant categories can be distinguished: (Latoszek, Proczek, 2001)

- intergovernmental organizations (IGO - International Governmental Organization);
- non-governmental organizations (INGO - International Non-Governmental Organization).

With reference to the first group of organizations, their characteristic feature is the fact that their members are appointed by states represented by representatives appointed for this purpose by governments and thus including all powers and instructions.

In order for such organizations to be established, it is necessary to associate at least three countries, create a specific organizational system defining the principles of and cooperation mechanisms.

Regular sessions are held as part of the organization's operation. The legal and institutional foundation regulating the principles of its existence and activities is the statute, which defines its goals, mission, tasks, organizational structure, the area of competence of its bodies, as well as the criteria to be met in order to join the organization and the conditions for the possibility of losing membership, etc. Currently, intergovernmental organizations include: the United Nations and the United Nations System, the European Communities (existing until 2009), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), as well as the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA). (Latoszek, Proczek, 2001)

Members of non-governmental organizations are natural or legal persons, which we can include, e.g. national and international associations of private or public nature. Their activities operate within the framework of voluntary compliance with internal regulations by its members. Under the decision No. 1296 of the UN General Assembly of June 26, 1968, non-governmental organizations are to be characterized by open membership for interested parties, and their activity must be international. The distinguishing feature of such organizations is the fact that they are not profit-oriented, but their activities are mainly focused on providing broadly understood help in the social, cultural and economic spheres. Moreover, the organizations have permanent administrative bodies, clearly defined decision-making procedures and more or less regular sessions. (Łoś-Nowak, 1999) Examples of such organizations include: Amnesty International, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), Green Peace, and the International Red Cross. (Latoszek, Proczek, 2001)

Due to the analysis of the activities of international organizations, the next criterion should be the availability of countries to a given organization, within which two types of intergovernmental organizations can be distinguished: universal - i.e. universal, and group - regional.

Universal intergovernmental organizations are characterized by a guarantee of formal and universal accessibility regulated in their statutes. They include, among others: the United Nations together with specialized organizations of the United Nations System, which include: World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Health Organization (WHO - World Health Organization), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). (Latoszek, Proczek, 2001)

On the other hand, regional organizations are characterized by a limited scope of membership, which is manifested in the possibility of access to these organizations. In particular, these organizations associate countries of a given geographical region, as well as countries specializing in a well-defined field of production or extraction of raw materials. Such organizations include: the North American Free Trade Area, the Central European Free Trade Area and the Organization of African Unity, which ceased to exist in 2002 and was replaced by the African Union. (Latoszek, Proczek, 2001)

Another criterion by which we can divide intergovernmental organizations is the extent of power held by the organization. Within this typology, we can distinguish between coordinating and supranational organizations. Coordination organizations are, for example: the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO - International Maritime Organization). Their typical feature is the harmonization of activities of individual countries, in the course of achieving the goals of the organization for consultations conducted by member countries, as well as the fulfillment of strictly defined recommendations assigned by the bodies of a given organization. (Latoszek, Proczek, 2001)

When referring to supranational organizations, it should be emphasized that their bodies are entitled to dispose of tasks towards the Member States and impose obligations on them as part of decisions made by the majority of votes. Administrative units of such an organization obtain significant financial resources, with the help of which they carry out the tasks of the organization. An example of an organization comparable to supranational organizations is the former European Communities (the European Coal and Steel Community - ECSC, operating in the years 1952–2002, and the European Atomic Energy Community - Euratom). (Latoszek, Proczek, 2001)

The division of intergovernmental organizations can also be made taking into account their material scope. We can then list (Latoszek, Proczek, 2001):

- organizations with general competences, such as the United Nations;
- organizations with special competences; An example of this can be organizations that no longer exist today, as well as those that function to this day:
  - a) economic - the European Community (EC - dissolved in 2009 under the Treaty of Lisbon, when the European Union acquired legal personality and replaced the European Community);
  - b) social - the International Labor Organization (ILO);
  - c) cultural - United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO);
  - d) politico-military - North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

#### **4 Characteristics of the functions of international organizations**

International organizations are formed for a specific purpose and have specific tasks in mind. The above classification of international organizations also takes into account their functions. (Menkes, Wasilkowski, 2004) Therefore, it is possible to indicate the various functions of the organization. Nevertheless, due to the dynamism of the development of the organization of functions, it is impossible to accurately and uniformly characterize it according to unitary criteria.

#### **4.1 Programming functions of international organizations**

Organizations are formed to solve certain problems with both of these of general and fundamental significance (which include keeping the peace and security) or having a significantly narrowed or possibly specialized character. Organizations are responsible for the implementation of key tasks and goals for which they have been established. The outline of the programming function includes the goals and tasks set out in their statutes. (Cziomer, Zyblikiewicz, 2007) Nevertheless, due to the changing economic, economic and social conditions, new problems still arise in the global environment, and therefore there is a need to program further directions of action aimed at solving them on the basis of the experience gained and the changes taking place.

Programming functions (Menkes, Wasilkowski, 2004) are fulfilled by all organizations, eg the following can be specified: the program for reducing hunger in the world (FAO), the program for combating dangerous diseases (WHO), educational programs (UNESCO), the program for combating terrorism (including the European Union).

#### **4.2 Normative functions of international organizations**

In order for an organization to fulfill its goals and objectives, it must adhere to certain rules. (Menkes, Wasilkowski, 2004) That is why international organizations develop certain standards with which the Member States are bound. Such norms are reflected in resolutions, the strength of which depends on the prestige of the organization, as well as on the type of results that are associated with adopting a resolution in relation to the statute of the organization. It should be mentioned that norms are most often divided into legal and political.

Normative functions can be observed in particular on the example of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and in UN agreements with specialized organizations.

#### **4.3 Integrating functions of international organizations**

Integrating functions (Menkes, Wasilkowski, 2004) are expressed by striving for a certain unification, standardization of rules concerning intra-state relations (in individual sectors). Currently, the integrating function covers a wide spectrum of problems / needs concerning, among others: economic turnover, promotion and observance of human rights, guaranteeing democratic forms of exercising power and formulating the state system. It is important that the integrating function performed by international organizations is expressed

through: the possibility of taking over a number of competences from the state, the possibility of adopting the law in force in the member states, the possibility of signing international agreements on behalf of states, the possibility of imposing disciplinary measures against states (e.g. financial penalties).

#### **4.4 Operational functions of international organizations**

The operational functions (Menkes, Wasilkowski, 2004) are manifested in activities undertaken by the organization on the basis of its own decisions, and these may be activities carried out in the field of: peace operations, operations to help people affected by war or natural disaster, operations aimed at helping refugees, organizing and conducting training, managing scientific research - research, credit operations. The performance of operational functions is typical for all international organizations, albeit with different frequency. Nevertheless, the following organizations can be distinguished as particularly active on this level: the United Nations together with the United Nations, as well as some regional organizations, such as the EU or the Organization of American States.

#### **4.5 Control functions of international organizations**

They rely on the verification of the implementation of individual tasks, and also control whether the organizations carry out activities in the field of their activities. The organization's standards of conduct, such as rules, regulations or procedures to be followed, are also subject to control. Control functions (Menkes, Wasilkowski, 2004) exist in all organizations. As part of this function, the following forms of control can be specified: analysis of publicly available data, request for information from countries, sending questionnaires containing sets of questions, creating teams whose task is to verify the implementation of tasks.

#### **4.6 Administrative functions of international organizations**

All institutions, and in particular those associating different members, are obliged to carry out extensive organizational, organizing, archival and documentation tasks. In general terms, these functions can be defined as administrative. (Menkes, Wasilkowski, 2004) As part of the administrative function, key activities for a given organization are carried out, e.g. typical activities carried out by international organizations as part of this function: substantive preparation of meetings of individual bodies, including, e.g. collecting the necessary documentation, preparing documentation containing information in the field of work carried out by the organization and on its basis creating archives, developing information materials, hiring staff, preparing budget plans for the organization and their verification as to the compliance of the incurred expenses

with budget assumptions, supporting cooperation of activities with other organizations.

## **5 Selected international organizations in the world**

International organizations are important participants in the system of international relations. They are an institutionalized form of cooperation between states or between institutions, legal and natural persons from different countries.

**The United Nations – UN** (Symonoides, 2005) is the largest international organization of a universal character. It was established after World War II on the initiative of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and China, as the successor of the League of Nations. The founding conference was held in San Francisco in the spring of 1945. It was then that the representatives of 50 countries finally developed, adopted and signed the United Nations Charter, which was the basis for the creation of the United Nations. It officially entered into force on October 24, 1945. Poland signed the United Nations Charter on October 16, 1945. In the following years, this was done by other countries, and the last one was Montenegro in 2006. Currently, 192 independent states belong to the United Nations. Only the Vatican, which has observer status, remains outside the United Nations. Territories with an ambiguous status, such as Kosovo, Palestine, Western Sahara, Abkhazia and others, are also not members of the Organization.

The main seat of the United Nations is New York (Geneva and Vienna in Europe).

The basic task of the United Nations is to maintain world peace and security and to organize international cooperation on many levels. (Furman, 2012) This is done by specialized units, incl. UNESCO (Education, Science and Culture Organization), UNICEF (Children's Aid Fund), FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization), WHO (World Health Organization), IMF (International Monetary Fund), IBRD (World Bank), ILO (International Labor Organization), WTO (World Tourism Organization).

In recent years, it has become necessary to introduce reforms in the functioning of the United Nations. The organization was founded over half a century ago and during this time the political situation in the world has changed significantly. This is related to, inter alia, the planned extension of the number of permanent members in the Security Council - after World War II, Germany, Italy and Japan, as defeated countries, could not be taken into account. Another manifestation of changes in the United Nations, aimed at ensuring greater efficiency and effectiveness of operations, is the general division of organizational structures into 4 main groups:

- peace and security,
- humanitarian matters,
- development,
- economic and social affairs.



## **Political and other organizations**

### **Group of the Seven Richest Countries in the World - G7 (Group G7 - formerly G8)**

Created in 1975 by the United States, Japan, Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy (Group of Six); Canada joined them in 1976, and Russia in 1998. In those years (1998-2014) when Russia was part of the group, this group was called the G8. However, Russia was suspended on March 24, 2014, after it had occupied the territory of Crimea and started the war in Donbas. After these events, the group is known as the G7 (Matera, 2015). Member States participate in meetings where information on global economic and political issues is exchanged. It is believed that this group actually rules all global politics and economy. The anti-globalists who always organize numerous demonstrations and protests during the meetings of the Seven are especially convinced of this. Representatives of the Member States meet at annual summits, where they jointly define the direction of multilateral dialogue, and formulate political responses to global challenges. The activities of the G7 complement the activities of the G20 to which they belong in turn, the countries with the highest GDP and population. The members of the G20 group together generate around 90% of the world's GDP, which makes them a powerful mover. Their goal is economic coordination of the world, which manifests itself, inter alia, in by stimulating economic growth.

Although the G7 is a narrower group, it also has a real impact on the world situation. Its representatives are able to agree on an international action plan. At this point, it is worth noting that the decisions they make are in no way binding in terms of legal provisions. Nevertheless, due to the power of the members of the group (we are talking here, for example, about the aforementioned United States), they have a strong political influence. (Matera, 2015)

### **The North Atlantic Treaty Organization – NATO**

It was established in 1949 as a political and military alliance of Western Europe, the United States and Canada. Its main goal was to counter the military threat posed by the Soviet Union and related countries (The "competitive" Warsaw Pact of 1955). Created in this way, two strong military camps began to fight against each other at a distance, which was called the "Cold War". There were, among others, intensive work on the development of newer, more perfect types of weapons, including nuclear weapons ("arms race"). This state of affairs lasted almost until the end of the 1980s. The political changes in Central Europe after 1989 and the "perestroika" in the USSR changed the character of the North Atlantic Treaty to a large extent. (Kuźniar, 2010) The overriding goal remained to ensure the security of the member states, but the main threat was no longer to

be the Soviet Union - this state broke up into several republics. For many years, the United States has been conducting multilateral talks with Russia, including on maintaining world peace. Moreover, it was decided to enlarge the Pact with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Assessing the relations of power in the international arena is an important and responsible task for analysts and advisers. As noted, this assessment requires some subtlety and caution, as it has some pitfalls. Politicians think in terms of power relations, and it would be good if these forces were well assessed. By various measures, NATO is by far the most powerful alliance the globe, both in offensive terms and especially in defensive terms. This assessment is not changed by the lowered coefficient of cohesion resulting from with a large number of members

### **Organization of American States - OAS**

Established in 1948 at a congress in Bogota (Colombia). It includes all the independent states of North and South America. The tasks of the Organization include "Strengthening peace and security on American continents, peaceful settlement of disputes between member states, joint resolution of economic, social and political problems". An example of OAS activities is the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America (South and Central America).

### **Commonwealth of Independent States - CIS**

It was established in Minsk in 1991 as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. All the former Soviet republics (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia) joined it except Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, as well as Georgia, which, however, joined in 1993 to finally leave the CIS in 2008. The main tasks of the CIS come down to creating a single economic space (customs, communication, economic) within its territory, and also to conducting a common international policy. However, it is quite difficult to implement, because there are many discrepancies in various issues between individual countries - their manifestation may be the fact that only 6 republics belong to the defense collective security agreement (Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Belarus).

Also, the political changes of the state authorities are not conducive to further integration. An example of this is Ukraine, where after Viktor Yushchenko's victory in the presidential election, the state policy was changed to a more pro-European one and its further participation in the Community was called into question (in turn, in 2010, Viktor Yanukovich became president, who in turn has a clearly pro-Russian attitude). In May 2006, Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia and Moldova established a separate Organization for Democracy and Development called GUAM.

Russia and Belarus seem to be the strongest links in the Commonwealth of Independent States - they have concluded a separate agreement called the Union of Belarus and Russia. In addition, Asian republics (especially Kazakhstan) are quite firmly held in the Community, seeing certain opportunities for themselves in ties with a stronger partner.

### **Association of Southeast Asian Nations - ASEAN**

Established in 1967 in Bangkok by the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei was admitted in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Burma (Myanmar) in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. Initially, the activities of the organization focused on political issues, e.g. in 1971 the member states created a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality. Later, the main emphasis was placed on economic matters, which was related to the development of the so-called "Asian tigers". Currently, ASEAN is actively involved in both economic and political cooperation. The seat of the Association is Jakarta (Indonesia).

### **League of Arab States - LPA (Jam'at Al-duwal al Arabijja).**

It is a regional organization that was established in 1945 in Cairo (Egypt). It is a loose union of Arab states aimed at strengthening political and economic cooperation. The proclamation of unanimous views on the global forum is also of great importance, as exemplified by the recognition of Palestine as an independent state and granting it the status of a member of the League of Arab States. In addition, this organization includes: Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Yemen, Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates.

### **African Union - AU**

It was established on July 9, 2002 in Durban (South Africa) after the liquidation of the Organization of African Unity. All African countries except Morocco belong to it. In terms of its aims and goals, this organization is similar to the European Union. The plans include, among others creation of a common parliament, central bank and court, introduction of a common currency, organization of peacekeeping forces. It will also be important to place greater emphasis on the democratization of social life and the protection of human rights. There are also intentions to attract foreign capital. However, achieving these goals seems very difficult due to the enormous social, economic and cultural differences that exist in Africa. Nevertheless, it is certainly an opportunity for the growing African population plagued by poverty, hunger, disease and natural disasters.

### **Interpol - OIPC (Organization Internationale de Police Criminelle)**

It is a police organization dedicated to fighting international crime. Its activity is based on the cooperation of law enforcement authorities of individual Member States (information exchange, joint actions). Currently, 187 countries

belong to Interpol, including Poland since 1990. The organization was founded in 1923 in Vienna, and since 1946 its headquarters are in Paris.

## **Economic organizations**

### **World Trade Organization - WTO**

It was established under an agreement concluded in April 1994 in Marrakesh (Morocco); started its activity in January 1995. Its main task is to liberalize world trade, as well as to create uniform conditions on international markets for all countries. Currently, 153 members of the WTO are members, including Poland since July 1995. The seat of the Organization is Geneva (Switzerland). (Kubel-Grabau, 2022)

### **Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development - OECD**

Established in 1961, its current headquarters is in Paris. It brings together over 30 most developed countries in the world from the so-called "Rich north" - the United States, Canada, Mexico, Chile, Japan, South Korea, most members of the European Union, as well as Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, Australia and New Zealand. It operates in accordance with its name, and is not limited to its members - it largely supports the economic development of poorer countries. OECD also organizes international scientific cooperation and takes particular care of environmental protection. (Michalski, 2022)

### **Free Trade Area of the Americas - FTAA**

It was supposed to start functioning by the end of 2005 and be the largest free trade zone in the world, covering about 800 million people on 2 continents. All the countries of North and South America (34), except Cuba, intended to join it. However, its creation has not yet taken place. The greatest resentment is in Latin America, which fear the US will dominate trade. While the movement of goods and services would be facilitated for all, the strongest would still play a major role. As a consequence, this could mean that the USA would significantly strengthen its position on the Latin American market, which would be at the expense of local entrepreneurs. So the creation of a free zone has stalled so far. The Argentinean summit of US leaders in November 2005 brought virtually no results; Instead, it received wide international attention with the many protests and street demonstrations against the FTAA. (Garlińska-Bielawska, 2011)

Currently, smaller free trade zones still operate on the American continents, such as the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), the Andean Common Market (ACM) or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

### **Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries - OPEC**

It was established in 1960 in Baghdad (Iraq). It includes countries from the so-called "Poor south" (most of the Middle East plus Algeria, Libya, Nigeria,

Angola, Venezuela, Ecuador), for which oil exports are the basis of the entire economy. It represents a uniform position on global markets - it defines the production volumes in order to maintain favorable prices and be able to effectively compete with other large exporters (Russia, Norway, Canada, Mexico).

### **Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation - APEC**

The organization was founded in 1989 in Canberra on the initiative of Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Canada and the USA. Other countries from the Pacific Ocean also joined the treaty - China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Singapore, Brunei, Papua New Guinea, Chile, Peru, Mexico and Russia. Two Chinese provinces: Taiwan and Hong Kong have the status of a separate APAC member. The main task is the gradual liberalization of trade until the creation of a completely free trade zone in 2015. Actions are also taken to support the development of the industry, with particular emphasis on the computer, IT and telecommunications industries. (Drews, 2015)

### **Conclusion**

The system of states and the relations between them are the most important indicator of international life, and such components as order, security, independence, democracy and justice are among the fundamental in state strategies. Contemporary countries, as part of international cooperation, want to best support the realization of their basic national interests, which is the motivating factor of their countries' policy. On the other hand, politics in international relations refers to the constant search for a balance between power and law, and between cooperation for the common good, i.e. solidarity, and selfishness. In this approach, one can find a direct reference to political realism, which focuses on nation states as actors of the international arena. Considering the realization of national interests in a realistic approach, balancing of forces is indicated as one of the forms regulating international relations. Meanwhile, it seems that international alliances constitute the most important mechanism of state policy, based on a balance or concentration of forces. Moreover, the key attribute of nation-states is still their sovereignty, which no unification process is able to threaten when it comes to protecting individual vital interests. (Bieleń, 2010)

The presented typology of the division of international organizations may indicate their functional diversity. Affiliation of countries to particular organizations is aimed at improving the position of a given country in the international arena and tightening cooperation in key areas influencing the domains of the state's functioning. It should be emphasized that the association of states within international organizations is also conducive to the creation of own

interests through a policy of cooperation with other countries. Affiliation to individual international organizations should be considered in terms of the opportunities and possibilities of members joining its structures.

Theoretical considerations concerning international organizations were carried out, and in particular, countries that have a wide range of opportunities to belong to individual organizations, which allows them to shape their own national interests with the help of a tool such as international organizations. State policy can be implemented on many levels, e.g. security policy, economic policy, social policy, economic policy, etc.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the participation of states in various international organizations allows, through the concluded alliances, to shape internal politics on various levels, in the manner of state partnership with other countries. Thanks to this, it is possible to obtain assistance in solving existing problems in the country, and it also enables the development of factors constituting a competitive advantage over other countries.

The complexity of contemporary international relations is the result of constant changes taking place at the level of events and processes in the global environment in which subjects of international law, including international organizations, participate. They have a significant impact on countries by creating new mechanisms of coexistence, and also impose certain standards in force in the framework of international cooperation. The most important manifestation of international life is the stimulation of mutual relations between states, which may become the basis for increasing the more effective flow of information, goods and services. Participation of countries in international organizations, it may help to protect its interests, and may also provide great opportunities for development. Therefore, it should be stated that the membership of states in international organizations helps them in creating a security policy and is a kind of pillar thanks to which states strengthen their weaknesses with the help of stronger states.

## References

- AMBUKITA, E. 2018. *Economic Community of West African States as an example of economic integration in Africa (2018) Theoretical and Methodical Problems*, University of Szczecin, Studies and Works of the Faculty of Economic Sciences and Management 53/2, pp. 9-22, ISSN 2080-488.
- ANTONOWICZ, L. 2000. *Textbook of International Law*, Legal Publishers PWN, Warsaw, 2000. ISBN 978-83-264-9255-6.
- BIELEŃ, S. 2010. *Polityka in international relations*, ASPRA-JR Publishing House, Warsaw, 2010, p. 4-7. ISSN 2084-3291.
- BYRSKA, D., GAWKOWSKI, K., LISZKOWSKA, D. 2017. *European Union, genesis and functioning of the challenge*. exante.com.pl, Wrocław 2017, pp. 7-40. ISBN 978-83-65374-53-0.

- CZIOMER, E. 2005. *Security and cooperation in Europe*. In CZIOMER, E., ZYBLIKIEWICZ, L.W. *Outline of contemporary international relations*, PWN, Warsaw, 2005. p. 154
- CZIOMER, E. 2008. *International political relations*, Krakow University of Applied Sciences Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski, Krakow 2008, p. 309-345 ISBN 978-83-89823-38-0.
- CZIOMER, E., ZYBLIKIEWICZ, L.W. 2007. *An outline of contemporary international relations*, Polish Scientific Publishers PWN, Warsaw, 2007.
- DREWS, A. 2015. *Influence of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation on the development of international exchange*. In PIETRYKA, I. (ed.), *Problems of the world economy*, volume V, Institute of Economic Research, Polish Economic Society Branch in Toruń, Toruń, 2015. pp. 17-29. ISBN 978- 83-62049-27-1.
- FURMAN, N.E. 2012. "Cultural heritage in the politics of the United Nations" 2012, Scientific Papers of the Students' Movement No. 2, Wrocław, pp. 87-92. ISSN 2084-2279.
- GARLIŃSKA-BIELAWSKA, J. 2011. *Free Trade Area Of The Americas - Ftaa as an alternative to the European integration model*, Poznań University of Economics, Zeszyty Naukowe 2011 (179), pp. 84-95. ISSN 1689-7374.
- KOSOWSKA, A. 2008. *Large Union of Small Countries - Small Countries in the European Union*. In ŻELICHOWSKI, R. (ed.) *Small Western European States and Territories with Special Status*. Their role and place in the European Union, Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, 2008, p. 24.
- KUBEL-GRABAU, A. 2022. *World Trade Organization WTO*, <https://www.gov.pl/web/rozwoj-technologie/swiatowa-organizacja-handlu-wto> (accessed: 28/02/2022).
- KUŹNIAR, R., et al. 2010. *NATO in the global balance of power - Military Aspect, Strategic Yearbook 2009/2010*, ed. Naukowe Scholar, Warsaw, 2010. pp. 384-391. ISBN 978-83-7383-449-1.
- LATOSZEK, E, PROCZEK, M. 2001. *International organizations. Assumptions, goals, activities*, ELIPSA Publishing House, Warsaw, 2001. ISBN 83-7151-718-1.
- ŁOŚ-NOWAK, T. ed. 1999. *Organizations in international relations. Essence, mechanisms of action, range*, Publishing House of the University of Wrocław, Wrocław, 1999. ISBN 8322919255
- MATERA, R. 2015. *The dimension of international security at the G7 / G8 summits (2015)*, *Polityka and Society* 2 (13).
- MENKES, J., WASILKOWSKI, A. 2004. *International organizations. Introduction to the system*. LexisNexis Legal Publishing, Warsaw, 2004. pp. 162-169. ISBN 83-7334-356-3.
- MICHALSKI, B. 2022 *The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in the face of selected economic problems*, University of Wrocław 1/22 / BM.

MORAWIECKI, M. *International economic organizations*, volume 1 - System of international organization, PWN, Warsaw, 1987. p. 33.

PIETRAŚ, M., *International security* [in:] *International political relations*, ed. M. Pietraś, Lublin (2006) pp. 122-130.

SULOWSKI S., BRZEZINSKI M. (eds.), *Internal security of the state. Selected Issues*, ELIPSA Publishing House, Warsaw, 2009. p. 25.

SYMONOIDES, J. 2005. "The United Nations in a changing world. Necessity of reform and taking up new challenges "2005. In STASZKÓW, J. „Krakow International Studies. Charter of the United Nations 1945-2005”, 1/2005, pp. 111-133. ISSN 1733-2680.

ŚWIDERSKI, K., KUŹNIAR, Z. 2017. *The State Security System in the face of contemporary civilization threats. Security Culture, Science - Practice - Reflections*, No. 25, 2017, Military Academy of Land Forces in Wrocław. 154–168. ISSN 2299-4033.

WELLERSHOFF, D. 1999. *Mit Sicherheit. Neue Sicherheit zwischen Western und Morgen*, Neue Gessellschaft Verlag, Bonn, 1999.

ZIĘBA, R., *Institutions of European security. Concepts - Structures - Functioning*, ed. 4, Scholar Publishing House, Warsaw 2004.

ZIĘBA, R., *The theory of state security in international relations*, [in:] *International relations in the 21st century*, ed. E. Halizak et al., Wydawnictwo Scholar, Warsaw 2006, pp. 3–25.



# THE STRATEGIC COMPASS AS A TOOL TO INCREASE THE EUROPEAN UNION'S DEFENCE CAPABILITIES<sup>1</sup>

Antonín Novotný<sup>2</sup>

## ABSTRACT

*The aim of the article is to describe EU document the Strategic Compass. The European Union has significantly increased its ambitions in the field of security and defence over the last five years. A number of tangible programs and initiatives aimed at strengthening the Union's defence capabilities have been set. The area in which the level of coordination has so far lagged relatively behind is strategic planning. But that, too, is set to change in the future. The tool for this is the EU Strategic Compass. It will be a strategic material that will set the direction and goals of the European Union in the field of defence and security. The Strategic Compass document should be adopted by the European Council in March 2022, and it will be implemented by the EU and its Member States by 2030.*

**Key words:** *European Union, Strategic Compass, military capability*

## Introduction

*The Strategic Compass is a political proposal to prevent the major risk the EU is facing: that of 'strategic shrinkage', or the risk of being always principled but seldom relevant. That is why it defines a high ambition and presents concrete means to make this ambition a reality (Josep Borrell, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission).*

The European Union (EU) is a unique economic and political association of European countries that have relinquished some of their powers in favor of the EU in order to achieve common goals. The current EU builds on previous European communities, which began to emerge with the idea of promoting economic cooperation in particular.

The Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security Defence Policy (CSDP) stem from the three pillars of the EU, which were originally introduced by Maastricht Treaty. Although the Maastricht Treaty has been replaced by the Lisbon Treaty, EU policies still stand on these three pillars: 1) the European Communities, 2) the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and 3) Police and judicial cooperation. The common foreign and security policy of the European Union has the task of coordinating the foreign and security policy of the

---

<sup>1</sup> This article is published within the project OZKON – Armed conflict (2022-2027)

<sup>2</sup> Antonín Novotný, Ing., Ph.D., Researcher, Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies, University of Defence in Brno, Kounicova 65, Brno, Czech Republic. antonin.novotny@unob.cz

EU member states. The main task of the CFSP is to safeguard peace, strengthen international security, promote cooperation between nations and develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Pursuant to Articles 42-46 of the Treaty on European Union, the Common Security and Defence Policy has been established by EU members as part of the CFSP and is thus an integral part of the Union's common foreign and security policy. The CSDP builds on the document Shared Vision, A Common Approach: A Stronger Europe, the European Union's Global Foreign and Security Policy Strategy, adopted in 2016. This document highlights the main objectives of the CSDP, which include strengthening cooperation between Member States and increasing their resilience; strengthening relations with NATO, together with strengthening autonomous military capabilities. In this year 2016, European defence cooperation entered a new era. Through a shared commitment to investing more and making defence cooperation more effective, the EU has increased its ambitions to develop a more cohesive European defence environment with a more capable, deployable, interoperable and sustainable set of military capabilities and forces. To achieve this new ambition, Member States have introduced a number of new EU instruments for defence cooperation:

- Revised Capability Development Plan (CDP),
- Coordinated Annual Defense Review (CARD);
- Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) - currently 60 joint projects in 4. waves;
- European Defence Fund (EDF) – €8 billion for 2021-2027 (EDA. Ensuring coherence among EU defence tools).

All these instruments can be, the impetus for European states to work together to build capabilities and overcome that fundamental weakness of considerable fragmentation. This prevails in many areas, from planning through research and development to specific weapon systems. Within the EU, it has a much higher number of individual types of weapons, such as airplanes or tanks, and still has very individualized support forces and logistics in general. This is uneconomical and inefficient.

In March 2022 should be adopted by the European Council document The Strategic Compass. The Czech Republic pays increased attention to this document, as our country will chair the EU Council in the second half of 2022.

## **2 Characteristic of Strategic Compass**

According to the Council Conclusions of 10 May 2021 “the Strategic Compass will define policy orientations, concrete goals and objectives for the next 5 to 10 years, in areas such as crisis management, resilience, capability development and partnerships”. The Compass has to be “ambitious and actionable” (EU Council. Council Conclusions on Security and Defence,

8396/21). Some of these problems can be solve. The strategic compass aims to enhance the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union in order to make the EU better able to act and to jointly respond to current and future threats.

The compass defines what the EU's civil and military crisis management can and should do in the area of security and defence, and what it cannot or should not do. Based on these clear shared goals, the EU will be able to respond more swiftly in future. Moreover, they facilitate shared and goal-oriented civil and military capability planning (German Federal Ministry of Defence. The European Union's strategic compass).

The EU has no ambition to build collective defence. This is a task for the North Atlantic Alliance, where 22-member states are also members of the EU. But EU has European Defence Agency (EDA) (EDA. The EU Capability Development Priorities). However, all projects and cooperation that the EU conducts or mediates through the EDA are in line with the North Atlantic Alliance, use common standards and can therefore automatically apply the resulting military capabilities within NATO. This strengthens the European wing of the Alliance. The current situation shows that great power competition is escalating in the world. It is clear that the EU should profile itself far more as a security and defence player in this environment. The Union should be able to take better care of its neighbourhood. Not only in the Eastern Neighbourhoods, where NATO is actively involved, but rather in the areas of North Africa - especially the Sahel and the Middle East.

EU member states have differing strategic cultures. Priorities and perspectives also vary from country to country. This is what makes the EU so strong and allows us to take a 360-degree view of the world. At the same time, the Strategic Compass as the new security policy document must be based on a broad political consensus and a strong political will to act. We must therefore identify those threats and challenges in particular that relate to all Europeans and must specify objectives to which all Europeans are committed (German EU presidency. Strategic Compass: Developing strategic principles).

The changed security environment should be the major factor for defining more precisely the EU military level of ambition. The 'threat analysis' points to a complex and broad set of threats with effects outside and within the EU. Also the chapter World we face, will be a comprehensive analysis on key threats and challenges to the Union, its Member States and citizens, including global and regional threats, conflicts in our neighbourhood by state and non-state actors. This is unprecedented at EU level.

Increasing operational readiness - another way how to speed up the launching of EU military operations is to increase operational preparedness. It means:

- Enlarging the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC)
- Contingency planning, advance planning and scenarios

- Live exercises
- Aligning capability development
- CARD
- PESCO
- EDF
- Streamlining the tools
- National implementation
- Maximising dual-use capabilities
- Strengthening the technological and industrial base
- Structuring European armed forces
- Increasing high-level political pressure (The EU's Strategic Compass for security and defence. Netherlands Institute of International Relations).

Other parts of document Strategic Compass are:

Crisis Management (ACT) – act more quickly and decisively when facing crises  
 Resilience (PROTECT) – secure EU citizens against fast-changing threats  
 Capabilities (INVEST) – invest in the capabilities and technologies EU needs

Partnerships (PARTNER) – partner with others to achieve common goals

The chapter Crisis management (ACT) describes:

- Improving the readiness of EU armed forces and civilian experts to reinforce CSDP missions and operations.
- Developing a European Union Rapid Deployment Capacity of up to 5000 troops supported by strategic enablers.

The chapter Resilience (PROTECT) describes:

- Strengthening EU capacity to prevent, deter and respond to hybrid threats including external cyber-attacks and foreign information manipulation and interference.
- Safeguarding EU security interests in the maritime and space domains.

The chapter Capabilities (INVEST) describes:

- Jointly investing in key military capabilities to operate on land, at sea, in the air, in the cyber domain and in outer space.
- Boosting research and innovation to fill strategic gaps and reduce technological and industrial dependencies.

The chapter Partnerships (PARTNER) describes:


- Strengthening cooperation with NATO and the UN, as well as with OSCE, AU and ASEAN.
- Boosting cooperation with individual partners such as the US, Canada and Norway and other countries.

Fig. 1 Timeline of Strategic Compass



Source: EU. Towards a strategic compass. 11/2021

Fig. 2 Strategic Compass process and its baskets



Source: EU. Where will the EU's Strategic Compass point?

## Conclusion

Strengthening European security autonomy is not a new idea. In 1998, a document was signed in Saint-Malo, calling for the creation of European capabilities - including military - to respond to the crisis abroad. The document also emphasized, among other things, that the new European defence structure needed to be built in such a way as to avoid creating unnecessary duplication with NATO.

In June 2016, the EU adopted its new Global Strategy emphasizing the need to achieve European defence autonomy, followed by the creation of a platform for the unification of defence cooperation PESCO, enabling, among other things, the sharing of some resources or joint development of military technology. The Strategic Compass document is then a continuation of this trend.

The United States has warned in the past about the risks of greater EU emancipation, which has come to light as 3D: 1. decoupling of European and Alliance decision-making, 2. duplication of initiatives, 3. discrimination against non-EU European NATO members (Turkey). This concern about European defence autonomy persists to this day.

However, in an increasingly geopolitically competitive environment, the United States should reconsider its position on European defence autonomy. If the United States wants to free up its capabilities in Europe and needs good allies at a time of growing competition between the powers, it should support the strengthening of European defence capabilities. The European Union is not faced with a choice between strengthening its own defence capabilities and deepening transatlantic cooperation within NATO. The second is conditioned by the first. Only then will the EU remain a credible partner.

There must be a deeper psychological change in Europe as a whole. The world has changed. European soft power should also be able to act as a geopolitical hard power where diplomacy reaches its limits.

In this context, we are not talking about strategic autonomy from something, that is, the United States, but to something, the ability to deal more independently with situations that threaten our security. It should also be emphasized that it is primarily a matter of strengthening individual national armies or small operational combat groups to deal with crises, not building a common European army. In this context, we are not talking about 'strategic autonomy', but rather about 'European sovereignty', and we should emphasize the 'European security order'.

In this case, the Strategic Compass, that should be adopted by the European Council in March 2022, and it will be implemented by the EU and its Member States by 2030, is the right step. The EU needs a strong defence industry to build the necessary capabilities to strengthen the EU's capacity for action. It is important, not only in connection of Russian war against Ukraine.

## References

- A Strategic Compass to make Europe a Security Provider, Foreword by HR/VP Josep Borrell, November 2021. Available at: [foreword\\_-\\_a\\_strategic\\_compass\\_to\\_make\\_europe\\_a\\_security\\_provider.pdf](#) (europa.eu)
- Council of the European Union. 2021. Council Conclusions on Security and Defence, 8396/21, (Brussels:10 May 2021), paragraph 2. EU. Where will the EU's Strategic Compass point? April, 2021. Available at: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/698057/EPRS\\_BRI\(2021\)698057\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/698057/EPRS_BRI(2021)698057_EN.pdf)
- EDA. 2022. The EU Capability Development Priorities. [cit. 2022-03-01]. Available at: <https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-publications/eda-brochure-cdp>
- EDA. 2019. Ensuring coherence among EU defence tools. [cit. 2022-03-01]. Available at: <https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-factsheets/2019-10-25-factsheet-coherence>
- EU. 2021. Towards a strategic compass. November, 2021. [cit. 2022-03-01]. Available at: [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/towards\\_a\\_strategic\\_compass-2021-11.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/towards_a_strategic_compass-2021-11.pdf)
- German Federal Ministry of Defence. 2022. The European Union's strategic compass: first draft published. [cit. 2022-03-01]. Available at: <https://www.bmvg.de/en/news/eu-strategic-compass-first-draft-5324994>
- German EU presidency. 2020 Strategic Compass: Developing strategic principles. [cit. 2022-03-01]. Available at: <https://www.eu2020.de/eu2020-en/news/article/eu-defense-strategic-compass-foreign-policy/2377030>
- The EU's Strategic Compass for security and defence. 2021. Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. Report, Mai 2021. [cit. 2022-03-01]. Available at: [https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2021-05/Report\\_The\\_EUs\\_Compas\\_for\\_security\\_and\\_defence\\_May\\_2021.pdf](https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2021-05/Report_The_EUs_Compas_for_security_and_defence_May_2021.pdf)

# DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC MIGRATION IN POLAND AND UKRAINIAN MIGRANTS

Antoni Olak<sup>1</sup> - Bożena Konecka-Szydełko<sup>2</sup>

## ABSTRACT

*The very phenomenon of migration has its positive and negative sides both for the state, from which citizens come and to the country that receives them. Among the positive factors for the country of origin, it is impossible to ignore the following: lowering unemployment rates, transfer of funds, investing in the country, lowering poverty rates. On the other hand, the negative ones: difficult to find new hands or keep the already employed, outflow of well-educated people, loss of human capital (the so-called braindrain), changes in the age and gender structure of the population. Consequences of migration for the host country: dissatisfaction of citizens, relationship with the employment of foreigners instead of native workers, cultural diversity of the society or the influx of specialists. A person leaving the country of origin in terms of earnings usually achieves higher earnings and a higher standard of living has the opportunity to improve qualifications or meet professional aspirations. Migration can also have political implications. The uncontrolled influx of foreigners causes many problems with their placement and the reluctance of the native inhabitants. The purpose of these considerations is to show that the threats related to the phenomenon of migration contributed to the emergence of populist movements. Populism can be treated as an ideology or a political strategy. In populism, it is important to identify the enemy who is responsible for the bad situation in the country. In populist thought, it is important to believe that society is permanently divided. Nationalist attitudes may also appear, manifesting themselves in placing the interests of one's own nation over the interests of other nations.*

**Key words:** Labor migration, migrants, unemployment, human capital.

## Introduction

The eastern borders delineated after World War II left a large group of Poles outside Poland, including on the territory of the USSR. In the years 1945-1949, people who were Polish citizens of Polish origin came to our country, the estimated number of which was 1,517,983 people (Gomółka, Gawrycka, 2019). Migrations are one of the most difficult to estimate demographic and physical processes, both in terms of the scale of migration flows and the number of foreigners living in a given country. In terms of politics, as well as culture, Poles found themselves in a different situation. In the initial period after the fall of the Polish People's Republic, the wave of migration from Ukraine to Poland, to a country that was culturally and ethnically similar, gained importance, which could

---

<sup>1</sup> Antoni Olak, prof. nzw. dr hab., MBA. PWSTE w Jarosławiu, Czarnieckiego 16, 37-500 Jarosław, Poland, antonio130@vp.pl

<sup>2</sup> Bożena Konecka –Szydełko, Mgr. Provincial Sanitary and Epidemiological Station in Rzeszow, 35-959 Rzeszów, ul. Wierzbowa 16, Poland, bozena.konecka@wsse.rzeszow.pl



be seen in the growing number of Polish-Ukrainian marriages. After the political transformation, the most frequent and intensified migrations took place from the neighboring countries of Poland, Belarus, Ukraine and the Russian Federation, it was the largest group of economic immigrants, the beginnings of which took place in the late 1980s. For many years, especially until joining the European Union in Poland, circular mobility based on visa-free tourist migration between neighboring countries and Poland was dominant. The migration was mainly related to migrants taking up work without appropriate permits (Górny, Kindler, 2018).

The most numerous group are citizens from Ukraine, while the number of holders of residence cards from the territory of Belarus and the Russian Federation in 2018 was similar and amounted to 15,330 and 11,415 people. The number of citizens from Ukraine with cards was more than ten times greater and exceeded 145,000. The number of Ukrainians coming to Poland legally is systematically growing. The degree of settlement is also slowly increasing. Unfortunately, due to the fact that the work performed by migrants from Ukraine is often unregistered and there is a certain scale of illegal stays, it is difficult to estimate both the number of Ukrainians residing in the territory of the Republic of Poland and the number of Ukrainian economic migrants. These groups are mainly characterized by high professional activity. In recent years, thanks to the liberalization of the employment policy towards temporary migrants from the East (declaration system), there has been a significant increase in interest in using legal paths to find employment in Poland (Górny, Kindler, 2018).

The main place attracting Ukrainian labor migration was the Mazowieckie Voivodeship, which accounted for approximately half of the registered migrants. The areas along the Polish-Ukrainian border and those areas inhabited by the Ukrainian minority are also very popular. This partly proves the role of migration networks in the process of Ukrainian migration to Poland. If we take into account the residence statistics, women play the dominant role among migrants from Ukraine. On the other hand, in the statistics concerning work, they give an advantage for men. A statistical economic migrant from Ukraine in Poland does not have any specific age. Among the newcomers from Ukraine, the inhabitants of western Ukrainian oblasts have a clear advantage. Most of them cross the border legally, their stay in the territory of the Republic of Poland is legal. The work itself is often undertaken in the shadow economy. At first glance, unregistered it is more profitable for both parties. The employer saves on contributions, while the migrant can count on a higher net salary and freedom of employment. However, in practice, apart from the loss for the budget, it also carries a direct threat to the migrant, e.g. exploitation by the employer, employee's illness. The migration of Ukrainians to Poland is short-term, often seasonal (Górny, Kindler, 2018).

According to the typology created by the Center for Migration Research, most Ukrainians fall under the category of "circulars". For many of them, this

form of migration is permanent - they do not intend to stop circulating - either to return to Ukraine or to stay in Poland permanently. Circulation between Ukraine and Poland is a way of life for them. They declare their intention to end it and return to their country of origin only when the economic situation in Ukraine improves. Social networks, supporting the migrant both in undertaking short-term labor migration and in the transition from circular mobility to a long-term form of migration. When looking for a job, Ukrainians rely mainly on informal channels, using contacts owned by family and friends to search. They find employment mainly in the so-called secondary labor market, in positions that do not require high qualifications. Taking up a job below one's qualifications leads to the waste of brains and the depreciation of professional qualifications. Ukrainian migrants in Poland work mainly in agriculture, construction and households. There are many indications that they perform a function on the labor market defined as: migrants, finding employment mainly in agriculture, domestic services, construction and retail trade; usually staying in Poland legally, but often undertaking illegal work; predominantly unskilled workers and students complementary to the domestic workforce, occupying positions for which there is no demand among Poles (Górny, Kindler, 2018).

Let us ask ourselves a very important question: what is the difference between the economic migration of Ukrainians to Poland and other destination countries? Above all, no other country has such a high proportion of irregular migrants from Ukraine. Moreover, Poland is distinguished by the highest percentage of Ukrainians employed in agriculture (about half of the employed). Construction dominates in Russia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Portugal, while domestic services are dominant in Italy. The migration of Ukrainians to Spain has the most similar profile to the Polish one, but employment in agriculture is not so dominant over other sectors. Spain is the most similar to Poland also in terms of the dominant professional group among migrants from Ukraine - here also people employed in basic occupations predominate. Another feature that distinguishes Poland from other target countries of Ukrainian labor migration is the low average earnings - except for Hungary, the lowest, compared to Italy and Spain almost twice as low.

Moreover, migrations to Poland, similarly to other countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Russia, are characterized by short periods of stay and many arrivals in a relatively short time. Ukrainians going to Italy, Spain and Portugal visit their country of origin much less often and prefer longer trips - on average only 15% of them come for less than six months. For example: in Spain, 93% of migrants to Ukraine go to Ukraine every 2 years or less. Taking into account the gender structure of migrants, economic migration of Ukrainians to Poland has a profile similar to that of migrants to Spain and Portugal (a slight majority of men). The migration of Ukrainians to Russia, the Czech Republic and Hungary is more masculinized (percentage men reach 70–80%; UCSR and Ukrstat, 2008), (Brunarska, Grotte, Lesińska, 2012).

Migration to Italy, in turn, is much more feminized - according to UCSR and Ukrstat (2008), among Ukrainians choosing this direction, women constitute 61%, and there are studies that say as much as 85%. In terms of education, the profile of migration to Poland is, according to the UCSR and Ukrstat (2008) study, the closest to the Russian one - the percentage of people with higher and incomplete higher education was 29.5% in Russia, and 27.9% in Poland. According to this study, a higher percentage of highly educated migrants can be found in Hungary (47%), Spain (45%) and Italy (37.7%), while Portugal (22.5%) and the Czech Republic (15, 3%), (Brunarska, Grotte, Lesińska, 2012).

Is the current state of economic migration of Ukrainian citizens to Poland favorable? from the perspective of the development of both countries? It is difficult to give an unequivocal answer to this question. On the one hand, we can talk about the benefits of migration on both sides, and on the other - the interests of Poland and Ukraine are partially divergent in this field. From the perspective of Ukraine, the economic migration of its citizens has a positive effect on the country's development thanks to transfers from abroad, which contribute to an increase in household income, which translates into an increase in consumption in the country. This is particularly important in view of the fact that migrants spend a small part of their earned money locally in Poland and spend the vast majority on expenses in Ukraine. Migration also reduces the unemployment rate in Ukraine, and indirectly relieves social tensions related to the poor economic situation in the country. The temporary nature of migration to Poland limits the negative consequences that are usually associated with the outflow of citizens from a given country. There are no indications that migrants from Ukraine in Poland would have to decide en masse to switch from typically economic circular migration to settlement migration. What more can be expected of that in the event of an improvement in the economic situation in Ukraine, people working in Poland will return to the country for good (Brunarska, Grotte, Lesińska, 2012).

The dominant model of migration to Poland provides great flexibility in this regard. Negative An aspect of the outflow of employees is the fact that the most enterprising units are usually characterized by the greatest mobility. It is comforting that in the case of migration to Poland, a relatively large part of it concerns the unemployed, i.e. people who have not realized their potential in Ukraine. However, a negative feature of Ukrainian migration to Poland is certainly the high percentage of migrants in an irregular situation. The Ukrainian state loses indirectly from this: as it is interested in the situation of its citizens abroad, it should be concerned about the fact that their illegal status limits their possibilities to pursue their rights and makes them exposed to various dangers, e.g. dishonest employers or intermediaries. Secondly, directly - in the case of people who are tax residents in Ukraine, it also loses the Ukrainian state treasury. Therefore, limiting illegal employment is in the interest of both countries (Brunarska, Grotte, Lesińska, 2012).

From the Polish point of view, economic migration of Ukrainians supplements the shortages of the labor force on the Polish labor market, especially in periods of the greatest demand for extra hands to work (summer season). At the same time, due to the fact that it plays a complementary role (Ukrainians perform jobs that Polish citizens are reluctant to undertake), it does not increase unemployment on the Polish labor market. Migration from Ukraine is also beneficial for Poland, because it does not require the use of integration policy tools towards the newcomers (both due to the cultural similarity and the temporary nature of migration). Ukrainian women who come to Poland to work as housekeepers, nannies or nannies indirectly contribute to the increase in professional activation of Polish women. In addition, they fill the existing institutional gap (no nurseries, kindergartens, nursing homes for the elderly). Among the unfavorable aspects of the current state of affairs for Poland, first of all the losses for the state budget should be mentioned with a large share of people from Ukraine undertaking undeclared work in Poland. This deprives the budget of any tax revenue. In addition, the way Ukrainians spend the money earned in Poland is also not favorable from the Polish point of view (it would be more advantageous for migrants to spend most of their earnings on consumption in Poland). This is one of the manifestations of the divergence of interests between Poland and Ukraine.

Another problem from the Polish point of view is the lack of control over the actual implementation of the declarations contained in the employers' declarations. You should also take into account the fact that in the long-term perspective, the short-term filling of labor shortages in the Polish labor market may turn out to be insufficient (Brunarska, Grotte, Lesińska, 2012). In view of the unfavorable demographic forecasts, Poland may begin to depend on migrants to settle. Then it will be much more difficult to reconcile the interests of both countries. The aging Ukrainian society will also need additional labor to support the growing numbers of retirees (Brunarska, Grotte, Lesińska, 2012).

## **1 Poland - country of economic migration**

The migration situation of the population began in the modern world in the nineteenth century as a result of socio-economic changes, there were conditions conducive to the movement of people in search of better living conditions. Masses of people emigrated from Poland, mainly peasants, looking for a better life, wanting to find their place or in agriculture or in newly established factories. After World War II, some Poles who found themselves in the West during the war did not decide to return to their own country and settled in the rich countries of the anti-Nazi coalition, i.e. in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. The number of people leaving Poland dropped significantly as a result of the communist government's policy of restricting citizens leaving to the West. After Poland regained its sovereignty in 1989, the possibility of emigration

reopened for Poles, but the scale of emigration from Poland was not large. In the post-war years, Poland was an emigration country, because the migration policy was a product of the state's policy that wanted to control migration processes, thanks to which it would strengthen the undemocratic system and shape the national structures of the state, i.e. the idea of a one-nation state. The territorial shape and the political system of Poland had a great influence on the migration policy. The migrations were involuntary, which resulted from the policy of the Polish authorities at the time (Wojtaszczyk, Szymańska, 2017).

In 1989, the process of socio-political transformation became a breakthrough in Poland, democratic political changes resulted in the opening of borders, and a more free exit and entry flow of Polish citizens and foreigners (<https://udsc.gov.pl/uchodzczy-2/uchodzczy/> dictionary, 2021). Thanks to this situation, the emigration and immigration status in the Republic of Poland was created, compared to the previous years, the number of people leaving and coming from Poland increased significantly. In the initial periods, a small number of migrants decided to stay on the territory of the Republic of Poland, the country's financial resources were limited due to the lack of well-developed infrastructure. Poland was perceived stereotypically in the first half of the 1990s, considered a country very unattractive for migrants, especially in terms of social conditions. Poland was a transit country for immigrants, but also a place of permanent settlement without taking up international mobility. Poland is no longer a country where the migration situation was not a new and exotic phenomenon.

The next key socio-economic change felt in Poland was the accession to the EU (European Union), and in particular the accession to the Schengen area. Poland gained more interest and better attractiveness among the immigrant group. For permanent residence, foreigners usually settled in small towns of approx. 72.6%, with the majority in the Mazowieckie and Śląskie voivodships, they were young people in the 25-41 age group, about 41% (<https://udsc.gov.pl/uchodzczy-2/uchodzczy/slownik>, 2021).

The situation changed with the influx of immigrants to the territory of the EU (European Union), the migration crisis in Europe caused political discussions on immigration in Poland, with an emphasis on the proposal to relocate refugees. This resulted in the anti-immigrant attitude of the Polish society, which looked for threats to the messages coming from politicians that may arise from immigrants, in particular those from countries subject to armed conflict, both from the Middle East and the Middle East. and Africa, but also the inhabitants of eastern Ukraine fleeing the war. The attitude of refugees in Poland is closely related to the political situation and terrorist attacks in Europe, which translates into reluctance to accept refugees in Poland (Fechler, Cebul, Podgórzńska, 2017).

## **2 The attractiveness of the Polish labor market for immigrants**

Each foreigner has the right to undertake and conduct business activity in the form of partnerships (limited partnerships and limited joint-stock partnerships) or capital companies (with limited liability and joint stock companies). They can also join such companies and buy their stock. Foreigners living outside Poland may also register companies in our country. However, for executives, a work permit is required. Such a permit is needed for persons who, due to the performance of their function, stay in the territory of Poland for a total of 6 months within the next 12 months. Such migrants should apply for a temporary residence permit for the purpose of running a business. As stipulated in the provisions of the regulation from 2002, a work permit must be obtained by foreigners who work with the company's management board for more than 30 days in Poland (Fechler, Cebul, Podgórska, 2017).

The Act on foreigners also specifies in Art. 117 situations where a residence permit is refused in order to undertake economic activity. These are, for example, situations when we have a final judgment stating the commission of certain crimes, such as counterfeit or the processing of documents legalizing a stay or work. Poland's policy of issuing work permits for migrants has changed from the 1990s to the beginning of the 21st century. First, the legal definitions of a foreigner have changed. Initially, permits were issued for foreigners on the basis of the Act of December 29, 1989 on Employment, and later on Employment and Unemployment of October 16, 1991. Both of these acts described a foreigner as a person who did not have Polish citizenship or a residence card. Second, the licensing procedures and their liberalization have been simplified. Third, more and more migrants can work without permits (Andrejuk, 2017).

Immigration to Poland itself is a new phenomenon, initiated by the political and economic transformations in the early 1990s. For over two decades, the influx of migrants was relatively small. This state of affairs was not influenced too much by Poland's accession to the European Union or the Schengen area. According to the 2011 census data, there were 86 thousand people living in Poland. There were foreigners, thus less than 1% of the population. Most of the migrants stayed in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship and along the eastern border of Poland. The situation changed after 2013, when Ukrainian citizens started to visit us and immediately became the largest group of foreigners. Compared to 2013, and in 2018, a fourfold increase in their number was recorded. According to data from the Office for Foreigners, on January 1, 2018, 325,000 foreigners lived in Poland, of which approximately half were Ukrainians (Andrejuk, 2017).

At the end of the second decade of the 21st century, we can even talk about the Ukrainization of migration to Poland. Citizens from across the eastern border are the largest group of both permanent and non-permanent residents and temporary employees or foreign students. Among foreigners from outside Europe, the largest groups include citizens of Vietnam or the United States. In recent years,

there has also been an increase in the number of Indians, Chinese and Nepalese. Considering the countries of origin, groups of foreigners can be characterized. The first is the inhabitants of the former USSR, mainly Ukrainians, Belarusians, but also Russians, it is worth noting here an increasing number of people who stay permanently. The second are the citizens of the European Union. Their legal status is privileged due to the fact that I have unlimited access to the labor market. Here, first of all, we have highly qualified employees. The third group are residents of Asian countries. For many years, the Vietnamese have created a kind of migrant community in our country. It has extensive transnational and business contacts (Górny, Kindler, 2018).

In the context of the discussion on the process of stabilization of immigration to Poland, reference should be made to the scale of residence / settlement in Poland of foreigners. The growing importance of this process is indicated by the statistics on the issued residence cards. The number of permanent residence permits issued is still not high - in 2018 and 2019 it was below 15,000. per year - and long-term resident's residence permits do not exceed 2,000 for over 5 years. However, there is a noticeable dynamic increase in the annual residence cards issued annually, which constitute the first stage of stabilization as regards the right to stay in Poland. In 2019, almost 140 thousand. such cards, while in 2014 it was just over 40,000. The total number of holders of all types of residence cards in Poland exceeded 420,000. in 2019. One fifth of them can be considered settled migrants (e.g. holders of permanent residence cards), (Górny, Madej, Porwit, 2020).

A noticeable change with regard to the nature of foreigners' stay in Poland, it refers to their situation on the Polish labor market, and more precisely - the relative importance of individual documents authorizing them to work in Poland (work permits, declarations, seasonal work permits). In 2014, the share of work permits among these documents was approximately 10%, while in 2019 it was already 20%. At the same time, although the number of declarations registered in subsequent years was in this period by an order of magnitude higher than in the case of work permits, after 2017, the numerical differences between the two types of documents began to gradually decrease. It is also worth emphasizing that while in the case of declarations, the increase in the number of registered documents between 2014 and 2019 was slightly more than fourfold, in the case of permits it was almost tenfold.

### **3 The demand for work by migrants from Ukraine in Poland**

Ukrainian citizens today constitute the largest group of foreigners also in Poland. However, it is difficult to indicate exactly how numerous this environment is, and its characteristics are mainly economic, driven by the prism of the needs of the Polish labor market. Estimates of the number of Ukrainian citizens residing permanently or temporarily in the territory of the Republic of

Poland differ significantly. First of all, it is difficult to count people who do not have a permanent residence permit, therefore they return to Ukraine every few months to extend the possibility of staying in Poland and, after completing the formalities, return to the Republic of Poland. In addition to these data, there is also a comparatively small group of people who apply for refugee status. The matter is complicated by the fact that the vast majority of Ukrainians residing in Poland do not register with the institutions dealing with foreigners, because there is no such need - to achieve their residence purposes, they only need a temporary work permit, renewed many times. Therefore, official data do not match the estimates and make it difficult to properly analyze this large and important nationality group in Poland (Polko, 2018).

The literature on the subject, describing the migration of Ukrainian citizens to Poland and other Central European countries such as the Czech Republic or Hungary, often uses the concept of circular migration or incomplete migration. Incomplete migrants are defined as people who spend most of their time in the country of migration, and this is their main place of professional activity, but the money obtained in this way is the basis for the maintenance of relatives left in the country to whom they regularly send this money. Circular migration, on the other hand, characterizes these newcomers as staying and working in the territory of the Republic of Poland, but emotionally connected with their country of origin and considering it as their home. They most often work in the service sector (construction or domestic help) and become a model of migration for their next countrymen (Polko, 2018).

According to the 2011 National Census of Population and Housing, Poland was actually inhabited by 227.5 thousand people born in Ukraine (Brunarska, Grotte, Lesińska, 2012). Unfortunately, the adopted census methodology means that this number tells us little about the size of the Ukrainian community in Poland. It was assumed that the country of birth should be entered according to the borders of the current countries at the time of the census. Thus, in these 227.5 thousand all Poles born during the Second Polish Republic in the territories that were then part of Poland and are now within the borders of Ukraine are also included. More information is provided by the number of people living in Poland with Ukrainian citizenship or declaring Ukrainian national and ethnic identification. According to the 2011 census, there were 13.4 thousand people with Ukrainian citizenship (about a quarter of third-country nationals living in Poland). Ukrainian national and ethnic identification was declared during the census by 49,000 people (including 27 thousand as the only one, 10 thousand as the first, but not the only one, and 12 thousand as the second). From the point of view of the population of migrants from Ukraine in Poland, the most important seems to be the number of people with Ukrainian citizenship. Taking into account this variable, Ukrainians constitute the most numerous foreign group in Poland. Importantly, their number has more than doubled in the last decade (from 5.4 thousand according to the 2002 census), (Brunarska, Grotte, Lesińska, 2012).



The increase in the number of foreigners in Poland, observed since 2014, was also registered in 2016, when the survey was conducted. According to data from the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Policy, 127 thousand work permits for foreigners (an increase by 93.6% compared to 2015) and 1.3 million were registered. declarations of willingness to entrust work to a foreigner (increase by 68.0%). Also in 2017, a dynamic increase in the number of foreigners interested in working in Poland can be observed. Just 108,000 were spent in the first half of the year work permits (by 110.0% more than in the same period of 2016) and over 948 thousand statements (49.4% more than the year before), (Chmielewska, Dobroczynek, Panuciak, 2018).

Poland is the country where the largest number of Ukrainian citizens travels (Miszewski, 2018). As of June 11, 2017, Ukrainian citizens no longer need a visa to enter the territory of the European Union. However, this stay may not exceed 90 days and must be related to business, tourist or family purposes. However, the abolition of the visa requirement does not mean that Ukrainians have been released from the need to meet the other conditions set out in the Schengen Border Code. When taking up employment in Poland, they still have to apply for a work permit or submit a declaration of intention to work in Poland. In 2017, 192.5 thousand Ukrainian citizens obtained a work permit, and 1.7 million submitted a declaration about the intention to work in our country. However, it is estimated that between 1.2 and 1.5 million Ukrainians were employed in the latter group. However, it should be remembered that these data do not take into account the number of newcomers from beyond the Bug who work in Poland in the so-called gray area. The lack of detailed data on the actual number of Ukrainian citizens also results from the rotational nature of their migration to Poland. Recent years have seen an influx of Ukrainian citizens to our country.

After the easing of the visa regime for Ukrainian citizens in June 2017, experts expressed different opinions on how the changes would affect the scale of Ukrainian immigration. in Poland.

It can be concluded that these changes are noticeable, and the data for the first half of 2019 indicate that the migration of Ukrainian citizens from the Vistula River to more wealthy EU countries has significantly intensified. This can be evidenced by the data provided by the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Policy, which show that in the first six months of 2018, Labor Offices registered 692,000 jobs. employers' declarations about the employment of Ukrainian citizens, while in the corresponding period of 2017 there were as many as 904,000. (Miszewski, 2018).

## **Conclusion**

In recent years, Poland has been increasingly perceived as a country attracting economic migrants. As evidenced by, among others a significant increase in the number of migrants of Ukrainian origin. At the same time, it should

be noted that the migration processes involve citizens from virtually every corner of the world, not only from Europe.

The very phenomenon of migration has its positive and negative sides both for the state, from which citizens come and to the country that receives them. Among the positive factors for the country of origin, it is impossible to ignore the following: lowering unemployment rates, transfer of funds, investing in the country, lowering poverty rates. On the other hand, the negative ones: difficult to find new hands or keep the already employed, outflow of well-educated people, loss of human capital (the so-called brain drain), changes in the age and gender structure of the population.

Effects of migration on the host country: dissatisfaction of citizens about employment foreigners instead of native workers, cultural diversity of the society or the influx of specialists. A person leaving the country of origin in terms of earnings usually achieves higher earnings and a higher standard of living has the opportunity to improve qualifications or meet professional aspirations.

Migration can also have political implications. The uncontrolled influx of foreigners causes many problems with their placement and the reluctance of the native inhabitants. The threats related to the phenomenon of migration contributed to the emergence of populist movements. Populism can be treated as an ideology or a political strategy. In populism, it is important to identify the enemy who is responsible for the bad situation in the country. In populist thought, it is important to believe that society is permanently divided. Nationalist attitudes may also appear, manifesting themselves in placing the interests of one's own nation over the interests of other nations.

## References

- ANDREJU, K. 2017. *Ukrainian entrepreneurs in Poland*, IFiS PAN Publishing House, Warsaw 2017.
- BRUNARSKA, Z., GROTE, M., LESIŃSKA, M. 2012. *Migrations of Ukrainian citizens to Poland in the context of socio-economic development: current state, politics, money transfers*, Warsaw, 2012.
- CHMIELEWSKA, I., DOBROCZEK, G., PANUCIAK, A. 2018. *Citizens of Ukraine working in Poland - survey report*, Department of Statistics of the National Bank of Poland, Warsaw, 2018.
- GÓRNY, A., KINDLER, M. 2018. *Foreigners in Poland at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries*. In LESIŃSKA, M., OKÓLSKI, M., *25 lectures on migrations*, SCHOLAR 2018 Publishing House.
- GÓRNY, A., MADEJ, K., PORWIT, K. 2020. *Evolution or revolution ?*, Warsaw 2020.
- GOMÓŁKA, M. GAWRYCKA, A. 2019. *Employment of citizens from the former USSR countries in Poland*, Wyd. Adam Marszałek, Toruń, 2019.

- MISZEWSKI, M. 2018. New immigrants from Ukraine in Poland 5 years after the Revolution of Dignity. *In Immigrants from Ukraine in Poland. Needs and expectations*, Miszewski M., Wrocław, 2018.
- FECHLER, W., CEBUL, K., PODGÓRZAŃSKA, R. 2017. *Migracja, as a challenge for the European Union and selected member states*, Difin S.A. Warsaw, 2017, pp. 158-162.
- POLKO, P. 2018. Perception of security of Ukrainian citizens staying in Poland in the light of available research. *In Immigrants from Ukraine in Poland. Needs and expectations*, Wrocław, 2018.
- SZYMAŃSKA J. 2017. *Refugees in Europe*, Warsaw, 2017. Oficyna, publ. ASPRA-JR.

# THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS

Jelena Rajković<sup>1</sup> - Ana Jurčić<sup>2</sup>

## **ABSTRACT**

*Terrorism has direct and indirect effects on international business. It can be pointed out and noted that governments spend a lot on security in the country, companies have become vulnerable to terrorist targets, and with significant implications for the business and performance of multinational companies. Direct damage is related to the destruction of infrastructure, equipment and lives of individuals, but indirect damage is related to reduced customer demand, increased costs of international companies, disruptions in international supply chains, reduced foreign direct investment and new government regulations and procedures to prevent new threats. Terrorism creates new barriers at the level of international trade and investment, such as national and supranational counterterrorism policies, regulations and procedures. Advanced communication technology, trade liberalization, investment and finance have increased the scope for unauthorized action beyond the control of the government. New forms of action by terrorist organizations are based on global networking and the Internet. It is known that terrorist organizations already routinely use the Internet for the purpose of spreading propaganda or internal communication. Internet-based attacks are commonly known as components of "cybercrime". Today, the use of global networks allows easy and cheap communication between companies, governments, academia, individuals and all other stakeholders and is very well established*

**Key words:** terrorism, international Business, cyber terrorism, security

## **1 The impact of terrorism on the international business**

Terrorism has direct and indirect effects on international business. It can be pointed out and noted that governments spend a lot on security in the country, companies have become vulnerable to terrorist targets, and with important implications for the operations and performance of multinational companies (Moruff, Adeniyi, 2014, pp. 247). Direct damage is related to the destruction of infrastructure, equipment and lives of individuals, but indirect damage is related to reduced customer demand, increased costs of international companies, disruptions in international supply chains, declining foreign direct investment *and* new government regulations and procedures designed to prevent new hazards as discussed by Spich and Grosse (2005) and Ketata and McIntyre, (2008).

---

<sup>1</sup>Jelena Rajković, Msc, School of engineering management, University Union Nikola Tesla, Bulevar vojvode Mišića 43, Belgrade, Serbia, j.rajkovic24@gmail.com

<sup>2</sup> Ana Jurčić, doc. dr., School of engineering management, University Union Nikola Tesla, Bulevar vojvode Mišića 43, Belgrade, Serbia

Terrorism creates new barriers at the level of international trade and investment, such as national and supranational counterterrorism policies, regulations and procedures (Spich, Groose, 2005, pp. 460). Advanced communication technology, trade liberalization, investment, and finance have increased the spaces in which unauthorized action can flourish beyond government control (Akbar, 2004, pp. 28). Just as openness serves to empower national economies and individual firms, it also makes them more vulnerable to external forces (Spich, Grosse, 2005, pp. 461).

Free trade encourages consumption opportunities and an increase in living standards, but also facilitates the activities of security-threatening entities (Czinkota et al., 2010, pp. 830). Various polls suggest companies have increased security budgets to defend against possible terrorist-related threats. Terrorism seems to play a significant role in decision-making on the selection of international markets (Wernick, 2006, pp. 62). Nations have taken a number of initiatives to improve security in key systems, particularly in international transport infrastructure, logistics, communications and information technology, they point out (Czinkota et al., 2010, pp. 831). Various government programs educate companies on disaster avoidance, security management, emergency planning and response, and providing loans and guarantees to companies affected by terrorism (Czinkota et al., 2010, pp. 831).

Terrorism has goals aimed at doing business in conflict zones. International companies will be less guided by foreign direct investment in certain areas that are targets of terrorists. The economic situation within the affected country may deteriorate, leading to dissatisfaction and perhaps even rebellion, making the declared goals of terrorists more acceptable and reasonable. The greater the expected effects of company-related terrorists, the more likely they are to take action. Companies are attractive targets because they can be located almost anywhere and therefore they are very difficult to protect. Moreover, private companies must provide and finance their own protection. They have to hire commercial security companies and have to install expensive equipment by raising their production costs (Moruff, Adeniyi, 2014, pp. 248).

The main goal of terrorists is to destroy the morale of the people and the security forces and create panic by intimidating people and the target society. The target area of terrorists in Nigeria, for example, includes churches, schools, shopping malls, restaurants, cafes where crowds gather. The second goal of terror is to shake the authority of the state by humiliating public institutions, security forces and other institutions in the eyes of public opinion (Varol, 2007, Moruff, Adeniyi, 2014, pp. 249). Terrorist organizations try to force the government and realize their aspirations by instilling fear in the public through violence and tension.

Terrorism has become a defining problem of 21st century international

politics. The rapid deterioration of security in parts of the Middle East and Africa has greatly contributed to the significant increase in overall terrorist attacks. The size and diversity of an economy has much to do with a country's ability to withstand terrorist attacks without showing significant economic effects. In a developed economy, such losses may have a temporary impact as resources are reallocated to other sectors or better security measures are in place to address problems. In addition, developed economies have better monetary and fiscal capabilities to limit the macroeconomic impacts of terrorist attacks than those small developing countries (Kinyah Joy, 2014, pp. 8).

The cost of terrorism is very expensive for multinational companies. From an economic perspective, multinational corporations have a wide range of significant operating costs, both fixed and variable. Fixed cost includes improving the physical security of a company's staff, assets, plant and equipment located in areas and zones where the incidence and likelihood of terrorism against a multinational company, its employees and assets is well above average risk. Due to the uncertainty of terrorism and other geopolitical disturbances, international companies bear the costs of insuring against political risk (Kinyah Joy, 2014, pp. 20).

Political risk can be managed more effectively if companies spend resources that strengthen the positive reputation of foreign locations. International companies can use the risk modeling method to manage terrorism risk. Computer models determine the likelihood of a terrorist attack and the expected level of damage through statistics, engineering, and other technical procedures (O'Brien, 2000 in Kinyah Joy, 2014, pp. 21).

International companies require managers in global business who not only understand business theory and practice, but also understand risk modeling (Kinyah Joy, 2014: 21). Based on the research, it was concluded that terrorist attacks and threats reduced the profits and normal operation of the operations of multinational companies. Research is showed that is internationally business investment multinational companies were affected by the level of terrorist acts in the country states Kinyah Joy (2014: 43-44).

## **1.1 New forms of terrorist action organization**

New forms of action by terrorist organizations are based on global networking and the Internet. It is known that terrorist organizations already routinely use the Internet for the purpose of spreading propaganda or conducting internal communication. Internet-based attacks are commonly known as components of "*cyber crime*". Sometimes the perpetrators in this area are often young hackers, who are eager to experiment with security issues and who are curious about technology. In the meantime, however, that situation has changed. Instead of experimenting with young, highly organized

groups using attacks as a source of income, war is waged by computer.

Terrorists primarily aim to create fear, create economic confusion or discriminate against a political opponent. Apart from these main motives, generating cash income or gathering information can also be a target of *cybercrime*. However, in many cases it is difficult to define the difference between *cybercrime* and *cyber terrorism* because it depends on the motive attacks.

Computer espionage offers a huge range of data theft possibilities. This includes *cybercrime* related to all forms of illegal activities such as: manipulation of computer operations, illegal actions against security computer systems, infiltration of computer viruses, *hacking*, piracy, computer espionage, computer sabotage, computer fraud and theft of computer services, etc. (Kolev et al., 2015, pp. 49).

*Hacking* refers to the illegal, unauthorized intrusion into computer systems for the purpose of obtaining exclusive documents and data. Hacking is a type of Internet crime. Today, there are situations in which it is heard through the media how certain hackers broke into someone's computer system. It should be noted that software, ie computer espionage is externally efficient penetration into computer devices by acquiring intellectual property by copying programs that have a license, and forwarding them to competition or incompetent individuals (Bazdan, 2016, pp. 62).

## **2 Hacking and industrial espionage as preconditions for theft data**

Attacks targeting other IT systems can serve a variety of purposes. Often, the first goal will be to gain access to a computer system. The protection and security of business data today is completely unavoidable and is part of data and information management. Due to the high importance of data, it is necessary to take all relevant steps to protect them. Information and data are an extremely important resource today, and data theft or embezzlement is possible. Protection is a special way of storing data and information that aims to prevent the loss of content in the action of presumed sources and ways of endangering (Hutinski, 1990, pp. 38).

If the data is to be reused, it is important to preserve it, but protection is also needed in terms of theft. In today's business and electronic age, verification and maximum data protection are necessary. It is necessary to protect valuable information, both with physical and digital protection, to control access to sensitive data, to monitor and restrict access, to monitor the movements of those who possess valuable information about the organization (Barger, Dial, 2014, pp. 9).

At the very beginning, it can be pointed out that today electronic data is exposed to various misuse and theft, so the aim is to build security mechanisms to protect it. Therefore, it is important to preserve business data

in a way that ensures the procedures for their valid protection. Important data must be protected to prevent the theft and even espionage or theft of private users' data.

However, *cybercrime* also affects businesses. Today there is an information war and the priority of companies is the protection of information if they have valuable information, and their goal is to sabotage competition. The war for any information means a significant aspiration and struggle to obtain relevant information on time, and information is an endangered subject and the main weapon used by companies (Javorović, Bilandžić, 2007, pp.56).

Cyberspace is easy to hack. The history of hacking (gaining unauthorized access to a computer or network and then creating computer systems that perform certain functions against the wishes of the computer owner) is almost the same as the history of computers (Baldi et al., 2003, pp. 15).

Typical forms of hacker attacks include electronic and virtual blockades, automated email bombing, viruses, fraudulent websites, and occasional computer system burglaries (Baldi et al. 2003: 26). Several governments have begun to view politicized hacking as a potential threat. For example, the UK Terrorism Act 2000 defines terrorism as: "the use or threat of an action seriously designed to interfere with or seriously disrupt an electronic system. With the spread of the Internet, societies are becoming increasingly dependent on information infrastructures and services in these areas (Baldi et al., 2003, pp. 29-30).

The cost of setting up a cyber-attack is almost trivial compared to the cost of building, implementing, and running the necessary defenses (Baldi et al., 2003, pp. 35). The international legal form enables the legalization of methods, techniques and tools, such as online forensics, which are available in the event of an attack (Antoliš, 2010, pp. 122).

Under the understanding of industrial espionage (English espionage, corporate espionage, German Industriespionage, Konkurrenzausspähung) implies the illegal action of economic entities (companies, institutions) on the accumulation of economic data in order to obtain new and added value (Cosic-Dragan, 2008, pp. 66).

Industrial espionage means that the government has nothing to do with entities that carry out unauthorized activities. Therefore, it is not supported by state government institutions. The methods used in industrial espionage are very similar to the methods of intelligence services, and differ depending on technological and human characteristics. In the newly created business environment, checking for competitive moves has become a huge business (Crane, 2010: 2). It involves a situation where an organization spies on another to steal its trade secrets or other protected information.

Industrial espionage gathers key information by applying illegal and unethical steps. It contributes to savings that would otherwise be necessary to



invest in our own research and development, which is unreliable and far-reaching. Otherwise, espionage can be viewed from two aspects. The first refers to the political aspect, and the second to the legal aspect (Bazdan, 2016, pp. 53).

The political aspect can refer to the collection of data that someone is hiding, while in the other aspect, the legal one, it is a procedure that has its own legal legislation, ie it is a criminal offense of espionage. Espionage is used as a tool to illegally attack closed sources that account for two to three percent of the required data. Therefore, it is a criminal act of espionage - conspiratorial use of individuals (Bazdan, 2016, pp. 53). Namely, it is a very risky business and activities. If such perpetrators are discovered, they can be held accountable for industrial espionage, as an act for which they can be punished, in a final court proceeding, with both fines and imprisonment. Industrial espionage has become an important factor for many economies. As for electronic espionage directed against digital information, the boundaries between the activities of individual hackers, organized groups and factions sponsored by the state are becoming increasingly blurred.

There are numerous cases of industrial espionage, but two can be mentioned:

- **The case of the last double Cold War spy;** It's about the American Aldrich "Ricku" Ames (1941), ex counterintelligence and analyst CIA

e. In 1994 he was accused and convicted of spying for the USSR since 1985, and after 1992 of the Russian Federation. He is considered to be the top paid spy in US history. He charged the Russians \$ 4.6 million for confidential military and economic information and for "ticking" secret agents infiltrated by the CIA into the intelligence community of the USSR and the Russian Federation. After that, all the detachments were liquidated. To date, the CIA has not been able to find out the bank and bank account to which most of the money was deposited. A. Ames endures for life prisoner.

- **The case of Formula 1 world champions - McLaren and Renault;** That industrial espionage is "big business" is mentioned in the following data: In 2007, McLaren was sanctioned with \$ 100 million with the confiscation of all so-called construction points for 2007. This happened after the International Automobile Federation (FIA) established that they illegally obtained secret data from Ferrari's technical documentation. It was later revealed that between September 2006 and October 2007, Renault illegally obtained McLaren's trade secrets, together with information relating to: design, innovation, testing, research and development and the 2007 McLaren Car Racing Strategy. (Bazdan, 2011, pp. 114-115).

A trade secret is any individual form and category of payment, operational, scientific, technical, economic or technological data, together with forms, plans, procedures, frameworks, or codes, regardless of how they

are stored, structured, structured or preserved, electronic, graphic , pictures or written - if: (1) the owner has taken all relevant activities to maintain secrecy and (2) if the information represents an independent economic value, current or possible, or if it is not generally known and was not present to the public in any way Anderson, 2009: 56).

This law from the USA, in particular, defines intelligence activities that are illegal and unethical, and they are:

- illegal intrusions into other people's information networks,
- listening to telephone conversations,
- false representation or camouflage for the purpose of obtaining the ownership of classified information,
- offering bribes, indemnification or supporting a company in exchange for classified information (Bazdan, 2011, pp. 115).

The law was set up for the reason that many companies have been involved in similar espionage activities, as mentioned above, but it was passed in the same way, also because of foreign governments. The goal of setting the law was exclusively focused on defining large penalties, even at the level of the criminal offense of economic terrorism. Therefore, a person who collects secret economic information about public and private economic capacities in the United States for the benefit of a foreign government may be punished with either a fine or imprisonment. punishment.

It is significant to emphasize that the preferred weapon of economic diplomacy is industrial espionage, which aims at intellectual property. However, it is relevant to establish the difference between industrial espionage between individual companies and economic espionage (Bazdan, 2010, pp. 414).

Of course, in order for a certain espionage to be economic and thus considered important, it is important to have the appropriate support of the government. It is clear that if a company tries to steal data from another company, from the research and development part, it must necessarily have the support of the government. So the government must stand behind it. If data are collected from open sources, then it can be pointed out that it is the activity of the business intelligence service of the subsidiary unit or the center of the business intelligence service set up in the base corporation. If, however, data are collected from closed sources, then we are talking about industrial espionage (Bazdan, 2016: 57).

## **2.1 Cyber terrorism**

Today, the use of global networks allows easy and cheap communication between companies, governments, academia, individuals and all other stakeholders and are very well established. However, global

networks have also enabled crimes and terrorist acts. It seems inevitable that in the future global networks will become a theater of war (Baldi et al., 2003, pp. 7).

*Cyber* terrorism as a concept has different definitions, mainly because security experts have their own definition. This term can be defined as the use of information technology by terrorist groups or individuals to achieve their goals. This may include the use of information technology and the undertaking of attacks against networks, computer systems and telecommunications infrastructures, and the performance of electronic threats (Bogdanovski, Petreski, 2013, pp. 59). The threat can manifest in many ways, such as hacking computer systems, programming viruses, attacking websites, conducting DoS (*Denial of service*) attacks and conducting attacks via electronic communications (Bogdanovski, Petreski, 2013, pp. 60).

In recent years, an increasing number of *cyber* attacks on political targets, critical infrastructure and the websites of commercial corporations have been visible. These attacks, which are also gaining increasing international attention, have been committed by states (which do not take responsibility for them), groups of hackers (such as *Anonymous*), criminal organizations and other hackers (ICT, 2016, pp. 24).

The first use of the Internet for terrorist purposes was the expansion of organizational and ideological doctrines. Terrorist groups use the internet to raise funds. The fundraising network is built on a voluntary basis, NGOs and other financial institutions. To recruit followers, they form their own *websites*, profiles on social networks, etc. Analyzing social networks helps to reveal group dynamics, patterns and collective actions of organizations (Wu, et al., 2014).

According to the author Zirojević Fatić (2014, pp. 68), the abuse of the Internet by terrorists can be threefold: as a weapon (*cyber* terrorism), as a way of communication among activists and as a medium for addressing the public. This is how *Cyber* terrorism and *cyber warfare* can be explained first: With the help of modern Internet weapons, terrorists can overload telephone and mobile lines with special programs, disable air traffic control and computers designed to control and operate other modes of traffic. Also, special programs that apply and use large financial institutions, hospitals and other emergency services can be coded and the formula for making medicines in the factory, etc. can be changed. encrypted *messages* . According to the author, previous analyzes of *the websites* of terrorist organizations are inspired by the prevailing theory of terrorism in communication studies, the "stage of terror" theory according to which terrorism is theater.

Societies have learned that no technology is perfect and that every technology leads to unpredictable side effects that need to be managed in the future. The Internet has largely been used to steal data, identity and similar

forms of misuse, as well as a global communication platform. What is particularly worrying is the misuse of the Internet by terrorists. A significant problem today is *cyber* terrorism (Antoliš, 2010, pp. 127).

According to Baldi et al. (2003, pp. 34) A possible definition of terrorism related to cyberspace was set out in the FBI's paper on *cyber* -terrorism: *Cyber* -terrorism is a pre-election, politically motivated attack on information, computer systems, computer programs and data resulting from violence against non-combat objectives of subnational groups or secret agents. It is known that hackers from around the world continue to direct their facilities to their own, as well as foreign governments, soldiers, nuclear power plants and others. To date, most terrorist activities have involved the use of explosives. Such attacks attracted a large amount of media attention. *Cybercriminals* work for financial gain, for example, credit card theft and misuse. Unlike *cyber* criminals, *cyber* terrorists are not interested in stealing credit cards but in:

- achieving a global and highly visible media attention
- impact on economic systems
- destabilizing civilian life and creating panic
- creating an asymmetric war against the law and government agency
- reducing confidence in the government's ability to protect its own population
- leveraging all the successes of the above to gain new support for their actions (Baldi et al., 2003, pp. 34).

*Cyber* terrorism has an impact on the physical world: data, databases, networks, computers, satellites, data centers, telecommunications, etc. Such systems are essential in the operation of critical infrastructures, emergency services, military activities, hospitals, etc. (Baldi et al., 2003, pp. 34).

Table 3 Global number of *cyber* security incidents in 2017, sorted by industry and organization size

	Large	Small	Unknown	Total
Total	24,505	961	27,842	53,308
Unknown	1,043	9	17,521	18,573
Entertainment	6	19	7,163	7,188
Information	54	76	910	1,040
Finance	74	74	450	598
Healthcare	165	152	433	750
Professional	158	59	323	540
Public	22,429	51	308	22,788
Education	42	26	224	292
Retail	56	111	150	317
Manufacturing	375	21	140	536
Other Services	5	11	46	62
Transportation	15	9	35	59
Accommodation	40	296	32	368
Utilities	14	8	24	46
Real Estate	2	5	24	31
Mining	3	3	20	26
Trade	13	5	13	31
Administrative	7	15	11	33
Construction	2	11	10	23
Agriculture	1	0	4	5
Management	1	0	1	2

Source: Statista, available at:  
<https://www.statista.com/statistics/194246/cyber-crime-incidents-victim-industry-size>

The statistics in Table 3 show the number of online security incidents worldwide in 2017, sorted by industry and organization size. That year, the

entertainment industry had a total of 7,188 cyber security incidents, the IT industry 1,040, the healthcare industry 750 and the financial industry 598. The largest number of *cyber* incidents during 2017 was recorded in public institutions, specifically in 22,788.

## Conclusion

Terrorism has a direct impact on the economy of any country and directly and indirectly affects a number of industries. Terrorism in modern business is the subject of many research papers and expert analyzes where it has been established that terrorism has an indirect impact on internationalization, international business and the success of the business itself. It can be concluded that companies need to constantly evaluate uncertainty triggered by terrorism and take special measures to reduce such risk. In essence, corporations today seek to include the impact of terrorism (as one of several key issues of international stability) in their strategic planning. A literature review of this research provided conclusions on recognizing the impact of terrorism and risk on international cooperation and business of various corporations.

Also, it should be emphasized that given the role and importance of information today, business information and data should be protected whether it is protection on a computer system or in the physical space where there is access to a particular database. Data can be stolen by industrial or economic espionage, and various tools are used for this purpose. Today, cybercrime is extremely present and should be protected from proper programs and employee education

## References

- ADENIYI, M. O., MORUFF S. O. 2014. Effects of Terrorism on the International Business in Nigeria, *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, Vol. 4, No.7 (1), 2014.
- AKBAR, Y. 2004. Historical forces in international affairs and commerce: Prospects for the international economy. In SUDER, G. (Ed.), *Terrorism and the international business environment: The security-business nexus: 25–42*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2004.
- ANTOLIŠ, K. 2010. Internet forensics and *cyber* terrorism, *Police and Security*, Vol.19 No.1/2010, pp. 121-128.
- BALDI, S., GELBSTEIN, G., KURBALIJA, J. 2003. *Hactivism, Cyber-terrorism and Cyberwar the Activities of the Uncivil Society in Cyberspace*, Malta: DiploFoundation, 2003
- BARGER, K. A., DIAL, A. 2014. *Preventing Corporate Espionage:*

- Investigations, Data Analyzes and Business Intelligence, *Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton*, pp. 1-18, 2014.
- BAZDAN, Z. 2011. Economic diplomacy and pathological trends of the global economy. Case study: Republic of Croatia, *Business Excellence: a scientific journal for promotion culture qualities and business excellence*, Vol.5 No.1 2011
- BOGDANOVSKI, M., PETRESKI, D. 2010. Cyber Terrorism – Global Security Threat, *International Scientific Defense, Security and Peace Journal*, Crane A. In the company of spies: when competitive intelligence gathering becomes industrial espionage, Paper published in *Business Horizons* 2010 48,  
<available at: [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=1031932](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1031932)>
- CZINKOTA, MR, KNIGHT, G., LIESCH, PW, STEEN, J. 2010. Terrorism and international business: A research agenda, *Journal of International Business Studies*, 41/2010, pp. 826– 843
- ĆOSIĆ-DRAGAN, D., 2008. Business and Reporting, *National security and the future* , Vol.9., No.1-2.2008.
- HUTINSKI, Ž. 1990. Approach to the construction of subsystems for storage and protection of data and information, *Journal of Information and Organizational Sciences* , No.14. 35-46. 1990
- International Institute for Counter - Terrorism, *Cyber-Terrorism Activities Report No. 16 January - March 2016*, 2016.
- JAVOROVIĆ, B., BILANDŽIĆ, M. 2007. *Business information and business intelligence* . Zagreb: Golden marketing - Tehnička knjiga, 2007
- KETATA, I., MCINTYRE, J. 2008. Corporate social responsibility as a new orientation in response to crisis management of sea changes and dead reckoning. In G. Suder (Ed.), *International business under adversity*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2008.
- KINYAH JOY, M. 2014. *The Impacts of Terrorism Acts on International Business Investment Decisions by Multinational Companies Operating in Kenya*, School Of Business University Of Nairobi, 2014.
- KOLEV, D., NASTIĆ, D., JAKUPOVIĆ, S. 2015. Socio-demographic characteristics of the perpetrators of cybercrime in Serbia, *Moć komunikacije*, 2015.
- O'BRIEN, K. L., LEICHENKO, R. L. 2000. Double exposure: assessing the impacts of climate change within the context of economic globalization. *Global Environmental Change*, 2000.
- SPICH, R., GROSSE, R. 2005. How does homeland security affect US firms' international competitiveness? *Journal of International Management*, 11 (4): 457–478., 2005

# DISINFORMATION AS A THREAT AND CHALLENGE FOR MUNICIPALITIES AND THEIR COMPETENCIES<sup>1</sup>

**Silvia Ručinská<sup>2</sup> - Ondrej Mital<sup>3</sup> -  
Miroslav Fečko<sup>4</sup> - Katarína Miňová<sup>5</sup>**

## **ABSTRACT**

*The constant increase in citizens' demands for the quality, quantity and complexity of public services is currently confronted with several challenges of local government, one of which is the spread of disinformation and hoaxes. Municipalities and cities can thus become a target of this current security threat, where disinformation can directly disrupt the execution of municipal competencies. The study examines, with the use of case study method, disinformation that aims to spread false information or to harm the execution of municipal competences. Altogether eight cases of disinformation between 2018 and 2021 were analysed. The main finding is based on the statement that the municipalities are not only the target of disinformation activities, but municipalities, mainly members of city councils must be also perceived as the creators of disinformation. Simultaneously, the benefit of the study is also associated with fostering an interest in the examined issues of disinformation in the area of local self-government.*

**Key words:** *disinformation, municipality, municipal competences, public policymaking, local self-government, information and communication technologies*

## **Introduction**

The principle of subsidiarity and strong preference to realize important competencies by cities and municipalities, the decentralized execution of public administration competencies is typical for contemporary democratic states governed by the rule of law (European Commission, 2017; Koprič, 2017; Council of European Municipalities and Regions, 2013). The citizens consider the

---

<sup>1</sup>The article is created as a result of a project supported by the Scientific grant agency of the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport of the Slovak Republic and the Slovak Academy of Sciences, Grant no: 1/0734/22.

<sup>2</sup> Silvia Ručinská, doc. Ing. PhD., associate professor, Pavol Jozef Šafárik University in Košice, Faculty of Public Administration, Popradská 66, Košice, 04011, Slovakia, [silvia.rucinska@upjs.sk](mailto:silvia.rucinska@upjs.sk)

<sup>3</sup> Ondrej Mital', PhDr. PhD., assistant professor, Pavol Jozef Šafárik University in Košice, Faculty of Public Administration, Popradská 66, Košice, 04011, Slovakia, [ondrej.mital@upjs.sk](mailto:ondrej.mital@upjs.sk)

<sup>4</sup> Miroslav Fečko, PhDr. PhD., assistant professor, Pavol Jozef Šafárik University in Košice, Faculty of Public Administration, Popradská 66, Košice, 04011, Slovakia, [miroslav.fecko@upjs.sk](mailto:miroslav.fecko@upjs.sk)

<sup>5</sup> Katarína Miňová, Mgr. PhD., assistant professor, Pavol Jozef Šafárik University in Košice, Faculty of Public Administration, Popradská 66, Košice, 04011, Slovakia, [katarina.minova@upjs.sk](mailto:katarina.minova@upjs.sk)



municipality level as the nearest to their everyday life needs and it is one of the reasons for the ambition of local self-government to constantly improve the execution of competencies in the context of democratic governance and serving the public interest. Democratic governance is a system in which citizens participate in government planning and decision-making while public administration organizations respond to citizens' needs with the high level of accountability and transparency (Reddy et al., 2015). These efforts are mostly connected with the concept of Good Governance, which describes the attitude to prioritize public interest at all levels of government, when citizens have possibilities to participate in policymaking, public goods and services are rightly targeted, human rights are respected and functioning of local self-government is transparent (Mital, 2022; Hopkins, 2013; Agere, 2000).

Regarding the permanent growth of citizens' demands at the municipal level, the execution of municipal competencies is constantly influenced by various challenges, such as sound financial management, transparency and openness, engagement of citizens, crisis management, eGovernment, digital transformation, as well as package of ambitions called European Green Deal. The ability of municipalities to improve their own interorganizational functioning also facilitate higher quality of services and standards of living in given territory (Ručinská and Fečko, 2020). Summing it up, local self-government helps to mitigate negative impacts of contemporary societal challenges.

## **1 The execution of municipal competencies and its electronization**

Information and communication technologies have affected our society at least three decades, but their impacts on human activities have grown enormously especially in last 10 years. Their impacts on individuals and communities is the main factor of development, progress and innovation (Zölde, 2018). Exponential rise of new technologies caused by recent development of social media, smartphones, WebGIS, and other devices make participation, interaction and collaboration in real time possible (Lin, 2018). The application and use of highly sophisticated Web based applications at local level corresponds with the decentralization process that is constantly leading to the revolution in municipalities to citizen relationships and has potential to improve the functioning of municipalities (Bolívar, 2017; Bónsón et al., 2012; Reddick and Aikins, 2012). The execution of municipal competences and its electronization seems to be more important challenge than ever before. In this sense, electronization of public administration and local self-government is mostly discussed within the processes of digital transformation. The impacts of digital progress are reflected in the transformation of our society, economies and execution of public administration's roles and functions (European Commission, 2018). There is a need to strengthen the transformation of public administrations and to ensure citizens have easy, trusted, and seamless access to public services.

The application of information and communication technologies has positive impacts on the execution of municipal competencies. New technologies have created alternative platforms for innovative policymaking and cooperative solutions when execution of municipal competences is possible without bureaucratic rules or restrictions (Mergel, 2015). Information and communication technologies, as a low-cost solution, have been discussed from the beginning of their implementation in the sphere of public administration, because their main benefit is to support transparency, openness, and participation of citizens in policymaking through the unique dialogue (Lnenicka and Nikiforova, 2021; K. Janssen, 2011; Shim and Eom, 2008).

Electronic execution of municipal competencies cannot be perceived as the best-known tool that has potential to solve current local self-government's issues. In this sense, various contradictory and negative impact on society must be outlined. Previous research revealed mutual relationship between social and economic conditions, the level of used technologies and potential positive impact on participation and engagement of citizens (Mano, 2021; Jho and Song, 2015). According to **O. Filipec** (2018), technologies could be the source of prosperity, but simultaneously technologies could be misused as a tool of control and as a weapon. In this sense, mainly social media (Facebook, Twitter) represent strong tool, which could easily influence the decisions of individuals. Modern technologies help to create hyperconnected society mainly through the existence of various applications and networks, what leads to the emergence of new challenges, such as cyber security, social networks security, changes in behaviour and decision-making of an individual in virtual and true social reality (Miňová, 2020). Over the past years, the new issue has been raised with focus on providing, searching and sharing of information. The battle against disinformation has become important element of information literacy. The issue of information disorder can be characterized as one of the biggest challenges for contemporary democracies.


## **2 Disinformation phenomenon – consequences, impacts and forms**

Disinformation has many negative consequences. Disinformation includes false information, creates distrust in media and supports the existence of harmful conspiracy theories. Disinformation is affecting states' responses to various challenges by undermining trust, amplifying fears, and sometimes leading to harmful behaviours (OECD, 2020). However, the most decisive negative consequence of disinformation is its potential to undermine democracy and secondly trust in municipalities. In this sense, public administration at all levels of government must combat this very specific and brand-new phenomenon.

From a behavioural and cognitive standpoint, the wave of disinformation contributes to an information overload in our society that can crowd out important and truthful information (Stevenson, 2020). Disinformation is very specific term

which is also very closely connected with other similar terms. The most relevant and cited clarification was provided by **C. Wardle and H. Derakshan (2017)** who defined misinformation, disinformation and malinformation with the focus on harm and falseness of the content.

False information with potential harmful impacts can be described through the various types of disinformation. According to **B. Collins et al. (2020)** types of disinformation are clickbait, propaganda, satire and parody, hoaxes and others, such as name-theft or framing. **H. Allcott and M. Gentzkow (2017)** created classification, which includes following types of misinformation and disinformation, unintentional reporting mistakes, rumours that do not originate from a particular news article, conspiracy theories, satire that is unlikely to be misconstrued as factual, false statements by politicians and reports that are slanted or misleading but not outright false. Using the words of **C. Wardle (2017)** seven types of misinformation and disinformation can be defined, mainly satire or parody, misleading content, imposter content, fabricated content, false connection, false context, manipulated context. The phenomenon of disinformation is very complex, and this statement was also confirmed by the **K. Santos-D'Amorim and M. Miranda (2020)** who defined 16 types of dis/mis/mal-information (Picture 1). Due to limited space, the ambition of this study is not to provide exhausting view on the meaning of the word disinformation. However, for the purpose of this study, disinformation is information with false content, which can cause any harm to the execution of municipal competencies.



## Picture 1: Practical incidences about mis-, dis-, mal-information

Source: Santos-D'Amorim and Miranda (2020)

Based on abovementioned, disinformation is mostly created intentionally. In this sense, individuals and organizations have various motives that leads them to construct and share false or harmful information. According to the European Commission (2020) disinformation are created for the profit or to deceive the public. These two main motives are the most frequently discussed by the various scholars (Levak, 2020; Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017). Sometimes, the ambition of disinformation or their creators is just to evolve problems in society (Wardle, 2019).

Disinformation can take several types, but the consequences of this kind of informational activities on the execution of municipal competences can be described as the main challenge for local governments. Each type of disinformation must be perceived as a real or potential threat for municipalities and the execution of their competencies. Disinformation undeniably can be described as a threat, especially due to the content that can influence individuals' beliefs and their decisions, and outgrow into a wider societal impact (Han, et al. 2019). The growing prevalence of disinformation are sometimes fuelled both by States and non-State actors (OSCE, 2017). States can also contribute the spreading of disinformation if there is no relevant mechanism to fight with them.

Different disinformation have affected behaviour of individuals in recent years, such as false or harmful information during elections (Cantarella et al., 2020; Faris et al., 2017), environmental disinformation (Benegal and Scruggs, 2018; Naderer, B. et al. 2017) as well as Covid-19 pandemic and vaccination disinformation (Gottlieb and Dyer, 2020; Steffens et al., 2019). Simultaneously, local self-governments and the execution of their competencies is also threatened by the phenomenon of disinformation.

### 3 Methods

Theoretical base of this study is composed of relevant scientific papers as well as international documents processed by international organizations. The study has an ambition to realize preliminary research and investigate the occurrence of the disinformation in the Slovak Republic's conditions, mainly local self-government. In this sense, the study investigates the use of disinformation which aims to spread incorrect information on the execution of municipal competences.

The study aims to answer the research question whether the execution of municipal competences is the target of disinformation activities. More precisely, the study examines, with the use of case study method, disinformation that aims to spread false information or to harm the execution of municipal competences. Altogether eight cases of disinformation between 2018 and 2021 were analysed.

The case studies represent the appropriate tool, which was used to demonstrate how various types of disinformation influence the execution of municipal competences. Each of eight case studies include description of background information, content of disinformation, creator of disinformation, target of disinformation, frequency of disinformation activity, as well as description of platforms which were used to spread and refute disinformation.

In the paper, the methods of content analysis, abstraction, comparison and synthesis were involved. Content analysis was used to analyse the content of disinformation. Comparisons were made between selected cases of disinformation with focus on selected methodology. Abstraction was used in the context of filtering those aspects of selected cases, which were relevant for our research. The method of synthesis was used to systematize new ideas based on our research, as well as to draw conclusions resulting from the analysis.

## **4 Results**

Several case studies have been analysed focusing on the false information and potential harm caused by disinformation in the Slovak Republic's conditions. The structure of the case studies reflects the chosen methodology.

### **Petržalka - private garage house at Vavilovova Street**

False information was used during online voting in Petržalka, the city district of Bratislava. In the year 2021, citizens had an opportunity to decide whether they want private garage house in their neighbourhood at Vavilovova Street. Unknown individuals were trying to question the voting process through the false emails, which included information that the citizens can vote multiple times. Fraudulent emails had the same visual as the automatic responses sent by the city district. Simultaneously, printed posters in the streets were replaced or modified. However, according to the official statement of the city district, the voting system registers only the last voting preference of every citizen (Petržalka, 2021). The target of disinformation was the city district of Bratislava, which ambition was to involve the citizens in the policymaking. Fraudulent emails were sent repeatedly. Petržalka representatives reacted through the information on the official website and official social media pages.

### **Bratislava - financial management in a city organization**

Disinformation with focus on bad financial management had been spread in the case of The City Forest in Bratislava, an organisation crated within the Slovak Republic's capital city Bratislava management. Creator of the disinformation signed with common name accused the city via an e-mail of an ineffective use of public finances. Disinformation included false information about expensive purchases, inefficient maintenance of forests and staff redundancy. Emails sent by anonymous creator regularly contained

disinformation that verbally attacked organization management, members of city council and their families (Bratislava.dnes24.sk, 2020). Bratislava tried to refute this disinformation through the social media pages, various informational websites, but there were also criminal complaints because of verbal attacks on family members.

### **Košice - fines in the public transport vehicles**

A big number of disinformation has been focused on Covid-19 pandemic and vaccination during last two years. Regarding the face mask restrictions, the city of Košice was the target of disinformation. False report talked about the fines for not wearing a mask in the public transport vehicles. Anonymous social media profile blamed city for the collection of fines. The city of Košice argued, through their official social media page, that municipalities do not have the right to collect fines for non-compliance with Covid-19 pandemic response duties of citizens (Košice - Mesto Košice, 2020). This case of disinformation is very specific, because false content is not just spreading incorrect information, but also assigns to the municipality very specific competence, which is assigned to different organization of public administration by the effective legal norm. The city refuted disinformation through the same platform that was used by the anonymous creator of the disinformation.

### **Prievidza - fees for closed school facilities**

Disinformation was also used against the Prievidza City, while the creator of the false information is the member of the city council. The spread disinformation tried to inform the citizens that parents must pay fees for closed school facilities. The member of the city council has used social media to spread this disinformation. Prievidza tried to refute this incorrect information through the official website and relevant social media pages (Prievidza, 2021). The aim of this one-time activity of the city council member was to harm good name of the city, while this disinformation was also connected with the negative emotions of citizens.

### **Prievidza - sale of the bus station building**

The second analysed disinformation was used in the case of Prievidza City contained a false information presented on social media by the same member of the city council that was mentioned in the previous case. Active member of the city council spread information that the city tried to sell the bus station in the city. However, Prievidza marked this information as disinformation, because the building of the bus station is owned by a private subject different from the city (Prievidza, 2020). This type of disinformation is very specific, because the ambition of the member of the city council is to spread false information and harm trust in the city itself. City tried to refute this disinformation through the official website and social media pages.

### **Banská Bystrica - unfair practices in urban development**

Similar case of disinformation occurs in the City of Banská Bystrica. The member of the city council tried to spread information about the unfair practices during the preparation phase for the construction of a new residential area in the city. Disinformation was confronted by the city on the official website and other informational websites in the city, and suspicions shared by the city council member have been shown to be unjustified (Bystricoviny.sk, 2021). Through the timely information campaign, there were no potential negative impacts on future development or trust of city. Information about disinformation and explanation by the city representatives were published on social media pages and various websites relevant for the particular local community.

### **Association of Towns and Communities of Slovakia ZMOS - winter maintenance**

The Association of Towns and Communities of Slovakia, which is a non-governmental organisation focusing on the cooperation of municipalities in Slovakia, was targeted by a disinformation, that The Association of Towns and Communities of Slovakia is responsible for the negative impact of legislative changes. Spokesperson of the Ministry of Transport and Construction of the Slovak Republic informed the public that lack of cooperation with The Association of Towns and Communities of Slovakia caused financial and organizational contradictories connected with the winter sidewalks maintenance (ZMOS, 2018). On contrary, The Association of Towns and Communities of Slovakia argued on the official website that interests of the municipalities and were presented in the accordance with the rules of legislative process (ZMOS, 2018). This one-time disinformation does not caused harm in the context of the execution of municipal competencies but was focused on the trust and position of The Association of Towns and Communities of Slovakia.

### **Bratislava - controversies during election campaign**

A disinformation in the case of the local self-government was focused on the current mayor of Bratislava city during the election campaign. False information about the parking system fees and enormous rise of property tax were spread on the various social media pages and websites. According to the official statement of the mayor, the aim of the disinformation was to harm him and his team during the election campaign (Vallo2018.sk, 2018). Put differently, the creators of mentioned disinformation aim to discredit the candidate, who at the end won the elections. This type of disinformation is different from the cases mentioned so far. Disinformation was not focused on the execution of municipal competencies, but its goal was to harm the candidate during elections. Current






mayor of the Bratislava used social media page and his personal website to deal with the particular disinformation.

## 5 Discussion

The aim of this study is to deal with disinformation in the conditions of the Slovak local self-government. Selected case studies on disinformation included different examples of a content, which was marked as incorrect content by the official communication channels.

Important part of the case studies described disinformation, which spread false information by anonymous individuals. The aim of these cases was to influence the execution of municipal competencies and undermine the trust in city offices and in public authorities. A different group of disinformation cases were produced by a member of the city councils. Both entities should cooperate within the execution of municipal competencies. However, these cases reveal that disinformation can also disrupt cooperation between the city offices and members of city councils. Execution of local self-government functions is also affected by very specific cases of disinformation. The following cases can not be primarily identified with the execution of competencies of certain city. However, these types of disinformation have negative impact on governing of local issues.

Selected disinformation cases spread incorrect information on the execution of municipal competencies. Upon a closer analysis, the highlighted cases were created by different types of creators. Differences were also identified in the context of used platforms, frequency of publication and dealing with the disinformation. Picture 2 includes the summarisation of the analysed case studies and their key characteristics.

	 Creator	 Target	 Platform	 Frequency	 Solution
<b>Petržalka</b> garage house	anonym	municipality	emails, posters	several times	social media, website
<b>Bratislava</b> city forest	anonym	municipality	emails	several times	social media, website, criminal complaints
<b>Košice</b> public transport	anonym	municipality	social media	once	social media, website
<b>Prievidza</b> closed facilities	member of city council	municipality	social media	once	social media, website
<b>Prievidza</b> bus station	member of city council	municipality	social media	once	social media, website
<b>Banská Bystrica</b> new residential area	member of city council	municipality	social media	once	social media, website
<b>ZMOS</b> winter maintenance	spokesperson of the ministry	association of municipalities	official statement	once	website
<b>Bratislava</b> election campaign	anonym	candidate for Mayor	social media, websites	several times	social media, website

municipality as subject

municipality as author and subject

Picture 2: Disinformation - municipalities case studies matrix

Source: authors



According to our research, the creators of disinformation used Web based applications to spread disinformation focused on the execution of municipal competencies, mainly social media and emails. Municipalities dealt with disinformation through their official social media pages and websites. We might argue that the social media were the main platform for spreading and combating disinformation. In the most cases, the disinformation has not been disseminated more than once.

The research revealed that municipalities faced disinformation created by the anonymous creators and the members of city councils. Our research revealed that the municipalities are not only the target of disinformation activities, but municipalities, mainly members of city councils must be also perceived as creators of disinformation.

The study tried to support an interest in deeper research both in local self-government and public administration in general. The benefits of the performed analysis and the defined recommendations should be considered in connection to their limits. The widening number of cases could be very useful both for theory and practice. However, the paper tries to be an initial insight into the relatively new research problem. The disinformation activities represent a relatively unexplored field of study, and possible negative impacts on the execution of municipal competencies have not been examined so far. In this sense, the paper could foster future research and the international comparison seems to be very attractive, for example in the Visegrad Group perspective. Besides, interesting findings might be revealed by examining specific types of disinformation activities, such as crisis management, election campaigns, policymaking, etc.

## **Conclusion**

The execution of municipal competencies must reflect constantly growing demands of citizens, while the quality of provided public services are the main attribute of successful city. However, the ideals of transparency and openness are also very important, mainly in the context of the informational disorder in contemporary society.

The study revealed that the execution of municipal competencies is the target of disinformation activities. According to our research, Web based applications were used to spread disinformation. However, the same platforms were used by the municipalities to deal with disinformation. The main finding is based on statement that the municipalities are not only the target of disinformation activities, but municipalities, mainly members of city councils must be also perceived as the creators of disinformation. The benefit of the study is also associated with fostering an interest in the examined issues of disinformation in the area of local self-government.

## References

- AGERE, S. 2000. *Promoting Good Governance: Principles, Practices and Perspectives*. London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2000. 144 p. ISBN 978-1-84859-712-9.
- ALLCOTT, H., GEHTZKOW, M. 2017. Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election. In: *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, vol. 31, 2017, n. 2. ISSN 1944-7965, p. 211-236. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.31.2.211>  
Available at < <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/3e89d981-48fc-11e8-bd1d-01aa75ed71a1/language-en>>.
- BENEGAL, S. D. SCRUGGS, L. A. 2018. Correcting misinformation about climate change: the impact of partisanship in an experimental setting. In: *Climatic Change*, vol. 148, 2018. p. 61-80. ISSN 1573-1480. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2192-4>
- BOLÍVAR, M. P. R. 2017. Governance Models for the Delivery of Public Services Through the Web 2.0 Technologies. In: *Social Science Computer Review*, vol. 35, 2017, n. 2. ISSN 0894-4393, p. 203-225. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0894439315609919>
- BÓNSÓN, E. et al. 2015. Citizens' engagement on local governments' Facebook sites. An empirical analysis: The impact of different media and content types in Western Europe. In: *Government Information Quarterly*, vol. 32, 2015, n. 1. ISSN 0740-624X, p. 52-62. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2014.11.001>
- BRATISLAVA24.SK. 2020. *Drancovanie kasy v Mestských lesoch? Sú to hoaxy od anonyma, kontruje samospráva*. [online]. [cit.15.01.2022]. Available at <<https://bratislava.dnes24.sk/drancovanie-kasy-v-mestskych-lesoch-su-to-hoaxy-od-anonyma-kontruje-samosprava-360947>>.
- by Git-based Principles. In: LOIZIDES, F. et al. (eds.). *Human Computer Interaction and Emerging Technologies: Adjunct Proceedings from the INTERACT 2019 Workshops*, Cardiff: Cardiff University Press, 2020, p. 67-74. ISBN 978-1-911653-10-3. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.18573/book3.h>
- BYSTRICOVINY.SK. 2021. *Za Tatranskou ulicou majú vyrásť moderné byty, poslankyňa Kasová o tejto výstavbe šírila hoax*. [online]. [cit.15.01.2022]. Available at <<https://www.bystricoviny.sk/spravy/za-tatranskou-maju-vyrast-moderne-byty/>>.
- CANTARELLA, M. et al. 2020. Does Fake News Affect Voting Behaviour? In: CEIS Tor Vergata Research Paper Series, vol. 18, 2020, no. 6. p. 1-13. ISSN 2610-931X. DOI: <https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3629666>
- COLLINS, B. et al. 2020. Fake News Types and Detection Models on Social Media A State-of-the-Art Survey. In: SITEK, P. et al (eds.), *Intelligent Information and Database Systems. ACIIDS 2020. Communications in Computer and Information Science*, vol 1178. Singapore: Springer, 2020. p. 562-573, ISBN 978-981-15-3379-2. DOI: [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3380-8\\_49](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3380-8_49)

COUNCIL OF EUROPEAN MUNICIPALITIES AND REGIONS. 2013. Decentralisation at a Crossroads Territorial Reforms in Europe in Times of Crisis. [online]. [cit.28.02.2022]. Available at <[https://www.ccre.org/img/uploads/piecesjointe/filename/CCRE\\_broch\\_EN\\_complete\\_low.pdf](https://www.ccre.org/img/uploads/piecesjointe/filename/CCRE_broch_EN_complete_low.pdf)>.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2018. Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing the Digital Europe Programme for the Period 2021-2027. [online]. [cit.28.01.2022]. Available at <<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2018%3A434%3AFIN>>.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2020. Tackling Online Disinformation. [online]. [cit.28.01.2022]. Available at <<https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/online-disinformation>>.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION. 2017. *A comparative overview of public administration characteristics and performance in EU28*. [online]. [cit.28.01.2022].

FARIS, R. et al. 2017. *Partisanship, Propaganda, and Disinformation: Online Media and the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election*. Cambridge: Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society. [online]. [cit.15.01.2022]. Available at <<http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33759251>>.

FILIPEC, O. 2018. Technology Revolution in the V4: Waiting for Godot? In: ČÍŽIK, T., BORÁROSOVÁ, I. (eds.), *The Future Revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe*. Bratislava: Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs, 2018, p. 38-58. ISBN: 978-80-89819-12-6.

GOTTLIEB, M. DYER, S. 2020. Information and Disinformation: Social Media in the COVID-19 Crisis. In: *Academic Emergency Medicine*, vol. 27, 2020, n. 7. P. 640-641. ISSN 1553-2712. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/acem.14036>

HAN, O. et al. 2020. Democratic Policy-making for Misinformation Detection Platforms

HOPKINS, B. R. 2013. *Starting and Managing a Nonprofit Organization*. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2013. 384 s. ISBN 978-111-8413-45-6.

JANSSEN, K. 2011. The influence of the PSI directive on open government data: An overview of recent developments. In: *Government Information Quarterly*, vol. 28, 2011, n. 4. ISSN 0740-624X, p. 446-456. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2011.01.004>

JHO, W., SONG, K. J. 2015. Institutional and technological determinants of civil e-Participation: Solo or duet? In: *Government Information Quarterly*, vol. 32, 2015, n. 4. ISSN 0740-624X, p. 488–495. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2015.09.003>

KOPRIĆ, I. 2017. European Administrative Space – Myth, Reality, and Hopes. In: KOPRIĆ, I., KOVAČ, P. (eds.), *European Administrative Space: Spreading Standards, Building Capacities*. Bratislava: NISPACE Press, 2017, p. 31-54. ISBN 978-80-89013-83-8.

- KOŠICE-MESTO KOŠICE. 2020. *Košičania, po Facebooku sa šíri HOAX, nepravdivá informácia o tom, že sa vo vozidlách DPMK "rozdávajú pokuty" za nerešpektovanie odporúčaní*. [online]. [cit.15.01.2022]. Available at <<https://www.facebook.com/kosiceofficial/photos/košičania-po-facebooku-sa-šíri-hoax-nepravdivá-informácia-o-tom-že-sa-vo-vozidlá/3012888088778897/>>.
- LEVAK, T. 2020. Disinformation in the New Media System – Characteristics, Forms, Reasons for its Dissemination and Potential Means of Tackling the Issue. In: *Medijska istraživanja: znanstveno-stručni časopis za novinarstvo i medije*, vol. 26, 2020, n. 2. ISSN 1330-6928, p. 29-58. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.22572/mi.26.2.2>
- LIN, Y. 2018. A comparison of selected Western and Chinese smart governance: The application of ICT in governmental management, participation and collaboration. In *Telecommunications Policy*, vol. 42, 2018, n. 10. ISSN 0308-5961, p. 800-809. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2018.07.003>
- LNENICKA, M., NIKIFOROVA, A. 2021 Transparency-by-design: What is the role of open data portals? In: *Telematics and Informatics*, vol. 61, 2021 August, 101605. ISSN 0736-5853, p. 1-18. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tele.2021.101605>
- MANO, R. 2021. The institutionalization of ICT and civic participation: Evidence from eight European nations. In: *Technology in Society*, vol. 64, 2021 February, 101518. ISSN 0160-791X, p. 1-6. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2020.101518>
- MERGEL, I. 2015. Open collaboration in the public sector: The case of social coding on GitHub. In: *Government Information Quarterly*, vol. 32, 2015, n. 4. ISSN, p. 464–472. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2015.09.004>
- MIŇOVÁ, K. 2020. Moral Aspects of the Security of Individuals in the Hyper-Connected Society. In: UŠIAK, J., KOLLÁR, D. (eds.), *Security Forum 2020 – 13th Annual International Scientific Conference February 12th- 13th, 2020 at Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, Slovakia, Conference Proceedings*. Banská Bystrica: Interpolis, 2020, p. 179-191. ISBN 978-80-973394-3-2.
- MITAL, O., 2022. Dobrá správa vecí verejných a súčasná verejná správa. In: MITAL, O. et al. (eds.), *Manuál dobrého spravovania pre budúcich expertov verejných inštitúcií*. Košice: ŠafárikPress, 2022. p. 10 – 23. ISBN 978-80-574-0083-7.
- NADERER, B. et al. 2017. Greenwashing: Disinformation through Green Advertising. In: SIEGERT, G. et al. (eds.), *Commercial Communication in the Digital Age: Information of Disinformation?* Berlin: De Gruyter Saur, 2017. p. 105-120. ISBN 978-3-1104-1679-4. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110416794-007>
- OECD. 2020. Transparency, Communication and Trust: The Role of Public Communication in Responding to the Wave of Disinformation About the New Coronavirus. [online]. [cit.28.01.2022]. Available at <<https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/transparency->

communication-and-trust-the-role-of-public-communication-in-responding-to-the-wave-of-disinformation-about-the-new-coronavirus-bef7ad6e/ >.

OSCE. 2017. *Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and “Fake News”, Disinformation and Propaganda*. [online]. [cit.28.01.2022]. Available at <<https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/8/302796.pdf>>.

PETRŽALKA. 2021. *Pozor na hoax k hlasovaniu Vavilovova*. [online]. [cit.15.01.2022]. Available at <<https://www.petrzalka.sk/2021-10-21-pozor-na-hoax-k-hlasovaniu-vavilovova/>>.

PRIEVIDZA. 2020. *Vyjadrenie k hoaxom o predaji autobusovej stanice*. [online]. [cit.15.01.2022]. Available at <<http://www.prievidza.sk/spravodajstvo/vyjadrenie-k-hoaxom-o-predaji-autobusovej-stanice/>>.

PRIEVIDZA. 2021. *Vyvraciame HOAX: Mesto Prievidza nepožaduje úhrady poplatkov v dlhodobozatvorených školských zariadeniach*. [online]. [cit.15.01.2022]. Available at <<http://www.prievidza.sk/spravodajstvo/vyvraciame-hoax-mesto-prievidza-nepozaduje-uhrody-poplatkov-v-dlhodobozatvorenych-skolskych-zariadeniach/>>.

REDDY, P. S. et al., 2015. The State of Local Government. In: *Public Policy and Administration*, vol. 14, 2015, n. 3. ISSN 1648-2603, p. 160-176. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5755/j01.ppaa.14.3.13430>

RUČINSKÁ, S., FEČKO, M. 2020. eServices as a Challenge for Small Municipalities: Slovak Republic Experiences. In: HEMKER, T. et al. (eds), *Central and Eastern European eDem and eGov Days 2020: Conference Proceedings*. Wien: Facultas Verlag, 2020, p. 383-392. ISBN 978-3-7089-1956-0 DOI: <https://doi.org/10.24989/ocg.338.30>

SANTOS-D'AMORIM, K., MIRANDA, M. K. F. 2021. Misinformation, Disinformation, and Malinformation: Clarifying the Definitions and Examples in Disinfodemic Times. In: *Encontros Bibli: revista eletrônica de biblioteconomia e ciência da informação*, vol. 26, 2021. ISSN 1518-2924, p. 1-23. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5007/1518-2924.2021.e76900>

Shim & Eom, 2008

SHIM, D. C., EOM, T. H. 2008. E-government and anti-corruption: Empirical analysis of international data. In: *International Journal of Public Administration*, vol. 31, 2008, n. 3. ISSN 0190-0692. p. 298-316. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01900690701590553>

STEFFENS, M. S. et al. 2019. How organisations promoting vaccination respond to misinformation on social media: a qualitative investigation. In: *MC Public Health*, vol. 19, 2019, n. 1348. ISSN 1471-2458, p. 1-12. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-019-7659-3>

STEVENSON, J. 2020. COVID-19 Information Overload leads to simple but unhelpful choices. [online]. [cit.28.01.2022]. Available at

<<https://www.city.ac.uk/news-and-events/news/2020/04/covid-19-information-overload-leads-to-simple-but-unhelpful-choices>>.

VALLO2018.sk. 2018. *Šírenie informácie o zdanení Bratislavčanov sú Hoax a antikampaň*. [online]. [cit.15.01.2022]. Available at <<http://www.vallo2018.sk/obratislave/hoax/>>.

WARDLE, C. 2017. Fake news. It's complicated. [online]. [cit.28.02.2022]. Available at <<https://firstdraftnews.org/articles/fake-news-complicated/>>.

WARDLE, C. 2019. Understanding Information Disorder. [online]. [cit.28.02.2022]. Available at <[https://firstdraftnews.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Information\\_Disorder\\_Digital\\_AW.pdf?x76701](https://firstdraftnews.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Information_Disorder_Digital_AW.pdf?x76701)>.

WARDLE, C., DERAKSHAN, H. 2017. Information Disorder: Toward an interdisciplinary framework for research and policy making. [online]. [cit.28.01.2022]. Available at <<https://rm.coe.int/information-disorder-toward-an-interdisciplinary-framework-for-researc/168076277c>>.

ZMOS. 2018. *Vyhlasenie ZMOS k aktualnej situácii pri celoplošnej zimnej údržbe*. [online]. [cit.15.01.2022]. Available at <<https://www.zmos.sk/oznamy/vyhlasenie-zmos-k-aktualnej-situacii-pri-celoplosnej-zimnej-udrzbe.html>>.

ZÖLDE, A. 2018. The Digital Divide in the Context of Electronic Public Services, In: HINTEA, Ch. M. et al. (eds.), *Transylvanian International Conference in Public Administration, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, 2-4 November 2017*. Cluj-Napoca: Accent, 2018, p. 564-578. ISBN 978-606-561-184-9.

# IMPACT OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC ON THE ILLICIT DRUG MARKET, CHANGES IN THEIR SMUGGLING, AND DRUG IDENTIFICATION OPTIONS<sup>1</sup>

Jozef Sabol<sup>2</sup>

## **ABSTRACT**

*The paper assesses the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on drug markets, where the situation is still evolving and there is increasing data availability on how smugglers are adapting to the changes associated with the coronavirus infection. The presentation aims to provide a comprehensive picture of the tangible effects of this pandemic and its potential impact on the current global crisis and the increased threat of terrorism. The analysis of how the pandemic took place and to what extent it affected the production and trafficking of various drugs, including their countries of origin and the routes by which these substances are transported to their final destinations, also serves this purpose. At the same time, issues related to the latest trends in drug trafficking and distribution at the retail level are also considered, including the use of both the traditional and black web (Darkweb). Finally, some results of measuring the seized drug samples using the method of instrumental neutron analysis are presented, which allows with high sensitivity and accuracy not only the detection but also the identification of smuggled drugs, and thus the estimation of their origin, which is extremely beneficial for criminologists.*

**Key words:** COVID-19, pandemic, smugglers, global crisis, terrorism, drug trafficking, dark web.

## **Introduction**

After initial outages at the beginning of the pandemic, organised crime groups quickly adapted to the changing circumstances. Already during 2021, it turned out that drug trafficking continued at essentially the same pace as before the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the pandemic has brought new trends in forms of trafficking, with the share of drug smuggling by sea or other waterways increasing significantly. These changes were mainly caused by border closures and difficulties in inland transport, as well as restrictions on commercial flights. Overall, the drug markets have proven to be largely resistant to COVID-19-related changes. However, in the European Union, as well as in some other regions of the world, instability and some disruption to drug markets, especially at the beginning

---

<sup>1</sup> The preparation of the paper has been partially supported under project no. VI20192022162 (Elemental characterisation of microtraces and narcotic and psychoactive substances by nuclear analytical methods).

<sup>2</sup> Jozef Sabol, doc. Ing, DrSc., Head of the Department of Crisis Management, Police Academy of the Czech Republic in Prague, Lhotecká 559/7, 143 01 Prague 4, Czech Republic, sabol@polac.cz

of the pandemic, have created increasingly unstable environments for criminal gangs and their supply chains. This has also led to increased violence between end-drug suppliers and distributors.

Finally, some results of measuring captured drug samples using the method of instrumental neutron analysis are presented, which allows with high sensitivity and accuracy not only to detect but also to identify smuggled drugs, and thus estimate their origin, which is extremely beneficial for criminologists.

## 1 The spread of the COVID-19 pandemic in the world and its effects

In December 2019, the highly infectious disease known now as COVID-19 began to spread from the Chinese city of Wuhan. In March 2020, the World Health Organization called the worldwide spread of the disease a pandemic. It has significantly affected all areas of human life all over the world. Data reflecting the spread of this dreadful infection have been collected and carefully assessed by many national and international institutions and organisations. One of the most reliable sources of information about the country-by-country situation is regularly published and upgraded by the prestigious Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland, USA (JHU, 2022).

Table 1 shows the current pandemic state (as of February 6, 2022) in the world, where total numbers of COVID-19 cases, together with the number of deaths and vaccinated people, are presented. Also given are 28-day numbers of positive cases, deaths and people to whom vaccine doses have been administered. Although in most countries these days the number of cases is climbing and reaching several times the previous figures, the situation is still not fully under control. In addition to omicron, some new mutations of coronavirus cannot be excluded in the near future, and we have to be prepared for such an eventuality.

Table 1 Overview of the world pandemic situation - based on (JHU, 2022)

<i>Cases</i>	<b>Total</b> <b>393 912 824</b>	<i>Deaths</i>	<b>Total</b> <b>5 736 283</b>	<i>Vaccinated</i>	<b>Total</b> <b>10 048 231 795</b>
	28-day <b>87 754 577</b>		28-day <b>246 161</b>		28-day <b>765 319 679</b>

Although country-wide data are important, the incidence of patients per million is much more representative. In this respect, the Czech Republic is one of the most affected countries in the world. This situation is illustrated in Fig. 1 over the last two years (OWD, 2022).






Fig. 1 The incidence of coronavirus COVID-19 in some selected countries per 1 million; based on (OWD, 2022).

The number of cases of coronavirus infection in the Czech Republic exceeds all previous records. Thanks to vaccination, however, the current number of infected matters less. The key indicators in the present phase of the pandemic are the so-called mortality and the number of people in hospitals. The recent situation in the Czech Republic is illustrated by the data provided by the Ministry of Health (Fig. 2). All other data refer to February 5, 2022.




Fig. 2 Overview of the present situation in the Czech Republic (MZ CR, 2022). The number of reinfected persons is estimated to be 140 109.

There is no doubt about how severely the COVID-19 pandemic has affected the national and international economy and trade, which has led to the increase of inflation and suffering of the low-income segment of the society. The pandemic

hit many sectors of industry heavily, including the production of cars, the energy sector, transport, the construction sphere, and the production of consumer items and other goods. In addition, the COVID-19 infection negatively influenced transport, education, health care, tourism, sport, research, culture and entertainment, and many other areas, resulting in severe socio-economic implications.

The numbers given show the total number of confirmed cases and the number of persons who died due to the infection. Of course, the absolute numbers cannot fully represent the impact of the pandemic on the local level, where a more appropriate picture can give us the number of cases per 1 mil of the population. Here, the Czech Republic is considered one of the most troubled countries, as illustrated in Fig. 1 above.

It is obvious that the COVID-19 pandemic has seriously affected not only the everyday life of the population where many restrictions have been introduced but also other socio-economic areas mentioned above. Additionally, there has been an increase in addiction to drugs as well as the crime rate, terrorism, and radicalization, particularly among those who had been frustrated and vehemently opposed to restrictions as well as vaccination.

## **2 The impact of the pandemic on drug smuggling**

The UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND, 2021) statement, which is consistent with the opinion of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2021), raises serious concerns about the global need to implement efficient measures against the COVID-19 pandemic to minimize its impact. Due to the specific situation, traditional infrastructure was facing increasing challenges, which may, among other things, have had an impact on its weakening as well as on health services, which are in most affected countries under tremendous pressure.

In the current difficult situation, all states should strengthen bilateral, regional and international cooperation to combat the abuse of traditional and online drug trafficking methods and identify and prevent routes used during the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same time, the principle of shared responsibility should remain at the heart of international cooperation in tackling and combating all aspects of the world's problems caused by illegal drug production, distribution and use. At the same time, appropriate and efficient measures must be taken to ensure that no one affected by the global drug problem is left behind in response to this pandemic and in mitigating the drug consequences.

Law enforcement agencies (LEA) and security forces must play a key role in the fight against drug trafficking and related crime, leading to the arrest, seizure of drugs and property, and the freezing of the property of apprehended criminals. At the same time, the persistent efforts of security staff during the COVID-19

pandemic may be associated with a high risk to their health and the health of their families.

The COVID-19 pandemic had initially negatively affected the illicit cultivation, production and trafficking of drugs and subsequently resulted in new methods of producing, distributing and trafficking a range of drugs, the structure and use of which have also undergone some changes. There is also a growing importance of using existing online database platforms for effective and increased collaboration between LEAs and the judiciary in collecting and sharing the data needed to identify and detect these dangerous, addictive substances.

There seems to be a need to further strengthen bilateral, regional, and international cooperation to combat the abuse of traditional and online drug trafficking methods and routes during and beyond the COVID-19 pandemic. There is also a need to continue to monitor changes in routes and trafficking methods, including increased shipping and online drug sales via the darknet and the conventional web. The competent authorities must respond adequately to these developments.

Today's situation calls for further acceleration of all international drug policy commitments so that progress in addressing and combating all aspects of the global drug problems at national, regional, and global levels is maintained and continued in the light of the needs of COVID-19 and its consequences.

The illegal drug trade creates a global black-market economy that puts the public at risk, not just from the substances being distributed, but also from the subsequent crimes committed by users, traffickers, and manufacturers. These crimes typically include burglary, assault, and fraud, but can also involve more serious crimes such as homicide, kidnapping, and human trafficking.

### **3 How nuclear analysis helps to identify drugs and trace their origin**

The primary goal of a forensic drug expert is to unambiguously identify any controlled substance present in the drug being tested. Most forensic laboratories commonly use gas chromatography, mass spectrometry, infrared spectroscopy, polarography, nuclear magnetic resonance spectrometry, and some other techniques. Most of these methods provide rapid, semi-automated analysis of the sample and usually offer sufficient information to identify the appropriate compounds. However, the use of such an approach for drug analysis has its limitations.

Some more sophisticated methods include neutron capture prompt gamma activation analysis (PGAA) and instrumental neutron activation analysis (INAA). These simultaneous multielement analytical methods are both non-destructive, which is advantageous because they can save much labour in sample preparation and avoid contamination or loss of some constituents due to chemical destruction. In addition, PGA is characterised by its capability for analysing light elements, such as boron, hydrogen, sulphur and silicon, which cannot readily be analysed

by INAA. By using these methods to complement each other, many elements can be determined simultaneously.

Neutron activation analysis is a direct, non-destructive method with extraordinary sensitivity for some of the important elements in high purity materials. The samples are irradiated in a neutron beam, which is usually provided by a research reactor. After the neutron capture, the nuclides in the sample emit characteristic prompt gamma radiation, which is detected by a semiconductor detector. After evaluation of the prompt gamma spectrum, the qualitative and quantitative analysis can be performed. Owing to nuclear physical factors, the different nuclides (and also the elements) have extremely different neutron capture cross-sections, which affect the analytical sensitivities. The principle of the neutron analysis is illustrated in fig. 3.




Fig. 3 The principle of neutron activation analysis based on the detection of prompt and delayed gamma photons.

At present, a number of samples of the drugs seized by LEAs and police are being measured in order to distinguish among many drugs of various origins and compositions. Some results of our previous analysis are shown in Table 2, which illustrates characteristic elements found in different samples of heroin samples (Kučera et al., 2017).

Table 2 Presence of elements in heroin samples using NAA.

Nuclide, unit	Sample code			
	H963	H1056	H1210	H1317
Na, mg.kg <sup>-1</sup>	2 080±30	296±4	701±11	220±30
Al, mg.kg <sup>-1</sup>	11±3	52±2	21±2	<60
Cl, mg.kg <sup>-1</sup>	686±21	44±14	25±14	7 780±1 300
K, mg.kg <sup>-1</sup>	<40	61±4	<24	<4 000
Ca, mg.kg <sup>-1</sup>	640±50	2 260±100	3 220±120	1 360±150
Sc, µg.kg <sup>-1</sup>	1.2±0.2	11.4±0.3	5.2±0,3	2.3±0.4
Mn, mg.kg <sup>-1</sup>	0.29±0.03	4.15±0.19	3.41±0.18	9.5±0.4
I, mg.kg <sup>-1</sup>	15.8±1.1	<1.5	<1.5	<21
Th, µg.kg <sup>-1</sup>	<7	9±3	16±3	25±6

## Conclusions

Fraudulent and criminal elements of society have already begun to quickly adapt to the changing environment and social climate in their inventive and innovative way. The governments and institutions of individual countries and international groupings and organizations are trying to respond to this development and face it by adopting ever new countermeasures, which, however, are often modified and thus do not always have the desired results.

A pandemic has a major impact on our lives and slows down our economy. However, this economic trend has not been observed in the international drug trade. The illegal markets continue to generate huge profits, even during a pandemic. Seizures of illicit drugs in some EU countries were higher in 2020 and 2021 than in the previous two years.

The COVID-19 crisis is taking its toll on the global economy, public health and our way of life. The virus has now infected more than 420 million people worldwide, killed nearly 6 million people, and led governments to take drastic measures to limit the spread of coronavirus disease. More than half of the global population is living under mobility restrictions, international border crossings have been closed, and economic activity has declined drastically, as many countries have opted for the closure of nonessential businesses.

Drug trafficking has been affected to varying degrees by restrictions on movement and border closures imposed to prevent the spread of COVID-19, depending on how drugs were trafficked before the pandemic. Heroin is mostly traded by land, often in addition to legal cargo, while cocaine is mostly traded by sea, even using non-commercial vessels such as specialist ships and yachts. Synthetic drugs tend to be traded by air, with certain substances reaching large quantities in some countries by air couriers who use wraps or hide drugs in their personal luggage. The greatest impact on drug trafficking can thus be expected in countries where large amounts of drugs are trafficked by air.

Will you not include more about distribution through the internet? The spread among young teenagers as they use the internet more with online learning? You spend a lot of time detailing the pandemic but not so much on the drug aspect. Perhaps you should spend more time on how radiation analysis can reduce drug spread.

## References

- CND. 2021. *Statement of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs*. UNESCO, E/CN.7/2021/L.2. Online (5/2/2022): <https://www.undocs/>
- JHU. 2022. *COVID-19 dashboard*. Center for Systems Science and Engineering at Johns Hopkins University, USA, 16:21, 6.2.2022. Online (6/2/2022): <https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html>.

KUČERA, J., KAMENÍK, J., SABOL, J. et al. 2018. *Provenancing of drugs based on their elemental composition determined by neutron activation analysis – feasibility study*. Sborník příspěvků z mezinárodní konferenc “Pokroky v kriminalistice” (Proceedings), Prague, 2018, pp. 101-110. ISBN 978-80-7251-485-4.

MZ ČR. 2022. COVID-19: *Přehled aktuální situace v ČR*. MZ ČR, Praha, 2022. Online (5/2/2022): <https://onemocneni-aktualne.mzcr.cz/covid-19>.

OWD, 2022. *Explore the global data on confirmed COVID-19 cases*. Our World in Data, Oxford, 5/2/2022. Online (5/2/2022): <https://ourworldindata.org/covid-cases>.

UNODC. 2021. *The 64th Session of the CND Adopts Joint Statement on the Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic*. 13/4/2021, Vienna. Online (5/2/2022): <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2021/April/the-64th-session-of-the-cnd-adopts-joint-statement-on-the-impact-of-the-covid-19-pandemic.html>.

# TEACHING AND RESEARCH AT UNIVERSITIES DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: NEGATIVES AND SOME PROS<sup>1</sup>

## VVÝUKA A VÝZKUM NA UNIVERZITÁCH BĚHEM PANDEMIE COVID-19: NEGATIVA A NĚKTERÉ PLUSY

Jozef Sabol<sup>2</sup> - Jan Nejedlý<sup>3</sup>

### **ABSTRACT**

*At universities and other schools, most of the teaching was transferred to the distance form, for which, especially at the beginning of the pandemic, neither the schools nor the research institutions were sufficiently prepared. Here, too, they had to improvise after the outbreak of the pandemic, not only because the staff was not sufficiently familiar with this form of teaching and communication, but their workplace was not properly equipped for this method of teaching and communication with students. However, the situation gradually began to improve rapidly in this direction. Now, it can be stated that all institutions, thanks to the pandemic, quickly equipped themselves with the necessary technology and trained their staff to use it at the appropriate level. Although developments in the previous period led to this stage of communication, the pandemic significantly accelerated these steps. It can be assumed that the implementation of the relevant distance measures will be of benefit in the future as well. Already today, many meetings of scientists and researchers are successfully taking place in distance form, and many of them will continue to do so after the end of the pandemic. However, there will always be events where we cannot do without personal contact and communication, even in the post-covid period. This applies to some specific forms of teaching (practical exercises), conferences and congresses, and internships and study exchanges or stays of students and staff at foreign universities and research institutes. Joint projects also require close cooperation, which cannot be done without personal contacts or joint experiments and further research with staff from different countries and research centres. The paper summarizes and discusses the main problems caused by the pandemic and how they were solved. It also discusses some positive aspects and lessons learned from the pandemic for the future.*

### **Keywords:**

*COVID-19, pandemic, education, teaching, university, online, impact.*

### **Introduction**

---

<sup>1</sup> The preparation of the paper has been partially supported under projects no. VI20192022162 and no. VI20192021171 conducted at the PA CR in Prague under the research programme of the Ministry of Interior of the CR

<sup>2</sup> Jozef Sabol, doc. Ing, DrSc., Head of the Department of Crisis Management, Police Academy of the Czech Republic in Prague, Lhotecká 559/7, 143 01 Prague 4, Czech Republic, sabol@polac.cz

<sup>3</sup> Jan Nejedlý, Mgr., Department of Information Technologies, Police Academy of the Czech Republic in Prague, Lhotecká 559/7, 143 01 Prague 4, Czech Republic, nejedly@polac.cz

The COVID-19 pandemic impacted virtually the entire world and has affected all spheres of society. However, most countries were not adequately prepared for such a scale of mass infection, so they had to improvise, especially at the beginning of the crisis. This mainly concerned personal protective equipment, wherein in the initial phase, we forgot that similar equipment was developed at a high level and elaborated down to the smallest detail during the "Cold War" to protect against weapons of mass destruction. Today, this area is better known as CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear).

Gradually, the situation began to change, and many protective equipment manufacturers began to benefit from this experience. Another problem posed by the pandemic with its unexpectedly intensive spread started with the introduction of various restrictive measures ranging from restrictions on the movement of people, the obligation to wear masks, working from home online, reductions in transport (especially by air), mandatory vaccinations and testing, and the cancellation of cultural and other social events, including international scientific conferences and seminars.

Following the data released by the Ministry of Health of the Czech Republic (MH CR, 2022), there were 3 385 250 confirmed cases of the pandemic infection, 37 765 persons died during the previous 14 days, 3 858 persons per 100 000 people were infected (as of Feb. 2, 2022). In recent days their number has decreased, as illustrated in Table 1.

Table 1. Number of deaths during the recent days

Day in Feb 2022	Number of on the date	Cumulative number
11	23	37 765
10	44	37 742
09	44	37 698
08	58	37 654
07	58	37 604

The COVID-19 statistics reflecting the situation worldwide is compiled by the Johns Hopkins University in the USA. According to their data, the development in the CR can be illustrated by Fig. 1, which shows the development of the pandemic in the country during the period from 2020 to the beginning of February 2022 (JHU, 2022).






Fig. 1. The information about how COVID-19 has affected CR since the pandemic first officially arrived in the country in January 2020: total cases and deaths

## 1 How the COVID-19 pandemic changed education at universities

The policy of social distancing has significantly disrupted traditional educational practices. However, the closure of a number of facilities or the reduction of their activities, the lack of suitable equipment and software, the adaptation of academics and students, as well as the unpreparedness for new conditions played an important role in adopting new teaching methods, which gradually showed their positive aspects and some specific advantages. This happened despite the illness and psychological discomfort of students and teachers and the changed conditions, and unreliable connectivity to the web, which made the whole process even more difficult.

All these factors played some role in the impact of the pandemic on university education and research. One has to realize that the COVID-19 pandemic created the largest disruption of education systems in human history, affecting nearly 2 billion learners in more than 200 countries.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, many researchers shared their work on teaching and learning in a variety of ways and exchanged their experience in teaching under new conditions. Several universities had discontinued teaching face-to-face and many have still not resumed using this traditional method. There are fears of losing the academic years 2020 and 2022 or even more in the future. There is also an urgent need to innovate and implement an alternative educational system and strategies in teaching under new conditions. The COVID-19 pandemic has given us the opportunity to pave the way for the introduction of digital education.

Almost all teachers took up the challenge of the digital switchover, their response was amazing, and they created a completely new system. It is clear that their experience from this period will continue to be used in the future even after the pandemic. They will surely integrate this experience into their life and incorporate it into the education system. Most teachers have found that online platforms can help them at work, and this crisis has presented a huge opportunity

to take our education system to the next level. The educational process will never be the same again. Teachers have been thrown into the world of online teaching and one can be sure that the result has been valuable: without this pandemic its development would have taken many years and been very expensive, and yet the effect would not have been so huge and its potential not fully explored; nor would teachers have understood why they should change their teaching habits and methods and how these changes could be positive. That is why we need to evaluate this period after we return to traditional face-to-face teaching in the context of quality in education and in terms of how to mitigate the possible negative effects of technology on data protection, teacher and student well-being, equality of access, etc. This is a great opportunity to reflect on how we teach and how to choose among the best of all the new ways we have discovered.

## **2 Some experience from the Czech Republic**

Many universities in the Czech Republic (CR) followed up on their projects with a successful survey carried out in cooperation with the Academy of Sciences of the CR. The researchers mapped the life and study situation of students. The study was part of the International COVID Well-being Study (SÚ AV ČR, 2021).

This survey was based on interviews at Czech universities during the first phase of the pandemic, when their functioning was severely limited. The aim was to determine how the students were affected by the pandemic and how they managed to cope with the established measures. The survey also looked at how teaching constraints affected their lives (Fig. 2 and Fig. 3).

For example, the results show that 15.5% of respondents suffered from at least one health problem, which is also a risk factor for COVID-19. Students in the period of limited functioning of universities indicated more symptoms of depression than the general population in the period before the pandemic (shift of the average by 0.5 points on a 4-point scale). About 37% of university students in the questionnaire survey showed high values of loneliness. The proportion of students with financial problems increased from 4.2% before the pandemic to 14.8%, and a third of students (32%) moved back to their parents' homes, mainly from dormitories and rentals.

The abolition of full-time teaching was mainly reflected in an increase in personal study time (on average by 7-8 hours per week). The greater the increase in personal study time, the greater the study load and the degree of stress it meant for the students. The workload and stress of students were lower if the university was able to replace the elimination of full-time teaching with online teaching to a greater or lesser extent than personal study.




Fig. 2 How students answered the question: I had enough money to cover all costs of my study




Fig. 3 Illustration of the survey of students concerning their housing before and after the COVID-19 pandemic

Statistics conducted among students also revealed the impact of the pandemic on their study results, which depended on students' social status and family background. There were relatively significant differences between students from financially independent families and those students who did not have the same opportunities for online teaching. The pandemic did not affect the study results for all categories of students in the same way. Thanks to the financial means of their parents, the students who benefitted had the necessary modern equipment and quiet atmosphere at home (e.g., separate rooms). Although the acquisition of knowledge decreased during the pandemic in all categories of students, the negative effect was much stronger in the case of students who did not have such good conditions for studying at home (large family in a small apartment, etc.). The situation is illustrated in Fig. 4.




Fig. 3 How study results were affected by the COVID-19 pandemic

Although the pandemic has caused many problems that had to be solved relatively quickly, the whole process accelerated the transition to using advanced digital technology applied to education. Obviously, in the post-pandemic era, the experience acquired throughout the pandemic will be beneficial and incorporated into all schools' routine teaching methods. This would have happened in the future anyway, but the pandemic forced us to shorten this transition period. There have been some more surveys on the impact of the pandemic on university students (MEYS CR, 2921). The study has shown that students were highly satisfied with the readiness of universities and with the means of communication. They also evaluated their overall experience with distance learning more positively, especially theoretical teaching. In the case of practical training, the results show a shift during the pandemic and thus better adaptation on the part of schools and students. For two-thirds of students, studying during a pandemic was more time-consuming than during the previous period. In 45% of students, there was a deterioration in physical health, in mental health in 55% of them. The financial situation worsened in 27% of students. The most common types of support from universities included the adjustment of study conditions, extension of the semester, as well as a specific approach of all schools to students. Almost 90% of academic staff were satisfied with the university's approach. Three-quarters of them were better prepared for distance learning during the pandemic than at the beginning. Over 50% of academic staff rated students' work in distance learning as worse than the full-time form in the previous period. Academic staff felt support from the university, especially in providing technical equipment or courses in working with technology and programs, and to a large extent also in adjusting working conditions. For example, the Police Academy of the CR in Prague immediately responded to the situation and acquired new computers and other necessary equipment. Special software was also installed, and relevant courses for the staff were organized.

The pandemic has also, to a certain extent, affected the research activities at many universities. At the PA CR currently, two research projects carried out

under the programme of the Ministry of Interior of the CR have been going on: one is aimed at the use of radioanalytical methods to detect and identify illicit drugs seized at the borders, and another deals with the analysis of CBRNE. Many of the planned activities had to be either cancelled, restricted or modified. The exchange and contacts among academics participating in these projects had to be heavily restricted. Moreover, participation in international workshops and conferences where the results of the projects were to be presented have been either cancelled or converted into webinars or online modes.

COVID-19 also led to the disruption of the Erasmus programmes and related activities since the students could not travel and visit universities in other countries.

## **Conclusions**

In the first half of 2020, people worldwide found themselves facing an invisible enemy in the form of COVID-19. Many countries have imposed dramatic changes in policies to force compliance to their rules and regulations in an effort to protect their communities from becoming victims of this pandemic and to ensure the continuation of high levels of productivity and performance.

The COVID-19 pandemic has forced many organizations around the world to make full use of a variety of emerging online communication platform technologies. Universities are among the organizations that have asked students, tutors, and lecturers to use a number of different online communication platforms to ensure that the educational process remains uninterrupted. However, the COVID-19 pandemic has generated considerable challenges for the global higher education community while using such emerging technologies.

One of the most important organizations to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic is the university in its role as a key higher education institution, as it is among the most important service sectors and its students represent the potential future workforce. Some university students have experience and a long history in dealing with online distance learning platforms to engage with learning activities, while others do not. The COVID-19 pandemic has tested the extent to which both academics and students are prepared to adopt and use these technologies in their online learning activities. Consequently, many university students during the COVID-19 period had no alternative but to deal with advanced online information and communication technologies to accomplish their learning activities and follow up with their instructors in a safe manner in order to ensure social distancing was maintained. It is undeniable that ICT applications enhanced by internet technologies have proven to be powerful tools and have played a significant role in the speedy development of e-learning.

The restrictions imposed to limit viral transmission and the direct impact of the virus profoundly affected daily life and well-being, with heightened anxiety and reduced access to usual coping mechanisms, including universities.

University students have been particularly affected by COVID-19. In addition to the changes experienced by the general population, students have experienced disruption to their learning, assessment and schedules, and the cancellation of enriched learning opportunities, field trips, laboratory courses and learning exchanges.

## References

- MZ ČR, 2022. COVID-19: *Přehled aktuální situace v ČR*. MZ ČR, Praha, 2022. Online (5/2/2022): <https://onemocneni-aktualne.mzcr.cz/covid-19>.
- UNCND, 2021. *Statement of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs*. United Nations Commission on Drugs, E/CN.7/2021/L.2. Online (5/2/2022): <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/commissions/CND/>.
- JHU, 2022. *COVID-19 dashboard*. Center for Systems Science and Engineering at Johns Hopkins University, USA. Online (12/2/2022): <https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/region/czechia>.
- SÚ AV ČR, 2021. *Vysokoškolští student během první vlny pandemie koronaviru*. Sociologický ústav Akademie věd ČR, 2021.
- MEYS ČR, 2021. *The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on university students*. Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports, Prague, 10 September 2021. Online (13.2.2022): <https://www.msmt.cz/dopady-pandemie-covid-19-na-studenty-vs?lang=1>.

# THE ACTIVITY OF THE POLISH POLICE IN THE FIELD OF COUNTERACTING TERRORISM AND CYBER-TERRORISM IN THE CONTEXT OF CONTEMPORARY THREATS OF THE 21ST CENTURY

**Kamil Samiczak<sup>1</sup> - Marcin Szymczak<sup>2</sup>**

## **ABSTRACT**

*Terrorism has become one of the greatest challenges of the 21st century. Politicians at both local and international level are trying to develop such positions that will allow to combat this phenomenon. A dozen years ago, no one in Central and Eastern Europe was aware that the problem of terrorism could also affect this region. Thanks to the process of globalization and new relations between states, talks about the security of citizens had to appear. An important phenomenon on the topic of disputes and discussions as well as disputes is terrorism, because it is a threat to national security. At this point, one must distinguish between two factors that make up the meaning of the word. First of all, this is a political phenomenon, and secondly it is a method of spreading fear, of sowing confusion. Terrorist activities have a significant psychological, media and social effect. Definitions are usually too vague and it is often difficult to determine what terrorism is and who should be referred to as a terrorist. It often happens that this one term in a description of murder, ethnic cleansing or planting a bomb under a public building. However, it must be remembered that terrorism is a political phenomenon and it is inherent in its features, it will always be associated with or against a fight for power in order to change a specific legal order or simply to stand against it in order to manifest power. The fight against terrorism will be a challenge for every government and every legal order. Terrorists in many regions of the world use more and more radical methods of their actions and transfer the theater of operations to new areas, e.g. cyberspace. Terrorists in many parts of the world use more and more radical methods of their actions. There is no doubt that terrorism, due to its range, becomes one of the most serious denominations for the modern world. That is why the operation of anti-terrorist services within each state and on the international arena is so important. Only such cooperation will effectively counteract this phenomenon. This publication focuses on a fragment of this issue - combating terrorism at the police and intelligence level by the police structures of the State.*

**Key words:** *Police, terrorism, security, anti-terrorism, cyberterrorism*

## **Contemporary terrorism**

Contemporary terrorism is a very dynamic and multifaceted phenomenon. In addition to traditional individual terrorism, more complex forms have emerged, using new techniques and technologies. Effective counteracting the negative

---

<sup>1</sup> Kamil Samiczak, dr., Department of Criminal Service of the Police School in Katowice, ul. gen. Jankego 276, 40-684 Katowice-Piotrowice, Poland, kamil\_samiczak@op.pl

<sup>2</sup> Marcin Szymczak, Mgr., Academy of Business School in Dąbrowa Górnicza, ul. Ciepłaka 1C, 41-300 Dąbrowa Górnicza, Poland, marcinszymczakatowice@gmail.com

effects of the phenomenon of terrorism depends on a comprehensive approach, international cooperation, education as well as rigorous compliance and fulfillment of signed obligations in the field of combating this phenomenon by modern states and organizations.

Currently, there are many definitions of terrorism in the literature, and depending on their interests, scientists try to direct them to their own use. Despite such a great interest in these issues, no unanimous or universally binding legal definition has been established. (Kiełt, 2015)

Based on various elements of the phenomenon of terrorism, a definition has been formulated by the US Department of Defense that terrorism is "the unlawful use - or the threat of use - of force or violence against a person or property to extort or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political goals, religious or ideological. (Liedel, Piasecka, 2004) According to the FBI definition, the essence of terrorism is the unlawful use of violence to oblige governments to support social or political goals. (Hołyst, 2011) The phenomenon was similarly described by the European Commission, which defined terrorism as "any deliberate acts committed by individual persons or organizations against one or more states, their institutions or people, with the aim of intimidating and seriously weakening or destroying the political, economic and social structure". (Pawłowski, 2001, p. 12)

The quoted approaches to terrorism clearly emphasize its political nature in the first place. The crux of terrorism is the intention of the perpetrator and the goal he is trying to achieve. The synthesis of these elements makes it possible to distinguish terrorists from other criminals.

On the other hand, in Polish literature, the definition of terrorism is given in a traditional, criminological approach. Nowadays, it is necessary to pay attention to the new concept of international terrorism, which says that this type of new terrorism is understood as acts of violence aimed at destroying the symbolic status of identity and being or the essence of the victim (society, institutions, civilians). In this approach, the victim is understood as a symbol of hatred, an enemy, a depersonalised, faceless object of hatred. Organized hate crime, on the other hand, is planned acts of violence against society, institutions and individuals. (Hołyst, 2011, p. 59)

The concept understood in this way broadens the goals of terrorist groups. Contrary to the old approach, the new concept of international terrorism sets as its key goals vaguely defined political goals, uncritical attacks, the pursuit of maximum psychological and social breakdown and the possibility of using weapons of mass destruction. (Martin, 2009, p. 343-357)

The consequences of terrorism have and will continue to be manifold, manifesting itself in the sphere of economy, politics, but also in the field of internal politics and interpersonal relations. (Hołyst, 2009, p. 335-357)



## **Fight against international terrorism**

"International terrorism is a phenomenon that takes more and more media time, engages more and more emotions and arouses more and more fear. Its dynamic nature means that the means used to combat it must be as flexible as its nature itself. (Liedel, 2005, p. 87) It is important that combating terrorism does not take place only on one level, but in many directions. This is since terrorism has many sources and ideologies that serve as a method to achieve political goals. This phenomenon is not limited to one continent, but extends to the entire international community.

Multidirectional prevention of terrorism is a necessary element to allow any discussion about combating it at all. Combating the phenomenon of terrorism takes place in four basic directions: police, intelligence, military and political.

When we mean the police plane, we mean the tasks that the police services perform within their units. This is done mainly at the operational level. The efforts of the police authorities are primarily aimed at providing protection to society, protection of life and property. The intelligence plane is one of the best ways to fight terrorism. This is directly related to what the police have already achieved in their actions. The operational activities of the intelligence service have one goal: to prevent attacks by terrorist organizations. „(...) To be effective, the activities of secret services must partially take place in this area, which is protected in democratic societies against state interference”. (Liedel, 2005, p. 89) It is important that all activities of intelligence services are governed by the law of countries.

The military level belongs to the quite specific framework in question. Only one international organization has chosen to use it in the fight against terrorism. It is the North Atlantic Alliance which is a military alliance. However, the documents that define NATO's existence speak of an important trait. They specify that military activities should be carried out in parallel with information, social, economic, legal activities and, above all, with diplomatic activities. This fact shows one thing: it is impossible to obtain any effect without the diversity and multifacetedness of activities. Nevertheless, the military plane itself does not have a preventive or pre-emptive dimension, as was the case at the Police and intelligence level. Here, the action always takes place after the fact. An important element in the fight against terrorism is the political level. It should be carried out in the same field. It is important to create one word for terrorism that is accepted in all countries. This could be an important step in the international fight against terrorism. It should be added that states are the only entities that are bound by law in the international arena. There are no options to prosecute or hold the group accountable of a terrorist nature.

Terrorism is a method of operation. In the fight against this international problem, it must be remembered that "the fight against one method of action must not be allowed to provoke the state and the organs acting on its behalf to transgress

the same norms and principles for which they defend. (Liedel, 2005, p. 93) Even though terrorists deprive their victims of the most important of their rights - the right to life, one cannot fight them against basic norms. It is known that the fight against terrorism is a fight to eliminate methods, not its causes. Terrorism hits humanity, on innocent citizens, on their basic needs, who are quite accidentally in the field of action. One of the responsibilities of governments is to ensure the safety of citizens within the country. The individual elements must fit together. To ensure security in the world, states must cooperate with each other on the international arena. The effectiveness of methods to combat terrorism largely depends on political action. (Hołyst, 2009, p. 357-359) The necessity of these methods can be seen in the example of cyberterrorism, where the actions of the perpetrators or organizations are international. (Liedel, 2010, p. 51-52) However, ensuring the effectiveness of operations at the intelligence and police levels is an integral part of the combat concept. Only appropriate tools for services that fight threats daily and ensure protection of the society, and which are permitted by law, i.e., the political dimension, allow for comprehensive protection of citizens.

Contemporary terrorism is a mixture of fear, paralysis of life, enslavement, taking away what we have earned, first it is an attack on the inalienable right, which is the right to life. This undermines the basics of living in a democratic society. The fight against terrorism will be a challenge for every government and every legal order. This publication focuses on a fragment of this issue - combating terrorism at the police and intelligence level by the police structures of the State.

## **Legal regulations in the field of combating terrorism**

The cooperation of states to combat terrorist groups appeared as early as the 1970s. Some countries were particularly affected by the problem of terrorism and therefore decided to establish the TREVI group. (Banach-Gutierrez, 2008, p. 150) Cooperation was to take place between the ministers of internal affairs and justice of the European Community countries in the field of security. This laid the groundwork for the future third pillar of the European Union.

States looked at the problem of terrorism rather from a national perspective. The services were rather reluctant to the fact of tightening cooperation. It was decided to work as part of bilateral contacts. There were concerns that the wrong people might have access to certain information. The attacks that were carried out on September 11, 2001 in New York and March 11, 2004 in Madrid, were a kind of mobilization in order not to limit the possibility of access to information through bilateral contacts. Following the attack on the World Trade Center in New York, UN Security Council Resolution 1373 was adopted, obliging member states to prevent, finance or plan terrorist acts. It requires the freezing of bank accounts of persons associated with terrorist organizations as well as cooperation in the field of information flow on terrorist activities between Member States. The resolution established the Counter-Terrorism Committee, an advisory body

coordinating the efforts of the member states. The European Union needed solutions on a larger scale. The events in Spain in 2004 showed that terrorism is not a threat to one country. It can touch anyone, without exception. (Aleksandrowicz, 2008, p. 51) The solutions needed by the European Union countries result from the fact that:

- There are no internal restrictions in the Union as regards the flow of services, capital, people or even information. Terrorists are not sleeping on this issue either. This is a great opportunity for them too. They are free to recruit, train, and finance their activities and raise new funds. Security services, intelligence services and the police are on guard in individual member states. The problem may be a different law, inconsistency in action and access to important information.
- Terrorist attacks have a huge impact on society. It is connected with the fact that citizens expect visible effects of actions. Efficient action by the Union should strengthen trust in it. (Jaroszyński, 2008, p. 265)

As a result of the attacks in Madrid, the problem of terrorism again became the topic No. 1. The European Security Strategy in 2003 recognized terrorism as the main threat to security in the world. Before the events took place in 2004, several projects were created to combat the phenomenon of terrorism. On March 25, 2004, the European Council adopted the Declaration on Combating Terrorism as part of an extraordinary session. On international cooperation, the Declaration states that „while supporting the essential role of the United Nations, the European Council will continue its work to implement and apply all UN Security Council resolutions, UN conventions on terrorism and their respective protocols. The European Union will cooperate with international, regional, and supra-regional organizations to strengthen international solidarity in the fight against terrorism (...) The European Council calls for the most effective use of all European Union police forces carrying out their mission in third countries, also in the context of crisis management”. (Declaration on Combating Terrorism, 2004)

The declaration mentions the appointment of a coordinator for combating terrorism. Its tasks will be "to coordinate the activities of the Council in the fight against terrorism and, taking into account the responsibilities of the Commission, it will analyze all the instruments at the disposal of the Union, and will then regularly report to the Council with relevant reports". (Declaration on Combating Terrorism, 2004) It turned out that the decision to appoint this function turned out to be the right thing to do, as it allowed for the systematization of the activities of the European Union bodies. On September 8, 2006, 192 UN member states adopted the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in the form of a resolution with an attached Action Plan.

It must be understood that anti-terrorist activity is not limited only to national terrorism, directed mainly against politicians or the government. Such reasoning would be an impulse not to treat terrorism as a threat on a global scale, but only as a problem of a given country. The problem of terrorism is considered more

broadly. Islamic fundamentalism and the resulting terrorist threat are of a different nature. It is an international threat that requires a completely different strategy. New forms of terrorist activities are emerging to spread fear and polarize society. In the years 2020-2021, terrorist organizations used the global pandemic to promote their own ideas, increase distrust of public institutions and anti-state activities. This is indicated by the Europol report on trends and the terrorist situation in the European Union (The EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report TE-SAT 2021). The need for transnational action becomes apparent here. "Moreover, religiously motivated terrorism - especially with the use of chemical, radiological or atomic (CBRN) - is an unprecedented threat. (Nawojek, 2006, p. 55) "The fact that terrorists care about as many civilians as possible means that a well-conducted attack can have considerable consequences. This is where the intelligence activities of various countries can prove themselves. authorities, close cooperation in the field of cooperation in the exchange of information can be invaluable in the fight against terrorism.

Coherent legal regulations penalizing behavior with a terrorist characteristic and enabling international cooperation in this area should appear in the national orders of states. The legal order of the Republic of Poland includes provisions enabling the prosecution of perpetrators of terrorist acts, including acts of cyberterrorism, and organizational provisions establishing services dealing with terrorist activities. Poland is an active member of the established institutions and implements the postulates of the adopted international standards, including Resolution 1373. Poland meets the highest standards in the multifaceted and structural fight against terrorism.

## **Security and the phenomenon of terrorism**

It has already been mentioned that the phenomenon of terrorism absolutely affects our security. It is commonly accepted that security is the basic need of every person and state, and the lack of it causes anxiety and a sense of threat. The current perception of security, however, is related not only to military problems, but also to non-military threats that modern societies have to face. (Samiczak, 2016, p. 217)

Security is a special value that permeates and connects everything and conditions therefore it comes in so many varieties. Its ambiguity and complexity do not allow for the creation of a closed category, but it forces it to be specified, allowing for a more in-depth analysis. For this reason, the types of security come down to dimensions within which security can be tested, such as: subject-spatial, objective, subject-objective, processual dimension, structural and organizational dimension. Taking into account the objective criterion, there are, among others, political, social and humanitarian security. (Brzeziński, 2009, p. 33)

Security in the social dimension is understood as protection of the existential foundations of people's life, ensuring the possibility of satisfying

individual needs (material and spiritual), realizing life aspirations by creating conditions for work and study, health protection and pension guarantees. (Skrabacz, p. 4) It should be mentioned that in the rapidly developing IT infrastructure, the role of state authorities will be to ensure information and telecommunications security in the context of an integrated international security system. (Jurgielewicz-Delegacz, 2015, p. 667) In turn, security in the humanitarian dimension is the pursuit of ordinary people looking for security in their everyday life. The humanitarian security distinguishes between economic security and health, environmental, personal and other security. When taking anti-terrorist actions, the legislative and executive authorities should take into account not only the effectiveness of the actions taken, but also the welfare of individuals. Based on the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, it is not possible to permanently limit human rights for the sake of the common interest. This would undermine the essence of constitutional rights. It should also be remembered that striving for the good of citizens should be taken into account not only in the fight against terrorism, but also should be translated into care for the principles of a democratic state ruled by law. (Stępnia, 2017, p. 127) In the conducted research, apart from common crime, terrorism and cyberterrorism are indicated as one of the causes of personal / social threat to citizens. (Guzik-Makaruk, 2011, p. 194-195) The Internal Security Agency in Poland defines cyberterrorism as using the achievements of information technology to cause harm, not only in the area of economy, but also in the spheres of political or social life. (Jurgielewicz-Delegacz, 2015, p. 670)

The third type of security is political security, which is primarily a political issue that results from a close relationship with the state and power. (Sulowski, 2009, p. 21) Political threats are aimed at the organizational stability of the state, its structures, processes or institutions. In the case of the state, the scope of security is defined by dividing it into internal and external threats.

For most people, a terrorist act is associated with the use of violence, which has long been an essential element of human activity. Contemporary times are also marked by this phenomenon, but due to the scale of using new means of violence, terrorist activities are distinguished by a much wider range. The scale and size of this phenomenon at the beginning of the 21st century turned into a global threat and gained a transnational character. Contemporary terrorist organizations operate on all continents and gain supporters from various nationalities.

In order to effectively counteract terrorist threats, it is necessary to know the goals of terrorist activities and the means used to achieve them. The tactical goal of an attack is related to two factors. The first is the strategic goal of a given terrorist group. The second is the current political situation, both within the group itself, within the target state, and the international situation. Both of these factors can influence the target of a particular attack to a varying degree<sup>28</sup>. (Kiełt, 2015, p. 322)

## **Anti-terrorist services**

The factors influencing the political security of the state include, among others: ensuring the constitutional order, political stability, democracy, public order, and the state economy. With regard to the national interest of the Republic of Poland in the field of security, Art. 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland (Journal of Laws 1997 No. 78, item 483, as amended) speaks of the need to have an effective security potential, Poland's strong position on the international arena, individual and collective protection of citizens and ensuring their freedom to exercise their freedoms and rights and ensuring the sustainable development of the social and economic potential of the state.

In the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland of 4 November 2014, combating terrorism appears several times: terrorism as a key threat to global security, terrorism as a real threat to the security of the Republic of Poland, identification of terrorist groups as beneficiaries of undermining the credibility of disarmament agreements. (National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland. 2014) Terrorism is also indicated as an instrument of possible ethnic or religious extremism. This act also points to the threat of cyberterrorism as a result of the development of new ICT technologies and the Internet.

The Strategy for the Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022 indicates that special attention is paid to activities related to combating international terrorism, organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery, counterintelligence protection, economic security of the State and the protection of classified information. (Strategy for the Development..., 2022, p. 23) International terrorism will remain a threat to Poland's security. The threat of terrorist attacks directed against Polish territory may increase in the future, due to the international activity of our country, especially resulting from allied commitments. The priority will be to increase the effectiveness of bilateral and multilateral cooperation, especially with the USA and in the Weimar Triangle formula, the Visegrad Group. Co-creation of a stable security environment, including a terrorist one. It will also require increasing the effectiveness of international law and international institutions as well as efficient use of international instruments in the area of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, arms control and disarmament, as well as confidence and security building measures, including cybersecurity or development aid. (Strategy for the Development..., 2022, p. 8)

In order to perform these tasks, including ensuring the internal order of the state, competent services have been established in Poland, including Police, Border Guard, Military Police, Internal Security Agency, Foreign Intelligence Agency and Central Anticorruption Bureau, and they have been entrusted with specific tasks in the field of combating terrorism. In this catalog, it is worth analyzing the special role of the Police as the basic entity in the security and public order system.

Among the many entities that have counter-terrorist activities in the scope of their competences, the Police are an important element of the national system of identifying, preventing and responding to terrorist offenses. In its organizational structures, it has specialized organizational units covering the scope of its activities, among others:

- a) physical combating of terrorist crimes, including conducting police negotiations - the Anti-Terrorist Operations Bureau of the Police Headquarters,
- b) operational identification of terrorist crimes - Central Investigation Bureau of the Polish Police Headquarters,
- c) securing mass events, supervision over the security of critical infrastructure facilities - the Chief Police Staff of the General Police Headquarters,
- d) social education for counteracting crime, including threats of a terrorist nature - officers of the preventive service of Police units at the level of provincial police headquarters / Warsaw Police Headquarters as well as city / district and powiat Police headquarters - Prevention Office of the Police Headquarters.

Police representatives are part of national and international bodies dealing with the analysis and exchange of information on threats from terrorist and extremist crime at the strategic and operational level. On the international forum, these are mainly Interpol, Europol, and the Working Group on Terrorism operating under the Third Pillar of the EU. At the national level, mention should be made of the Interministerial Team for Terrorist Threats, operating until 2006, also performing responsible tasks, working since 2008 at the Anti-Terrorist Center of the Internal Security Agency. Pursuant to the relevant provisions, the Police are obliged to cooperate in the framework of preventing and combating terrorism with (Sitko, 2013, p. 27-28):

- a) the State Fire Service and the Railway Security Guard in order to monitor transports and places of storage of harmful substances posing a threat to public safety,
- b) the Internal Security Agency, the Military Police and the Border Guard in order to exchange knowledge about terrorism-related crime and the sources of its financing,
- c) an international group of the PWGT in the field of identifying and combating terrorism,
- d) Europol and Interpol,
- e) the State Protection Service,
- f) the Ministry of Health,
- g) neighboring countries as part of cross-border cooperation and cooperation,
- h) the media.

The police are obliged to cooperate on an ongoing basis in the scope of exchange of information on border crossing and migration by persons suspected of terrorist activity, with the local Border Guard posts. The task of the Police is also to analyze all obtained information on the possibility of a terrorist threat and

their exchange with the Internal Security Agency, the State Protection Service, the Military Police, the Border Service, the Customs and Treasury Service and between individual police units and other law enforcement services. The role of the Police in the implementation of tasks related to the phenomenon of terrorism can be divided into two areas. The first area covers the prevention and combating of terrorism, here the role of the Police is to take preventive actions. The second area is responding to a terrorist attack, where the role of the Police is to deal with a crisis situation as quickly as possible, according to strictly defined and prepared procedures. (Sitko, 2013, p. 29)

The advent of the Internet has introduced numerous opportunities in accessing tools that can be used in terrorist attacks, which creates new challenges for the services. Attacks in Europe took place in Great Britain, Ireland, France, Germany and Spain, Belgium, but they can also happen in Poland. Therefore, we should be prepared for any form of terrorist attacks, including attacks in cyberspace. Where a single person, a group of people, and even the critical infrastructure of the entire country can fall victim. (II Polish National Scientific Conference, 2017, p. 28)

### **Operation of the Office of Anti-Terrorist Operations of the Police Headquarters**

The problem of terrorism is viewed in a different way by the broadly understood society from the perspective of media reports, and a completely different approach is in relation to special units dedicated to this. In the case of specialized services, it is a direct confrontation with the phenomenon of terrorism and the elimination of the threat.

Today, the goal of terrorists is different than before, now the goal of a terrorist is to kill as many people as possible in a way that will terrify society as much as possible. Currently, a terrorist often assumes and even expects a confrontation with anti-terrorist units. For an assassin, killing an officer of such a unit is additional glory. (Musimy działać perfekcyjnie, 2017) Anti-terrorist services must be prepared for such actions and act fully professionally. Terrorists have developed their own training systems, they learn how to minimize their losses and, at the same time, how to inflict as much damage on the enemy as possible.

Changes in the anti-terrorist cells have been taking place since 2015. At that time, he was appointed, inter alia, the central anti-terrorist reserve of the Police Commander in Chief, which, in the event of announcing the 2nd or 3rd level of alerting or if it is necessary to use more than one anti-terrorist sub-unit in a police operation, may be directed to act by a decision of the Police Commander in Chief. Subsequent changes were dictated by the entry into force in June 2016 of the Act on anti-terrorist activities (i.e. Journal of Laws of 2021, item 815), and in fact the need to ensure security during the NATO summit and World Youth Day. The



results and the safe course of both of these events prove that the direction in which the anti-terrorist units are heading is the right and, above all, necessary direction.

The most important changes in the structures of the anti-terrorist services include, first of all, the unification of structures and changes in training. The unification of structures in terms of organization took place on May 1, 2017. Independent Anti-Terrorist Sub-Units were created from the anti-terrorist units of provincial headquarters and the Execution Department of the Warsaw Police Headquarters, then reorganized into Independent Counter-Terrorist Sub-Units of the Police. Each of them is headed by a commander. The next step is to standardize the full-time structures so that each SPKP consists of a section headed by a manager. As part of their duties, managers may, *inter alia*, be assigned to command specific combat operations. This standardization of command is very important because it directly translates into speed and effectiveness<sup>39</sup>. (Musimy działać perfekcyjnie, 2017) These two features determine the quality of work and professionalism of a given service. Another important change is the strengthening of each SPKP with new "general police" posts, which will exclude officers from the combat division from the necessity to perform duty, logistic service of the sub-unit, etc., and will allow them to be used for combat operations. This is a significant change because today each SPKP has several dozen jobs. The changes do not only concern the unification of structures, but also uniforms and weapons. As far as training is concerned, the most anticipated changes take place and continue to do so. The services strive to ensure that each activity of each policemen, of each implementation team, constitutes an element of a perfectly functioning whole. A dedicated unit carrying out a specific action, consisting of policemen from two different units, equally well trained, but in some respects slightly different, will work very well, but if both are trained equally well and at the same time, the whole will work perfectly. Observing how quickly the type of threats that Europe and the world are fighting are changing rapidly, any training system should react just as quickly.

The Bureau of Anti-Terrorist Operations of the Police Headquarters, as the central counter-terrorist unit, operates in the EU task force ATLAS, which brings together special police anti-terrorist units of the European Community countries. Within this group, documents are exchanged, meetings are held with officers of other services, and joint analyzes of threats and specific events are carried out, also in terms of possible cooperation. All units associated in ATLAS work on uniform documents, thanks to which the flow of information is faster and less prone to distortions. How much such cooperation is needed is shown by the experience of recent attacks, in which the citizens of A plan an attack in B, and then - if it was not a suicide attack - try to flee and take refuge in C. they exist, it is obvious, but it imposes specific requirements on anti-terrorist units. (Musimy działać perfekcyjnie, 2017)

An interesting element of cooperation within ATLAS are also working groups devoted to various issues. Each of them is responsible for one area of

operation, which is very different, e.g. activities on the water, activities in buildings, drones, public transport, parachute jumping, sharpshooters etc. The group responsible for a given area organizes exercises in this area, conducts analyzes, research, and looks for solutions to problems. Of course, the point of existence of such groups is the exchange of information. Due to the number of issues, no formation will penetrate all of them thoroughly. Such a specialization allows everyone to be up to date in every field.

It is also important that the Act on anti-terrorist activities added to the tasks of the Police the task of conducting counter-terrorist activities in the event of a suspected or occurrence of a terrorist event. Currently, these activities are carried out by anti-terrorist units of the Police. The way of carrying out tasks during counter-terrorist activities with the use of anti-terrorist tactics, specialized forces and resources and training is different than the activities carried out by the criminal, investigative or preventive services.

This direction resulted in the need to separate anti-terrorist units and units of the Police from the prevention service, and in accordance with the needs, an independent counter-terrorist service, the so-called Central Counterterrorism Unit of the Police BOA (Anti-Terrorist Protection Bureau). The task of the CPKP "BOA" is, inter alia, counteracting terrorism and fighting it physically, as well as organizing, coordinating and supervising the activities of the Police in this area, in particular:

1. conducting combat and reconnaissance activities aimed at eliminating terrorist attacks, as well as counteracting events of this nature, including activities of a particular degree of complexity and in the environment exposed to a chemical, biological, ionizing, nuclear radiation and explosives);
2. carrying out activities requiring the use of specialized forces and means or the use of special tactics;
3. conducting police negotiations;
4. performing tasks supporting protective activities undertaken in relation to the protected persons;
5. supporting the activities of Police organizational units and organizational units of the General Police Headquarters in conditions of a particular threat or requiring specific qualifications and skills;
6. coordinating the preparations of the Police to conduct combat, mining and pyrotechnic activities and police negotiations;
7. analyzing various aspects of combating terrorism and undertaking initiatives influencing the proper performance of Police tasks in this area;
8. cooperation with domestic and foreign formations competent in the matters of counteracting and combating terrorism.

The sub-unit performs the tasks of a special intervention unit referred to in Council Decision 2008/617 / JHA of 23 June 2008 on improving cooperation between special intervention units of the European Union Member States in crisis situations (Journal of Laws UE L 210 of 06.08. . 2008, p. 73).

She will be responsible for conducting counter-terrorist activities. This will increase the ability and ability to respond to terrorist threats by the Police in the state's anti-terrorist security system.

## **Central Cybercrime Bureau**

Pursuant to the Act of 17 December 2021 on the establishment of the Central Cybercrime Bureau, a new organizational unit of the Police was established, competent to identify and combat crimes committed with the use of an IT system, an ICT system, prevent these crimes, as well as detect and prosecute their perpetrators. This corresponds to the assumptions outlined in the Strategy for the Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland of 2022, which indicated that a particular challenge for the security of Poland, like other highly developed countries, including our close allies and partners, will be negative impacts in cyberspace, resulting from intentional or unintentional human activities or caused by a breakdown or accident, disruptions in the functioning of the ICT infrastructure. (Strategy for the Development..., 2022, p. 33)

The Cybercrime Fighting Office carries out tasks related to the creation of conditions for the effective detection of perpetrators of crimes committed with the use of modern ICT technologies

The tasks of the Office for Combating Cybercrime include in particular:

1. supervising, coordinating and supporting activities aimed at combating cybercrime conducted by the provincial (Warsaw) Police headquarters in the field of operational and intelligence activities and cooperation with the Central Police Investigation Bureau in this regard;
2. carrying out operational and reconnaissance activities that are the property of the bureau;
3. initiating and conducting cooperation with government administration bodies, courts, public prosecutor's offices, state institutions, as well as private entities in the scope of tasks remaining within the competence of the bureau;
4. conducting international cooperation and cooperation with the Office for International Police Cooperation in the scope of tasks remaining within the competence of the office;
5. running a 24-hour service aimed at coordinating the activities of the Police in the field of threats to crimes in the Internet, combating them and cooperation of Police organizational units with domestic and foreign non-police authorities and entities;
6. conducting technical consultations, initiating and supporting research and projects, as well as cooperation with domestic and foreign entities aimed at identifying and implementing modern solutions in the fight against cybercrime. (Biuro do Walki z Cyberprzestepczoscia, 2022)

This service, whose full-time employment will amount to 1,800 police positions, will deal with disclosing and combating cybercrime (Gryszczyńska,

Szpor, 2017, p. 31-32), regardless of the way the perpetrators or organizations operate. The employed Police officers are to have competences in the field of IT security (computer forensic) and combating computer crime or crime in computer networks. The subject scope of BCPZ's activity is based on specific categories of crimes (computer crimes) and a specific method of operation of the perpetrators of these prohibited acts. In the event of disclosure of cyber-terrorist activities, the basic activities will be performed by employees and specialists of this Bureau, and then, in accordance with the factual jurisdiction, transferred to the appropriate counter-terrorist unit. It should be noted that the Polish criminal code defines a terrorist offense. However, this legal definition does not indicate the mode of action of the perpetrators, which means that it is possible that an act of computer crime may be classified as a terrorist crime (Article 115 § 20 of the CC). This means that crimes such as the protection of IT data for the security of the country or causing damage to databases will constitute terrorist crimes, and due to the material competence of the Bureau, they will fall under its jurisdiction<sup>46</sup>. (Dziwisz, 2013, p. 279)

## **Conclusion**

As a member of the democratic international community, Poland saw the need to take practical steps to strengthen measures to combat international terrorism both internally and internationally. The introduction of legislative changes in the country, the assumption of new obligations related to the instruments of international law, as well as the introduction of practical solutions at the operational level increase the level of state security. Poland is an active subject of international relations. (Kiełt, 2015, p. 323) As a member state of the United Nations and the EU, Poland implements the postulates adopted within the framework of international cooperation and international law.

The summary of the Strategy for the Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland of 2022 indicates "The analysis of the nature of the contemporary national security environment shows that in the coming years, the main challenges and threats for Poland will be related to: the dynamics of relations within NATO and the EU and the scale of the US involvement in security European law, ensuring the effectiveness of international law, international terrorism and organized international crime, and the progressive proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery ". In the chapter "Chance for Poland's security", the title opportunity should be seen in strengthening international law and ensuring its universal respect, development of legal norms and executive mechanisms that will be effective tools in combating new threats, especially those related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, including cyber-terrorism, and crime organized and the phenomenon of failed states.

The awareness of the nature of the threat resulting from a terrorist attack plays a key role in counter-terrorist prevention. Knowing the ways to recognize the symptoms of a possible threat, and to react safely to them, you can prevent it from being carried out. On the other hand, the knowledge of response procedures in the event of a terrorist attack may determine the scale of its negative effects. That is why it is so important that the actions of the Police are consistent in order to counteract the phenomenon of terrorism, both nationally and globally.

This means that in a changing world, the threats we have known so far are evolving and completely new ones appear next to them. Criminals and terrorists are looking for new ways to achieve their goals. Only the methods of operation indicated above - including increasing the power of action of relevant services - will allow for relatively quick disclosure of these threats in order to avoid them or at least minimize them. The direction of changes in the police services is a consequence of the changes taking place and sets the Police tasks in line with today's reality and contemporary threats.

## References

- ALEKSANDROWICZ, T. 2008. International Terrorism, Academic and Professional Publishing, Warsaw, 2008
- BANACH-GUTIERREZ, J. 2008. Police cooperation in the European Union from TREVI to Schengen III, New Codification of Criminal Law T. XXIII, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław, 2008
- BRZEZIŃSKI, B. 2009. Types of state security. In Internal security of the state, Selected issues, edited by S. Sulowski, M. Brzeziński, Warsaw, 2009.
- Declaration on Combating Terrorism, 25 March 2004, Article 12,
- DZIWIŚ, S. 2013. Criminal liability for terrorist crimes committed in cyberspace in: Cyberterrorism as a threat to the 21st century. Political and legal perspective, ed. Podraza A., Potakowski P., Wiak K., Wyd. Difin, Warsaw, 2013
- GRYSZCZYŃSKA A., SZPOR G (ed.). 2017. Internet Security Strategies, C.H. Beck, Warsaw 2017,
- GUZIK-MAKARUK, E. M. (ed.). 2011. The sense of security of citizens in Poland. Identification and counteracting modern threats. Ed. Wolters Kluwer Polska Sp. z.o.o., Warsaw, 2011
- HOŁYST, B. 2009. Forensic Psychology, Wyd. LexisNexis, Warsaw, 2009
- HOŁYST, B. 2011. Terrorism, Issue 2 revised, Volume I, Wyd. LexisNexis, Warsaw, 2011
- II Polish National Scientific Conference, On terrorism in practice and science, (in :) Police 997, November 2017,
- JAROSZYŃSKI, J. 2008. Contemporary dimension of antiterrorism. Wydawnictwo TRIO Collegium Civitas, Warszawa, 2008

JURGIELEWICZ-DELEGACZ, E. 2015. Selected legal and criminological aspects of cyberterrorism in Poland. In *Crime in the 21st century. Prevention and fight. Technological and IT problems* ed. Pływaczewski E. W., Filipkowski W., Rau Z., Wyd. Wolters Kluwer SA, Warsaw, 2015

KIEŁT, A. 2015. Counteracting terrorism as an element of actions for the security of the state, WSPIA Publishing House in Rzeszów, Rzeszów, 2015.

KIEŁT, A. 2015. Counteracting terrorism as an element of activities for the sake of state security, Wydawnictwo WSPIA Rzeszów, 2015.

LIEDEL K., PIASECKA P. 2004. Protection of citizens and public institutions against attacks of terrorism and violence – poradnik, Warsaw, 2004

LIEDEL, K. 2005. Terrorism. A sign of our time, Warszawa, 2005

LIEDEL, K. 2010. Information Management in the Fight Against Terrorism, Wyd. TRIO, Warsaw, 2010

MARTIN, G., 2009. Understanding Terrorism. Challenges, Perspectives and Issues, London, New Delhi, Washington, DC, 2009

National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland. 2014.

NAWOJEK, M. 2006. The European Union and Terrorism after the Attacks in Madrid – selected aspects. In LIEDEL, K., MARSZAŁEK – KAWA. J., WUDARSKI, Sz. Political methods of combating terrorism, Toruń, 2006

PAWŁOWSKI, J. 2001. Terrorism in the contemporary world, Wyd. Wołoszański, Warsaw, 2001

SAMICZAK, K. 2016. Preventive action of the Police and social security. In *Polish Society 'in the Second Decade of the Twenty-First Century: Dimensions, Problems, Ideas*, edited by Such-Pyrgiel M., Novikova K., Józefów, 2016.

SITKO P. 2013. Terrorism. The role and place of the Police in fighting it, Police School in Katowice, Katowice, 2013.

SKRABACZ, M. Social security. Theoretical and practical foundations.

STĘPNIAK, K. Fight against terrorism and cyberterrorism versus protection of constitutional rights and freedoms of an individual. In *Internet. Security strategies* (eds.) Szpor A., Gryszczyńska A. Wydawnictwo C.H. Beck, Warsaw, 2017

Strategy for the Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland. 2022

SULOWSKI, S. 2009. About the new security paradigm in the era of globalization. *Internal security of the state, Selected issues*, edited by S. Sulowski, M. Brzeziński, Warsaw, 2009

# SOFT POWER“ INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND SERBIA TOWARD KOSOVO

Vesna Stanković Pejnović<sup>1</sup>

## ABSTRACT

*“Soft power” is based on the idea or ability to set political priorities in a way that shapes the desires of others, by connecting with invisible forms of power such as culture, ideology, and institutions. Regional co-operation is part of the evaluations of the Western Balkan countries on the road to EU integration and regional economies to align with EU rapprochement programs and policies. the recipe used by the EU in the Western Balkans, built around the notion of conditionality. The new concept of “resilience” which advanced in the EU’s Global Strategy is simply stability repackaged, and it falls short of re-balancing the basis upon which the EU’s distinctive claim for normative power rests. Regionalizing the EU’s enlargement policy would aim at increasing the regional ownership of the European integration project in the Western Balkans. According to National Development Strategy 2021– 2030 which coincides with the Decade of Action policy planning and monitoring as long-term development objectives are focused on four thematic pillars: human capital; rule of law and good governance; development of competitive industries; and development of infrastructure. It remains to be seen how the ‘four freedoms’, trade, investment, mobility, and digital integration, will be achieved in the Western Balkans and bring about fundamental change of political and economic. The role of civil society networks is essential, assisted by various non-governmental organizations, organizations for the fight for democracy and protection of human rights, which often act in synchrony in mutual synergy and are promoted in the media. Serbia can achieve “soft power” culturally through the preservation of identity and religion as an element that strengthens and emphasizes the national identity of Serbs in Kosovo. The paper proves that the actors who led the aggression on Kosovo are now using “soft power” to implement their influence through regional cooperation of the six Balkan states, which is an opportunity for Serbia to use “soft power” to maintain the identity of the Serbian people in Kosovo.*

**Key words:** *“soft power”, Kosovo, international community, identity, religion*

## Introduction

The problems with Kosovo and its consequences, as well as the entire media, political and legal structure formed on this occasion, indicated the establishment of a new world order, different from the traditional form of representative democracy, with silent colonization and cooperation with NATO peacekeeping forces. Through the articulation of modern wars, the infinity of the present is recognized, since wars have no reality in the present. Yet there has always been an imperial trinity; an army that conquers, trade that opens the market and missionaries, preachers as advocates of respect for human rights.

---

<sup>1</sup> Vesna Stanković Pejnović, research assistant, Intitution for Political Studies, Svetozara Markovića 36, 11000 Belgrade, Serbia, vesna.stankovic.pejnovic@gmail.com.

The United States sees the whole world as a field of its interests and strives to achieve imperial power that knows no borders. American interventionism is not classically imperial because the United States is an imperial power without an empire, a hegemonic power without a territory. (Badiou, 2006, 43-45) The reality consists of the American game of power (financial and military power of the "international community") and the UN parliamentary game (with a subordinate role to power). (Ibid, 42) . In order to implement their power as easily as possible, they developed the use value of tutoring democracy and pragmatic crypto-ideology.

The reality consists of the American game of power (financial and military power of the "international community") and the UN parliamentary game (with a subordinate role to power). In order to implement their power as easily as possible, they developed the use value of tutoring democracy and pragmatic crypto-ideology.

The leading actors in the aggression on Kosovo were not states (with the exception of the United States), but institutions. The aggression in Kosovo is not explained in the discourse of traditional state interests, but in the institutional field of "European security", with the support of impersonal words such as "West", "communities of values", "new world order". The discourses are impersonal, and the aggression on Kosovo has described the collective body of the West, which appears in the field of symbolic exchange and simulation. (Badiou, 2012, 41).

## **Soft power**

Power is the ability to achieve set goals or the ability to achieve desired results by influencing others. Sources of power are never static and change in today's world. Power itself is arbitrariness which, in its essence, wants only itself, and is not responsible to anyone. Power is general and all-encompassing, and unlike force, it rules over a larger area and for a longer period of time. Power is a relationship of forces, violence is its companion, but not necessarily its integral part.

According to Karl Deutsch, will is connected with power. An organization can try to act "according to character", i.e.. by refusing to adapt and remain unchanged as a form of "unwavering desire", i.e.. a form of "character" action. (Deutsch, 1963, 111).

Power is also the ability of organizations to implement projections of their internal structure on the environment and produce norms and normalization as an essential form of rational sociability.

Forcing other states to change can be called a direct or commanding method of exercising power, as a form of "hard power" based on the promise of a reward or threat. Unlike such power, the soft or indirect way to exercise power lies in its abstraction in which every person is trapped in a pyramidal social order. (Canetti, 2006)



Soft power is based on the idea or ability to set political priorities in a way that shapes the desires of others, by connecting with invisible forms of power such as culture, ideology, and institutions. Unlike hard power, which is present in industrializing and pre-industrial parts of the world, soft power is present in relations between post-industrial societies of the information age in which democratic peace prevails. (Nye, 2008, 70) Power is multidimensional and is not determined exclusively in the military sense, because the structures have become more complex, but is visible in the world of global communications and growing transnational relations. (Nye, 2008)

Power among states operates in a pattern reminiscent of a complex three-dimensional chessboard, on which power acts horizontally and vertically based on control in the bureaucratic coordination of independent corporate entities (Brzezinski, 2016). Soft power is the ability to draw another to your side, and that is more significant, stronger, more subtle than coercion. "Soft power" springs from the attractiveness of the state itself, its culture, political ideals and the overall policy of the state in question. (Nye, 2008, 31) Soft power represents the ability to influence the preferences of others, that is, it is about the power of shaping. When the logic of power becomes absolute, it triumphs over the political - the logic of civil peace and the rule of law - and encourages the opening of Pandora's box of social implosion. (Virilio, 2007, 47).

The new form of government contains a more cunning, ie. covert way, because "new procedures of power do not function as a right, but as a technique, not as a law, but as normalization, not as punishment, but as control. They are implemented at levels and forms that transcend the state and its apparatuses." A whole history remains to be written of spaces-which would at the same time be the history of powers (both these terms in the plural)-from the great strategies of geo-politics to the little tactics of the habitat. (Foucault, 1972, 140)

Governments have always controlled the flow of information, but new technology is transforming the basic structures of world politics. That is why in the New Age of the technocratic era, those who control information have power. The hard power of nation states is no longer the main actor in the event, but a new reality has been created in which the possibility of social and political control has been increased in order to establish control over all citizens. Today, there is a great need to cover up the need for strong state power, while at the same time it is being brutally used. A whole history remains to be written of spaces-which would at the same time be the history of powers (both these terms in the plural)-from the great strategies of geo-politics to the little tactics of the habitat. (Foucault, 1972, 142) Governments lose sovereignty and share areas of influence with secret government actors who "rule information" in order to strengthen their soft power and put pressure on governments directly or indirectly. Paraphrased, in the words of Francis Bacon, the government is a society that sees and controls everything, but which no one else sees. The information war encompasses the "humanitarian" dimension of the "conflict over human rights", so one gets an idea of the ethical

dimension of the global program of information domination. In this "real time" era of info war, large-scale panoptic optics, the ability to monitor not only hostile but also friendly movements is growing thanks to the control of public opinion. Cybernetics of the system strives to dominate the lives of nations in the economic and political field - and especially in the field of global geopolitics. (Virilio, 2007, 21-24).

### **The soft power of the international community**

Building trust among the countries of the Western Balkans is a difficult and time-consuming process due to general mistrust and the tendency to avoid mutual cooperation. This is an obvious obstacle to Euro-Atlantic integration, as cooperation would facilitate and accelerate necessary reforms. Many authors believe that close NATO and EU cooperation with the Western Balkans is important for stability and security because they can direct countries in the region to work together rather than against each other. (Andreychuk, 2018)

According to this position, they have ways to persuade other countries and organizations to act in their interest, because American companies have a significant economic role within the stagnant and unstable global economy. (Stanković Pejnović, 2014, 120). In all segments of social events, the unquestionable success of the United States in imposing its power on the world is obvious, because it is a traditional Hegelian delusion about identifying success with the right. Under US leadership, NATO has presented itself as a protector of peace. NATO waged an epistemological war to secure its privileged moral status in the fight against systemic anarchy in the international system, the inherent ambivalence and indecision that necessarily requires political identity creation. The new, post-national, world order is hegemony based mainly on the means of seduction, promoting brands such as NATO, Boeing, CNN, democracy, IMF, human rights, the euro ... First of all, coercive actions like the one in Kosovo are needed to would improve brand recognition. (Medvedev, 2000, 19)

With the disintegration of Yugoslavia, initiatives were launched that were supposed to define the system of relations with the Western Balkans. In the past, political elites in the Western Balkans have focused more on maintaining the status quo that kept them in power than on forcing the necessary reforms. (Less, 2016, Mujanovic 2017)

The EU has sought to clarify these relations with a "regional approach". The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SPSEE) was established in 1999 as a form of peace strategy and security in the region to "promote peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity" for stability in the region, including a group of countries outside the Western Balkans.

Regional cooperation in the Western Balkans became possible only after the agreement on the regional representation of Kosovo in 2012 and the First Agreement on the principles governing the normalization of relations in 2013,

between Kosovo and Serbia. This enabled the launch of the Berlin Process in 2014, which further shaped regional cooperation through the Western Balkans Six format.

Regional co-operation is part of evaluations of the Western Balkan countries on the road to EU integration and regional economies, with the aim of aligning with EU rapprochement programs and policies. As such, regional cooperation is vital to the EU integration process. The Multi-Annual Action Plan on the Regional Economic Area of the Western Balkans (MAP REA) was supported by the leaders of the Western Balkans in the Berlin Process in Trieste. The goal of the Berlin Process is to advance the EU agenda in three dimensions: economic growth and connectivity, good neighborly relations and regional cooperation, and the development of civil society and interpersonal relations. It was launched as an additional and complementary process, essentially anchored in the normative approach to EU membership (EU Enlargement Strategy 2013) and the Regional Competitiveness and Growth Strategy (SEE 2020). In light of this very demanding process, promised the region more than they can (or intend to) meet "and that the overall implementation of soft measures remains weak. (Hackaj, Hackaj, 2017, 25–26)

According to a Balkan Group report, Kosovo did not welcome the common market initiative, but its government agreed to another form of regional economic co-operation as a last-minute compromise. Kosovo's political leadership has never considered regional integration to be in line with European integration, and as such, a cost-benefit analysis has never been conducted by any of its implementing institutions. (Balkans Group report, 2018)

In October 2019, in a parallel process, the leaders of Serbia, Northern Macedonia and Albania announced the so-called "Mini-Schengen" initiative that seeks to establish the free movement of people, goods, services and capital in the Western Balkans. In Kosovo, this was not a failure for all politicians, analysts, academia and civil society. In October 2019, the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, the Prime Minister of Albania, Edi Rama, and the Prime Minister of Northern Macedonia, Zoran Zaev, initiated the so-called Schengen "with the aim of promoting economic integration, free movement of people, goods, services and capital through them using only ID cards." (Holroyd, Sánche, 2019)

Kosovo is recommended to align key priorities and objectives in regional programs and initiatives, with the development of cross-sectoral and inter-institutional approaches to achieving priorities and regional programs and initiatives (especially those under the Berlin Process and the "mini-Schengen"), involving civil society and experts' group on regional cooperation issues related to domestic and European agendas. (Marciacq, 2017, 24)

Kosovo's backwardness in all areas and its obstacles to joining the regional co-operation network are twofold: political barriers such as non-recognition by the two Western Balkan countries and five EU members; is not an "associated country" in the EU's Horizon 2020 funding program; there is no domain of the

country's internet code, there are significant administrative and technical obstacles due to the lack of experts and coordinators, the lack of a stock exchange, while the most significant are the lack of political stability and frequent elections. (Balkans Policy Research Group, 2021).

NATO countries have argued that their political action is based, not on power, but on international responsibility, not national interests. From that perspective, it is understandable to interpret NATO's engagement in a new type of cosmopolitan mission, as part of a battle in which "difference" was not necessarily interpreted as hostility. NATO countries were careful not to define Serbia, and especially Serbs as a people, as their enemies, emphasizing that they are defending human rights, and not striving to conquer a country. From the West's perspective, the Balkans are the Otherness to the Civilized West, the "cradle of the wild beast." (Žižek, Hamza, 2013, 17). Their efforts were directed towards "post-national war", and NATO's new political campaign was part of "military humanism", which unites the classic notions of war and the novelty of NATO's efforts. (Beck, 1999, 987)

### **Soft power of Serbia - preservation of identity**

The mediators of the nation states and Brussels are marked by double loyalty; strives to achieve an EU enlargement project that affects the change of the existing identity, and on the other hand, they are committed to preserving their own identity. Various cooperation projects are based on the matrix of administrative language combined with political ideas on interstate cooperation, rule of law, respect for diversity, equality and freedom of all citizens, and on the other hand are technical data on specialized areas. The Union provides models, and candidate countries need to incorporate them into their legislation. (Zielonka, 2006, 56)

Can regional cooperation strengthen or weaken national identity? The phrase "returning to Europe" is used as proof of lost identity as way to the circle to which we have always belonged, but unjustly "thrown out". Identity crisis occurs when the present is uncertain for people, and the future is uncertain, uncertain, full of fear and anticipation. Today, the crisis of identity is so obvious that we could even talk about the "silent disappearance" of identity, if there were no rare heroes of the spirit who are aware of that crisis.

It is hard to believe that national identity can be preserved behind the great words of universalism. It is questionable how much citizens believe in the idea that the EU is a joint project of building democracy, peace, prosperity, because it is increasingly emerging as an arena in which states are fighting for their national interests based on zero sum logic. In such real conditions, the soft power that Serbia can use in the case of Kosovo is help in maintaining the identity of the Serbian people. The very notion of identity is vague because it has multiple explanations. Already observing, "identity is the feeling of an individual or a

group about itself as a product of self-awareness that the entity possesses some qualities that distinguish it from other groups. Identities can be territorial, cultural, political, social and national, but they are a "product" of interaction between individuals. The dialectic of the interrelationships between state sovereignty and national identity is complex, often contradictory, phenomenology is intricate and ideologically blurred - but their historical ontology is deep and indisputable. (Mitrović, 2016, 60).

External expressions of identity can also be shaped by wider social circles or by political authorities. National identity unites ethnic and cultural determination. A nation is a group that invokes a common identity with the right to a state. There is a noticeable change in cultural, social and national identity as a result of unfavorable internal social turmoil, the negative consequences of which in Serbian society are exacerbated by the constant and inconspicuous external imposition of radical changes. With the synchronized use of traditional, modern and postmodern means and methods of collective coercion and manipulation, soft power is "exercised by strong states over weaker ones."

The sense of belonging to an ethnic group is determined by objective (language, religion, territory) and subjective factors (common origin, history, memories, myths, symbols). "The importance of a national identity for a society depends on the society's aspiration to preserve its traditions and customs, the political context and the circumstances in which that society finds itself." (Mitrović, 2016, 38).

Based on such a perspective, Serbia is able to implement cultural hegemony through various cultural and educational institutions and non-governmental organizations. Antonio Gramsci, gives an overview of the theory of cultural hegemony, which is aimed at invisible changes in opinions and moods in the consciousness of every person. According to Gramsci, domination in society is achieved by one class through cultural hegemony, through techniques of subordination and voluntary acceptance of subordinates through the press, mass media, organized religion, school system and commercialization of popular culture. (Gramsci, 1999).

Gramsci's idea of cultural hegemony and quiet, gradual changes in the consciousness of citizens is, in a way, a precursor to what is a form of "soft power". Such a process is crucial, according to Gramsci, because the influence of the ruling elite is spreading gradually in all social segments in which the best organized groups win, and not groups whose demands are the fairest or most objective. The soft power of Serbia can also spread through religion, because religion and nation have common elements that shape collective identities. When language and religion are politically and ideologically opposed, they foster internal conflicts, deep national divisions and nation divisions. (Mitrović 2016, 49).

Religion can be part of shaping national consciousness, important for shaping national identity. "Religion, language, history, tradition form the core of

the national identity not only of Serbian but also of any other identity. (Mitrović 2016, 53) Archibald Reiss also emphasized that "national piety is the foundation of Serbian national identity." (Rajs, 2005, 4). Such an approach is still possible today because the national identity of Serbs in Kosovo is endangered, and they see themselves as bearers of preserving old, traditional customs and faith. "Their identity is a construct of specific circumstances that arise from the border character of Kosovo, which leads to fragmentation and non-belonging to any group. They do not receive recognition from Kosovo Albanians or other residents of Serbia due to different customs and organization of life, so their affiliation and national identity are called into question. "In Kosovo, Serbian culture and traditions have been suppressed for years and by the pressure of other traditions. Although the survival of the Serbian tradition is in great danger through various informal paths of power, it is necessary to greatly strengthen the cultural identity of Serbs. "Denying the national tradition is the surest way to lose national identity and begin to take away state sovereignty until it slowly disappears," because Albanian forces are imperceptibly but systematically destroying and erasing or distorting Serbian tradition. (Mitrović, 2016, 53).

## **Conclusion**

"Rulers of simulated reality" play games with those they rule over, united in a game of false appearances. Their "soft power" is spreading in an effort to make the world and people more open and interconnected. For people, the most important thing is appearance, approach to the problem, appearance itself. "Reality" is in itself a representation, and the representation of "reality" is political, because there is a "linguistic turn" in philosophy, (Derrida, 1988, 148).

According to Derrida, all reality has a structure of differential traces. Because of this approach, the ruling elite of the New Age emphasizes the importance of the survival of national identities, despite or because of cultural homogenization as a result of globalization; the need to maintain a façade of representative democracy in which the local elite makes seemingly important decisions; the need to ensure limited local security in order to obtain the minimum social benefit, and a certain amount of monopoly of violence that the nation state must have in order to be able to ensure the free flow of capital. (Derrida, 1988)

For global governance, "soft power" is extremely, perhaps crucial, and media dominance is crucial. In "controlling" the flow of information, media interventions replace arguments and counter-propaganda aimed at destroyed communities. The conflict in Kosovo was a form of "passive offensive." (Virilio, 2007, 25-26) and Serbia was seen as a facility located in the common European space; as an inferior entity that had to force itself to respect the rules of the new European order. From the scale of moral superiority, inferiority was the reason for treating Serbia as an area in which NATO member countries can fulfill their self-approved role of guardians of emerging civilizations. Serbia, as a problematic

case, had to be "Europeanized" without being thrown into the sphere of external "otherness". By signing the Brussels Agreement in 2013, Serbia voluntarily renounced a number of competencies in the interest of the Albanian side and relinquished control over its territory. The "delimitation" plan as part of the "Comprehensive Peace Agreement between Serbia and Kosovo" would mean that Serbia recognizes Kosovo as an independent state by signing such an agreement. The Americans are interested in supporting the "demarcation plan" of Serbia with Kosovo and thus gaining a wider room for maneuver to complete the space in the Balkans, because they strive to include the entire Balkan region in NATO. The "temporal" dimension of strategic supremacy The United States has forever won here in the "spatial" dimensions of the old geostrategic supremacy of the Atlantic Alliance. (Virilio, 2007, 37).

Through regional cooperation in the Western Balkans, the soft power of international actors is realized through the realization of the "four freedoms" (trade, investment, mobility, and digital integration), which requires sufficient financial resources and appropriate regulations and institutions, which is the basis of political and economic change.

Changes in this "capillary expansion of power" are not visible until the very end, until the moment of complete conquest of power and authority, both "soft" and classic. This is assisted by various non-governmental organizations, organizations for the fight for democracy and protection of human rights, which often act in synchrony in mutual synergy and are promoted in the media. This achieves cultural hegemony. Serbia can achieve "soft power" by preserving its identity and religion as an element that strengthens and emphasizes the national identity of Serbs in Kosovo. In modern societies, the denial of national tradition is a sure way to lose national identity - as the first step towards the deprivation of state sovereignty and the most lasting form of internal enslavement and complete disappearance. (Mitrović, 2016, 51)

## References

ADEMMEER, E., BÖRZEL, T. 2013. "Migration, Energy and Good Governance in the EU's Eastern Neighborhood," *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 65, no.4., 2013, pp. 581–582.

ANDREYCHUK, R. 2018. *Security in the Western Balkans*, POLITICAL COMMITTEE (PC) Sub-Committee on NATO Partnerships, September 2018, <https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2F2018-12%2F178%20PCNP%2018%20E%20rev.1%20fin%20%20SECURITY%20IN%20THE%20WESTERN%20BALKANS%20%20ANDREYCHUK%20REPORT.pdf>.

BADIOU, A. 2006. *Polemics*, Verso, New York, 2006.

- BADIOU, A. 2012. *The Rebirth of History – Times of Riots and Uprising*, Verso, London, 2012.
- Balkans Policy Research Group. 2021. *Regional cooperation in the Western Balkans, Regional Economic Area, the “Mini-Schengen” and the Common Regional Market*, January, 2021.
- Balkans Group report. 2018. The Berlin Process for the Western Balkans: Gains and Challenges for Kosovo. 2018. 17 January 2018, at <https://balkansgroup.org/the-berlin-process-for-the-western-balkans-gains-and-challenges-for-kosovo/>
- Balkans Group, *Kosovo 2020: A Complex Agenda for the New Government*, 17 December 2019, at <https://balkansgroup.org/en/kosovo-2020-a-complex-agenda-for-the-new-government-2>
- BECK, U. 1999. “Über den postnationalen Krieg“, *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, vol. 44 no.8., 1999, pp. 936-939.
- BRZEZINSKI, Z. 2016. *The grand chessboard: American primacy and its geostrategic imperatives*, Basic Books, New York, 2016.
- CANETTI, E. 2006. *Masse und Macht*, Auflage. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2006.
- DELEUZE, G. 1988. *Foucault*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1988.
- DEUTSCH, K. W. 1963. *The Nerves of Government. Models of Political Communication and Control*, The Free Press of Glencoe, London, 1963.
- DERRIDA, J. 1988. “Signature Event Context,“ *Limited Inc.* Northwestern University Press, Evanston, II, 1988.
- FOUCAULT, M. 1972. *Power/Knowledge, Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 Michel Foucault*, Pantheon Books, New York, 1972.
- GRAMSCI, Antonio, *Selection from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (eds), The Electric Book, London, 1999.
- HACKAJ, A., HACKAJ, K. 2017. *Monitoring the Berlin Process: From Paris to Trieste*, Botimet, Tirana, 2017.
- HOLROYD, M., SÁNCHE, S. 2019. Euronews, “Western Balkan leaders plot their own ‘mini-Schengen’ zone”, 11 November 2019, at <https://www.euronews.com/2019/11/11/western-balkan-leaders-plot-their-own-mini-schengen-zone>
- MARCIACQ, F. 2017. *The EU and the Western Balkans after the Berlin Process*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Sarajevo, 2017.
- MEDVEDEV, S. 2000. “Kosovo: a European fin de siècle“, In: Peter van Ham and Sergei Medvedev (eds.) *Mapping European security after Kosovo*, Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York, 2000, pp. 15-27.
- MITROVIĆ, M. 2016. Fenomenologija i dijalektika nacionalnog identiteta i srpskog identiteta Srbije“, Radmila Vasić i Milena Polojac (ur) *Identitetski preobražaj Srbije*, Pravni fakultet, Beograd, 2016, 47-76,



- NYE, J. Jr. 2008. *Understanding International Conflicts Study Guide*, Longman, 2008
- RAJS, A. 2005. *Čujte Srbi!*, Ethos, Biblioteka Nasleđe, Beograd, 2005.
- STANKOVIĆ PEJNOVIĆ, V. 2014. „Meka moć vladara „novog doba“, *Srpska politička misao*, vol 3. no.45, 2014. pp. 111-133.
- VIRILIO, P. 2007. *Strategy of deception*, Verso, London, New York, 2007.
- ZIELONKA, J. 2006. *Europe as Empire: nature of the Enlarged EU*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.
- ŽIŽEK, S., AGON, H. 2013. *From Myth to Symptom: the case of Kosovo*, Kolektivi Materializmi Dialektik, Prishtinë, 2013.

# KEY ASPECTS OF SECURING THE REQUIRED QUALITY OF DECISION-MAKING

Břetislav Štěpánek<sup>1</sup> - Pavel Otrisal<sup>2</sup>

## **ABSTRACT**

*Decision-making is one of the basic managerial activities, the quality of which largely affects the results and efficiency of the functioning of economic units. Managers at different levels of management should therefore acquire a certain set of knowledge and skills that are important for ensuring the required quality of decision-making or decision-making solutions.*

*Key words: decision-making, decision-solving, process, specifics, quality.*

## **Introduction**

The importance of decision-making is manifested primarily in the fact that the qualities and results of these processes (especially strategic decision-making processes, taking place at the highest levels of organization management) significantly affect the effectiveness of the functioning and future prosperity of these organizations. Poor decision-making can be one of the major causes of business failure.

## **1 Decision-making specifics**

Decision-making or decision-making processes taking place at different levels of organization management have two aspects: the merits (factual, content) and the formal-logical (procedural) page. The merits reflect the differences between decision-making processes or their types. Depending on their content, decisions about the production program, capital investment decisions, marketing strategy decisions, etc. differ depending on their content. Each of these types of decision-making process has its own specific features, which are the source of the differences in these processes (Brožová, 2007). On the other hand, however, individual decision-making processes, or their types, have certain common features and characteristics. What unites individual decision-making processes is a framework procedure (procedure) of the solution, from identifying the problem, clarifying its causes, solution objectives, etc. to evaluating variant solutions and choosing a variant for implementation. It is the common features of decision-

---

<sup>1</sup> Břetislav, Štěpánek, Ing., Ph.D., Faculty of Physical Culture, Palacký University Olomouc, třída Míru 117, 771 11, Olomouc, Czech Republic, bretin@seznam.cz

<sup>2</sup> Pavel, Otrisal, prof., Ing., Ph.D., MBA, Faculty of Physical Culture, Palacký University Olomouc, třída Míru 117, 771 11, Olomouc, Česká republika, pavel.otrisal@upol.cz

making processes, their procedural and instrumental side, that are the subject of the study of decision theory.

During historical development, more decision-making theories were gradually conceived, differing in a certain way of looking at decision-making processes. Differences in theories also result from their normative or descriptive nature. Normative theory focuses on providing guidance on how to solve decision-making problems, what models and how to use them (Dostál, 2005). It is therefore about creating certain standards for solving decision-making problems, the application of which would allow the desired quality of decision-making to be achieved. Unlike normative theory, descriptive theories of decision-making processes have already taken place. It is about describing, analyzing and evaluating decision-making processes, their progress, basic elements, advantages, and shortcomings, etc.

We understand decision-making processes as decision-solving processes, thus problems with multiple (at least two) solution options. If we assume that the basic attribute of decision-making is the choice process, thus the assessment of individual options and the choice of decision, then problems with a single solution are therefore not decision-making problems and the solution of these problems does not lead to the decision-making process (Ochrana, 2001).

In general, problems could be defined by the existence of a differentiation (deviation) between the desired state (standard, standard plan) of a particular component of the decision maker's surroundings and its actual state. Naturally, this must be an undesirable deviation, thus the actual condition is worse than the desired.

In most cases, these are real, pre-existing problems, which may differ in scope, urgency and thus the impact on the company in the event that these problems are not addressed (Mitchell, 2005). However, we could identify certain problems as potential problems that may arise in the future. Potential problems can either endanger the company (entry of competition into the market, increase in raw material prices, war conflict in a particular region), or they can bring an opportunity to the company (discovery of new products, increase in demand, withdrawal of competition). Awareness of these threats or opportunities and timely response to them means preventing later problems that could threaten the very existence of the company (Fotr, 2003).

## **1.1 Structure and elements of the decision-making process**

Interdependent and follow-up activities, which form the content of decision-making processes, can be broken down into certain components, which are referred to as stages (periods) of these processes. The decision-making process can be divided into stages in several ways, either in more detail or in an aggregated way, where the decision-making process is divided into a relatively small number

of stages (Tidd, 2000). A less detailed decision-making process may include the following 5 stages in which:

1. by analyzing, we identify problems, determine conditions, determine causes, obtain information and data;
2. we are looking for solutions and developing analysis of possible solutions;
3. we look for the best methods and choose the appropriate option;
4. testing verifies the applicability of the solution in practice;
5. we use methods in practice, verify the correctness of the solution or method used, or return to points 1 to 4 to improve the decision-making process.

The choice of the option to be implemented is then considered the final stage of the decision-making process, its certain culmination and represents its own decision. Since the sum of the stages preceding this Decision consists essentially in the processing of information enabling decisions, those stages are collectively referred to as the preparation of decisions.

It is important to correctly describe the elements of the decision-making process for a correct analysis of the problem situation and the choice of quantitative methods and exact problem-solving procedures. They are:

1. the objective of decision-making;
2. evaluation criteria;
3. the decision-making subject (body);
4. decision-making object;
5. decision-making options;
6. states of the world.

The aim of decision-making is to understand the state of the company, its surroundings, which is to be achieved by solving the decision-making problem. As a rule, solving a decision-making problem does not follow the achievement of a single goal, but is usually about achieving more goals. There are often some links between sub-targets. From the point of view of solving decision-making problems, a form of expression of objectives that can either be expressed numerically (quantitative targets) or can be described verbally (qualitative objectives) is often important (Grasseová, 2008).

Evaluation criteria are aspects chosen by the decision-maker, which serve to assess the advantages of individual decision-making options in terms of achieving or achieving the partial objectives of the decision-making problem.

The decision-making body (the decision-making subject) refers to the decision-making body, thus it chooses the option intended for implementation. The decision-making body can be either an individual or a group of people. If the decision-making person is an individual, we are talking about an individual decision-making entity, as opposed to a collective decision-making body, where the decision-making person is a group of persons.

As a rule, the object of decision-making is usually understood as the area of the organizational unit within which the problem was formulated, the goal of its solution was set and to which the decision-making concerns (for example

production program, organizational organization of the company, technological innovations).

The concept of problem solving is closely related to the object of decision-making representing different ways of acting the decision-maker, which is intended to lead to the solution of the problem or to the fulfilment of the set goals (Kanki, 2010). Their consequences are closely linked to decision-making options, which we understand as the expected impact on the company and its surroundings.

We understand the world's states (scenarios, risk situations) as future mutually exclusive situations that may arise after the implementation of the decision-making option and which affect the consequences of this option due to certain evaluation criteria.

## **1.2 Breakdown of decision-making problems and quality of decision-making**

The breakdown of decision-making problems into well-structured ones in terms of their complexity and algorithmic possibilities is one of the basic classifications.

Well-structured decision-making problems (we also refer to them as simple, programmed) are usually repeatedly addressed at the operational level of management and there are routine resolution procedures for them (Veber, 2002). These problems are characterized by the fact that the variables found in them can generally be quantified and usually have a quantitative evaluation criterion (for example the occupation of individual machines by workers).

Poorly structured decision-making problems are usually solved at higher levels of management, which are always new and unrepeatable in nature. Solving these problems always requires a creative approach, the use of extensive knowledge, experience and intuition (for example decision-making on product and technological innovations).

The quality of decision-making processes should not be assessed based on the results of the implementation of the chosen option, but on the basis of certain characteristics of the decision-making processes, so that quality decision-making leads to better economic results in the long term and lower quality decision-making to worse results (Jablonský, 2001). The quality of decision-making processes is influenced by:

1. the stated objectives of addressing the decision-making problem;
2. the quantity and quality of the information;
3. the degree of application of the tools and knowledge of decision theory;
4. the quality of the decision-making project;
5. the quality of the decision-making object;
6. the quality of decision-making process management.

## Conclusion

Information plays a key role in decision-making processes. This is supported by the fact that sometimes decision-making processes are understood as processes for collecting and transforming input information into output information, including the interpretation of this information. An important role in the process of obtaining and collecting information shall be played by the decision-making body whose knowledge, experience and judgement are necessary to ensure the efficient collection of information, the identification of the appropriate scope of information and the correct interpretation of the information obtained.

## References

- BROŽOVÁ, H. 2007. Modely pro řízení znalostí a podporu rozhodování. Praha: ČZU, 2007. ISBN 978-80-213-1633-1.
- DOSTÁL, P. 2005. Pokročilé metody manažerského rozhodování. Praha: Grada Publishing, 2005. ISBN 80-247-1338-1.
- FOTR, J., DĚDINA, J., HRŮZOVÁ, H. 2003. Manažerské rozhodování. Praha: Kopress, 2003. 263 s. ISBN 80-86119-69-6.
- GRASSEOVÁ, M. a kol. 2008. Procesní řízení ve veřejném i soukromém sektoru. 1. vyd. Brno: Computer Press, 2008. 266 s. ISBN 978-80-251-1987-7.
- JABLONSKÝ, J. 2001. Operační výzkum. Praha: VŠE, 2001. ISBN 80-245-0162-7.
- KANKI, B. HELMREICH, R. ANCA, J. 2010. Crew resource management. 1st. ed. California, San Diego: Academic Press Elsevier Inc., 2010. 511 p. ISBN 978-0-12-374946-8.
- MITCHELL, D. 2005. Making Foreign Policy: Presidential management of the decision-making process. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2005.
- OCHRANA F. 2001. Veřejný sektor a efektivní rozhodování. Praha: Management press, 2001. 247 s. ISBN 80-7261-018-X.
- TIDD, J. 2000. From Knowledge Management to Strategic Competence: Measuring Technological, Market and Organizational Innovation. London: Imperial College Press, 2000.
- VEBER, J. et al. 2002. Management. Praha: Management Press, 2002. 700 s. ISBN 80-7261-029-5.

# SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE WESTERN BALKANS IN THE SHADOW OF A GLOBAL PANDEMIC

**Richard Stojar<sup>1</sup>**

## **ABSTRACT**

*The article focuses on security developments in the Western Balkans region. In the past two years, new dynamics in the areas of latent tension can be observed there (due to the Covid-19 pandemic). The efforts of some local actors to use the situation to strengthen their positions are analyzed. Attention is also paid to the activities of external actors seeking to strengthen their influence in the region through new tools in the context of the global pandemic response.*

*Key words: Western Balkan, pandemic Covid-19, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, security.*

## **1 Serbia: regional covid diplomacy and a new geopolitical brother**

The global impact of the Covid-19 pandemic has also significantly affected the Western Balkans region. Some processes were dampened by the pandemic, but others brought new dynamism due to their consequences and countermeasures, and in the shadow of the pandemic there were major domestic and foreign policy changes. This process was very different in the individual states of the region, in some pandemics had only domestic political consequences and contributed to a change in political settings. In others, however, we can also observe changes in the current foreign policy orientation, respectively. Perhaps the biggest changes we can talk about in this context are the case of Serbia. Serbia was affected by the pandemic as well as other states, however, the Serbian response, measures and options were unique compared to regional states and were also unique in the global comparison. The Serbian political establishment, like some other states (including the Czech Republic or Slovakia), used the possibility of cooperation with the People's Republic of China (PRC) to ensure sufficient protective equipment and medical supplies for its population. However, thanks to its good bilateral relations and the fact that it was not limited in any way by EU membership, Serbia was also able to take advantage of vaccine offers from the Russian Federation and the PRC (*Sputnik* and *Sinopharm*). However, on an economic basis, it was also able to purchase vaccines of American and Western European origin, and thanks to this mix of supplies, it then became in the first phase of the epidemic, or more precisely in its second wave one of the most vaccinated countries in the world. Due to the circumstances, i.e. the refusal of a significant number of the population to be vaccinated, had a significant number of otherwise unavailable vaccines and used them in vaccination diplomacy in a similarly efficient way as the large producing countries.

---

<sup>1</sup> Richard Stojar, PhD., The Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies, University of Defence, Kounicova 65, 662 10 Brno, Czech Republic, richard.stojar@unob.cz

Of course, Serbia has only been able to implement this diplomacy to a limited regional extent, but with relatively great success. Serbia has offered the opportunity to vaccinate not only its citizens, but also members of the Serbian minorities in neighboring states and citizens of neighboring states, regardless of ethnicity. For many citizens of North Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, Serbian vaccines have thus become one and often the only way to get vaccinated. The motivations of these people were different, but in addition to the health concerns themselves, it was also an effort to obtain a vaccination certificate, which then significantly facilitated their mobility. The number of applicants was existentially dependent on this facilitation of movement, as the possibilities of their employment were closely connected with the possibility of moving outside their own state. Thus, a number of people who had a highly reserved relationship with Serbia or with its political establishment went to Serbia. For Serbs from neighboring states, this was an evidence of the living interest of mother Serbia in their lives and destinies, as well as an act of direct support that their own states or entities were unable to secure.

Serbia's ability to provide scarce medical supplies and newly developed vaccines across Europe at a time when population vaccination was generally considered a necessary way out of a persistent pandemic and not a factor splitting society, contrasted sharply with the apparent or real inability of neighboring regional governments. The generosity with which the Serbian government offered its potential to neighboring neighbors then impressed the current strong critics of the Serbian regime or Serbia as such. However, the supply of medical supplies affected not only the Serbian image, but also bilateral relations between Serbia and its key partners. Despite supplies of *Sputnik* vaccines and other forms of support from the Russian Federation, most of the material arrived from the People's Republic of China. The PRC has long been one of the main investors in Serbia, and its economic influence has begun to offset Russia's political influence to date. Deliveries from the PRC were then accompanied by a spectacular campaign that served both China's Public Relations and President **Vučić's** domestic needs. He repeatedly, very emotionally expressed concern for the fate of the most at-risk groups, or rather. the older part of the population that forms the core of its electorate. In relation to Chinese aid, he then expressed gratitude, which again emphasized his concern for the well-being of Serbian citizens. President **Vučić** personally welcomed the planes with supplies from the PRC, kissing the Chinese flag and emphasizing the brotherhood between Serbia and China in his accompanying speeches. Government-funded billboards with images of the Chinese president and with the inscription *Thank you Brother Xi* then appeared in Belgrade and other Serbian cities or with Presidents **Vučić** and **Xi** with the inscription *Serbs and Chinese are brothers forever*. Although this campaign was mostly accepted by the population with reserve or contempt, which was reflected in a number of parodies on social networks, it also illustrated the growing Chinese influence in Serbia. And also the fact that the current emphasis



on the Serbian-Russian brotherhood is gradually weakened and the preferred brother is no longer Slavic Orthodox Russia, a traditional Serbian ally and protector, but civilly and geographically very distant China. Surprisingly, the Chinese factor began to be emphasized on non-governmental activities; similar pro-Chinese images also appeared at demonstrations or meetings of Serbian refugees from Kosovo demanding clarification of Kosovo-Albanian crimes and the fates of missing persons of Serbian nationality. In the current anti-Western Serbian iconography, **Vladimir Putin** is thus pushed into the background by the Chinese **Xi**. However, the reasons for this pragmatic shift are probably different from just Serbian-Chinese cooperation in the pandemic era. The Serbian regime is aware of China's growing potential, compared to declining Russian influence. President **Vučić** is personally an unprincipled pragmatist, willing to resign at any time to previously held positions or values if it turns out that they no longer derive such political or other profits as in the past.

China's economic strength is then the dominant factor in **Vučić's** reasoning. The PRC is already replacing Russian investors and the opportunities for profit resulting from close economic cooperation with the Chinese side are pragmatically displacing the traditional pro-Russian orientation, based more on emotions and historical ties, whose usefulness for the Serbian regime is no longer as it was in the past. Although Serbia continues to emphasize the policy of all azimuths, Russia is beginning to play a less important role than it has in the recent past. On the contrary, Serbia is willing to strengthen its ties to the West, also to the traditional partner of the Serbian state - the French Republic. According to these considerations, France should become a kind of Serbian window to the West. This manifested itself on a practical level and in the announced intention not to modernize the Serbian Air Force by acquiring additional supersonic aircraft Mig-29 of Russian origin, but by acquiring supersonic fighter *Dassault Rafale*. Although the rationale for this change was also purely practical, the Russian Mig-29 would not be a sufficient counterweight to the newly acquired Croatian fighters, and for this reason it is also necessary to purchase more powerful aircraft for the Serbian Air Force to maintain regional military balance. And while this argument is not flattering to the Russian side, the acquisition of *Rafale* would increase Serbia's military capabilities and a significant trade agreement with France would undoubtedly have a positive effect on Serbian-French relations. Ergo good economic relations are positively reflected in the political and military cooperation (Procházka et al., 2018).

In connection with the deteriorating relationship between Russia and the West due to the Ukrainian issue, the Russian Federation is becoming a somewhat problematic partner for Serbia. And the current profit from close Russian-Serbian cooperation could be greatly outweighed by the negatives. Probably for this reason, Serbia did not take a neutral position in the UN General Assembly and voted in favor of a resolution strongly condemning Russia's aggression in Ukraine. This Serbian position can be justified by references to the similarity of

Russian aggression and NATO aggression to Serbia in 1999 and also by the emphasis on the territorial integrity of the invaded states and the analogies of Kosovo and Crimea or Donbas. However, in the background of this attitude resonates rather the gradual erosion of Russian-Serbian ties and the greater economic and eventually political gain from Sino-Serbian cooperation. This was significantly demonstrated by the opening of the Olympic Games in Beijing, where President **Vučić** met with President **Xi** on this occasion (Global Times, 2022). Apart from the meeting with Russian President **Vladimir Putin**, it was the most important meeting of the Chinese official with a foreign partner, while Serbia is, of course, an insignificant partner for the Chinese side from a global point of view.

However, in the Serbian case, the economic political or societal dimension of security is confronted by the environmental dimension by Chinese entities. Although the environmental dimension has not been perceived in the recent past as a direct part of the traditional concept of security (Ivančik, 2021), it is now becoming increasingly important, even in the Serbian case. Although environmental security in the Western Balkans region is not as emphasized as in the Western European environment, which is, of course, due to the significant economic and social problems here, its growing importance can also be observed here. Although Chinese investment or economic operators in Serbia bring economic benefits, in some cases they limit themselves to exploiting mineral wealth and ignore environmental impacts and damage. In some cases, Chinese activities have led to widespread societal protests and sparked growing interest in the environmental sector to such an extent that the Serbian government has had to respond. The role of **Novak Djoković**, a phenomenal Serbian tennis player whose popularity is extremely high, was somewhat curious in this regard. His consistent anti-vaxer stance, after several reversals in the Australian authorities, prevented him from participating in the Australia Open tennis tournament and eventually led to his isolation and expulsion from the country. The Serbian government and President **Vučić** personally supported **Djoković**, and one of the reactions was the cessation of the activities of a multinational mining company with a significant Australian shareholding, *Rio Tinto*. This entity had a strong interest in lithium mining in the Serbian region Loznica where it was conducting research (Ekolist, 2021). However, it was apparently also an undesirable competition for Chinese interested in the same site and its use, so the **Djoković** case, together with the declared environmental threat in the case of mining by *Rio Tinto*, served only as a suitable excuse to stop a competing Australian company in Serbia.

## **2 Bosnia and Herzegovina: increasing erosion of a complicated confederation**

However, the pandemic and the great foreign support were not just a matter for Serbia. It was similarly used by some Islamic states, which, through the supply of various materials, emphasized the factor of Islamic belonging in relation to the

Western Balkan Muslims. Humanitarian and charitable activities have been a traditional tool for promoting the external influence of Islamic states since the early 1990s, but gained a new dimension during the pandemic, complementing the growing economic influence (similar in the Serbian case), and investment of rich Middle Eastern Islamic states. However, this influence is accompanied by efforts to enforce stricter forms of Islam. And support for Muslim communities has often been contrasted with the declared incompetence of their secular governments. The last pre-pandemic elections of 2018 also contributed to such an interpretation, which traditionally did not lack empty promises, but on the contrary lacked economic and social visions of how to improve the lives of ordinary citizens (Majchút, Vaššová, 2020). The traditional Balkan conception of Islam is thus being replaced in some regions, especially the Muslim part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, by a purist interpretation of the Sunni branch of Islam, with Saudi Arabia being the main promoter (Stojarová, Stojar, 2019). Investment and humanitarian support are inextricably linked to ideological activity, the establishment of new madrassas and mosques in which Islamic teachings according to the Saudi-Arabic model are preached. However, this contributes to the widening of the differences between the various sections within Bosnian society and between the various constitutional ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a last resort, this process leads to the radicalization of some individuals and larger groups, which in the recent past has been reflected in the departure of Western Balkan jihadists to the Syrian conflict in radical Islamist groups or their direct involvement in the *Islamic State* in Syria and Iraq (Stojar, 2016). The participation of Balkan Islamic extremists in terrorist attacks and logistical support are also documented in this context (Kosárová, 2020). Given the combination of factors, stability is probably the most difficult issue in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Majchút, Vaššová, KM 2020). Here, in addition to the factor of increasing Islamization of the Muslim part, a growing effort to self-determine the Serbian part of Republika Srpska also contributes to the erosion of the state. Bosnian Serb political representation has long been dissatisfied with the dysfunctional model of the state and the controversy associated with the relationship between the Serbian and Bosnian sections of society, or rather their political leaders are very common. The escalation of controversial attitudes into drastic statements by politicians or intense media campaigns has been a traditional folklore in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the conclusion of the Dayton Peace. In previous years, for example, the dispute over the declaration of the national holiday of the Republika Srpska in 2016, which the Muslim part of the country considers to be the day of the outbreak of the 1992 war, resonated very strongly. After the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina annulled the decision of the Republika Srpska, it was subsequently overruled by a Serbian referendum and its decision was ignored (Nationalia, 2016). The media on both sides reported on the de facto declaration of war and the resurgence of the conflict in BiH. However, over time, the case completely disappeared from public and political

space, resonating only in the period around this holiday, in the Republika Srpska associated with military parades and demonstrations of self-confidence and patriotism in relation to the other constitutive entity and common bodies of the unpopular state (RFE/RL, 2022). However, the Covid-19 pandemic in BiH has exacerbated the already difficult economic and social situation of the population. The loss of mobility associated with the existential dependence of many people on professional employment outside BiH then made the pandemic a bigger problem than in other countries. The unsatisfactory situation in many areas then led, as in other states, to dissatisfaction with the current governments and a growing call for a change and growth in the preferences of opposition political entities. The dominant political parties in BiH then tried to avert the possible threat of a decline in electoral preferences in the traditional proven way, i.e. social mobilization and nationalist rhetoric.

This was most evident in the case of Republika Srpska and its longtime leader **Milorad Dodik**, but it was a matter for all three Bosnian communities. From July 2021, Bosnian Serbs launched a boycott of the common central institutions in protest against the ban on denying the Srebrenica genocide. This ban, a move forcibly implementing the narrative of the Muslim party of the Serbian part of BiH, was announced, several days before the end of his term, by former High Representative **Valentin Inzko**. Last year, **Milorad Dodik** decided to raise the issue of a fundamental redefinition of Republika Srpska's position in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On this occasion, he said, among other things, that Bosnia is an unviable experiment that does not have the inner capacity to survive. According to **Dodik**, the National Assembly of RS will begin proceedings in November to *retake powers* that the Bosnian Serb entity has ceded to the Bosnian state during the last 20 years. The Parliament of the Republika Srpska approved his proposal to restore full sovereignty of the RS in a number of areas, including the restoration of its own autonomous armed forces, the judiciary, etc. **Dodik's** personal position will probably be weakened in the future, as he was closely associated with the Russian Federation in previous years, which was one of his strong cards. However, in the case of the Republika Srpska, the possible weakening of Russian influence has nothing to do with relations with Serbia, and **Dodik** also has very good ties with Hungary and Prime Minister **Viktor Orbán**. Hungary also has a relatively ambitious policy in the Western Balkans region and is one of the largest foreign investors in the Republika Srpska itself. However, the current position of Croatian President **Zoran Milanović** is particularly surprising. Compared to his predecessors, he expressed considerable understanding for the separatist tendencies of the Republika Srpska. Today, President **Milanović** sees a greater threat not in the separation of the Serbian entity and the disintegration of BiH, but in the gradual weakening of the Croatian community and its marginalization by Bosnian Muslims.

The prospects of creating a functional model of the state organization of BiH will thus continue to face significant challenges of local and external origin in the years to come.

## References

- EKOLIST.CZ. 2021. *Po protestech ruší Srbsko plány na těžbu lithia*. 17.12.2021. Po protestech ruší Srbsko plány na těžbu lithia - Ekolist.cz
- GLOBAL TIMES. 2022. Xi, Vucic meet during Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics. February 05.2022. Xi, Vucic meet during Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics, underline 'iron-clad' friendship - Global Times
- IVANČÍK, R. 2021. *Security Theory: Security as a Multidimensional Phenomenon*. Vojenské reflexive, Number 3/2021. 32-53. ISSN1336-9202.
- KOSÁROVÁ, D. 2020. *Safe Havens for Global Jihadi Movements*. European Journal of Transformation Studies. 2020. 8(2). 23-50. ISSN 2298-0997.
- MAJCHÚT, I., VAŠŠOVÁ, T. 2020. *Bosnia and Herzegovina after October 2018 Elections*. ALMANACH Actual Issues in World Economics and Politics, University of Economics in Bratislava Volume XV, 4/2020. 29-39. ISSN 1339-3502.
- MAJCHÚT, I., VAŠŠOVÁ, T. 2020. *The Reasons of Disintegration of Yugoslavia*. Krízový manažment 2/2020. 37-45. ISSN 1336 0019.
- NATIONALIA. 2016. *Over 99% of Srpska voters support controversial national holiday in referendum*. 27.09.2016. Over 99% of Srpska voters support controversial national holiday in referendum - Nationalia
- PROCHÁZKA, J., NOVOTNÝ, A., STOJAR, R., FRANK, L. 2018. *The Long Term Perspective for Defence 2030 – Comparative Analysis*. Politické vedy/Political Sciences. 2018. 21(4). 118-139. ISSN 1335-2741.
- RFE/RL. 2022. *Ethnic Serbs Celebrate Republika Srpska Day Despite Ban By Bosnia Court*. January 09/2022. Ethnic Serbs Celebrate Republika Srpska Day Despite Ban By Bosnia Court (rferl.org)
- STOJAR, R. 2016. *Islámský radikalismus a jeho násilné projevy v kontextu balkánského regionu*. Obrana a strategie. (Defence and Strategy.). 2016. 16(1/2016). 61-78. ISSN 1214-6463.
- STOJAROVÁ, V., STOJAR, R. 2019. *Balkan Regional Development: Moderate or Radical Islam for the Balkans*. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies. 2019, 21(4). 387-402. ISSN 1944-8953.

# PUBLIC HEALTH MANAGEMENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

**Katarina Strbac<sup>1</sup> - Damir Ilic<sup>2</sup> - Branislav Milosavljevic<sup>3</sup>**

## **ABSTRACT**

*The authors discuss public health management in the Republic of Serbia in the emergency caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The specificity of the pandemic is that all health systems in the world are unprepared for this kind of threat. The pandemic crisis has shown that health systems are exposed to the most significant burden for public health management. Namely, the reactions and management of the healthcare system during a pandemic are primarily dependent on resources. It turned out that public health management in countries where health systems are still state-owned has shown greater adaptability to sudden and unforeseen circumstances than health systems in economically developed countries. In these countries, the health system is privately owned, and public health is only dealt with by an administration that has no authority over these health systems. One of such adaptable and resilient health care systems is in the Republic of Serbia. The state health care system in the Republic of Serbia operates on the entire territory. Therefore, the public health component in the Republic of Serbia is primarily focused on the population's health and takes place at all levels, national, regional and local. Even before the COVID 19 epidemic outbreak in March 2020, the health care system of the Republic of Serbia was facing severe challenges in terms of organization financing and provision of services. But, despite that, the system has shown resilience and adaptability to this emergency from the very beginning. The fact is that the system has slightly changed and modernized after the period of socialism, and public health is dealt with by health institutions owned by the state, i.e. citizens of the Republic of Serbia. In everyday work, the system barely functioned due to insufficient financial resources and inadequate education, especially education for dealing with emergencies such as the Covid 19 pandemic, lack of personnel, disincentives for health workers, and overtime work. Nevertheless, in a brief time, the health care system has adapted to extraordinary circumstances and continues to work to maintain the public health of the population of the Republic of Serbia. Therefore, it can be said that, despite all the weaknesses from the previous period, during the pandemic, public health management worked in the function of caring for and recovering patients in the best possible way.*

**Key words:** public health, pandemic COVID 19, management, Republic of Serbia

---

<sup>1</sup> Katarina Strbac, PhD, Associate Professor, School of Engineering Management, Vojvoda Zivojin Mistic 43, 11000 Belgrade, Republic of Serbia, katarina.strbac@fim.rs

<sup>2</sup> Damir Ilic, MSc, Assistant Professor, School of Engineering Management, Vojvoda Zivojin Mistic 43, 11000 Belgrade, Republic of Serbia, damir.ilic@fim.rs

<sup>3</sup> Branislav Milosavljevic, PhD, Assistant Professor, Faculty for Law and Business, Jurija Gagarina 149a, 11000 Belgrade, Republic of Serbia, branislav.milosavljevic@fjsp.edu.rs

## **Introduction**

For the first time in the history of humanity, the world encountered a global emergency that showed all the weaknesses of emergency management and the unwillingness of states to respond to that challenge adequately. Although it is evident that the governments in which the state-owned health care system adapted more quickly to the epidemic, it was also apparent that the emergency management was practically on local governments, but also that the states with a clearly defined legal framework and established management systems emergencies are easier to deal with such an emergency. Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) caused by the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) was identified in December 2019 in China, Hubei province - the city of Wuhan. The news on the virus has been globally spread since January 2020. The virus has spread from China to other Asian countries (Japan, South Korea, Singapore), the United States, Western, Eastern Europe, and South America. World Health Organization (WHO) declared a pandemic on March 11. The Republic of Serbia was not an exception, and the first official case was confirmed on March 6, 2020. (Ilic-Kosanovic, T, 2021) In the Republic of Serbia, there is a legally prescribed procedure for acting in epidemics, which is a sufficient basis for engaging emergency management. (Strbac et al. 2021) Management of the outbreak in the Republic of Serbia is mainly based on laws that cover emergencies. The concept and classification of emergencies are determined primarily by different types of hazards, which endanger the safety and which, caused by the action of nature or the activity of the human factor, can lead to an emergency in a specific territory. Therefore, when regular activities (preventive, operational and other) cannot prevent and eliminate the consequences caused by dangers, then the risk states acquire the character of an emergency. (Strbac et al. 2021) Based on the declared epidemic and the state of emergency, the entire health system of the Republic of Serbia was put on standby. It should not be forgotten that this was a virus about which almost nothing was known, and the survival of patients depended solely on the vast experience of medical workers in hospitals.

### **1 The legal framework of the Republic of Serbia for responding to epidemics**

The Republic of Serbia has precisely regulated the area of possible epidemics of infectious diseases with the Law on Public Health. ("Official Gazette of RS", No. 15/2016) According to the mentioned Law, the most important institutions in identifying, meeting the spread and stopping the epidemic are institutes and institutes for public health, which, according to their competence, cover the entire territory of the Republic of Serbia. Bodies of the Republic of Serbia, autonomous provinces, local self-government units, health services, health insurance organizations, social protection system, health councils at local self-

government units, educational and other institutions, media participate in the process of taking care of public health of citizens of the Republic of Serbia, companies, public companies, entrepreneurs, humanitarian, religious, sports and other organizations and associations, families and citizens. In addition to the Law on Public Health, many other legal and strategic documents deal with public health, including the National Security Strategy, where epidemics and pandemics of infectious diseases are identified in part related to challenges, risks and security threats of the Republic of Serbia. ("Official Gazette of RS", No. 94/2019.) It is stated that epidemics and pandemics can endanger the population of the Republic of Serbia and carry the risk of severe economic and social consequences. The strategy implies that epidemics and pandemics increase the number of patients and deaths. The part that refers to all infectious diseases, including COVID-19, is regulated by the Law on Protection of Population from Communicable Diseases ("Official Gazette of RS" No. 15/16, 68/20, 136/2) and Rulebook on Reporting Communicable Diseases and Special Health Issues. ("Official Gazette of RS" No. 44/17, 58/18) The Law on the Protection of the Population from Infectious Diseases(2016) was amended after the outbreak of Covid-19. This Law regulates various protection issues and rules as regards the preservation of the population against contagious diseases, including specific health issues, rules regarding the infectious diseases that can endanger the health of the population, and whose prevention and suppression is of general interest for the Republic of Serbia, further setting the implementation of epidemiological surveillance and monitoring measures, and various security requirements useful for such scope. Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Law stipulates that protecting the population from infectious diseases is an organized and all-encompassing activity of society to prevent and combat infectious diseases and their elimination and eradication. Article 4 of the Law stipulates that infectious diseases include: diseases that lead or may lead to significant illness or death, especially those whose prevention requires broader coordination of activities; diseases where the exchange of information can provide early warning for threats to public health; rare and serious infectious diseases, which are not present in the Republic of Serbia, and for which grouping of data may indicate the factors responsible for their outbreak; diseases for which there are effective prevention measures for the benefit of the population; diseases in which comparing the frequency of occurrence with other environments can contribute to the assessment and improvement of programs for the protection of the population from infectious diseases. The Law prescribes the rights, obligations, and competencies in the implementation of protection of the population from infectious diseases and measures for protecting the population from infectious diseases and the modalities of their implementation. In this context, Article 14 stipulates those measures undertaken to protect the population from infectious diseases are a set of all activities planned, organized, and implemented by the authorities of the Republic of Serbia, autonomous provinces, local governments, businesses, and legal entities, institutes and public health



institutions and other health care institutions, health workers and health associates and natural persons to protect the population from infectious diseases. Protection of the population from infectious diseases is performed by implementing general, special, emergency, and other measures to protect the population from infectious diseases. Regarding preventive measures, the Minister of Labor, Employment, Veterans and Social Affairs on July 3, 2020, based on the Law on Safety and Health at Work (2005), passed the Rulebook on Preventive Measures for Safe and Healthy Work to Prevent the Occurrence and Spread of Epidemics of Infectious Diseases ("Official Gazette of RS", No. 94/2020). This Rulebook prescribes preventive measures that the employer is obliged to apply to prevent the occurrence and spread of infectious diseases and eliminate risks for safe and healthy work of employees, as well as persons present in the work environment, in the case when a competent authority declares an epidemic of infectious diseases. Article 4 stipulates that the Implementation plan sets out measures and activities that increase and improve the safety and health of employees to prevent the outbreak of infectious disease, as well as measures and activities taken in the event of an outbreak of an infectious disease to maintain a safe and healthy work environment for all employees and the protection of those present at the workplace. Consequently, the Implementation plan must contain: 1) preventive measures and activities aimed at preventing the outbreak of an infectious disease; 2) persons responsible for the implementation and control of the implementation of preventive measures and activities; 3) measures and activities for action in case of an outbreak of an infectious disease. In addition to the above-mentioned, Article 8 of the Rulebook prescribes the employee's obligations in applying safety and health measures at work to preserve his health and the health of other employees. In the Republic of Serbia, due to the COVID19 epidemic, a state of emergency was declared on the entire territory on March 15, 2020, at 8 pm, and it lasted until May 6 of the same year. The emergency has been lifted, but preventive and protective measures are still in place, given many patients. All this time, medical institutions in the Republic of Serbia are working in extraordinary circumstances, with the COVID 19 infection of the medical staff itself.

## **2 Public health management in the Republic of Serbia**

Health care of the population in the Republic of Serbia is directly provided through a network of health care institutions, and its use depends not only on the needs of users but also on the development of the provision of health services. According to the Decree on the Health Care Institution Network Plan, the total number of health care institutions was 336 in 2020. This number includes primary health care centres and general hospitals within health centres. The table does not present healthcare institutions in Kosovo and Metohija and military medical institutions outside of the public healthcare system in the Republic of Serbia. (Health Statistical Yearbook Of Republic Of Serbia 2020)

Table 1. Number of health care institutions by type of institution, Serbia, 2020

<b>HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS</b>	<b>Number of institutions</b>
PHARMACY	28
PRIMARY HEALTH CARE CENTRE (“dom zdravlja”)	141
INSTITUTE (“zavod”)	22
HEALTH CENTRE (“zdravstveni centar”)	8
PRIMARY HEALTH CARE CENTRE	17
GENERAL HOSPITAL	10
GENERAL HOSPITAL	30
SPECIAL HOSPITAL	33
CLINICAL – HOSPITAL CENTRE	4
CLINICAL CENTRE	4
CLINIC	7
INSTITUTE	16
PUBLIC HEALTH INSTITUTE	24
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>336</b>

In 2020, the health care service of the Republic of Serbia (health institutions in the Network Plan) employed 105,233 persons on permanent contracts. There were 23,075 health workers with university education. Of those, 20,101 were medical doctors, 1545 dentists and 1429 pharmacists. Of all physicians in the Republic of Serbia, 3617 were general medicine doctors (18%), 2728 were in specialist training (14%), and the total number of specialists was 13,756 (68%). The share of women among employed medical doctors is significantly higher than men (67% vs 33%). Health care institutions employ 1429 pharmacists, of whom 209 (19%) were specialists or pharmacists in specialist training. In 2020, there were a total of 56,662 health workers with college and secondary education in health care institutions, of which 42,791 (76%) were nurses. Health care institutions employed a total of 22,094 (21%) non-medical staff, of which 5,533 (25%) were administrative workers, and 16,013 (72%) were technical workers. (Health Statistical Yearbook Of Republic Of Serbia 2020) Although there is still no accurate data on the deaths of medical personnel during the pandemic, the fact is that a large number of medical workers lost their lives in the fight against the virus. The reasons are multiple, from insufficient equipment to the inability to receive adequate treatment. Despite all the shortcomings of the health system in the Republic of Serbia, which is reflected in the inadequate number of medical workers caring for patients to a small number of doctors per a large number of patients, it can be said that in the circumstances of such an epidemic system still works adequately. The outbreak of the COVID-19 epidemic required optimizing

the capacity of health systems in the Republic of Serbia. The biggest challenge was to respond to the growing demand for care faced by the healthcare system. The increasing number of patients makes it difficult to access the diagnosis, hospitalization and critical treatment of the most complex cases. The redistribution of health workers tried to respond to the needs of patients, which was evident in the testing of a large number of people, but also in the care of the infected persons. Regardless of the shortcomings, the health system has shown resilience, which is crucial for dealing with any emergency, including the Covid-19 pandemic. Another critical component of a successful public health system is an efficient network of laboratories to systematically identify, collect and transport samples to laboratories with appropriate equipment to perform reliable tests. In addition to the above, it is vital to assess the health system's preparedness for pandemics adequately. This creates insight into its vulnerability and space for action when much can be done to strengthen and consolidate existing resources. It is commonly believed that the better the health system, the more resilient it is. However, this is not particularly necessary, as even health systems with varying degrees of weakness can be well prepared for certain types of emergencies.

## **Conclusion**

The COVID-19 outbreak reminds us that proactive planning for healthcare emergencies and an intensified commitment to global public health preparedness remains necessary. Regardless of heavy demand, difficulties and shortcomings, the Serbian health system – with universal health coverage – succeeded in reducing the peak and reversing the spread of COVID-19. The public health system, which was well-developed and comprehensive during the Socialist period, reinforced by EU donations and loans over the past two decades, managed to avoid many significant weaknesses observed in other countries. (Santic et al. 1, 2020) There is no doubt that the consequences of the presence of Covid-19, but also the implementation of all state measures to prevent the spread of the virus significantly affect the health system (mainly in the domain of its accelerated improvement to respond as adequately as possible to the growing number of infected people). Despite all the shortcomings, the health system of the Republic of Serbia has shown resistance to the epidemic. Since the epidemic's beginning, public health management has adapted to the new circumstances. The epidemic has been going on for two years, and based on the lessons learned, and it would be necessary:

- Continue strengthening public health management in the Republic of Serbia,
- Ensure the stability of financing and human resources in the Health System of the Republic of Serbia,
- Use modern technologies in future health crises.

## References

"Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia", No 5/2020, 11/2020, 52/2020, 88/2020, 62/2021, 69/2021 and 74/2021

Health Statistical Yearbook Of Republic Of Serbia 2020, Institute Of Public Health Of Serbia, Dr Milan Jovanovic Batut", Belgrade, 2021, ISSN 2217-3714 (Online)

ILIC-KOSANOVIC, T. 2021. Work-life balance of teaching staff at higher education during pandemic Serbian Journal of Engineering Management Vol. 6, No. 1, 2021, DOI: 10.5937/SJEM2101064I

KRUK, M.E., MYERS, M., VARPILAH, S.T., DAHN, B.T. 2015 What is a resilient health system? Lessons from Ebola. Lancet. 2015 May 9;385(9980):1910-2. DOI: 10.1016/S0140-6736(15)60755-3. PMID: 25987159.

ŠANTIĆ, D. ANTIĆ, M. 2020 Serbia in the time of COVID-19: between "corona diplomacy", tough measures and migration management, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 61:4-5, 546-558, DOI: 10.1080/15387216.2020.1780457

BLANCHET, K. 2015. Thinking shift on health systems: from blueprint health programmes towards resilience of health systems: Comment on "Constraints to applying systems thinking concepts in health systems: A regional perspective from surveying stakeholders in Eastern Mediterranean countries". Int J Health Policy Manag 2015;4: 307–309. DOI: 10.15171/ijhpm.2015.49

STRBAC, K., TOMIC, D. 2021. Emergency management during the COVID-19 epidemic in the Republic of Serbia, Serbian Journal of Engineering Management 2021, vol. 6, br. 2, Belgrade, DOI: 10.5937/SJEM2102073S

# DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS AND THE ARMED CONFLICTS VERSUS GLOBAL CHANGES<sup>1</sup>

**Božena Konecka-Szydelko<sup>2</sup> - Dagmar Nováková<sup>3</sup>**

## **ABSTRACT**

*State organs play an important role in the era of constantly ongoing civilization changes. They are of particular importance in international relations. The issue of diplomatic missions is the domain of international, as well as diplomatic and consular law. These are some of the oldest areas of law, having their foundations at the beginning of human civilization. The necessity of cooperation between states in order to improve their existence, as well as the inevitable at that time necessity to defend their interests and rights, and with the passage of time the pursuit of peaceful coexistence, forced the establishment of some permanent principles of cooperation and coexistence respected by all participants of this community.*

**Key words:** *Diplomacy, armed conflicts, globalization, conflict prevention, peace support operation, international organizations, international relations*

## **Introduction**

From the very beginning of its existence, mankind has solved conflicts and problems mostly by resorting to violence. Peace was actually a shorter or longer break between the wars. War was the decisive instrument of foreign policy, including the settlement of disputes and conflicts, first between primitive human communities, and then between nations and states.

It resulted mainly from the essence of the prevailing social system, based on the exploitation not only of one's own societies, but also of other nations. (Sutor, 1979, p. 8) It should be noted, however, that even under conditions where war was a legally permissible means of settling disputes, from antiquity to the present day, there is a dream first, and then the pursuit and action to preserve and consolidate peace. This must be done by creating an alternative to war, gradually limiting its destructive effects, developing over time more and more new methods and means of peaceful settlement of disputes such as negotiations, mediation, and arbitration. (Sutor, 1979)

---

<sup>1</sup> This article has been published within the project VEGA 1/0774/22 Sovereignty as a factor in the crisis of the liberal world order

<sup>2</sup> Božena Konecka-Szydelko, Mgr. PhD. student, Department of Security Studies, Faculty of Political Science and International Relations, Matej Bel University, Kuzmányho 1, 974 01 Banská Bystrica, Slovakia

<sup>3</sup> Dagmar Nováková, PhDr., PhD., lecturer, Department of Security Studies, Faculty of Political Science and International Relations, Matej Bel University, Kuzmányho 1, 974 01 Banská Bystrica, Slovakia, dagmar.novakova@umb.sk

In the modern world, filled with numerous and more and more dangerous threats to states, but at the same time in a world striving for integration and wider mutual cooperation, in a world where states are simultaneously active in many theaters, often contradictory, where the process of globalization is ubiquitous, a sine qua non is to explore the basics of international law, including diplomatic law. The basic task of states is to respect the rules adopted in the Charter of the United Nations in the field of peaceful coexistence, dialogue, cooperation, mutual assistance, and above all, settlement of any conflicts through mutual dialogue and with the use of peaceful instruments available at a given time. (Szuber-Bednarz, Kucharski, 2011.)

Nowadays, the importance of diplomacy in regulating international conflicts and shaping global security is a topic worth attention for several reasons. Firstly, the modern foreign service operating in the post-Cold War conditions is characterized by a huge dynamic of internal changes, especially in countries which underwent a stage of political transformation - the post-Soviet countries. Secondly, contemporary geopolitical conditions pose new challenges to diplomacy, such as the situation in Ukraine, Russia's imperialist ambitions, or the echoes of the so-called Arab Revolution, which greatly affects global security. The preservation and protection of peace is a fundamental legal requirement of our era. Contemporary diplomacy can fulfill multiple functions, especially in the conditions of the formation of new states because of the secession of military actions or the fall of dictators. It seems necessary to act on preventive diplomacy and other forms of cooperation for international security.

The purpose of this article is to focus on the security conventions of diplomacy, as well as an introduction to the issue as an introduction to further considerations on this issue. On the other hand, the research goal of the thesis is to define the term security of diplomacy. At the beginning, the concept of diplomatic security should be distinguished from the security of diplomacy. The first relates to the role and activities of diplomacy to ensure (state) security, and the second, in principle, to the efficient and safe functioning of diplomacy itself.

These terms are often used incorrectly. This is due to the direct translation of the diplomatic security expression used in Anglo-Saxon terminology and its relation precisely to the security of diplomacy. In addition, in this study I will try to present the relations of diplomacy with national and global security and its importance for the resolution of international disputes.

## **1 Global security**

Peacekeeping missions (Marcinkowski, 2011) are among the most important activities undertaken by the United Nations to ensure international peace and security. The United Nations also undertakes activities in the field of:

- conflict prevention and mediation)

- creating peace (peacemaking)
- peace enforcement
- peacebuilding.

Conflict prevention, peace-building, peace-keeping and peace enforcement are not undertaken on a predetermined agenda. Experience shows that the above actions should complement each other as only a comprehensive approach reduces the risk of an armed conflict erupting again.

### **1.1 Conflict prevention**

To prevent intra-state or inter-state tensions from turning into an armed conflict, steps must be taken diplomatically. Conflict prevention includes activities such as early warning, information gathering and thorough analysis of the factors that led to the outbreak of an armed conflict. There may also be "good offices" (Krzemińska, 2014) set up by the UN Secretary-General, preventive UN peacekeeping missions or mediation by the Department of Political Affairs.

### **1.2 Peacemaking**

Peace-building includes activities undertaken to resolve armed conflicts. They usually consist in conducting diplomatic activities aimed at negotiating and reaching an agreement by the parties to the conflict. (Krzemińska, 2014) The Secretary General has the option to set up "good offices" to carry out activities aimed at ending the conflict. Participants in peacekeeping missions may be envoys, governments, groups of states, regional organizations and the United Nations. Also unofficial and non-governmental groups as well as prominent personalities can make efforts to create peace.

### **1.3 Enforcement of peace**

The enforcement of peace involves the use of coercive measures, including military force. Taking such action requires the authorization of the Security Council. The enforcement of peace is used in situations that threaten or violate peace, or in the face of an act of aggression. It is the Security Council that decides whether it is necessary to take action to restore international peace and security. It may authorize regional organizations and other entities to carry out a peace action in accordance with the United Nations Charter. (Marcinkowski, 2011)

### **1.4 Peacebuilding**

Building peace is associated with reducing the risk of states and local communities all over the world emerging or falling into an armed conflict.

Peacebuilding is about strengthening the capacity of state administration institutions at all levels. Peacebuilding missions deal with crisis management, peacebuilding and country development. Building a room is complex and the long process of creating the necessary conditions to achieve a lasting peace. Peacebuilding missions deal with the most pertinent issues relating to the functioning of societies and state structures. They strengthen the ability of states to effectively exercise their functions based on the law. (Krzemińska, 2014)

## 2 Diplomacy and security

The institution of diplomacy is one of the oldest in relations between states. It was born in antiquity along with the development of contacts between the countries of the ancient world. The institution of bargaining developed especially early, especially in Egypt, related with sending special messages, making all sorts of contracts, mostly with neighboring countries.

The term diplomacy is derived from the Greek word diploma, the name of two wax-covered tablets connected by thongs and folded tablets on which instructions were written for envoys. After folding the plates, the content of the manual was not visible outside, which emphasized its confidentiality.

Diplomacy in the modern sense, (Sutor, 2019) especially permanent diplomatic missions and ministries of foreign affairs did not appear until the 15th and 17th centuries. Until then, the main organizational form of diplomacy were ad hoc missions to deal with a specific task. Already in the 17th century, the institution of permanent representations became widely practiced, mainly in European countries. This process was accompanied by the development of common law norms and also many protocol rules. In the 18th century in Western Europe, the term "diplomacy" was synonymous with state activity in the field of foreign relations and all organs and persons engaged in this activity.

**Diplomacy** is a specific content and form of action and a team of people who officially represent the state in relations with other subjects of international law The definition of diplomacy consists of three elements:

1) official, official activities of the state directed outside, aimed at the implementation of the current tasks of the state's foreign policy and ensuring the protection of rights and the interests of the state and its citizens by negotiating and concluding international agreements,

2) methods of this activity requiring, due to the external nature of actions, tact, dexterity, caution and the ability to compromise,

3) organizational apparatus and people (diplomatic and consular service) (Sutor, 2000) who pursue the goals of foreign policy.

By definition, diplomacy is a component of a country's foreign policy. Diplomacy supports all foreign policy by fulfilling the following functions:

- the determining function consists in determining the tasks of the foreign policy of one's own country;



- the evaluation function relates to the activities of other states and governments.  
It consists in assessing the goals and tasks of their foreign policy also in relation to one's own country;
- the selection function consists in eliminating the issues that create a zone of inconsistency between one's own and foreign foreign policies and selecting those that make up the zone of compatibility of goals and issues;
- the prescription function means that diplomacy indicates the most appropriate methods of achieving its goals and tasks by foreign policy and the selection of means to achieve the goal at each stage of the implementation of this policy. (Malendowski, Mojsiewicz, 2004) Foreign policy defines the goals and tasks of diplomacy, which in turn encompasses all practical forms, means and methods serving this policy.

Initially, diplomacy was based on ad hoc missions that were set up to carry out a specific task. Permanent missions began to be maintained at the end of the Middle Ages, initially in Italy (the Pope and Italian cities), and in the mid-17th century spread throughout Europe. Diplomacy functions were expanded. In addition to the ceremonial functions, much attention was paid to the negotiating and, above all, observational functions the main reasons for establishing a permanent mission was the need to observe what was happening in the receiving country and to inform the authorities of the sending country about it. The subject of negotiations was also enriched: the issues of war and peace, maintaining the balance of power, and the safety of trade and shipping. The lively development of international contacts and the development of a network of permanent missions gave rise to the need to coordinate and manage the state's foreign policy. In the nineteenth century, separate central bodies were established - ministries of foreign affairs, gathering all powers related to official and international relations. (Łoś-Nowak, 1997)

The creation of permanent embassies, legations and special missions meant that their functioning was not limited to the implementation of one task but encompassed the entirety of relations between states. A system of diplomatic privileges and immunities began to develop, which were to guarantee diplomats the possibility of carrying out their various tasks. With the development of diplomatic privileges and immunities, diplomatic law began to develop. Its norms were of a customary nature for a long time, they were not written down, but in the practice of states they were generally recognized and respected. It was not until the 19th century that the codification of the system of diplomatic norms began. (Kukułka, 1984)

The concept of defense diplomacy functions in political science and practice as a relatively new term for a specialized area of a state's foreign activity<sup>4</sup>. The aforementioned specialization was forced by the need to respond to the dynamically expanding material scope of international relations (Holsti, 2004), complicating the processes of shaping and implementing the external goals of the state.

This exacerbated the need for diplomats to have specialist knowledge, but also the experience necessary for the systematic (sometimes also long-term) "handling" of their respective processes and forums for cooperation. However, this did not mean a change in the overall role of diplomacy as an integrated instrument of the foreign policy of the state<sup>5</sup> - subordinated to national constitutional decision-making centers and using a common pool of forces and resources (budget, human capital, state thought, etc.). In such conditions, flexible management of diplomatic processes is achieved both by increasing the presence of representatives of state bodies other than those traditionally responsible for foreign affairs within the framework of foreign services and embassies, by continuous education of diplomats, as well as by developing appropriate mechanisms for coordinating their work<sup>6</sup>. The carriers of skills are people - diplomacy of various specialties, which can be considered as the capital of foreign

---

<sup>4</sup> It is often used in the literature as a synonym for military diplomacy - a specialized category of diplomacy implemented by state structures (evolving along with state systems and maturing "in the heat of institutional disputes"), supervising the armed forces. An example of such conceptual confusion in the clash with the different roles of both (however functionally related) fields of diplomacy, see: J. Gryz, *Contemporary shape of military diplomacy*, [in:] B. Surmacz (ed.), "New faces of diplomacy", Ed. UMCS, Lublin 2013, p. 240–252.

<sup>5</sup> Traditionally understood also as a team of people professionally prepared for diplomatic work and their skills, as well as forms of activities appropriate for the implementation of foreign policy, see: J. Sutor, *Diplomatic and Consular Law*, Wyd. Lexis-Nexis, Warsaw 2003, pp. 29–30. For a wider set of diplomacy definition criteria, based on a literature review on the subject, see B. Surmacz, *The Evolution of Contemporary Diplomacy. Actors, structures, functions*, Wyd. UMCS, Lublin 2015, pp. 25–37. Also, numerous dictionary editions, e.g. C.W. Freeman, *Diplomat's Dictionary*, US Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC 2010, pp. 52–67.

<sup>6</sup> For national foreign services, as well as for the diplomacy of international organizations, this means the gradual displacement (or parallel functioning) of "diplomats-generalists" by diplomats specializing in specific areas of international relations, such as culture, economic relations, security and defense. Often these specialist divisions go deeper. A vivid example of this may be the presence of a kind of "corps", such as specialists in nuclear weapons, conventional disarmament, export control or humanitarian security, within the specialization of "international security". They are characterized not only by the occasional concentration of diplomats on a given issue, but by the continuous long-term activity within a given specialization, building not only the institutional memory necessary in this profession, a specific workshop, knowledge and interpersonal relations, but also entire professional careers concerning precisely qualified diplomatic specialties.

services, uniform in the sense of legal regulations<sup>7</sup>, but quite diverse in terms of skills and substantive preparation.

In order to analyze the importance of diplomacy in the regulation of international conflicts and shaping global security, one should start with the question about the essence of security. It is also important to distinguish a notional network which includes: the definition of security, national security and also international security. In the social consciousness, the three terms mentioned above are often treated synonymously, which does not reflect the depth of the essence of the problem described. Therefore, an extremely important element is to correctly distinguish and discuss the conceptual apparatus used.

The concept of security in the broadest sense covers such issues as meeting basic human needs, which include existence, survival, identity, independence, peace, having certainty of development and the like. (Zięba, 1989) Security is also equated with the main need of states and international systems, it results from the need to secure the basic needs of a human being and the community in which a given individual functions.

Security is a condition resulting from a specific socio-political and military situation. Such a state can be considered as a situation in which internal and external contradictions do not lead to crisis or conflicts. On the other hand, security treated as a process is the provision of conditions for survival and uninterrupted development of the nation in situations of emerging internal threats and external for the stability and sovereignty of the state. (Dworecki, 1994)

The concept of national security is inextricably linked with the issues of global security. Each state, which is also part of the international community, cares for the inviolability of its own borders, as well as the internal order. There are numerous definitions of national security in the available literature on the subject. Its identification is extremely important because disputes between states - at the most extreme stage - threaten sovereignty and national security. It is defined as:

- a) the state of social awareness, in which the existing level of threats, thanks to the possessed defense abilities, does not raise concerns, fear of maintaining (achieving) the recognized values, (Rutkowski, 1995)
- b) the balance between the threat posed by the possibility of a conflict and defense potential, (Stankiewicz, 1991)
- c) the actual state of internal and sovereign stability of the state, which reflects the absence or presence of any threats. (Dworecki, 1994)

Ultimately, the concept of national security should be understood as the most important value, national need and the priority objective of the state, individuals and social groups, and at the same time a process that includes various measures, guaranteeing a permanent, free from disturbances and national development, protection and defense of the state as a political institution and

---

<sup>7</sup> In Poland, it is defined in the Foreign Service Act, <https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WDU20210000464> (access: 10/03/2022).

protection of individuals and the entire society, their goods and the natural environment against threats that significantly limit its functioning or threaten the values that are subject to special protection. (Kitler, 2011) If the conflict between two given countries spreads over a larger area, other countries will provide military support, and UN peacekeepers will enter the action, then the dispute may be dangerous for maintaining peace and international security. International security is a concept in the field of the theory of international relations that characterizes the security of the entire community of states and the international system in which these states exist. The term is also used to describe external security aspects national. International security, apart from the sum of the security of individual states, also includes conditions, norms, and international mechanisms. (Zięba, 2008) Its scope also covers the goals and values common to the entire international system, i.e. stability, peace, balance and cooperation. (Zięba, 2008)

Each country uses different tools and measures to ensure and maintain national security, and if necessary, international security. In the 21st century, one of the keyways to resolve tensions or conflicts between individual countries is the diplomatic way. It is with diplomacy that it all begins, and, at best, it ends with diplomatic means of peaceful settlement of disputes - without entering the phase of an armed conflict.

## **2.1 From military diplomacy to defense diplomacy**

Military (and today also defense) diplomacy is probably one of the most obvious areas of specialization among the state's foreign policy instruments. Historically, it results from the constant search for harmony between the contradictory elements of politics: diplomacy - based on rules, art, avoiding the use of force - and the military, the operation of which was traditionally associated with actions based on violence, or the demonstration of force and the ability to use it for aggressive purposes, defense or deterrence (his other roles related to cooperation with foreign armies were important, as long as they supported this main mission). After all, both spheres belong to the strategic resources of the state (the defense subsystem). His political and military security was the primary motive for his presence in international relations, so the military was involved in these activities from the very beginning, and commanders' missions often included functions inscribed in the canon of politics and diplomacy (such as negotiations, foreign representation, acts of war and peace). However, it was the modern era that highlighted the progressive separation between the two elements<sup>8</sup>.

---

<sup>8</sup> It was a kind of compromise between attempts in history to replace diplomacy with military (military) activities, or to entrust high-ranking officers with ambassadorial functions. The problem of differences between a diplomat and a military, jokingly summarized Vernon Walters - an American general, diplomat and spy (thus a person who understands the interpenetration of these worlds): "They both do nothing, only

The thing was not only that from the ever-stronger influence of international law, shaping the principles and forms of interstate relations, or the marked distinctness of the tasks of civilian diplomats subordinated to the central state institutions and military - functioning within your own chain of command. It was also related to the different formation and professional preparation (more and more comprehensive for diplomats) and a different distribution of values such as trust in relations with foreign countries for both professions.

It can therefore be said that the representation / implementation of military interests states (and armed forces) abroad - directly by the military, but within general supervision of state authorities - was the most obvious and oldest reason for the emergence of a specialty, which is military diplomacy. (Vagts, 1956) This was achieved thanks to the rapidly progressing similarity of national solutions regarding this segment of diplomacy, the similarity of (military) cultures within it, distinctness in the ranks of the diplomatic corps, principles of service, decision-making processes, and related interests and spheres of interest determining the tasks of "uniformed diplomats".

It has built this distinct identity of military diplomacy into policy coordination processes foreign and security elements of multi-level competition within state system. (Vagts, 1956) The scope of responsibility of military diplomacy and the accompanying conceptual apparatus has been constantly widening over the years. However, taking into account the most intensive development as a specific field of diplomacy, its classic period should be considered the period from the first half of the 19th century to the last decade of the 20th century, when it was permanently attached to the institution of the military attaché<sup>9</sup> and the military attachate supporting it.

### **3 Contemporary diplomacy**

From the earliest times, it was known that political and economic goals in interpersonal relations, between states and nations could be achieved not only through war, but also through negotiated agreements. It was a much less dangerous solution, but also cheaper. It should be remembered that talking to an unfriendly state is not the same as accepting its policy and approving its authorities. The Americans kept their diplomats in Moscow even under Stalinism, although they did not agree with the policy of the Kremlin tyrant. Current contact and maintaining basic communication between the parties allows you to probe the opponent's reactions and eliminate the causes of misunderstandings. Although there have been profound changes in the subject of negotiations throughout history, the essence of the negotiations has remained unchanged. It was the pursuit

---

the military wakes up early in the morning and does it with great discipline, a diplomat in the late afternoon and in great confusion”, *Diplomat's Dictionary...*, p. 67.

<sup>9</sup> Despite the passage of half a century, the work of A. Vagts, *The Military Attache*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1967 is still the best monograph on this subject.

of a peaceful arrangement to defend the rudimentary, basic, most vital values and principles by which humanity could survive in community. In the era of globalization, the most important challenge for diplomats and businesspeople has become the ability to negotiate transactions all over the world, regardless of the subject, conditions of place and time.

Contemporary diplomacy should be closely seen in the context of international law. Its main task is to shape relations between states and between them and other actors of these relations, especially advising and creating and implementation (execution) of the state's foreign policy. (Bulajic, 1997) The classic functions of diplomacy should be understood as:

- a) creating general principles in the multilateral plane or changing them,
- b) creating favorable conditions for political solutions or legal bases at the bilateral or regional level, as well as global,
- c) settling disputes,
- d) concluding innovative agreements, conventions or treaties,
- e) conducting bilateral or multilateral activities related to trade, finance, investment, science and culture. (Bulajic, 1997)

When we think about diplomacy, we invariably associate it with the foreign policy of a given country, as it is one of the tools for carrying out its tasks. For centuries, the goals of states have remained unchanged - protection against aggression or the threat of aggression and ensuring the development of their own economy, and thus achieving an appropriate social level. Choice of options action to protect state policy is in fact significantly limited, and the objectives of this protection must not be confused with measures to implement them.

Such a goal is the security of the state and its interests, and the means to achieve it are, inter alia, the possession of appropriate forces capable of resisting aggression, the conclusion of military alliances, or membership in the collective system of regional security. In practice, conducting foreign policy requires states to balance recognized international principles and moral imperatives with pragmatic adherence to reality. Modern diplomacy uses, apart from traditional means, also - and much more broadly - means of persuasion through mass media, dialogue and various forms of negotiation. It also requires the involvement of highly qualified, professional diplomatic services. (Miłosz, 2011)

It is worth noting that a characteristic feature of all diplomatic means of peaceful settlement of international disputes is the fact that in a dispute, by cooperating in settling the dispute, they retain the possibility of making a final decision for themselves. There is no situation here that after transferring the dispute to a third party, countries are obliged to comply with a legally binding judgment. (Bierzanek, 1974)

Diplomatic methods of the peaceful settlement of disputes include the following measures:

- a) direct negotiations

Direct negotiation is defined as the process in which states try to resolve differences through a direct exchange of views. (Hackworth, 1943) They consist in the exchange of proposals that are kept secret and which, by way of compromise, can lead to an agreement. (Bastid, 1954) It is often indicated that this is the most accessible, flexible and the most common way to resolve a dispute, (Michailowski, 1962) because it does not require great investment, neither financial nor time. They are often conducted behind the scenes of the United Nations without drawing the attention of the public and the press, which is the case during special meetings of foreign ministers. and ambassadors. (Bierzanek, 1974)

Handling international affairs requires both confidential diplomacy and public, multilateral debate - the United Nations provides opportunities both for one, and the other side. (Claude, 1964)

b) good services and mediation

Good services and mediation, also known as brokerage, are an auxiliary procedure that facilitates direct negotiations between the parties and establishes them in the event of a breakdown. With good services, the state that provides them strives to make it easier for the parties to enter interrupted negotiations, is an intermediary in their preliminary talks, but does not itself take part in them. (Bierzanek, 1974) The function of the mediator is similar, with the difference that he does not limit himself to the modest role of providing his good services to facilitate and prepare the conference of the parties, but takes part in the negotiations, directs them and makes his own proposals. (Makowski, 1926)

c) research committees and conciliation bodies

If in the negotiations between the parties to the dispute there is a difference of opinion as to the facts, the parties may appoint an investigating commission to clarify the issue in dispute. The result of this commission's research, usually in the form of a report, is not of absolute importance for the parties, although it usually constitutes a starting point for further conciliation. (Makowski, 1926)

In the post-war years, there was a more vivid interest in the doctrine of international law in conciliation. Many authors prefer the conciliation procedure over arbitration because the conciliation body is not forced to apply legal provisions, that is, the standards of conduct developed in the past, but can adopt constructive solutions considering the future. (Bierzanek, 1974)

#### **4 Theoretical foundations of international conflicts**

It provides a theoretical interpretation to consider the international conflict another concept, namely international dispute. According to E. Cziomer, it is happening when states or other entities within the meaning of international law they present different positions on the same issues. Dispute may pose one of the sources of the conflict, but its essence lies mainly in the fact that it can stay

resolved by legal means. (Cziomer, Zyblikiewicz, 2006) So considering the general the conditions describing this concept, it can be seen that its interpretation is provided by law international, which is a kind of formal distinguishing feature in relation to definition of armed conflict. International disputes may be vital state interests and pose a threat to the maintenance of the international order, but they are also those that adversely affect international relations, although not are threats to international peace and security. (Piskrzyńska, 2022) The literature on the subject is divided into political and legal disputes. Whether a dispute is political is determined by such criteria as: reason of state, interests political or vital national interests.

On the other hand, the assessment of the legal dispute is based based on a specific norm of international law. (Malendowski, 2004) When resolving disputes some general rules apply:

1. States are bound to seek a just solution in a good one in faith and in a spirit of cooperation. 2. The parties are obliged to refrain from any actions that worsen the situation and disturbing relations between them, and in particular should refrain from the use of force.

The means of peaceful settlement of disputes can be divided into:

- Extrajudicial measures - diplomatic;
  - negotiations - direct negotiations;
  - high level of services;
  - mediation - intermediation;
  - research committees;
  - conciliation - reconciliation.
- Judicial measures:
  - international arbitration - conciliation;
  - international judiciary<sup>10</sup>.

An international conflict, on the other hand, takes place when two or more entities are in conflict due to differences of interest<sup>11</sup>. Depending on the situation and the escalation of tension, the subject of the conflict may appear both gradually and violently. It occurs when the parties take political, economic or military actions in order to impose their arguments. (Malendowski, 2004)

The fact is that conflicts will arise less frequently in the modern reality international exploding suddenly - unannounced. Rather, one should take into account that a conflict of this type will tend to increase as the situation changes between the naves and the political and economic means used to it fueling or leveling. Consequently, the international conflict is taking different phases.

The first is a conflict of interest based on premises historical or government action. It is usually solved by politics foreign. With its help, governments try to

---

<sup>10</sup> These principles are described in detail in Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter.

<sup>11</sup> Lexicon of political science, ed. A. Antoszewski, R. Herbut, Wyd. Atla 2, Wrocław 2000, p. 224



guarantee security and stability to its states, assuming that the existing conflicts of interest do not cause a conflict situation.

The second phase is usually disputes that arise when external or internal tensions resulting from conflicts of interest will be outside the system full control, provoking a reaction from the other party. Then the state or states by taking appropriate action, they can lead to increased international tensions and create a situation that threatens peace.

The third phase is a crisis that usually occurs when the parties are in order achieving their interests (which are mutually exclusive), engage various means in the form of protectionism, embargoes, economic isolation, and in extreme cases they undertake even military activation, with the threat of using the armed forces. This is the phase in which the hand they can withdraw from the final confrontation.

The next phase is a confrontation - this stage is not the same as the beginning war. There may also be a compromise at this stage, for example when one of the parties decide to withdraw. On the other hand, the war during the confrontation it creates this type of relationship between states that expresses inertia when it comes to about controlling the situation. The fact is that wars bring economic and biological benefits destruction, but on the other hand, they are also accelerated by political, social and other changes.

The last phase is usually a peaceful settlement of the conflict, where usually the third party has a great influence on its end. (Piskrzyńska, 2022)

It should therefore be stated that a characteristic feature of an international conflict is on the one hand, the fact that it does not concern the internal spheres of a given country, but the international community in a given region, and the fact that it has its own legal authority.

#### **4.1 Identification of an international dispute**

A dispute in international law should be identified with a situation in which there are contradictory positions between subjects of international law. In the light of the ruling of the Permanent International Court of International Justice, the dispute is is a disagreement as to law or fact, a conflict of legal positions or interests between two people<sup>12</sup>. Importantly, the Charter of the United Nations formulates an obligation to settle disputes peacefully. All members should settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a way as to prevent it to a threat to international peace and security and justice<sup>13</sup>. Some representatives of the doctrine indicate a relationship between the concept of a dispute and the interests of the states participating in the dispute. Professor Ehrlich is of the

---

<sup>12</sup> The judgment of the STSM of August 30, 1924, <http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/series-a.php?p1=9&p2=1> (accessed on December 21, 2021).

<sup>13</sup> Art. 2 sec. 3 Charter of the United Nations, [http://www.unic.un.org.pl/dokumenty/karta\\_onz.php#6](http://www.unic.un.org.pl/dokumenty/karta_onz.php#6)

opinion that the source of an international dispute is always the interest of the party causing the dispute. Such an interest may be protected by a norm of international law, but it also happens that the state strives to achieve its own interest, although it cannot rely on equitable international law for this purpose. (Ehrlich, 1958) According to Professor Klafkowski, the concept of an international dispute assumes the existence of a contradiction only between states, and thus the subjects of international law. Moreover, the definition of the grounds for an international dispute is of decisive importance for the manner in which it is settled. (Klafkowski, 1966)

There are many divisions of international disputes depending on the various characteristics. From the point of view of the security relationship with foreign policy and diplomacy, the most important are disputes that threaten the national security of individual countries or even threaten the maintenance of international peace. United Nations Charter pays particular attention to disputes:

- a) legal and political, and
- b) ordinary and qualified.

Pursuant to the provision of Art. 36 sec. 3 of the Charter of the United Nations, legal disputes shall be referred to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of its Statute<sup>14</sup>. The scope of competence of the International Court of Justice is regulated by Art. 37 sec. 2 of its statutes<sup>15</sup>. Disputes that cannot qualify as legal disputes are political disputes. (Góralczyk, 2017) However, as the Court itself noted in the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran case, legal disputes between sovereign states, by their very nature, tend to emerge in political contexts and are often only one element of a wider dispute between two states. Moreover, it has never been argued that, since a legal dispute submitted to the Court is only one aspect of a political dispute, the Court should refrain from deciding between the parties on the points of law on which they are in dispute. The doctrine emphasizes that if the Tribunal were to adopt such a view, contrary to its established jurisprudence, it would result in a far-reaching and difficult to predict limitation of its role in the peaceful settlement of international disputes. (Górski, 2014)

As for the Security Council, in the light of Art. 34 of the Charter of the United Nations, it may determine whether the continuation of the dispute endangers the maintenance of international peace and security<sup>16</sup>. Such a dispute is classified as qualified, which entails further organizational and legal consequences. (Góralczyk, 2011) The Security Council may summon the parties to settle a qualified dispute and recommend - in a non-binding manner - a method

---

<sup>14</sup> Article 36 (3) of the Charter of the United Nations, [http://www.unic.un.org.pl/dokumenty/karta\\_onz.php#6](http://www.unic.un.org.pl/dokumenty/karta_onz.php#6)

<sup>15</sup> Article 37 (2) of the Statute of the ICJ <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU19470230090>

<sup>16</sup> Article 34 of the Charter of the United Nations, [http://www.unic.un.org.pl/dokumenty/karta\\_onz.php#6](http://www.unic.un.org.pl/dokumenty/karta_onz.php#6)

of its resolution<sup>17</sup> (Article 33 (2) and Article 36 (1)). An example of such action can be seen in Resolution 2334 (2016), in which the Security Council condemned Israeli settlement in the West Bank, stating that Israel's actions in the Palestinian territories, including East Jerusalem, occupied since 1967, have no legal basis and constitute serious violation of international law, thus impeding the implementation of the two state solution<sup>18</sup>. It is worth emphasizing that the adoption of the resolution proves the will of the Council to lead the conflict and the determination of the international community to bring it to a peaceful end. However, the remaining disputes are ordinary disputes. (Góralczyk, 2011) It is worth emphasizing the special function performed by the UN Security Council.

## 5 Contemporary international relations

The basic task of international activity of states is cooperation with other countries or participants in international relations. Based on the criterion of the number of participating entities, we can talk about bilateral and multilateral cooperation. (Cziomer, 2008) However, in terms of the type of cooperation, it covers the following areas: political, legal, economic, military, social, cultural, etc.

Bilateral relations are of fundamental importance in the context of the needs and interests of states. The content and form of interstate relations are extremely diverse: from occasional contacts, through regular ones covering various areas of bilateral relations, to allied or integration ties; from hostility to neutrality, for friendly relations.

Governments seek to give relationships with their more important partners a broader, treaty basis. Inter-state treaties usually regulate the entirety of bilateral relations: political cooperation, the foundations of economic cooperation, legal issues, cultural relations, youth and military cooperation, common border issues, etc. The treaties may provide for periodic political consultations at various levels. Regardless of the overall treaties, states often conclude bilateral agreements with each other regulating specific issues. (Halizak, Kuźniar, 2006)

The original and oldest form of diplomacy were special missions - ad hoc and short-term, representing sending countries - which for millennia were the only form of diplomatic contacts between states. Permanent diplomatic missions, and with them modern professional diplomacy, was born in the second half of the 15th century in the cities-republics of Italy (Venice, Milan, Genoa, Florence). This is also where the practice of establishing permanent envoys comes from, which then spread throughout Europe. The development of modern forms of diplomacy began with the Congress of Vienna (1815). The creation and development of

---

<sup>17</sup> Art. 33 sec. 2 and art. 36 sec. 1 of the United Nations Charter, [http://www.unic.un.org/pl/dokumenty/karta\\_onz.php#6](http://www.unic.un.org/pl/dokumenty/karta_onz.php#6)

<sup>18</sup> Resolution 2334 (2016), <http://www.un.org/webcast/pdfs/SRES2334-2016.pdf>

permanent diplomatic missions did not cause the disappearance of special missions.

Multilateral relations are the result of states' conviction that the realization of certain national interests and the resolution of certain international problems require the combined effort of a greater number of states. Merging of states in order to achieve specific solutions may be ad hoc, one-off or more permanent.

The rapid development of multilateral forms of international relations was caused by the fact that the previous forms - bilateral - became insufficient since the 19th century due to the rapid quantitative development of the international community, the expansion of the fields of cooperation between states and the intertwining of their interests, and the rapid development of transport and communication, breaking the previously existing geographic isolation of states. (Pietraś, 1986)

A variant of multilateral relations are international conferences convened by governments. An international conference in the broadest sense is a meeting of representatives of governments or social organizations from more than two countries, convened to discuss a specific matter. In a narrower sense, it means a meeting of official representatives of states convened to settle the problem to which it is devoted, e. g. to settle an international dispute.

Contemporary international relations in a dynamically changing world, as a return to the era of multipolarity and multilateralism is fraught with multiple and multi-faceted threats to international peace and security. Former leading guardians of the global status quo, especially the United States, plunged in a crisis of leadership and slowly losing global hegemony for the benefit of emerging powers, they cannot bear the burden of responsibility and in them by the international community hope to play a leading role, especially in the field of security, a constructive role in the modern world.

President Obama's strategy, contested among some of the United States' allies, including Poland, rejected many elements of politics from the position of force, implemented in the era of George W. Bush's republican administration, emphasizing the elements of the policy of negotiations, diplomacy and understanding, i. e. smart power. It was a kind of a *mélange* of hard and soft power - both approaches in practicing foreign policy, co in relation to the strategy of the Obama government, it meant modernization, sustainability and integrating all the tools and means of American power for achievement goals, including the most important one, i. e. the renewal of the US world leadership.

In the context of the fight against international terrorism, the democratic administration took the position that it is not a direct threat to the United States as a state that at least still recognizes itself as the most powerful country in the world, although Islamic terrorism remains a serious threat to US citizens. The twilight of American domination, prophesied by supporters of the hegemonic cycle of Georg Modelski, or the theory of world-systems of Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, is accompanied by the growing importance of regional powers, such as India, Brazil,

Germany, and in the Eurasian space - the Russian Federation, among which only China seems to be take up the challenge on a global scale, although the military, financial, economic and scientific and technical potential of the United States will probably provide them with a leading role in international relations for many more decades.

Against the background of a constantly changing constellation and conflicting great interests and smaller actors on the world stage are undoubtedly Iran and Turkey, in the area of the Middle East that is traditionally sensitive to global security, and Russia, which goes beyond the strictly one-dimensional framework, is constantly expanding its influence on the international environment.

In the case of the simultaneous armed conflicts in Ukraine and in the Middle East, it seems that it is the Russian Federation to the greatest extent - paradoxically also in Syria - that has multiple assets in its hands, including influence, potential and political will. In recent years, Russia has not only significantly increased its involvement in the post-Soviet area and, more broadly, in the former sphere of influence dating back to the Soviet Union but has also decided to make it a field for implementing the vision of a multipolar world in which Moscow will take the privileged position of one from the power centers of the world. Naturally, Russia does not narrow this center only for regional areas, e.g. European or Middle East, but its ambitions go much further and are summarized in the will to participate in making decisions on a global scale.

The question is whether it is really worth underlining, and resulting from history and the traditions of Russian foreign policy and diplomacy, firmly rooted in Russian political thought, is the Kremlin's consistency in implementing the great-power vision justified by the country's potential, or does it play a role in contemporary international relations disproportionate to its actual capabilities?

Considering the above issue in purely politicalological terms, for example with the help of Robert Gilpin's theory of change of the international system - the Russian Federation becomes the actor who benefits most from the change in international relations, trying to transform the system according to its interests. Russia, occupying the largest area in the world, with an inexhaustible source of raw materials and a powerful armed force, including a nuclear arsenal, was and remains a country threatened by separatist tendencies, experiencing a demographic crisis, with a technologically backward and constantly shrinking economy, low in relation to the leading countries world standard of living.

Well-known statistical data on many aspects of Russian reality should therefore speak rather in favor of a progressive degradation of Russia's significance. Contrary to this, paradoxically, we are currently dealing with the noticeable - especially in the last dozen or so months.

An often-underestimated component of Russia's position in the arena international is Russia's skillful use of soft power, especially in the post-Soviet

area in the Eurasian civilization space, but not only - also in the broadly understood West, where the still high Russian culture is triumphant.

The armed conflict in Ukraine, played by the Kremlin in the pure form of textbook political realism, according to the formula described by Kenneth Waltz and Hans Morgenthau, or the conflicts on the periphery of the former empire, of course in a different, wider dimension in the Middle East, especially in Syria, where the interests of the West and Russia clashed openly, have become a platform for the Russian Federation to increase its own power and, moreover, patiently convincing world leaders that the problems in Ukraine and in Syria cannot be solved without Russia's active and even leading role. In the case of Ukraine, as well as allies belonging to the Russian zone influence, their importance for Russia also derives from the value of modernization for Russian economy.

The armed conflict in Ukraine and the long-lasting conflicts in the Middle East, due to the destabilization of the region and being one of its derivatives, growing, mainly in Syria and Iraq, the focus of international terrorism seems to be the most determinant of the changing balance of power in the world. So far, referring to a known opinion, presented years ago by Zbigniew Brzezinski, the dominant United States remains the most powerful, but it ceases to be all-powerful and without an active cooperation of regional powers, i.e. as is the case with Ukraine and Syria - the Russian Federation, will not be able to exercise their leadership. The consequences of this state of affairs for international security lead to the redefinition of many old axioms of international politics.

## **Conclusion**

Summarizing the issues raised, it should be stated that maintaining stability in an integrating Europe and in the world is an extremely difficult process, requiring cooperation and commitment from members of the international community. Transnational Europe is a community of states, regions and citizens.

Internal and international conflicts are a manifestation of conflicting interests between states, proof of impossibility, and even, as T. Łoś-Nowak claims, reluctance to resort to amicable solutions. (Łoś-Nowak, 1995) They are both existential, coexistent and functional interests. Conflicts, disputes, wars are phenomena that have always served humanity in its development. They cannot be eradicated overnight because countries are too diverse and often have different ideas about a certain phenomenon. In addition to democracies (consolidated, i.e. liberal and unconsolidated, electoral), there exist and function in the world states of the "gray" political zone, as well as authoritarian countries. The systemic conditions in the perception of the world and regional situation by the elite and society are very strong. Problems in the process of externalization "spill over" across national borders to varying degrees, threatening peace in entire regions.

However, attempts should be made to eliminate the source of their occurrence. Besides, in contemporary international relations it is important to not resort to force solutions, but rather to solve problems by peaceful means. It is worth mentioning here that the diplomatic methods of solving international disputes include: negotiations, mediation, good services, research committees and conciliations. In addition to the above-mentioned, there are also judicial methods in the form of international arbitration (conciliation) or permanent courts. Thus, states should make use of all available methods before resorting to forceful solutions peaceful resolution of disputes.

Diplomacy is one of the instruments of foreign policy, it is versatile and influences the direction and nature of relations in various fields and in a wide range. Its shape is influenced by many factors.

The most important of them are globalization, the influence of religion on politics and law (Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco), the problem of democracy in some countries (especially the post-Soviet bloc), as well as social inequalities and the power of influence of the so-called great powers. Regardless of its form. The most important thing is that diplomacy works out against conflicts, it tries - by peaceful methods - to calm disputes and lead to their resolution, before states decide to use military force. Diplomacy is a kind of dam that prevents conflicts between states from becoming inflamed and spreading. In order to maintain world peace and security, first of all, diplomatic means of peaceful settlement of disputes are used, then organized sanctions, and as a last resort - military forces.

## References

- Act on Foreign Service,  
<https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WDU20210000464> (access: 10/03/2022).
- ANTOSZEWSKI, A., HERBUT, R. 2004. *Lexicon of political science*, Wyd. Atla 4, Wrocław, 2004. p. 224, ISBN 83-88555-46-4.
- BASTID S. 1954. *Droit des gens - Droit des crises internationales*, Paris 1954, vol. II, p. 204.
- BIERZANEK R. 1974. *Settling international disputes 1945 - 1973*, Warsaw, 1974. p. 98-131.
- BULAJIC, 1997. R., *Global and Regional Trade and Cooperation Key Tasks of Today's Diplomacy*, "Review of International Affaires", vol. XLVIII, 15 July - 15 August 1997, pp. 8-9.
- BULAJIC, R. 1997. *Global and Regional Trade and Cooperation Key Tasks of Today's Diplomacy*, "Review of International Affaires", vol. XLVIII, 15 July - 15 August 1997, p. 8.

- BYRSKA, D., GAWKOWSKI, K., LISZKOWSKA, D. 2017. *European Union, genesis and functioning of the challenge*. exante.com.pl. Wrocław, 2017. pp. 7-40. ISBN 978-83-65374-53-0.
- CLAUDE, I. L. 1964. *Swords into Plowshares*. London, 1964. p. 220.
- CZIOMER, E. 2008. *International political relations*, Krakow University of Applied Sciences Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski, Krakow 2008, p. 120, 309-345, ISBN 978-83-89823-38-0.
- CZIOMER, E., ZYBLIKIEWICZ, L. W. 2006. *Outline of contemporary international relations*, Polish Scientific Publishers PWN: Warsaw, 2006. p. 250, ISBN: 8301145412.
- DWORECKI, S. 1994. *Development of state security*, WSO - AON, Warsaw, 1994. pp. 316.
- EHRlich, L. 1958. *International law*, Warsaw 1958, Wydawnictwo Prawnicze p. 356.
- FREEMAN, C.W. 2010. *Diplomat's Dictionary*, US Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC, 2010. p. 52–67. ISBN 978-1-60127-050-4.
- GÓRALCZYK, W., SAWICKI, S. 2017. *An overview of public international law*, Warsaw, 2017. Issue 17, p. 332, ISBN 978-83-8107-459-9.
- GÓRSKI, M. 2014. *Political role of international courts and juridization of politics*. In WYROZUMSKA, A. (ed.). *Limits of freedom of adjudication by international courts*, Łódź 2014. p. 153, ISBN 978-83-937101-3-3.
- GRYZ, J. 2013. *The contemporary shape of military diplomacy*. In SURMACZ, B. (ed.), *"New faces of diplomacy"*, Wyd. UMCS, Lublin 2013, pp. 240–252, ISBN 978-83-7784-288-1.
- HACKWORTH, G. H. 1943. *Digest of International Law, Washington 1943*, vol. VI, p. 1. ISBN 9041105484.
- HALIŻAK, E., KUŹNIAR, R. 2006. *International relations. Genesis, structure, dynamics*. Publishing House of the University of Warsaw: Warsaw, 2006. p. 139, ISBN 83-235-0281-1.
- HOLSTI, K.J. 2004. *Taming the Sovereigns. Institutional Change in International Politics*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2004. ISBN 9780511491382.
- KITLER, W. 2011. *National security of the Republic of Poland. Basic categories - determinants – system*. Warsaw, 2011. p. 25, ISBN 9788375231595.
- KLAFKOWSKI, A. 1966. *Public international law*, State Scientific Publishers, Warsaw, 1966. p. 316, TIN T00050299.
- KRZEMIŃSKA, A. 2014. *Evolution of Poland's involvement in building security in the Middle East*, Defense. Zeszyty Naukowe 1 (9) / 2014, p. 89, ISSN 2299-2316
- KUKUŁKA, J. 1984. *International political relations, 1984*, State Publishing House. Naukowe. Warsaw, p. 67, ISBN 8301036133.



- KUPIECKI, R. 2014. *Military attaches of the Second Polish Republic in the light of documents. A few remarks to volume I*. In SZYMANIUK, R., WSZENDYRÓWNY, A., JASKUŁA, A. (ED.). *Polish military diplomacy 1918–1945. Selection of documents*, MON, vol. 1, Warsaw, 2014. p. 7–14, ISBN 978-83-64475-19-1.
- ŁOŚ-NOWAK, T. ed. (1995, 1997), *Contemporary international relations*, Publishing House of the University of Wrocław, Wrocław 1997, p. 80, ISBN 83-229-1677-9.
- ŁOŚ-NOWAK, T. 1995. *Basic problems of contemporary international relations*. In *Contemporary international relations*, ed. T. Łoś-Nowak, Wyd. Of the University of Wrocław, Wrocław 1995. ISBN 83-229-1677-9.
- MALENDOWSKI, W., MOJSIEWICZ, C. eds. 2004. *International Relations*, ed. III 2004, Wrocław, p. 67. ISBN ISBN 83-88555-77-4.
- MALENDOWSKI, W. 2004. *International disputes and conflicts*. In *International relations*, ed. MALENDOWSKI W., MOJSIEWICZ Cz., Wyd. Atla 2, Wrocław 2004, pp. 513-514. ISBN 83-88555-77-4.
- MAJZNER, R. 1945. *Military Attachments of the Second Republic of Poland 1919–1945. Structural and organizational aspects of functioning*. Academy of Jana Długosza, Częstochowa 2014. ISBN 978-83-745-5391-9.
- 31.MAKOWSKI, J. 1926. *Contemporary forms of international judiciary*, Warsaw 1926, pp. 112, 517.
- 32.MARCINKOWSKI Cz. 2011. *The essence and evolution of UN peacekeeping missions*, Warsaw, 2011, *Historical and Military Review* 12 (63) / 5 (238), pp. 7-20, ISSN 1640-6281.
- MICHAŁOWSKI, M. K. 1962. *Miedzunarodnyj arbitrage*, Kyiv 1962, p. 171.
- MIŁOSZ, S. 2011. *Contemporary Diplomacy and Diplomatic Protocol. Theory and Practice*. Warsaw 2011, pp. 36, 978-83-62345-43-4.
- PIETRAŚ, Z. J. 1986. *Fundamentals of the theory of international relations*, Lublin 1986, Publishing house: Maria Curie-Skłodowska University. Intercollegiate Institute of Political Sciences, p. 133.
- PISKRZYŃSKA, K. 2022. *Crises and international conflicts in the regional dimension. Theoretical considerations*, <https://www.sbc.org.pl/dlibra/publication/11041/edition/10181/content> (accessed: 10/03/2022).
- Resolution 2334 (2016), <http://www.un.org/webcast/pdfs/SRES2334-2016>. (accessed: 10/03/2022).
- RUTKOWSKI, C. 1995. *Security and defense: strategies - concepts - doctrines*, Warsaw 1995, p. 30
- STANKIEWICZ, W. 1991. *National security and unarmed fights*. Studium, Warsaw 1991, p. 73.
- SURMACZ, B. 2015. *The evolution of modern diplomacy. Actors, structures, functions*, Wyd. UMCS: Lublin 2015. pp. 25-37. ISBN 978-83-7784-658-2

- SUTOR, J. 1979. *Peaceful settlement of international disputes*, Warsaw 1979, p. 8.
- SUTOR, J. 2000. *Diplomatic and consular law*, ed. VI, Warsaw 2000, pp. 175-176. ISBN 83-87558-77-X.
- SUTOR, J. 2018. *Diplomatic and Consular Law*, Edition 13, Wolters Kluwer Polska, Warsaw 2018. p. 29-30. ISBN 978-83-8160-129-0.
- SUTOR, J. 2019. *Diplomatic and consular law*, ed. 13, Warsaw 2019, pp. 27-47. ISBN 978-83-8160-129-0.
- SZUBER-BEDNARZ, E., KUCHARSKI, G. 2011: *Diplomatic missions in armed conflicts in the era of civilization changes Traditions and perspectives*, 2011 Poznań, pp. 191-203. ISBN 978-83-60038-24-6.
- ŚWIDERSKI, K., KUŹNIAR, Z. 2017. *The State Security System in the face of contemporary civilization threats*, Security Culture, Science - Practice - Reflections, No. 25, 2017, Military University of Land Forces in Wrocław (154–168), ISSN 2299-4033
- United Nations Charter*, <http://libr.sejm.gov.pl/tek01/txt/onz/1945.html> (accessed on 10/03/2022).
- Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.
  - Art. 2 sec. 3 United Nations Charter,
  - Art. 33 sec. 2 and art. 36 sec. 1 of the United Nations Charter,
  - Article 34 of the Charter of the United Nations,
  - Article 36 (3) of the Charter of the United Nations,
  - Article 37 (2) of the Statute of the ICJ
- <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU19470230090> (access: 21/12/2016).
- ZIĘBA, R. 1989. *The concept of state security in international relations*. International Affairs No.10, 1989, p. 49.
- The judgment of the STSM of August 30, 1924*, <http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/series-a.php?p1=9&p2=1> (accessed on December 21, 2016).
- VAGTS, A. 1956. *Defense and Diplomacy. The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign Relations*. King's Crown Press, New York 1956, <https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/62/3/601/80009?redirectedFrom=fulltext> (accessed 10/03/2022) .
- VAGTS, A. 1967. *The Military Attache*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1967. ISBN 9781400876358.
- ZENDEROWSKI, R. 2006. *International Relations, Vademecum*, Wyd. Atla 2, Wrocław 2006. p. 479-488. ISBN 9788388555237.
- ZIĘBA, Z. 2008. *International security after the Cold War*, ed. 1., Warsaw 2008, p. 17. ISBN 978-83-60501-92-4.

# PROBLEMS OF VIOLENCE AND ITS MANIFESTATIONS IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF KOJETÍN AND ITS SURROUNDINGS

Tomáš Škurka<sup>1</sup> - Pavel Otrísal<sup>2</sup> - Břetislav Štěpánek<sup>3</sup>

## **ABSTRACT**

*The paper generally deals with the issue of violence and its impact on society. Research activities were carried out in the municipality of Kojetín and its surroundings. Following the specification of selected aspects of violence and its relation to young people and adults, areas that are typical for the selected municipality were specified. In the practical part, the most significant outputs of the sociological survey are presented. The aim of the research was to find up opinions of the public living in the selected locality on national minorities in the Czech Republic in relation to violence. The findings that the biggest problem lies in poor public awareness can be considered as the contribution of the communication. In the conclusion, suggestions and proposals are given that could significantly improve the public's view of the issue.*

**Key words:** *Prevention, media, national minority, violence, crime, research*

## **Introduction**

Nowadays, it can be said that we live in a time when we encounter various forms of violence practically in everyday practice. In news reports, violence is very often mentioned in connection with schools and public spaces. Violence is seen as ubiquitous, has always been there and will probably always be with us. This consideration can be attributed to the fact that violence is a manifestation of interpersonal relations in society. It describes society and a comprehensible world as something that helps people to make decisions whose consequences they can predict, at least to some extent, and therefore more easily bear. In this context, he understands man as a personality who feels the need for an ordered and comprehensible picture of the world around him. This need is felt by the individual in an insistent and unavoidable way, because he is condemned to act, the consequences of which he can never fully appreciate.

---

<sup>1</sup> Tomáš Škurka, Bc., Faculty of Physical Culture, Palacký University Olomouc, třída Míru 117, 771 11, Olomouc, Czech Republic, tomsig@seznam.cz

<sup>2</sup> Pavel Otrísal, prof., Ing., Ph.D., MBA, Faculty of Physical Culture, Palacký University Olomouc, Třída Míru 117, 771 11 Olomouc, Czech Republic, pavel.otrisal@upol.cz

<sup>3</sup> Břetislav, Štěpánek, Ing., Ph.D., Faculty of Physical Culture, Palacký University Olomouc, třída Míru 117, 771 11, Olomouc, Czech Republic, bretin@seznam.cz

# 1 Violence and its aspects

## 1.1 Violence according to the World Health Organization

Violence is generally understood as the intentional use or threatened use of physical force against oneself, another person or a group of persons that causes or has a high probability of causing injury, death, psychological harm, hardship, or damage. It is now generally condemned but is considered legal and permitted in certain defined circumstances, such as in combat sports or in cases of necessary defence.

The World Health Organization (WHO) categorizes violence according to different characteristics of the perpetrators of violent acts:

- self-inflicted violence - expresses a person's violent behaviour towards himself/herself with the deliberate intention of harming himself/herself. It takes the form of self-harm and suicidal behaviour;
- interpersonal violence - includes domestic violence, sexual assault and stalking;
- collective violence - the use of violence by people who consider themselves part of a group against another group of people to achieve political, economic, or social goals. Typical forms include wars, terrorism, state violence and organized crime.

Violence can also be categorized according to the nature of the violent acts:

- physical - a form involving any physical attack on another person or animal. Most often this includes punching, kicking, choking and beating, usually with the use of an object. However, it also includes non-physical violence, such as forcing someone to take a drug;
- sexual - violation of intimacy and personal boundaries to demonstrate power, humiliation, or degradation. This includes any conduct involving the use of coercion to attempt to achieve sexual intercourse, unwanted sexual remarks and advances directed against an individual's sexuality and without their consent (sleeping, drugging, etc.);
- psychological - the WHO defines psychological violence as intimidation, psychological coercion, threats, name-calling and humiliation, and acts that cause psychological harm to the victim. This violence often escalates into physical violence;
- deprivation - in this case, it refers to a condition where an important psychological or physical need of an individual is not being met. It is most often described as emotional deprivation, i.e. any lack of feelings and emotions experienced by an individual.

According to this theory, Gál (1994) further differentiated violence into positive and negative. As positive violence he perceives, for example, self-defence and intervention against an attacker who assaults a woman or child, or the combat sports.

In contrast to aggression, which can be understood as one of the sources of life energy and development, as a condition or motivation for assertion and independence, violence is defined as a relational behaviour that results in the disruption of the development or continuity of another's life (Poněšický, 2010).

According to Spurný (1996), violence can also be understood as a pathological way of interaction of a particular individual (group) with the environment. It includes all activities by means of which an individual or group (subject, actor) creates and regulates relations to the social environment in a way that is perceived as aggressive or manipulative.

## **1.2 History of violence**

Castleden (2009) claims that: “No matter how deeply we look into history, we always come across some kind of conflict accompanied by some kind of violence. The reason for these ancient tribal clashes was mutually incompatible claims to natural resources, especially water and land.” Conflicts in the Stone Age were not extensive because the communities themselves were not very large. However, communities and societies gradually grew and with them conflicts. Over the centuries, the development of communications and transport, as well as advances in military technology, allowed the scale of conflict to increase significantly. However, the greatest rise in this direction took place in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, greatly helped by the so-called Industrial Revolution. This brought with it, among other things, the industrialisation of warfare. With the discovery of a whole range of new technologies, the two world wars were the greatest violent conflicts known to mankind up to the present time.

## **1.3 Violence and the law**

The Police of the Czech Republic (CR) describes violence as the use of physical force to overcome or prevent resistance, whether expected or not. It also considers violence to be putting another into a state of defencelessness (for example drunkenness) by deceit, because of which the victim is unable to defend himself effectively. The Police of the CR also distinguish between threats of violence, which the Police describes as psychological influence on the will of another. It may not only be a threat of immediate violence, but also one that is to be used in the future. The threatened violence may be directed against the attacked person or against a third party. The threat may be expressed directly or indirectly, verbally or by gesture.

Important documents regulating individual acts of violence are legal provisions falling under the category of civil law. This can be further divided into individual sources, which include:

- Constitutional Act No. 1/1993 Coll. - Constitution of the CR;
- Act No. 89/2012 Coll. - Civil Code;

- Resolution No. 2/1993 Coll. - Resolution of the Presidency of the Czech National Council on the proclamation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms as part of the constitutional order of the CR.

In legal terms, violence can be divided into misdemeanours and felonies according to the type of seriousness of the act, the amount of damage to property, and the harmfulness and dangerousness. In legal terms, violence is understood both as a misdemeanour and as a criminal offence. A misdemeanour is regulated as an unlawful act of a lower degree of seriousness than a criminal offence, which is socially harmful and which is explicitly designated as a misdemeanour by Act No. 250/2016 Coll., Section 5 on the liability for misdemeanours and the proceedings thereon. Criminal offences (also called misdemeanours in the case of juvenile offenders) are understood in Czech criminal law as a comprehensive set of precisely defined features, all of which must be fulfilled to the extent provided for by law, at the time of the commission of the act in which the offence is perceived. Violent crimes are described by the Police of the CR as those crimes listed in the Criminal Code that involve violence against another person or the threat of violence. Examples of such offences are:

- offences against life and health - e.g. attempted murder (Section 140 of Act No. 40/2009 Coll. - Criminal Code - Criminal Code - CC), assault and grievous bodily harm (Sections 145 and 146 CC), torture and other inhuman treatment (Section 149 CC);
- crimes against freedom - e.g. trafficking in human beings (§ 168 of the Criminal Code), deprivation of personal liberty (§ 170 of the Criminal Code), robbery (§ 173 of the Criminal Code), extortion (§ 175 of the Criminal Code);
- certain offences against the family and children - e.g. abuse of a ward (§ 198 of the Criminal Code) and abuse of a person living in a common dwelling (§ 199).

## **2 Violence in relation to youth**

According to Martínek (2015), today's children are no worse than children of past generations. The world that surrounds today's youth, the inappropriate upbringing (at home and often at school), the lack of support and understanding, the haste of the times and the overabundance of technology make them individuals who are unable to identify with everyday reality.

Based on this statement, it is argued that often pathological behaviour of young people in the form of aggression, bullying, stealing, lying and truancy is only a form of defence and a manifestation of inability to deal with difficult life situations.

### **2.1 Bullying**

Řičan (1995) states that “Bullying in school is certainly as old as school itself, children would not be children if the strong never hurt the weak. Malice and cruelty are age-old human vices”.

Holecek (1997) describes bullying as a special case of aggression (violence), because it is actually the way in which aggression is carried out. It is a situation of violence where the so-called victim of bullying is usually weaker and defenceless. It also considers it to be the deliberate and unprovoked use of force by one child or group of children to repeatedly inflict pain, harm or distress on another child. He accurately describes it with this statement: 'Bullying harms another person and is therefore much worse than damaging property or stealing'.

Bullying in a scope of children can be generalised in relation to the above-mentioned definition. It means that one child or group of children say nasty and unpleasant things to another, threaten them, kick, and hit them, lock them in a room etc. These incidents may be repeated frequently, and it is difficult for the bullied child to defend himself or herself. Sometimes frequent taunts or nasty remarks about the family can also be labelled as bullying. The signs of bullying are shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Direct and indirect signs of bullying

## 2.2 Cyberbullying or virtual bullying

Kopecký (2013) states that “Cyberbullying is an individual or group deliberate misuse of information or electronic communication leading to deliberate and repeated harassment or threatening of an individual or group by disseminating harmful texts, images, etc.”

Cyberbullying or virtual bullying is a sophisticated form of antisocial phenomenon in cyberspace. Technological developments and widespread use of electronic communication, especially via the Internet, allow access to important information and also to connect with friends and family. At the same time, however, this environment represents a potential space for conflict with harmful influences, such as the growing influence of bullying today.

Cyberbullying can be divided according to several approaches, one of which is shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2: Division of cyberbullying based on communication forms and their types

Završnik (2017) adds that cyberbullying differs from bullying primarily because of the anonymity and greater publicity of the act. According to him, the basic elements of cyberbullying are:

- aggressive and intentional act;
- an act carried out by a group or an individual;
- an act committed through electronic communication, especially via the internet;
- a prolonged or repeated act;
- the victim cannot easily defend himself or herself.

### 3 Violence of adults

According to Haškovcová (2004), we live in time when violence is a common phenomenon and anyone, anywhere can become a victim of it. She stresses that in addition to property crime and violent crime, there are many other forms of violence that take place covertly and are thus difficult to verify. The victim of covert violence then manifests itself mainly through psychological or social blackmail and only really turns to the “five minutes to twelve” for help. The author goes on to describe violence as a type of human behaviour that deliberately threatens, attempts to cause, or causes physical harm to other people.

#### 3.1 Domestic violence

Domestic violence is one of the most widespread forms of aggression and cuts across the socio-demographic spectrum. Unlike violence in the broader sense, domestic violence is characterised by a close relationship between a victim and an aggressor. In addition to the close relationship, the aggressor and the victim are usually linked by their social environment (children, friends and acquaintances, etc.). Domestic violence is not limited to a single act of aggression, but has various recurring phases, with which therefore come recurring attacks.

Domestic violence can be understood in the context shown in Figure 3.






Figure 3: Division of domestic violence into groups and forms.

### 3.2 Sexual violence

Uhlířová (2016) describes sexual violence as different types of violence that are associated with sex. Sexual violence most often happens to women or girls who are often specific to some form of disability. However, men as victims are no exception. The rapist then takes advantage of the fact that he is bigger, stronger and more “important” than the person he is hurting.

These facts also reflect Kovář (2008), who argues that sexual violence is always traumatic for the victim. Forced and involuntary sex without intimacy is, according to him, a reliable means of psychologically damaging the other person, and for a long time.

In this context, Křišová (2021) describes research by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, which showed that violence against women, which includes sexual violence, is a serious and frequent problem throughout the European Union, and therefore also in the CR. The results show that one from ten women over the age of 15 has experienced some form of sexual violence and one from five women over the age of 15 has experienced sexual harassment in the form of unpleasant touching or kissing.

## 4 Methodology of research

### 4.1 Characteristics of the research population

The research sample of the questionnaire consisted of 340 random respondents, both men and women, in various age categories and coming from all regions of the CR. Almost three quarters of all respondents were women, thus 71.3% (244 women in total) and the remaining 28.7 % were men (98 men in total).

The above-mentioned preponderance of women participants does not constitute a barrier because this issue concerns all people regardless of gender. The respondents were divided into six age categories in terms of age. Most of them, 216 (63.2 %) belong to the age group from 21 to 30 years. The second largest group, (19.9 %) is between the ages of 10-20. The age groups from 31 to 40 and from 41 to 50 are both represented at 5.8 %. Respondents aged 51 to 60 make up 4.4 % of the total composition and the least numerous groups is aged 61 and over, which accounts for only 0.9% of all respondents.

## **4.2 Research methods and techniques**

Methods of non-standardized quantitative survey were chosen. These methods were designed specifically for the purpose of the research. Disman (2011) describes quantitative research as a method for collecting data to describe the area under study. According to this author, the quantitative method works with many respondents from whom responses are collected and from which data is then processed and statistically evaluated.

## **4.3 Research implementation**

The research was conducted in February/March 2021 through an electronic survey for the public. The survey was created on the SURVIO website. A premium account option was subscribed for the best results and to work with them. Prior to the release of this survey and data collection, a custom pre-survey was conducted. The aim of this pre-survey was to see if all questions and answers were clear, logical, and unambiguous. The survey was then published and distributed electronically.

## **4.4 Data processing**

For statistical data processing, the spreadsheet software and powerful tool for data visualization and analysis MS Excel and SURVIO program in its paid version have been used. The paid version differs from the version that is freely available in that it allows for the collection of far more responses from respondents (only 100 in the non-paid version), allows for skipping questions for logic and clarity for respondents, and also makes connections between questions.

The individual responses to the survey questions are evaluated and analysed in the text below. Furthermore, the author's own views and opinions on the results are presented and possible solutions are suggested.

Based on the data and the significant percentages of a particular group of respondents, some of the questions are given context that was deemed appropriate or otherwise interesting. These contexts relate to the age and, where appropriate, gender of respondents and their responses to questions.

## 5 Results

As noted above, violence is a relational behaviour that results in disruption of the development or continuity of the other's life. The research was focused on the area around the town of Kojetín, which is characterized by a more significant presence of citizens of the Roma population. The focus was put on, therefore, whether violence is a major problem and whether it should be addressed. To the question: "Have you experienced any form of violence in your neighbourhood?" 236 respondents answered positively, which is 69 % of the respondents. Interestingly, only 25 % of respondents in aged between 21 and 30 gave a negative answer. We assumed that the younger generation, on the other hand, would not encounter these phenomena as much, but the fact that virtually every young person spends a lot of their time on the Internet contributes to the fact that new forms of Internet violence are on the rise.

Respondents who answered that they had experienced violence were asked what form of violence they had personally experienced. Respondents were given a choice of several options for this question. A high number of 182 (77.8 %) appeared for the answer "Bullying, cyberbullying". Such a high incidence is somewhat suppressed by the fact that this manifestation of violence is well addressed or suppressed in the CR or in the Olomouc Region. More than 50 % of the occurrences were recorded for the answers "Damage to other people's property" and "Theft". These types of violence or conflict were generally expected to have a high percentage because they occur essentially regardless of the spatial location of the research implementation. The response options "Rioting and battery" have the same 40 % response rate. "Domestic violence" has 21.8 % and "Vice crime" accounts for 9 %.

In terms of the roles in which the respondents appeared, most (80 %) chose the answer that they were in the role of a bystander. Almost half of the respondents (44 %) were victims. Respondents in the number of 18 (7.7 %) appeared in the role of aggressor. In terms of respondents' perception of the area as a dangerous place to live, nearly half (47.8 %) said they "Rather Disagree" with living in an area with higher crime rates. If we add to this number the 26.7 % of all people who answered that they "Disagree" with this question, we arrive at 74.5 %, which corresponds to 254 people, almost three quarters of all respondents. Despite the often-mentioned problems with the coexistence of majority and minority groups in this area, the finding that they consider their surroundings to be less affected by crime is quite interesting. What is interesting about this question are the results for women and men. While only a quarter of women (25.41 %) said they considered their neighbourhood to be criminally active, almost half of men (46.43 %) did so. This disparity can be explained mainly by the different thinking of men and women in terms of prevention. While women usually avoid dangerous places, men often do not acknowledge the danger and often seek out places with higher crime rates.

Furthermore, the share of crime and the representation of members of national minorities were examined. It turned out that the positive and negative answers in all their variants were approximately 50:50. The distribution of responses according to the age of the respondents or their gender did not show any major variations and the percentages were quite similar for each group. It also turned out that most respondents who answered in the affirmative to any of the previous questions think the higher crime rate in their neighbourhood is caused by the Roma minority. The nationalities listed were Ukrainian, Vietnamese, Polish, Slovak and Arab. In view of this defined result, it is not surprising that members of the Roma minority have a majority share in the violence in the study area. It is reported that approximately 245 000 Roma people live in the CR public. According to the Czech Statistical Office, 134 000 Ukrainians live in the Czech Republic. According to the statistics, there are roughly twice as many Roma people living here as there are Ukrainians. According to the surveys' results, however, people perceive Roma people, who number only 121 000 more than Ukrainians, as a conflict group several times more often. If we add the fact that, according to the data on the Romeo website, 80 % of all Roma live in socially excluded localities and are also long-term unemployed, and if we add the fact that Ukrainians come to the Czech Republic exclusively to work (they are controlled and supervised with the help of visas), we get a completely absurd view of the matter.

In questions concerning the implementation of prevention activities, it was found that most respondents were not convinced of the quality of the organisation of prevention activities. Almost 60 % of the respondents chose a negative answer, suggesting that the Czech media do not focus much on this issue. It was also found that 48.5 % of the respondents consider prevention activities in schools to be insufficient, which is quite interesting given the existence of programmes and projects that focus on violence. Furthermore, 71.9 % of respondents indicated that schools provide insufficient or rather inadequate information on national minorities.

## **6 Discussion**

From the results above, it can be deduced that most of the respondents have already experienced some form of violence in their lives, especially bullying/cyberbullying, damage to property and theft. Most often, the respondents were in the role of a bystander or witness to these acts. These questions were a kind of a key indicator of security in the CR, and gradually, directly and indirectly, other questions were linked to them. It was found that people were not afraid in their neighbourhood, even at night, and they also did not feel that they lived in a neighbourhood with higher crime rates. Based on these results, it can be concluded that the Olomouc Region and Kojetín, including its surroundings, are relatively safe, even at night. It was also found that approximately half of the

respondents believe that ethnic minorities have the largest share of crime in their neighbourhood, and of that half, the majority said that members of the Roma population are involved in that crime.

Attention was also focused on the level of awareness as an essential part of prevention. It has been shown that there is rather poor awareness of both majority and minority societies, both by the media and by schools. Furthermore, it can be stated that the work of the Police of the Czech Republic in dealing with the problems of national minorities is assessed well by the respondents, in contrast to the work of the state. From the obtained results it can be concluded that the state should deal more with the issue of national minorities and inform its citizens about it through the media and schools.

## **Conclusions and recommendations**

The research has shown that people in the CR, or in the Olomouc Region, feel safe and are generally open and friendly to other nationalities, except in a few cases related to the Roma and, in less frequent cases, Ukrainian communities. Furthermore, the biggest problem in the CR is seen by citizens as the work of the state and poor information through the media and schools.

On the basis of the carried out research, it is possible to specify proposals that, if they reach their implementation phase, could significantly contribute to a better understanding of the issue of violence in all contexts of its perception. We consider it essential to link European and national legal awareness of the issue of violent crime and the enforcement of its punishment. This approach would very likely allow European countries to implement a uniform European law and to punish individual crimes and offences according to uniformly understood rules. Furthermore, we consider as necessary to create a broad awareness-raising activity at all levels of education. In this area, it is necessary to be aware that there is still a strong legal ignorance even among the teaching staff of each type of school, and it is generally assumed that teachers will educate and guide their pupils in the spirit of anti-violence policy.

Based on the conducted research, we further propose to start intensive work on the implementation of information campaigns, not only at the level of printed traditional media, but especially at the level of electronic information sources. Knowing their reach and wide multi-age coverage, we can say that the awareness of the population will be on the rise. In this context, it is worth mentioning that only 1.05% of the questionnaires were distributed in written form, which shows the impact of the studied issue in the electronic information environment, which seems to be irreplaceable at present. It will also be necessary to focus attention on specifically planned and organized information campaigns in regions where the issue of the occurrence of violence in all aspects of its perception appears more frequently and intensively than in areas with a lower incidence of this phenomenon. We suggest that these areas be defined and specified at the central

state level. Based on the partial analyses thus carried out, it would be appropriate to systematically direct financial flows for targeted information campaigns on a permanent basis.

It has also proved beneficial in the long term that a significant number of violent crimes and offences are publicised, even though they are usually anonymised. We suggest that these practical examples be further analysed, studied, and used as a basis for the development of model scenarios for use in real educational practice in primary and secondary schools. To implement this idea, we propose creating joint work teams composed of specialists in violent crime and educators trained in the prevention of socially undesirable (negative, pathological) phenomena. A specific school authority or the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports of the CR as such could take over the guarantee over the creation of such intended programmes and specific educational activities. We also propose that discussions be held between specialists in violent crime and primary and secondary school pupils as part of so-called project days. We believe that the inclusion of this issue in the more general framework of the protection of people in the face of common risks and emergencies in primary and secondary schools makes sense and is justified.

## References

- CASTLEDEN, R. 2009. *Konflikty, které změnilý svět*. Brno: Jota, 2009. ISBN 978-80-7217-659-5.
- DISMAN, M. 2011. *Jak se vyrábí sociologická znalost: příručka pro uživatele*. 4., nezměněné vydání. Praha: Karolinum, 2011. ISBN 978-80-246-1966-8.
- GÁL, F. 1994. *Násilí*. Praha: Egem, 1994. Hic et nunc. ISBN 80-85395-41-X.
- HAŠKOVCOVÁ, Helena. *Manuálek o násilí*. V Brně: Národní centrum ošetrovatelství a nelékařských zdravotnických oborů, 2004. ISBN 80-7013-397-X.
- HOLEČEK, V. 1997. *Sociální psychologie pro učitele: studijní text Management a ekonomika školy*. Plzeň: Západočeská univerzita, 1997. ISBN 80-7082-349-6.
- KOPECKÝ, K. 2013. *Rizika internetové komunikace v teorii a praxi*. Olomouc: Univerzita Palackého v Olomouci, 2013. Monografie. ISBN 978-80-244-3571-8.
- KOVÁŘ, P. 2008. *Sexuální agrese: znásilnění z pohledu medicíny a práva*. Praha: Maxdorf, c2008. Jessenius. ISBN 978-80-7345-161-5.
- MARTÍNEK, Z. 2015. *Agresivita a kriminalita školní mládeže*. 2., aktualizované a rozšířené vydání. Praha: Grada, 2015. Pedagogika. ISBN 978-80-247-5309-6.

- PONĚŠICKÝ, J. 2010. *Agrese, násilí a psychologie moci: v životě i v procesu psychoterapie*. 2., dopl. vyd. Praha: Triton, 2010. Psyché. ISBN 978-80-7387-378-3.
- ŘÍČAN, P. 1995. *Agresivita a šikana mezi dětmi: jak dát dětem ve škole pocit bezpečí*. Praha: Portál, 1995. Pedagogická praxe. ISBN 80-7178-049-9.
- SPURNÝ, J. 1996. *Psychologie násilí: o psychologické podstatě násilí, jeho projevech a způsobech psychologické obrany proti němu*. Praha: Eurounion, 1996. ISBN 80-85858-30-4.
- Stránky PED MUNI - Komenský: odborný časopis pro učitele základní školy* [online]. C2021. KRIŠOVÁ, Dagmar. K prevenci sexuálního násilí může přispět každý z nás. [citováno 2021-10-28]. Dostupné z: <<https://1url.cz/nK4nc>>.
- UHLÍŘOVÁ, B., FATKOVÁ, D., FATKOVÁ, S., BLAŽKOVÁ, A., STOKLASOVÁ, M., MROCZKOWSKÁ, P., DOČKÁLKOVÁ, X., STEJSKALOVÁ, J. 2016. *Sexuální násilí*. [Praha]: Společnost pro podporu lidí s mentálním postižením v České republice, [2016]. Už vím! : srozumitelně o těle a duši pro ženy s mentálním postižením. ISBN 978-80-906224-8-7.
- ZAVRŠNIK, A. 2017. *Kyberkriminalita*. Praha: Wolters Kluwer, 2017. Právní monografie. ISBN 978-80-7552-758-5.

# CYBER SECURITY AND IMPLEMENTATION OF ISO STANDARDS IN ONLINE BANKING

**Srdjan Tomic<sup>1</sup> - Stanko Bulajic<sup>2</sup>**

## **ABSTRACT**

*The Internet was originally conceived as a tool to be used in a closed circle, mostly among learned people who are not burdened with security concerns. Cyber security has become the focus of interest thanks to the rapid expansion of the Internet user base. The Internet has repeated the old truth that technology can be both operational and threatening. What can be used for the benefit of society can also be used to its detriment. The side effect of the rapid integration of the Internet in almost all aspects of human activity is the increased vulnerability of modern society. The Internet is part of a critical global infrastructure. Other important services of modern society, such as power lines, transportation systems, health services, are increasingly dependent on the Internet. They are a frequent target of cyber-attacks. Cyber security issues can be classified according to three criteria: Type of action, perpetrator and target. The very nature of the organization of the Internet affects its security. The future development of e-commerce requires a high level of cyber security. Cyber security is often mentioned as one of the preconditions for the rapid development of e-commerce. Without a secure and reliable Internet, customers will not be willing to provide confidential information, such as credit card numbers. The same goes for online banking and the use of electronic money. If overall cyber security improves slowly (with, for example, a lack of standards), the business sector is likely to seek faster change. This could lead to further challenges in relation to the principle of net neutrality and to the development of a 'new internet', which would, among other things, enable safer communication.*

**Key words:** *Internet, Cyber security, standards, quality, online banking.*

## **1 Cyber space and its layers**

The application of information and communication technologies has qualitatively improved the way human society functions. There is no area of human activity in which their application does not allow for improved effectiveness, efficiency, optimization or new opportunities. Drastically improving the way of communication, work, exchange, education and other relationships between people, reducing differences in time, space and availability of information, services and content, information and communication technologies are one of the key reasons and factors for globalization. They directly

---

<sup>1</sup> Srdjan Tomic, Full professor, Vice Dean for Education, University "Union - Nikola Tesla", School of Engineering Management, Bulevar vojvode Misica 43, Belgrade, 11000, Serbia, [srdjan.tomic@fim.rs](mailto:srdjan.tomic@fim.rs)

<sup>2</sup> Stanko Bulajic, Associate professor, University "Union - Nikola Tesla", School of Engineering Management, Bulevar vojvode Misica 43, Belgrade, 11000, Serbia, [stanko.bulajic@fim.rs](mailto:stanko.bulajic@fim.rs)



enabled the creation of the concept of the information society, which is important for all functions of modern society, and especially for security and defense. Cyber warfare in the general sense is war in cyberspace. There are numerous concepts, definitions and theories about the term "warfare", as well as professional matters, which is not the case with the term "cyberspace", especially given the need for its precise definition in terms of international law. Therefore, this simple definition of cyber warfare requires an extensive process of defining cyberspace. However, although required, this approach is practical, because defining the meaning of cyber warfare reduces the definition of cyberspace, i.e. its technological and social context. Therefore, this approach to the analysis of cyber warfare has the potential to last longer, despite the dynamic change of its nature, while reducing all other factors that can change significantly over time, allowing the inclusion of new factors that may come with future technology developments. Artificial intelligence systems in the process of conflict management in cyberspace.

### **1.1 Meaning of the term "cyber"**

Although the impact of information and communication technologies on all of humanity is obvious and revolutionary, it is difficult to quantify, especially in a general sense. (Akinci, 2010) The reason for that is the complexity and breadth of their specific and general application. One of the possible indirect indicators of the growing importance of information and communication technologies for modern humanity is the analysis of the frequency of everyday use of their characteristic linguistic symbols (words). The key term in relation to the application of information and communication technologies that accompanies their entire development is the term "cyber". This expression has the property of words, morphemes and lexemes and is a key conceptual symbol of modern use of information and communication technologies in all areas, including security and defense. It originated in the culture of the American nation, in English, based on the etymological root of the ancient (Al Hawari, 2006) Greek language from which it spread in transliterated form to all modern languages of the world, including Serbian. Due to its universal use, it can be said to be one of the most famous modern internationalist lexemes, which has a unique (general) meaning and the same form in every language, nation and part of the world. According to statistics from the specialized Internet service for searching terms in printed sources, the Google Ingram Viewer service, the frequency of the appearance of the term "cyber" in English in the period from 1985 to 2008 increased 129 times. The number of published articles with the term "cyber" in the database of scientific aggregator and search engine of scientific, academic and professional papers ProQuest, published in the period 1980-1989 is 4,517, while in the period 2010-2016 this number is 189,024, which represents an increase of 42 times. (Anderson. 1997)

Such an application is particularly favored within the US Department of Defense and the US Army, but with a very rational reason. The term "cyberspace" is an integral part of the complex term "cyberspace".




Figure 1. Frequency of the term "cyber" in the period from 1800 to 2008  
Both terms are used in modern usage to denote a new, special field in the practice of computer science and the application of information and communication technologies in various fields, including the conduct of military operations and other activities. (Barclay, 1995)

Also, they are widely used for the purpose of ontological and semantic formation of several appropriate names of terms in military application: "cyber warfare", "cyber war" or "cyber war", "cyber conflict". Cyber conflict), "cyber attack" and others. Introducing one concept (cyberspace) into a new operational environment based on that concept (cyberspace) most easily harmonizes the entire existing set of military concepts, activities, actions between traditional conflict (in the physical environment) and conflict in cyberspace. (Baron, 1986) Otherwise, it is necessary to introduce and universally adopt completely new meanings and definitions of terms related to cyberspace, many of which would be drastically different in nature from the corresponding traditional ones, due to the specific nature of cyberspace. In a military environment, given the importance and possible consequences, it is always necessary to express accurately and standardized and clearly distinguish between terms and terms.

## 1.2 The origin of cyberspace

The term "cyberspace" originated and developed in the United States, in parallel with the development and application of computer science and information and communication technologies. The first publicly used meaning of the term "cyberspace" was developed by literary, film and comic artists, as an artistic and philosophical concept, within a specific, technology-oriented, science fiction subgenre called "cyberpunk" in the period from the 1960s to the late 1980s. (Bloemer, 1999) The artistic and philosophical representation of cyberspace encompassed a conceptual "virtual" environment made up of digital data. However, it would be wrong to think that artists are responsible for the creation

and existence of cyberspace. The nature of cyberspace cannot be properly understood without the involvement of the military element, i.e. without the influence of national security and defense factors.

A review of existing databases of terms related to cyberspace prefixes makes it easy to see that security and defense documents are the source of most definitions of cyberspace in official use at the national or relevant international level. Organizations. (Boiral, 2007)

From the beginning, there is an essential connection between cyberspace and military activities. Information and communication technologies, including computers, computer networks and cyberspace, created by their networking, were initially developed for the needs of the military and defense, in the United States and Great Britain. Internet, home base and largest global network in the concept, now called "cyberspace", was technically developed and created in the late 1960s and early 1990s in a number of projects, essentially the US Department of Defense's ARPANET project, working with several prominent individuals, with the contribution of scientists and institutions from Great Britain. (Boshoff, 2007) The creative power of this project stemmed from the fact that in addition to the US Department of Defense, through the functioning of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), the scientific research community of leading US universities in the field of computer science actively participated. Science and information and communication technologies. Thus, peacetime research potential was translated into defense activities of strategic importance with the simultaneous interest of the defense, scientific and industrial communities. (Boyer, 2005)

## **2 Definition of cyberspace**

Considering that international law is created by states, in terms of the international legal definition of cyber warfare and cyberspace, the attitudes of states, and then of relevant international professional organizations, are of the greatest importance. However, there is no single definition of cyberspace as a technical, social, military or natural phenomenon. There are many different definitions in the academic and professional public that differ in context, content and purpose. Most countries that create their own information society development strategies or national security and defense strategies have adopted their own definitions of cyberspace. In a number of cases, differences in their attitudes are significant. (Buttle, 2002)

Definitions differ depending on the accepted criteria. Also, due to the rapid development of computer science, engineering and information and communication technologies, the meaning of cyberspace changes over time even within the same context, i.e. within the same institutions. Due to the rapid and dynamic change in the nature of cyberspace, to analyze its impact to conflicts in cyberspace and their regulation, more important than the choice of the definition

it is the determination of its key universal properties and elements. (Carmines, 1979)

### **3 Selection of relevant sources**

Several projects and databases / aggregators of definitions of key terms of importance for information security and the use of information and communication technologies have been formed in the world academic and professional community. Among them are the most complete database of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the NATO Center of Excellence for Cooperative Cyber Defense (CCDCOE) and the American think tank organization Open Institute of Technology (OTI). (Casadeus, 2003)

Definitions of important terms can also be found by reviewing national strategic documents in the field of national security, cyber security and defense. Reviews of these strategies are updated by the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) and CCDOCE201. (Cristobal, 2007) For the purpose of ontological and functional analysis of the nature of cyberspace, it is useful to perform a comparative analysis of the above definitions of cyberspace from the mentioned sources. However, due to the number of existing definitions, it is not practical, and due to the different relevance of the source, it is not necessary to analyze all existing definitions. In many cases, their contents overlap in meaning, due to mutual professional, social, political or military-security influence. (Fornell, 1981) Also, the definitions of terms are not permanent, but change over time in accordance with the development of the environment and technology. Different countries publish their own strategies in different time periods, resulting in current definitions coming from different time periods, with a time difference between their occurrences that is often more than five years. Given the rapid development of information and communication technologies and their practical application in the field of national security and defense, this period can be considered long, given that the average medium-term evolution of the risk management cycle in the field of national security and defense usually takes about five years. And long-term over a period of ten years. (Fuentes-Blasco, 2010)

The duration of the strategic cycle in the field of security and defense depends on several factors, which can be grouped into external and internal. The external ones include various elements of the strategic environment, such as the likelihood of new threats and risks in relation to the existing strategy, which are not covered by the current security and / or defense strategy, expected resource status and external factors. (Goode, 1996) Internal factors primarily include elements of social and political organization, election and medium-term budget cycle, the emergence of internal threats and risks, the expected availability of critical resources and others. In smaller organizational systems, such as business organizations, the length of the strategic action plan cycle can be shorter and

ranges from 3-5 years, which also depends on the dynamics of the development of the structure and goals of the organization. (Hair, 1998) Having in mind the above, it can be considered that for the purpose of determining the characteristics of cyberspace, it is sufficient to perform a comparative analysis of attitudes (definitions) of a wider set of relevant factors. (Harris, 2000) Undoubtedly, in this regard, the greatest influence in the world is exerted by those countries that have the greatest influence on the development of computer science and information and communication technologies, on the development of cyberspace, its application in security and defense, which have the greatest economic, political, economic and military power and research and development capabilities in the field of cyber security. In the absence of exact quantitative metrics in assessing the relevance of state approaches and the impact on cyber security and defense, expert analyzes of a qualitative nature can be of practical use for comparison, i.e. results obtained based on ranking subjective attitudes of surveyed experts. (Hu, 1999)

#### **4 Telecommunication infrastructure**

Internet data can travel across a wide range of communications media: telephone wires, optical cables, satellites, microwaves and wireless connections. Even the mains can be used for transmitting Internet content using electrical wires. As the telecommunication layer transmits internet traffic, all new regulations related to telecommunications will inevitably be reflected in Internet. It regulates the telecommunication infrastructure on both the state and the internationally a multitude of public and private organizations. The main ones international organizations involved in the regulation of telecommunications include the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which passed elaborated rules to cover relations between national operators, for the allocation of radio spectrum and for the management of satellite positioning, and The World Trade Organization (WTO), which has played a key role in liberalization of telecommunications markets around the world. (Ronnback, 2008)

The roles of the WTO and the ITU are quite different. The ITU sets out detailed technical standards, enacts international regulations specific to telecommunications and provides assistance to developing countries. The WTO provides a framework for general market rules. (Rusjan, 2010)

Liberalization of national telecommunications markets has made it possible large telecommunications companies such as AT&T, Cable and Radio, Telecom France, Sprint and SvetKom, to cover the markets on global plan. How most of the internet traffic is transmitted through the telecommunications infrastructures of these companies, they have significant impact on the development of the Internet. (Ruzevicius, 2004)

## 5 Cyber security

The Internet was originally conceived as a tool to be used in a closed circle, mostly among learned people who are not burdened security concerns. (Sanzo, 2003) They communicated openly and engaged possible security issues in an informal way. Cyber security has become the focus of interest thanks to its rapid expansion Internet user databases. The Internet has repeated that old truth that technology it can be both operational and threatening. What can be used to advantage society can be used to his detriment. (Saura, 2008)

The side effect of the sudden integration of the Internet in almost all aspects of human activities is the increased vulnerability of modern society. The Internet is a part critical global infrastructure. (Srinivasan, 2002) Other important services of modern society, such as which are electric power lines, transportation systems, health services, more and more depends on the internet. They are a frequent target of cyber-attacks. (Tai, 2011)

Cyber security issues can be classified according to three criteria:

1. Type of action. Classification based on the type of action may imply data interception, obstruction of data reception, illegal access, espionage, data destruction, sabotage, denial of services and theft identity.
2. Type of perpetrator. Possible perpetrators could include hackers, cybercriminals, cyber warriors and cyber terrorists.
3. Type of goal. Possible goals are numerous, ranging from individuals, private ones companies and public institutions to critical infrastructure, government and military funds.

## 6 Cyber security and privacy

Another issue that is being discussed is the relationship between security and privacy. Will additional measures related to cyber security include from conscientious loss of privacy? What regulations should be applied to encryption software, which can also be used to legitimately protect the communicative privacy and to protect communications from terrorists and criminals? Answers these and other issues depend on the constant shift in the balance between cyber security and privacy. (Van Der Wiele, 2005)

After the terrorist attack in New York in September In 2001, security became a priority reflected in the adoption of various national laws which, among other things, determined higher levels internet control. Civil society reaction focused on privacy threats and concept notion of expression. (Vlogeberghs, 1996)

At the international level, the issue of balancing cyber security with protection privacy has been at the center of discussions related to the extension of the Convention Council of Europe on cybercrime on a global scale. The main objection of the fighters for human rights refers to the fact that the Convention

deals with issues cyber security at the expense of privacy and other human rights. (Zeithaml, 2002)

## **Conclusion**

Cyber warfare is warfare in cyberspace. Conceptually and in practice, it is different from all previous forms of warfare. In order to conceptually determine its meaning and character, a necessary condition is to previously define the phenomenon of cyberspace. This phenomenon is completely technologically based; it is changing and developing in accordance with the development of information and communication technologies. During the period of its development, cyberspace has always had the same, universal structure based on layers, i.e. the same areas of existence of its key elements and functions: physical, logical and cognitive layer. The logical layer is central in enabling the functioning of cyberspace as a new operational environment in which international conflicts are taking place. It represents the field of mathematical-logical relations, defined by logical rules and instructions that are created by the mental work of people. Algorithms affect data and run software, which runs hardware.

There are already examples of this approach in the world, and they refer to agreements in the field of cyber security between key world powers such as the United States and Russia, and the United States and China. Although it does not have the power to address the problems arising from the rapid development of information and communication technologies and the slow development of international public law, this approach has the least need, allowing for a practical relationship of respect and peace, while enabling stakeholders to further develop cyber defense capabilities.

## **References**

- AKINCI, S. ATILGAN-INA, E., AKSOY, S. 2010. "Re-assessment of E-S-Qual and E-RecS-Qual in a pure service setting", *Journal of Business Research*, Vol. 63, pp. 232-40.
- AL-HAWARI, M. AND WARD, T. 2006. "The effect of automated service quality on Australian banks' financial performance and the mediating role of customer satisfaction", *Marketing Intelligence & Planning*, Vol. 24 No. 2, pp. 127-47.
- ANDERSON, E.W., FORNELL, C., RUST, R.T. 1997. "Customer satisfaction, productivity, and profitability: differences between goods and services", *Marketing Science*, Vol. 16 No. 2, pp. 129-45.
- ANDERSON, R.E., SRINIVASAN, S.S. 2003. "E-satisfaction and e-loyalty: a contingent framework", *Psychology & Marketing*, Vol. 20 No. 2, pp. 123-38.

- BARCLAY, D., HIGGINS, C. THOMPSON, R. 1995. "The partial least squares (PLS) approach to causal modelling: personal computer adoption and use as an illustration", *Technology Studies*, Vol. 2 No. 2, pp. 285-309
- BARON, R.M. KENNY, D.A. 1986. "The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 51 No. 6, pp. 1173-82.
- BLOEMER, J., DE RUYTER, K., WETZELS, M. 1999. "Linking perceived service quality and service loyalty: a multi-dimensional perspective", *European Journal of Marketing*, Vol. 33 Nos 11/12, pp. 1082-107.
- BOIRAL, O., ROY, M.J. 2007. "ISO 9000: integration rationales and organizational impacts", *International Journal of Operations & Production Management*, Vol. 27 No. 2, pp. 226-47.
- BOSHOFF, C. 2007. "A psychometric assessment of E-S-QUAL: a scale to measure electronic service quality", *Journal of Electronic Commerce Research*, Vol. 8 No. 1, pp. 101-14.
- BOYER, K., HULT, G. 2005. "Extending the supply chain: integrating operations and marketing in the online grocery industry", *Journal of Operations Management*, Vol. 23 No. 6, pp. 642-61.
- BUTTLE, F., BURTON, J. 2002. "Does service failure influence customer loyalty?", *Journal of Consumer Behavior*, Vol. 1 No. 3, pp. 217-27.
- CARMINES, E.G., ZELLER, R.A. 1979. *Reliability and Validity Assessment*, Stage University Paper Series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences No. 7010, Sage, Beverly Hills, CA.
- CASADESUS, M., KARAPETROVIC, S. 2003. "The erosion of ISO 9000 benefits: a temporal study", *International Journal of Quality & Reliability Management*, Vol. 22, pp. 120-36.
- CASADESUS, M., GIME'NEZ, G., HERAS, I. 2001. "Benefits of ISO 9000 implementation in Spanish industry", *European Business Review*, Vol. 13 No. 6, pp. 327-35.
- CRISTOBAL, E., FLAVIAN, C., GUINALIU, M. 2007. "Perceived e-service quality (PeSQ): measurement validation and effects on consumer satisfaction and web site loyalty", *Managing Service Quality*, Vol. 17 No. 3, pp. 317-40.
- FORNELL, C., LARCKER, D.F. 1981. "Evaluating structural equation models with unobservable variables and measurement error", *Journal of Marketing Research*, Vol. 28 No. 1, pp. 39-50.
- FUENTES-BLASCO, M., GIL-SAURA, I., BERENQUER-CONTRI', G., MOLINER-VELA'ZQUEZ, B. 2010. "Measuring the antecedents of e-loyalty and the effect of switching costs on website", *The Service Industries Journal*, Vol. 30 No. 11, pp. 1837-52.
- GOODE, M.M., MOUTINHO, L.A., CHIEN, C. 1996. "Structural equation modelling of overall satisfaction and full use of services for ATMs", *International Journal of Bank Marketing*, Vol. 14 No. 7, pp. 4-11.



HAIR, J.F., ANDERSON, R.E., TATHAM, R.L., BLACK, W.C. 1998. *Multivariate Data Analysis*, 5th ed., Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ.

Harris, L.C. and Goode, M.M.H. (2004), "The four levels of loyalty and the pivotal role of trust: a study of online service dynamics", *Journal of Retailing*, Vol. 80, pp. 139-58.

HARRIS, M., HARRINGTON, H.J. 2000. "Service quality in the knowledge age – huge opportunities for the twenty first century", *Measuring Business Excellence*, Vol. 4 No. 4, pp. 31-6.

HU, L., BENTLER, P. 1999. "Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure analysis: conventional criteria versus new alternatives", *Structural Equation Modeling*, Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 1-55.

RONNBACK, A., WITTELL, L. 2008. "A review of empirical investigations comparing quality initiatives in manufacturing and service organizations", *Managing Service Quality*, Vol. 18 No. 6, pp. 577-93.

RUSJAN, B., ALIC, M. 2010. "Capitalising on ISO 9001 benefits for strategic results", *International Journal of Quality & Reliability Management*, Vol. 27 No. 7, pp. 756-78.

RUZEVICIUS, J., ADOMAITIENE, R., SIRVIADAITE, J. 2004. "Motivation and efficiency of quality management systems implementation: a study of Lithuanian organizations", *Total Quality Management & Business Excellence*, Vol. 15 No. 2, pp. 173-89.

SANTOS, J. 2003. "E-service quality: a model of virtual service quality dimensions", *Management Service Quality*, Vol. 13 No. 3, pp. 233-46.

SANZO, M.J., SANTOS, M.L., VA'ZQUEZ, R., A'LVAREZ, L.I. 2003. "The effect of market orientation on buyer-beller relationship satisfaction", *Industrial Marketing Management*, Vol. 32 No. 4, pp. 327-45.

SAURA, I., SERVERA, D., BERENQUER, G., FUENTES, M. 2008. "Logistics service quality: a new way to loyalty", *Industrial Management & Data Systems*, Vol. 108 No. 5, pp. 650-68.

SRINIVASAN, S., ANDERSON, R., PONNAVOLU, K. 2002. "Customer loyalty in e-commerce: an exploration of its antecedents and consequences", *Journal of Retailing*, Vol. 78 No. 1, pp. 41-50.

TAI, Y.-M. (2011), "Perceived value for customers in information sharing services", *Industrial Management & Data Systems*, Vol. 111 No. 4, pp. 551-69.

VAN DER WIELE, T., VAN IWAARDEN, J., WILLIAMS, R., DALE, B. 2005. "Perceptions about the ISO 9000 (2000) quality system standard revision and its value: the Dutch experience", *International Journal of Quality & Reliability Management*, Vol. 22 No. 2, pp. 101-19.

VLOEGEBERGHES, D., BELLENS, J. 1996. "Implementing the ISO 9000 standards", *Quality Progress*, Vol. 29 No. 6, pp. 43-8.

YEN, C., LU, H. 2008. "Effects of e-service quality on loyalty intention: an empirical study in online auction", *Managing Service Quality*, Vol. 18 No. 2, pp. 127-46.

ZEITHAML, V.A., PARASURAMAN, A., MALHOTRA, A. 2002. "Service quality delivery through web sites: a critical review of extant knowledge", *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science*, Vol. 30 No. 4, pp. 362-75.

# SECURITY ASPECTS OF MIGRATION CHALLENGES INITIATED BY ECOLOGICAL MIGRANTS AND SOCIETAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS

Katerina Veljanovska Blazhevskaa<sup>1</sup>

## **ABSTRACT**

*There is divergence among scholars whether ecological refugees should be called refugees, since the current state of the art is that they cannot fit under the refugee definition as described in the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The social context of the issue is seen in the existing framework of climate change that is becoming a large-scale challenge to the global way of life of each individual, affecting each society, individually and collectively. In addition, environmental refugees are becoming a kind of reality that must be set in a legal framework, in order for this field to be properly regulated in the future, fitting in with existing global challenges, especially within refugees. In the context of the above, among the factors that have the largest share in terms of analytical presentation, the spatial-social dimension of the problem is emphasized. Regarding the legal aspects, the paper starts from the legal framework for the interpretation of the definition of refugees, through the Geneva Convention of 1951, as well as more specifically about climate, environmental refugees, especially through the official interpretation by the IOM. The main purpose of this analytical research is to encourage a more serious security approach to ecological (environmental) refugees, which need to be framed in a legal document and a stable security structure, in order for their further interpretation internationally to be legalized and translated into an appropriate social order with their own rights and obligations. This paper uses a qualitative methodological framework, more specifically a method of content analysis, a method of comparison and a method of generalization and synthesis.*

Key words: security, migration, ecological, refugees, legal, aspects

## **Introduction**

Migration has impact on the countries of origin and the countries of destination as well as on the migrants host and sending societies. **Ratha, Mohapatra and Scheja** claim that the effects of migration on the country of origin are most often positive as the increased incomes from remittances, the ability to access finance for starting a new business as well as the knowledge, resources and support provided by the migrant diaspora foster poverty alleviation in the country of origin (Ratha et al., 2010). The authors suggest that migration can have serious negative impacts for the domestic institutions and politics in the cases of emigration of capable people that may cause loss of governance capacity in countries which have weak institutions.

Firstly, it is important to look into the criteria of the refugee definition and the Convention's object and purpose. Secondly, the section discusses the meaning of the term climate or environmental refugee. Thirdly, builds on the previous sections and discusses how the Convention definition should be interpreted to

---

<sup>1</sup> Katerina Veljanovska Blazhevskaa, Assoc. Prof. Dr.sc., MIT University – Skopje, Faculty of Security Sciences, Republic of North Macedonia, veljanovska\_katerina@yahoo.com

encompass climate refugees. In order to make the theoretical part relevant, this essay interprets a case study of climate refugees from Somalia - situations and perspectives in the context of interpreting international regulations and refugee initiatives.

It is difficult if not impossible to give a single definition of migration which is universally accepted under all circumstances of human migration, therefore there are different approaches of defining human migration. Migration can be defined as a process of moving, whether across an international border, or within the borders of a state encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes.

## **1 Migration: Causes and consequences**

There is no clear-cut definition on migration nor classification of the phenomena but there are some key features on which most authors seem to agree, and which are considered relevant for this paper. Human migration has been a part of human history since its very beginning. According to **Graham and Poku**, since the 1960s, the issue of migration has become a major topic in the international politics for various reasons (Graham, Poku, 2000).

Firstly the level of movements has increased largely, in the 60s, mainly the traditional immigration nations in North America and Oceania, were significantly affected by international migration, but by the 1990s more than 2 percent of the world's population was living outside of their country of birth and virtually every nation was influenced in some way by immigration or emigration of various kinds. Secondly, the diversity of the international population movement has been increased. In the past, the bulk of such movement involved permanent, or at least long-term, settlement at the destination, while at present times migration is characterized not only by increased levels of permanent settlement in foreign countries but also by a myriad of temporary, circular migrations of varying duration with a range of purposes. Thirdly, governments in destination countries are actively trying to limit the numbers and characteristics of immigrants but at the same time the involvement of governments in destination countries encourage emigration of different kinds because of the benefits of remittances to the national development (Graham, Poku, 2000).

There is no unique definition on migration nor is a simple classification of migration not possible either, because of the existence of multi-dimensional migration criteria's such as cause, length, distance, direction, volume, velocity, migratory status etc. According to **Clarke**, migration can be classified as internal, within the boundaries of a state or international and this approach has been introduced by many scholars because of the great significance of state political boundaries and the availability of information about migration at the state level (Clarke, 1972).

According to the IOM Glossary on Migration, international migration is the “movement of persons who leave their country of origin, or the country of habitual residence, to establish themselves either permanently or temporarily in another country” (International Migration Law, 2004).

**Chandna**, classifies migration based on duration of stay as permanent, semi-permanent and temporary migration (Chandna, 1998). Migration can also be forced, impelled, free and planned. Forced migration is caused by wars, repressive regimes and droughts that generate a mass movement of refugees who suffer from ill health, persecution, malnutrition and poverty (Ferne, Pitkethly, 1985).

Voluntary migrants or economic migrants include the category of migrants who decide to move as a result of their own desires and motivations. People can migrate legally for the purposes of family reunification or employment as well as studies and training while those migrants who evade formal migration controls or the ones who have stayed legally but remain after the end of the permitted period are classified as illegal migrants.

Migration has always been an important component of population change at local, regional, national and global scale. There are many reasons why people decide to migrate to another region or country. These can be push factors such as political instability, civil conflict, forced migration, a lack of job opportunities, famine, or pull factors such as stability in the new country, higher pay rates or better opportunities. Usually, migration is not caused by a single factor but by a set of interacting and synergistic effects caused by a multitude of social, demographic, economic, climatic and biological factors. **Bogue**, lists twenty five migration-stimulating situations for persons, fifteen factors in choosing a destination, and ten socio-economic conditions which can stimulate or retard mobility among a population as shown below (Bogue, Donald, 1959):

1. Migration-stimulating conditions and factors: Graduation; marriage; lack of marriage; employment offers; employment opportunities; migratory work; special skills; transfer of employment; sale of business; loss of farm; discharge from employment; low wages; retirement; death of relative; military service; medical care; imprisonment; political, racial or religious oppression; natural disasters; invasion or infiltration by outsiders; inheritance; maladjustment to community; wanderlust; social rejection; forced movement.
2. Factors in choosing destination: Cost of moving; presence of relatives or friends; employment offer; physical attractiveness of community; physical environment; amenities; population composition; special employment ; special assistance; subsidies; information; reputation; lack of alternative destinations.
3. Socio-economic conditions affecting migration: Major capital investments; major business recessions; technological change; changes in economic organization; provisions for social welfare; migration propaganda facilities;

regulations affecting migration; moving conditions and levels; tolerance of minorities; migration policy.

## **2 Lees's migration push and pull model**

According to Lee's Theory on Migration every act of migration involves a place of origin, a place of destination and a set of intervening obstacles. Lee, recognizes four categories of factors that influence the decision to migrate (Lee, 1966):

- Factors associated with the area of origin.
- Factors associated with the area of destination.
- Intervening obstacles.
- Personal factors.

There are both positive and negative factors associated with the place of origin as well as positive and negative factors associated with the place of destination. But different factors have various influences on different individuals in specific situations. For example, a good schooling system may be counted as a positive factor for a parent and negative for a house owner with no children because of the high real-estate taxes while an unmarried person without taxable property would be indifferent to the situation. However, there is a difference between factors related to the place of origin and the ones related to the place of destination. People are familiar with the place of origin and base their judgments according to their experience while they are not familiar with the place of destination thus there is always an ignorance regarding advantages and disadvantages in the place of destination as one can now about them only by living there. According to Lee's push and pull model there are two sets of "push" and two sets of "pull" factors involved in the process of migration, meaning there are positive and negative factors related to the place of origin and the place of destination and they may be any type political, economic, social, environmental or cultural forces. For Lee, while migration may result from comparing factors at the place of origin and destination a simple calculation of positive and negative factors does not decide the act of migration rather the balance in favor of the decision to migrate must be enough to overcome the natural inertia which always exists. Besides these positive and negative factors in the place of origin and destination, there is a set of intervening obstacles and restrictions between the place of origin and destination and these obstacles include distance, costs of moving, loss of income, housing or legal regulations regarding immigration. However, these obstacles may have little consequences for some migrants while being great impediments for others. Furthermore, personal factors also may facilitate or retard migration. Personal awareness of conditions elsewhere and intelligence influence the evaluation of the situation at the place of origin while

the knowledge of the situation at the place of destination depends upon personal contacts or sources of information which are not universally available for everyone. Also, personalities play an important role because some are resistant to change of residence or any other change while others welcome change for the sake of change, for some there must be solid reasons for migration while for others a little provocation or promise is enough to make the decision. For Lee, migration is a balance of push-pull at origin, push-pull at destination, and the intervening obstacles. Alternatively, it may impact the subjective opinions or expectations of a potential migrant thinking whether he should to move or stay put. Lee does not consider how the competing pushes and pulls are reconciled, but assumes that a choice is made by some rational process based on positive and negative conditions at the place of origin and destination. Today Lee's model of migration push and pull factors apply to different migration contexts including the studied context in this thesis but what is also important to emphasize in the case of Kosovo is that international migration is highly restricted by Lee's intervening obstacles in the form of immigration laws regulating which people, from which countries and under which conditions may enter and stay in a certain country.

### **3 Explaining the crucial aspects of the refugee definition**

It was not until 1951 that a universal definition of refugee was agreed upon in article 1A(2) of the Convention (Hong, 2001, pg. 324). The Convention defines a refugee as:

„A person that owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself to the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (Art. 1A). Additionally, the preamble of the Convention recognizes the importance of people enjoying fundamental rights and freedoms and urges states to recognize the humanitarian nature of refugees 'circumstances (Preamble of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees). In addition, it is because the national authorities are not able to provide this protection (Heater, Simon, 2014, pg. 548). According to **Heater** and **Simon** and with further deeper analysis, it can be seen that it is important to restore the fundamental rights and freedoms of those who have lost the protection of their national governments, by granting them international protection in the form of asylum ”. Moreover, it is about the safeguarding human dignity (Arboleda, Hoy, 1993, pg. 67).

#### **4 Climate refugees (or) Environmental refugees - the world towards a new challenge**

The term environmental refugee was introduced by **El-Hinnawi** in 1985 (Boon, La Tra, 1985, pg. 86). Stating that environmental refugees are people: “who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural/and or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life” (Zellentin, 2010, pg. 65).

Despite some theoretical aspects and definitions, one still cannot speak of consensus among scholars and international organizations as to who is a climate refugee and whether the term is appropriate (or ecological refugees). According to **Keane**, climate refugee is an inappropriate term, stating that people fleeing due to environmental circumstances do not fall under the scope of the Convention definition of refugee (Keane, 2004, pg. 210-215). Accordingly, three points which stand in the way of granting refugee status to people solely fleeing climate or environmental dangers: the lack of crossing an international border, the absence of persecution and the absence of one of the persecution reasons.

#### **5 Climate/environmental Refugees – A Case Study**

The case of Somalia is analysed as a kind of example, where there has been an armed conflict for almost 20 years, but also many droughts and floods, so that the humanitarian crisis is becoming more visible and actual. In fact, in this part of the world the main means of subsistence and the economy as a whole depend directly on the weather. A number of local and international humanitarian organizations and agencies are involved in this process. In addition, the fact that there is a high population growth in certain areas of Somalia contributes to these facts (Little, 2008).

When it comes to the fact that climate refugees cannot be easily distinguished from other types of refugees, such as economic refugees, refugees due to danger in certain areas, etc., then in the case of Somalia, the escalation of the civil war contributes for the humanitarian crisis that has been going on in this country for the last twenty years.

In this case, the fact is mentioned that the country is not a member of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, ie there is no direct national action for adaptation to climate change. To a large extent, all this is due to the complex dynamics of conflicts and disasters, but also human mobility in this area.

One of the solutions offered by international humanitarian agencies, local NGOs is to provide internal resettlement, as the external migration scheme is disrupted.

According to **Little**, due to environmental disasters, environmental refugees first start migrating to other cities in Somalia, such as Mogadishu,



however droughts are prolonged on the grounds that the population needs to migrate further. This is a seemingly "proof" of how complex the situation of natural disasters and conflicts in an area can be (Little, 2008).

The case of Somali environmental refugees and the overall developments in this country as a result of the ongoing environmental disasters and armed conflicts point to the fact that stereotyping when it comes to migrants and refugees is no longer appropriate. More specifically, according to **Kolmannskog**, traditional frameworks and mechanisms for protecting people from climate disasters and conflicts require new forms of action by international regulations in this area as well as international agencies aimed at protecting refugees, with a special focus on environmental refugees. In this regard, the country faces laws passed only "on paper" while the international community faces areas it cannot help by offering its classic, tried-and-true approach (Kolmannskog, 2009, pg. 183).

If the issue of environmental refugees from Somalia is considered from the other side, then the area that comes to the fore is Kenya. Namely, according to The Kenyan Refugees Act (2006), these people are recognized as refugees on the basis of fear of persecution, religion, nationality or political opinion, all in accordance with the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951). The Kenyan government, however, restricts the right to work and freedom of movement of these refugees (Reuters, 2009).

In line with this, the Kenyan government also points to the application of this group of refugees to the UNHCR regarding the determination of their refugee status. However, the problem becomes cyclical because the situation in Kenya is not particularly great because this country is also a region of drought and competition of locals and displaced persons (U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2009).

## **Conclusion**

Climate refugees do not fall within the definition of the existing concept of refugees. According to a review of the wider literature, in order to clarify the relationship between climate refugees and environmental refugees, it is seen that the climate refugees are in a way a subset of the environmental refugees, who were forced to flee due to sudden or gradual changes in the natural environment. In addition, there is already a breakdown of the definition of environmental refugees by the International Organization for Migration, of environmental emergency migrants; forced migrants and motivated migrants.

According with the above mentioned, it becoming clear why climate refugees do not entirely fit under the Convention definition. Furthermore, McAdam focused more on explaining why under the current circumstances climate refugees do not meet the Convention criteria. Keane is more straight-forward and claims that the fact that the Convention is silent on climate harms as

recognized reasons, provides enough evidence as to why climate refugees cannot be Convention refugees. But that should not have to mean too much. Fleeing due to sexual orientation is also not specifically mentioned in the definition, but still can be a reason to obtain refugee status by reading the fleeing reason into the persecution reason of 'membership of a particular social group'.

In addition, within the case of Somalia, there is some overlap with the official definition of a refugee under the Convention, especially in terms of the apparent fear of persecution, but there is no column in the definition itself that initiates a fear of terrorism or insecurity in the country due to armed conflict. Additionally, the definition needs to be extended to the need for fear of climate change, ie changes in the environment that may initiate a danger to the health of the citizen. Perhaps, through these initiated directions, a new wave of refugees can be analysed and specified in the future, climate (ecological) refugees, primarily as a result of global warming and the growing climate and ecological changes that are expected in different parts of the world, interpreted differently.

There is ambiguity in the analytical view (as in McAdam) that climate refugees do not fall into the category of typical persecution, as it calls into question the possibility of recognizing climate / environmental damage. However, the case of Somalia described in this paper states otherwise. Namely, climate change must not be experienced in a non-discriminatory manner. There is only one explanation for this view, even with an addition to the definition of refugee status. Additionally, the allusion to distinguishing between climate refugees in their own country, in that regard, emphasizes the need to include these individuals in the category of internally displaced persons (IDPs).

Climate refugees, those who crossed a border, do qualify as Convention refugees which are being persecuted for their membership of a particular social group. By recognizing this, the international community will not only act in accordance with their obligations. But also recognize their role in the bigger picture of climate change and face the consequences.

## References

Art. 1A(2) of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137 (the Convention)

ARBOLEDA, E., HOY, I. 1993. *The Convention Refugee Definition in the West: Disharmony of Interpretation and Application* International Journal of Refugee Law, 1993, 5 (1): 66-90

BOON, L. T. 1985. (n 29) 85, *Refer to the Essam El-Hinnawi's definition*. His original statement can be found in Essam El-Hinnawi, Environmental Refugees, UNEP, 1985

BOGUE, D. J. 1959. *Internal Migration*. In *The Study of Population*. Philip M. Hauser and Otus Dudley Duncan. eds. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959

CLARKE, J., I. 1972. *Population Geography*. Second edition. Oxford. Pregamon Press, 1972

CHANDNA, R.C.1998. *Population*. New Delhi. Kayani Publishers, 1998

FERNIE, J., PITKETHLY, A. 1985. *Resources, environment and policy*. London. Harper and Row, 1985, p. 17

HEATER, A., JOHNATHAN, S. 2014. *Unable to Return in the 1951 Refugee Convention: Stateless Refugees and Climate Change* Florida Journal of International Law. 2014

GRAHAM, D.T., POKY, N.K. 2004. *Migration globalization and human security*. London: Routledge. 2000

International Migration Law. 2004. *Glossary on Migration*. Geneva

JEANHEE, H. 2001. *Refugees of the 21st century: environmental injustice*. Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy. 2001

KEANE, D. 2004. *The Environmental Causes and Consequences of Migration: A Search for the Meaning of “Environmental Refugees* The Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 210. 2004

KOLMANNSSKOG, V. 2009. *Norwegian Refugee Council, Climate change, disaster, displacement and migration: initial evidence from Africa*. New Issues in Refugee Research, Research Paper No. 180. 2009

LITTLE, P. D. 2008. *Somalia: Economy without State*. The International African Institute, quoted in Norton, Gregory Land, Property and Housing in Somalia, NRC. 2008

LEE, E. S. 1966. *Theory of Migration*. Demography 3, 1966

Preamble of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137 (the Convention).

RATHA, D., MOHAPTRA, S., SCHEJA, E. 2011. *Impact of migration on economic and social development: a review of evidence and emerging issues*. Policy Research Working Paper. 2011

ZELLENTIN, A. 2010. *Climate Migration*. Cultural Aspects of Climate Change. Analyse & Kritik 63. 2010

Reuters, *Floods could threaten up to 750 000 in Kenya—UN*, 6 November 2009, available at <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-53776774>, Accessed at 17/01/2022

U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants. *World Refugee Survey 2009 – Kenya* available at, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4a40d2aa76.html>, Accessed at 18/02/2022

UNHCR. *Guidelines on International Protection: Membership of a particular social group within the context of article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees* (Geneva 2002),

<https://www.unhcr.org/publications/legal/3d58de2da/guidelines-international-protection-2-membership-particular-social-group.html>, Accessed at 20/02/2022

# CHALLENGES FOR MOROCCAN'S ECONOMY AFTER COVID-19, BETWEEN NECESSARY REFORMS AND MAINTAINING POLITICAL STABILITY

Mohamed Badine El Yattioui<sup>1</sup> - Dusko Tomic<sup>2</sup> - Eldar Saljic<sup>3</sup>

## **ABSTRACT**

*Morocco implemented various economic policies during the last decades. If the level of growth and the modernization were relevant, the social programs were not efficient against poverty. During and now, after the pandemic, an acceleration of the reforms seems to be considered by the authorities. This paper will analyse what was done and what are the main challenges for this kingdom.*

**Key words:** Morocco, economy, growth, challenges, social

## **Introduction**

Since 2000, Morocco chose to promote economic reforms. The impact in economic growth and the reduction in poverty existed. The result has remained largely incomplete in terms of economic achievements and social progress. Despite the efforts of the different governments, structural and real transformation remained weak. They have gradually opened up trade with regional and global partners but the impact for social programs is irrelevant (Chauffour, 2018). Like several emerging and developing countries, Morocco has committed itself over the past two years to a policy of opening up the economy. The trade openness rate rose from 46% in 2003 to nearly 67% in 2013. This gain reflects the gradual liberalization of foreign trade which has taken place with the accession to the agreements of the World Trade Organization and, more specifically, through several bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements (European Union, Arab countries, United States and Turkey (Mourji and Masmoudi, 2015).

Before the pandemic, the King Mohammed VI created a special commission for the Development. Its role was to invent a new model for the future decades. The social and economic impact of the Covid-19 obliged the commission to adapt its priorities. Officially, the role of the new government, established in October 2021, after House of Representatives elections, is to concretize the

---

<sup>1</sup> Mohamed Badine El Yattioui, 1American University in the Emirates, College of Security and Global Studies, Dubai International Academic City, Block 6 & 7, Dubai, UAE, mohamed.elyattiou@ae.ae

<sup>2</sup> Dusko Tomic, 1American University in the Emirates, College of Security and Global Studies, Dubai International Academic City, Block 6 & 7, Dubai, UAE, dusko.tomic@ae.ae

<sup>3</sup> Eldar Saljic, 1American University in the Emirates, College of Security and Global Studies, Dubai International Academic City, Block 6 & 7, Dubai, UAE, eldar.saljic@ae.ae

proposals of the royal commission. In this paper, we will analyze the foundations of the Moroccan economy, its limits, and the priorities for the post-Covid-19 period.

## **1 Moroccan economy before Covid-19**


Between 1980 and 2000, Morocco's per capita GDP grew an average of 2 percent per year. This similar performance to European countries did not permit to close the economic gap between the Kingdom and this region (Chauffour, 2018).

Morocco clearly chose to be an actor of the globalization because before the 1990s, the Moroccan economy was highly protected and mostly based on import substitution industrialization and agricultural self-sufficiency (Currie & Harrison, 1997).

We can observe that structural reforms conducted during the 1990s improved Morocco's growth rate. The favorable international economic period, until 2008, permits to the per capita GDP growth rate stood at 3.3 percent between 2000 and 2015 (Chauffour, 2018).

We can also observe that since the independence in 1956, Morocco still have an important agricultural sector but that the structural reforms since the 1980's developed considerably the sector of the services. It represents nowadays more than 50% of the GDP (Statista, 2021).

The question for the transformation of the Moroccan economy seems to be the industry that represent around 25% of the GDP since the last decade (Statista, 2021). The question of the economic model for the next decades is related to the role of the industry in the GDP but also the quality of its products. We will talk about it later.



*Figure 1. Morocco: distribution of GDP across economic sectors*  
*Source: Statista*

Since the beginning of his reign in 1999, the King Mohammed VI started a "fast-track modernization process driven by major sectoral infrastructure

projects" in important sectors (agriculture, mining, energy, and industry (Chauffour, 2018). The decrease in the contribution of the agriculture, explains the reduced volatility in overall economic growth. The secondary sector was supported by the development of manufacturing activities, and more particularly the "new world trades of Morocco" following the relocation of subcontracting in the automotive sectors (Mourji and Masmoudi, 2015). The Green Morocco Plan (2008–20) had important effects on agriculture's modernization. During the 2008–2015 period, this sector's growth rate was around 8.9% on average, compared with 3.4% for the global economy (Chauffour, 2018).

From the mid-2000s, significant investments in infrastructure enabled the acquisition of a motorway network of 1,800 kilometers, 19 modern airports, ports of international level (Tanger Med, the largest port in Africa) and railways (with a high speed line between Tangier and Casablanca). Nevertheless, economic and social distortions could not be reduced.

The economic crisis in the Kingdom's partner countries has had a strong impact via foreign demand, tourist receipts, transfers from Moroccans living abroad and foreign direct investment. We can note that the 2008-2009 financial crisis and its economic consequences impacted Moroccan growth, which rose from 5.6% in 2008 to 3.6% in 2010 (Mourji and Masmoudi, 2015).

Although, has mentioned, Morocco has clearly made the choice of globalization, free trade agreements have not made it possible to develop Moroccan exports. The trade balance remains in deficit with all of its free trade partners. The slow structural transformation of the Moroccan economy is both the cause and the result of the slowdown in growth. This has maintained a high weight of the informal economy, a high unemployment rate of young graduates and a low participation of women in employment. Jobs growth declined between 2000-2009 and 2010-2019 for example, from 0.31 to 0.16 (Mourji and Masmoudi, 2015).

## **2 The impact of the Covid-19 on the Moroccan economy**

Due to its magnitude, the coronavirus required a comprehensive and fast national response.

A special fund has also been created by King Mohammed VI. Large sums have been allocated to it. If 10 billion dirhams (1 billion dollars) were expected, the fund almost reaches 33 billion dirhams or 3.3 billion dollars and 3% of the GDP. In addition to employees declared to the CNSS (National Social Security Fund) who will benefit from a monthly allowance of 2,000 dirhams, workers in the informal sector benefiting from RAMED (Medical Assistance Plan) will receive between 800 DH and 1,200 DH per month. , depending on the size of the household. Households without RAMED have also benefited from assistance. Due to this endowment, Morocco is ranked 4th on the world podium in terms of resources mobilized as a percentage of GDP, with 2.7% (Yammad and Lalaoui, 2021).



As it concerns, the textile industry has urgently reconverted its production line, at the request of the government. In a few weeks, production went from 2.5 million to 3.5 million per day. The price was set at 0.8 dirham (0.08 dollars) each, due to support from the special fund, and the distribution channel was supervised by the state. Moulay Hafid El Alamy, then Minister of Industry, declared the country self-sufficient and wanted to switch to production of 5 million masks per day next week in order to become an exporter.

Morocco therefore offers itself as an alternative to China for Europeans but also for Africans. The Kingdom is therefore positioning itself as an actor in the “geopolitics of masks”. Morocco could revive its industry and try to rebalance its foreign trade, the balance of which is negative.

From a business perspective, they have faced cash flow issues. The Bank Al Maghrib (Central Bank), as part of its monetary policy, has opted for easing measures. It lowered its policy rate by 25 basis points, to a rate of 2% in March 2020, followed by a second cut to 50 basis points, so the policy rate drops to 1.5%. The CNSS has postponed the payment of employers' social contributions until June 2020. The central guarantee fund, in order to relieve the cash flow of small businesses, and prevent possible bankruptcies, has introduced “Damane Oxygene” credits to the profit of structures whose turnover does not exceed 200 million dirhams (Yammad and Lalaoui, 2021).

On the side of international organizations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) praised the Moroccan strategy. Two examples. "In terms of monetary policy and fiscal positioning of Morocco, the country has made the right choices for its citizens," said the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, Kristalina Georgieva. And according to the director of the MENA and Central Asia department of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Jihad Azour “The Moroccan economy has been one of the “ most dynamic to adjust and adapt to constraints but also to opportunities ” posed by the crisis linked to the novel coronavirus pandemic " (Deloitte, 2021).

The Economic Watch Committee (CVE) created during this crisis and chaired by the Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Administrative Reform (MEFRA) was set up on March 16, 2020. Composed of several ministerial departments , the Central Bank and the private sector, is responsible for closely monitoring the evolution of the economic situation through monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, and identifying support measures for the most affected sectors.

In order to help stabilize the balance of payments, Morocco has mobilized all the external financing instruments: drawing on the precautionary and liquidity line made available to Morocco by the IMF (3% of GDP), Treasury bond issue and loans contracted with multinational institutions (African Development Bank (ADB), World Bank (WB) and Arab Monetary Fund-AMF). All of this compensated for the decrease in foreign exchange linked to the drop in export

earnings. This Policy-mix was favored by the maintenance at a comfortable level of MRE transfers which ended in 2020 with a surprising increase of 5%, and reached 68 billion dirhams. According to the World Bank, and despite the gravity of the crisis, Morocco remains "better placed than other emerging economies to weather this storm thanks to the credibility of its macro-budgetary framework, its relatively large external buffers and its easy access to international financial markets "(Deloitte, 2021).

### **3 Necessary reforms**

International changes marked by the formation of regional economic units, and the liberalization of international trade require Morocco to transform its development model. Even before the pandemic. Today, this requires the diversification of its exports. The transformation of the industrial sector is a priority and for that, Morocco will have to improve its competitiveness and develop new export sectors with high added value. A geographic reorientation of trade is essential. Priority should be given to middle-income and rapidly growing countries, particularly in Africa (Hassani and Chougrani, 2019).

The impact on the Moroccan economy in the short term is likely to revolve around several axes. Before the crisis, the national economy was marked by dependence on the strategies of multinationals, a structural trade deficit and the weight of rent and the informal.

The medium and long term challenges for Morocco are numerous and particularly complex.

In 2019, King Mohammed VI wanted to engage the Kingdom in "a new stage of modernizing development". The economic situation, marked by COVID and its economic and social consequences, seems to be accelerating this process.

The King insisted on the fact that public investment will be one of the fundamental bases of economic recovery. 120 billion dirhams, or 11% of GDP, will be injected into the national economy, through the establishment of a Strategic Investment Fund. The latter will have to prioritize the key sectors for a rapid and effective recovery, notably allowing the creation of jobs and the development of high added value activities. Austerity therefore does not seem to be being held back. The head of state wants to support both supply and demand.

He also insisted on the need to modernize the system of governance of the public sector in order to make it more effective and more efficient "to correct the structural malfunctions of public establishments and enterprises, to guarantee optimal complementarity and coherence between their respective missions" . In order to make them concrete, the Sovereign recommended "the creation of a National Agency whose mission will be to ensure the strategic management of State holdings and to monitor the performance of public establishments". The King wants to establish a culture of results within the public administration in order to meet the expectations of citizens. The goal is to see the country rise to

the rank of emerging countries through more effective governance based on accountability and regular evaluation of public policies. Social justice and a better allocation of budgetary resources will be at the heart of this new ambition.

The implementation, from January 2021 of an action plan for the next five years, to allow "the generalization of Compulsory Health Insurance and family allowances. It will then be extended to other social coverages such as retirement and compensation for loss of employment", demonstrates the priority given to the social issue by the Sovereign. The stakes are high and could allow a significant reduction in the informal sector and the establishment of a new social contract. The government and the social partners will have to be pragmatic in order to create management mechanisms that are both coherent and effective.

According to the World Bank, the Gross Domestic Product in Morocco was 112.87 billion US dollars in 2020. The GDP value of Morocco represents 0.10% of the world economy (Trade economics, 2021). The real question for the kingdom is to establish a strong and real connection between the increase of the GDP and the implementation of social programs for the population. For this reason, the question of the governance, which we mentioned before, is becoming central for the Moroccan political economy strategy.




Figure 2. Evolution of the Moroccan GDP between 2010 and 2020 in billion US dollars.

Source: World Bank, Trade Economics.com

## Conclusion

The medium and long-term challenges for Morocco are numerous and difficult. The consolidation of a new inclusive development model with a health policy to be (re) invented, the creation of national solidarity mechanisms, a research and development (R&D) policy to be promoted. The latter requires a strong partnership between the State and the private sector in order to diversify industrial policy and allow a move upmarket in international trade in order to create jobs with high benefit. The competitiveness and reconfiguration of industrial policy with the promotion of “national champions” will also be taken into account. Encouraging entrepreneurship is also becoming essential, in order to be able to count on a solid economic fabric. For this, tools such as economic and territorial intelligence should be strengthened.

Finally, we will have also to think about free trade agreements. Many of them are unfavorable to Morocco because imports are greater than exports. Allowing Moroccan manufacturers to better position themselves on the domestic market and then promote exports (mainly to Africa) should become a priority. The Moroccan come back in the African Union in 2017 and the royal visits in African countries are part of this strategy to increase economic relations with the continent. Morocco has also joined the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Moroccan economic diplomacy permitted to the kingdom to consolidate the political relations with investments and trade. More than 1000 cooperation agreements were signed, according to Amani Abou-Zeid, Commissioner for Infrastructure and Energy at the African Union Commission (AUC) (Maroc.ma, 2021).

The crisis generated by the pandemic will inevitably have repercussions on the Moroccan economy as a whole because the interruption of activities results in a huge loss of earnings for the private sector. But not only. Public finances will also be affected by the almost inevitable reduction in certain revenues. The fiscal resources, which finance 86% of the state budget, will decline. The question of expenditure therefore arises, but it is not the only one.

## References

- CHAUFFOUR, J.P. 2018. Morocco 2040: Emerging by Investing in Intangible Capital Directions in Development – Countries and Regions. World Bank, Washington, DC. License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.
- CURRIE, J., HARRISON, A.E. 1997. Sharing the Costs: The Impact of Trade Reform on Capital and Labor in Morocco. *Journal of Labor Economics*, 15 (S3), S44-S71.
- HASSANI, K., CHOUGRANI, S. 2019. Enjeux de l’ouverture économique du Maroc dans la perspective du nouveau modèle de développement. *Revue*

Internationale des Sciences de Gestion: Numéro 5: Octobre 2019, Volume 2, numéro 4. P. 190-209.

Maroc.ma. 2021. L'action africaine du Maroc : une Vision Royale qui place les intérêts de l'Afrique et des Africains au centre de ses préoccupations.

<https://www.maroc.ma/fr/actualites/laction-africaine-du-maroc-une-vision-royale-qui-place-les-interets-de-lafrique-et-des#:~:text=%E2%80%9CL'africanit%C3%A9%20du%20Maroc%20n,%2C%20Mme%20Amani%20Abou%2DZeid.>

MOURJI, F., MASMOUDI, H. 2015. L'état de l'économie marocaine: un potentiel de développement réel mais contraint. Le Maroc au présent dir.

Baudouin Dupret, Zakaria Rhani, Assia Boutaleb, et al. P. 907-944.

Policy Paper Deloitte. 2021. Le Maroc, de la résilience à l'émergence?. Mais quid du Maroc?.

Statista. 2021. Morocco: Distribution of gross domestic product (GDP) across economic sectors from 2010 to 2020.

<https://www.statista.com/statistics/502771/morocco-gdp-distribution-across-economic-sectors/>

Trade Economics. 2021. Morocco GDP.

<https://tradingeconomics.com/morocco/gdp>

YAMMAD, Y., LALAOUI, S. 2021. La Covid-19: quell impact sur le development économique du Maroc?. Revue Internationale du Chercheur, 2(2).

# THE SECURITY SYSTEM OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND AS AN ANSWER FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION REQUIREMENTS

**Krzysztof Żołyniak<sup>1</sup>**

## **ABSTRACT**

*In the 21<sup>st</sup> century thoughts on the future are extensively dominated by two significant phenomena: globalisation and common implementation of IT solutions. Along with the development of digital technology and information society a whole new area of security which is territorially unlimited and connected with various areas of life transferred to the cyberspace was created. Transport, energy and health, telecommunication, finances, security, democracy, processes, space and defense are largely dependent on network and information systems. Cybersecurity is an integral part of Europeans security. The question is if connected devices, power grids or banks, planes, public administration, hospitals, people deserve it with the confidence that they are protected from cyberthreats. In the following article issues related to security in cyberspace are discussed. There are provided definitions of cyberspace and cybersecurity established by the Republic of Poland, the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Organisation of Standardisation from the telecommunications industry ITU (the International Telecommunication Union). Moreover, in this article there are presented the most important regulations and actions undertaken by the European Union in terms of ensuring the protection in cyberspace and their reflection on the national level. There has also been a reference to the new cybersecurity strategy for the Republic of Poland which main objective is increasing the level of cyberthreats resilience.*

**Key words:** security, cybersecurity, cyberspace, the European Union, the Republic of Poland

## **1 Cybersecurity in the conceptual approach**

Social and economic development is increasingly dependent on rapid and unrestricted access to information and its use in managements, production, service and public sector. Dynamic development of information systems serves the development of national economy, especially in the area of communication, trade, transport or financial services. Social relationships are created with the use of digital technologies forming cyberspace, and the services in the Internet have become tools influencing the behaviour of social groups and affecting the political sphere. Every significant disruption in the cyberspace functioning will have an impact on security of economic cycle, security of citizens, efficient functioning of the public sector, the course of production and service processes,

---

<sup>1</sup> Krzysztof Żołyniak, doctor of Sociology in discipline of social sciences, the teacher in Urban School Complex number 3 in Krosno, Decowskiego Street 2, 38-401 Krosno, Poland, zoliniakcris@o2.pl

and as a result national security in general (The Resolution of the Council of Ministers, 2019).

European Union Agency for Cybersecurity which is responsible for assuring high and efficient security level in networks and information systems recommends the need to harmonise the concepts of cybersecurity- at both European and global levels (European Network and Information Security Agency, 2012). Unification of particular defined terms would greatly facilitate common actions in the field of cybersecurity planning. A terminological problem is present in this matter since the 1990s, which is when the term of ‘cyberspace’ entered the general circulation. Nowadays the variety of this term interpretations, results in many dangers (Warchoł, 2019). Due to the character of the article, it is reasonable to present definitions of cyberspace established by the Republic of Poland, EU , NATO and the oldest in the world international organization, set up in order to standardise and regulate telecommunication and radio-communication market, *ITU - International Telecommunication Union*. The comparative analysis of *cyberspace* definition introduced by the Republic of Poland and the European Union will be performed. At the same time, definitions formulated by European organization participating in digital sphere regulations will be considered i.e. European Union Agency for Cybersecurity and ITU (Cichosz, 2019).

According to the Cybersecurity Doctrine of the Republic of Poland of 2015 term *cyberspace* means: ‘an area of processing and information exchange created by teleinformation systems (sets of cooperating devices and softwares that provide processing, storage, as well as data sending and receiving via ICT networks, using a particular terminal teleinformation device for a particular type of network, which is dedicated to direct or indirect connection to the ends of networks) together with connections between them and relationships with users. (the Cybersecurity Doctrine of the Republic of Poland, 2015). At the same time the above document specifies the term of *cyberspace of the Republic of Poland*, as: ‘cyberspace within Poland and in places where Polish representations function (diplomatic missions, military contingents, watercraft and aircraft out of Polish space, which are under Polish jurisdiction)’ (the Cybersecurity Doctrine of the Republic of Poland). However, according to NATO cyberspace is ‘more than the Internet, equipment, software and information systems, these are also people and social interactions within these networks’ (Klimburg, 2012). Whereas the United States presents the term of cyberspace in the form of the following formula: ‘an interdependent network of IT infrastructure which includes the Internet, telecommunication networks, computer systems as well as embedded processors and controllers’ (National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies, 2018). Similarly, standardisation organisation ITU specifies cyberspace as systems and services directly or indirectly associated with the Internet, telecommunication and computer networks’ (National Cybersecurity Strategy Guide, 2011). In view of the above considerations, it should be taken that definitions of cyberspace

presented by the United States and ITU emphasize only technical elements, all the while ignoring person as a user who interacts with cyberspace and becomes in this way its part. Given the above, recommendations both from the NATO and the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity have arisen which relate to the standardization of cyberspace definitions in common strategic documents (Grzelak, Liedel, 2012). Lack of cyberspace definitions standardization certainly may impact the responsibility of operators who are obliged to its protection and defence, as well as directions of cybersecurity policy strategic objectives (Cichosz, 2017). Definitions of cyberspace mentioned above therefore induce a reflection that this term is defined differently which may make it difficult to form interoperability in the sphere of security in the course of upcoming years (Cichosz, 2019). These include, for example, problems connected with allocating responsibility for prohibited acts committed in cyberspace or inability to build effective security systems (Warchoń, 2019).

In the Cybersecurity Doctrine of the Republic of Poland in 2015 two terms are also distinguished: *cybersecurity of the Republic of Poland* and *security in cyberspace of the Republic of Poland*. The first term is defined as: ‘a process of providing safe functioning in country cyberspace as a whole, its structures, natural and legal person in this entrepreneurs and other entities without legal personality and those who are in the availability of ICT systems and information resources in global cyberspace’ (the Cybersecurity Doctrine of the Republic of Poland, 2015). The second term presented in the Doctrine is *security of cyberspace in the Republic of Poland* as follows: ‘a part of country cybersecurity which includes organizational-legal, technical, physical and educational undertakings designed to provide smooth functioning of Polish cyberspace with its component public and private ICT critical infrastructure and security of processed in it information resources’ (the Cybersecurity Doctrine of the Republic of Poland, 2015).

According to the *National Cyber-Security System Act* of 5 July 2018, *cybersecurity* means: ‘information systems resistance to activities infringing confidentiality, integrity, availability, and authenticity of processed data or connected with them services which they offer (*National Cyber-Security System Act*, 2018).

The European Parliament considers that term of *cybersecurity* determines ‘all actions necessary for the protection against cyberthreats on the network and information systems, their users and affected people’ (Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2017). Whereas according to ENISA, cybersecurity includes: ‘all actions necessary for cyberspace protection, its users and people affected by cyberthreats. Cybersecurity takes into account all aspects of cyberincidents prevention, prediction, tolerance, detection, mitigation, removal, analysis and research. Considering different cyberspace types of elements, cybersecurity should include the following attributes: availability, reliability, security, confidentiality, integrity, easy maintenance (material



systems, information and network), solidity, resistance (due to cyberspace dynamic support), responsibility, authenticity and non-repudiation (due to information security support) (Helmbrecht, 2017).

Meanwhile, cyberspace definition presented by ITU has multifaceted dimension and includes: 'set of tools, politics, safety concept, protections, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, trainings, best practices, ensuring and technologies which may be used to protect cyberspace and organisations as well as user resources. The organization and the user resources include connected computer devices, personel, infrastructure, applications, services, telecommunication systems and all of transferred and/or stored information in cybernetic environment. Cybersecurity strives to providing achieving and maintaining security features of organizations and user resources in relation to appropriate security threats in the cybernetic environment (European Organisation for Security, 2015).

## **2 Selected documents and institutions of the European Union in terms of cybersecurity**

Within the process, which lasts at least since nineties of the twentieth century, the European Union has become a visible subject of safety management. Towards the end of the Cold War European discourse on the security started to shift in the direction of international safety risks which in the world of increasing globalization blurring division into internal and external security (Górka, Gibka, 2019).

Significant was EU evolution phase after 'September 11' which made it necessary to establish the European Union as security subject in the face of international threats. Gradually EU policy has also been connected to the broader political crisis related to transnational, i.e. cyberthreats, organised crime, 'refugee crisis' or brexit. (Górka, Gibka, 2019).

The first, symbolic incident was an attack of hackers associated with the Russian government on the Estonian infrastructure on May 2007. Since then there have occurred many high-profile cases of cybersecurity breaches not only at the critical infrastructure facilities of European countries but also at EU authorities, including the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European External Action Service. There has also been an increase in availability of devices causing interferences in the Internet which at the same time began to be an increasingly relevant challenge for the development of the European digital economy (ENISA, 2016). Increased risks to EU and citizens, governments and companies resulted in fact that safe development and using digital technologies has become a crucial pillar for the European Union policy (Górka, Gibka, 2019).

The evidence of an increasing attention to this issue by EU is i.e. *the European Digital Single Market Strategy* publication (the European Commission, 2015) and initiatives within public-private partnership (PPP), which are intended

to create the European economy competitiveness (the European Commission, 2016). Gradually, the need for legal regulations area change has been noticed. It was indicated that attacks against information systems, being the result of organized crime or terrorist activity focused on the critical infrastructure of EU countries, require a response at EU level (the European Commission, 2005). Protection from cybercrime, over time, has become one of the highest priorities for the European Union.

The European Cybernetic Security Strategy announced in 2013 became focal point of international regulations and important instrument for member states. It was stressed that due to the transnational capacity and nature of cyberthreats the effective response from individual governments requires the involvement at EU level (the European Commission, 2013). This strategy is the first document explaining the necessity of strengthening in the EU policy – apart from efforts connected with the battle against the cybercrime and ensuring the security of network and information – ‘cyberdefence capability’. Therefore, it reflects the priorities of these entities within the EU institutions which were responsible for development of various aspects of cybersecurity policy, such as the European Defence Agency or the European External Action Service which are responsible for cyberdefence (Górka, Gibka, 2019).

In addition to *the 2013 European Cybersecurity Strategy* the second important document is the *Network and Information Security directive* (NIS). This document was adopted in August 2016 (the Council of the European Union, 2017). Its purpose is to prepare the European Union countries on the reaction to the cybernetic incidents, among others, by establishment of the Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRT) which main function is to prevent and detect possible cyberattacks and reduce their consequences. The NIS directive is the first European legal act which highlights the need for cybernetic incidents reporting in all of the member states.

An important stage on the way to cybersecurity development process was establishment of the European Network and Information Security Agency in 2004. It played a significant role in the best practices defining and increasing cooperation between all of the interested stakeholders determining. In the first-term of office from 2005 this institution was also given the responsibility for support to national computer incident response teams (CIRT) for which the programmes and cooperation working group have been established (the European Parliament and Council Regulation, 2004). ENISA, like the whole process of EU cybersecurity policy development, was created due to the increasing number of cyberthreats which caused financial damages and undermined the confidence in public institutions, which had a negative impact on the European Union plans connected with the development of e-commerce (Górka, Gibka, 2019).

The continuous growth of cybercrime caused that the role of the European Cyber Crime Center (EC3), which operates at Europol, became the strategic priority in terms of maintaining cybersecurity. EC3 mission is adaptation of tasks

to actions of other relevant EU agencies, such as the European Union's Judicial Cooperation Unit (Eurojust), ENISA and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL). This is to provide, that tasks including training, capacity building, strategic analysis and technical support defined in the framework of the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACTS) will be effectively realized (Europol, 2014).

Development of EU digitization in recent years was dynamic enough that the measures provided by the NIS directive according to the European Union authorities has proved insufficient to ensure the appropriate level of cybersecurity in member states. Therefore, a proposal for a new NIS2 directive has been published on 16 December 2020 which was intended to replace the current NIS directive and lead to harmonization of cybersecurity regulations at the area of EU. The project of the directive is a part of European pack for cybersecurity. In the explanatory memorandum to the introduction of the new directive the need of adaptation of the European Union's rules connected with COVID pandemic, which significantly accelerated digital transformation of society and companies as well as increased number of cyberattacks, was mentioned. The project of new directive aimed also at weak points elimination related to the application of the NIS directive rules, mainly caused by differences within its implementation way in individual countries, lack of adequate cooperation and exchange of the information between member states as well as with lack of proper enforcement of the introduced regulations by member states (PAED, 2021).

A novelty comparing the current NIS directive to the project of new NIS2 directive is an implementation of obligation to develop the national incident and crisis response plan by member states. This plan ought to include appropriate procedures, channels of information flow, or measures which can be taken to prepare the member states authorities in case of occurrence of cybersecurity incidents of large-scale.

In accordance, to ensure international cooperation in the response to such incidents a new authority is to be created- the liaison organization of member states, which main purpose is to support in the field of cooperation in the management of security incidents of large-scale (*European Cyber Crises Liaison Organisation Network – EU - CyCLONe*) (PARP, 2021).

### **3 Cybersecurity in the national security system of the Republic of Poland**

Facing many challenges connected with ensuring security in cyberspace Poland undertakes actions which aim is to create and maintain an effective cybersecurity system in accordance with the interests of the state and EU requirements, aiming to provide interoperability of existing and future technologies. Polish legislator defines the strategic objectives and appropriate political and regulatory measures aimed at achieving and maintaining high level of cybersecurity of the Republic of Poland (Cichosz, 2019).

Since 1990, in the documents related to the security of Poland, the legislator provided the need to ensure the telecommunication services security within the context of protection and defense of Poland (*the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland 2000*). During the presidency of A. Duda the Ministry of Digital Affairs presented the project of *the Cyber-Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland 2017-2022* (also known as *the National Policy of Cyber-Security Frameworks of the Republic of Poland 2017-2022*). It is a proposal of national strategy in terms of telecommunication systems security (*the Cyber-Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland 2017-2022, 2017*).

On May 9, 2017 the Prime Minister B. Szydło signed the resolution number 52/2017 of Council of the Ministers of 27 April 2017 regarding *the National Framework of Cyber Security Policy of the Republic of Poland for years 2017-2022*.

Intention of the above strategy is determination of frame actions, aiming to establish *the national teleinformatic system* with high resistance to cyberthreats in collaboration with public administration, operators of essential services and critical infrastructure as well as digital services providers. Indicated strategic directions should also improve the effectiveness of law enforcement and judicial authorities in detecting and combating crimes, terrorist and cyber-espionage actions. 'The Strategy is consistent with the conducted activities connected with critical infrastructure operators using ICT systems and it takes into account the need of Polish Armed Forces involvement'. The term of cybersecurity was redefined and the areas crucial for government administration were presented in this document. Adopting *the Cyber-Security Strategy for the years 2017-2022* allowed to standardize definitions formulated in current legislation (*the Cyber-Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland 2017-2022 – Analysis, 2017*). The strategy provides the creation of analytical center, i.e. the National Cyber-Security Centre, monitoring the exchange of the information between entrepreneurs, banks and public administration (*the National Cyber-Security Centre, 2016*). The key issue in the document is construction of the innovative hubs, which provide supporting the development of companies in the area of cybersecurity (*the National Cyber-Security Centre, 2016*), as well as international cooperation within NATO, the United Nations Organization and EU (*the Cyber-Security Strategy 2017-2022 - Analysis, 2017*).

The complement of the Cyber-Security Strategy 2017-2022 is the Act of National Cybersecurity System of 5 July, 2018 (*the Act of National Cybersecurity System, 2018*). It provides the authorities responsible for information security management and comprehensive actions for the implementation of national system for responding to information security threats (digitally processed), including rules of cooperation between entities obliged to detection of infringements in the cyberspace. In the context of cybersecurity it determines 'the incidents significance levels' and mentions important sectors of the national economy. The above mentioned actions indicate the continuation of adaptation of

Polish law to European law, strengthening of the network and systems security operating in EU adequately to the technological progress (the Cyber-Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland 2017-2022, 2017, Hoffman, 2018).

Since 31 October, 2019 *the National Framework of Cyber-Security Policy for the years 2017-2022* was replaced by *the Cyber-Security Strategy 2019-2024*. The role of this document is accurate indication of various strategic objectives, and also determining the appropriate political and regulatory measures aimed at achieving a high level of cybersecurity, mainly ‘the information systems resistance of essential services operators, operators of critical infrastructure, digital services providers and public administration for cyberthreats as well as improvement in the level of information protection in the information systems by standardization of protection. The achievement of the strategic objectives may also affect the increase of the national security, increase the efficiency of law enforcement authorities and judicial system in detecting and combating cybercrime as well as hybrid activities (including terrorist activities) and spy activities in cyberspace’ (the Cyber-Security Strategy 2019-2024, 2019).

The Cyber-Security Strategy for the years 2019-2024 remains fully coherent with various actions taken in relation to the ICT systems of critical infrastructure operators and takes into account needs connected with ensuring the capacity of Polish Armed Forces in national, alliance and coalition systems for implementing the military activities in case of cybersecurity threat and take defensive actions. The main aim of the Cyber-Security Strategy for the years 2019-2024 is ‘increasing the level of resistance to cyberthreats and improving the level of information protection in the public, military, private sectors as well as knowledge and good practices promotion which allow citizens to protect their information in a better way’ (the Cyber-Security Strategy 2019-2024, 2019).

## References

*Bezpieczna Polska w cyfrowej erze. Strategia Cyberbezpieczeństwa na lata 2017-2022 [ANALIZA]*, [online] [cit. 25.1.2022] Dostępne pod adresem: <https://cyberdefence24.pl/bezpieczna-polska-w-cyfrowej-erze-strategia-cyberbezpieczenstwa-na-lata-2017-2022-analiza>

CICHOSZ, J. 2017. Polityka cyberbezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Rozprawa doktorska. Lublin, 2017. p. 621.

CICHOSZ, J. 2017. Społeczny wymiar problematyki bezpieczeństwa obywateli Unii Europejskiej w cyberprzestrzeni. Analiza porównawcza. W *Bezpieczeństwo osób w cyberprzestrzeni*. Lublin: WSEi, 2017. p. 148. ISBN: 978-83-64527-71-5.

Doktryna Cyberbezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. 2015. [online] [cit. 26.1.2022] Dostępne pod adresem: <https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dok/01/DCB.pdf>  
Dyrektywa Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady (UE) 2016/1148 z dnia 6 lipca

2016 roku w sprawie środków na rzecz wysokiego wspólnego poziomu bezpieczeństwa sieci i systemów informatycznych na terytorium Unii, Dz. U. UE, L 194/1, PL 19.7.2016

European Network and Information Security Agency. National Cyber Security Strategies. 2012. [online] [cit. 27.1.2022] Dostępne pod adresem: [http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/national-cyber-security-strategies-ncsss/cybersecurity-strategies-paper/at\\_download/fullReport](http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/national-cyber-security-strategies-ncsss/cybersecurity-strategies-paper/at_download/fullReport)  
European Organisation for Security. Cybersecurity for a trusted EU single digital market - Market Study for a Cybersecurity Flagship Programme. 2015.  
Europol. 2014. Europejskie Centrum ds. Cyberprzestępczości (EC3) – Sprawozdanie za pierwszy rok. [online] [cit. 26.1.2022] Dostępne pod adresem: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/european-cybercrime-center-ec3-firstyear-report>

HELMBRECHT, U. 2017. ENISA overview of cybersecurity and related terminology. European Union Agency For Network and Information Security. [online] [cit. 26.1.2022] Dostępne pod adresem: <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-position-papers-and-opinions/enisa-overview-of-cybersecurity-and-related-terminology>  
HOFFMANN, T. 2018. *Wybrane aspekty cyberbezpieczeństwa w Polsce*. Poznań: FNCE, 2018. s. 146. ISBN: 978-83-949123-8-9.

1. GÓRKA, M, GIBKA, M. 2019. Zjawisko europeizacji w kontekście polityki bezpieczeństwa cybernetycznego Unii Europejskiej. W *Acta Politica Polonica*, nr 2 (48), 2019, ISSN: 2451-0432, ss. 19-32.

GRZELAK, M, LIEDEL, K. 2012. Bezpieczeństwo w cyberprzestrzeni. Zagrożenia i wyzwania dla Polski - zarys problemu. W *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe*, nr 22, 2012, ISSN: 1896-4923, ss. 125-139.

Komisja Europejska. 2005. Opinia Europejskiego Komitetu Ekonomiczno-Społecznego w sprawie komunikatu Komisji do Rady, Parlamentu Europejskiego, Europejskiego Komitetu Ekonomiczno-Społecznego oraz Komitetu Regionów „i2010 - Europejskie społeczeństwo informacyjne na rzecz wzrostu i zatrudnienia” [online] [cit. 26.1.2022] Dostępne pod adresem: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PL/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52006AE0415>

Komisja Europejska. 2013. Strategia bezpieczeństwa cybernetycznego Unii Europejskiej: otwarta, bezpieczna i chroniona cyberprzestrzeń. [online] [cit. 26.1.2022] Dostępne pod adresem: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PL/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52013JC0001&from=HR>

Komisja Europejska. 2015. Europejska agenda bezpieczeństwa, COM(2015) 185 final. [online] [cit. 26.1.2022] Dostępne pod adresem:

[https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/eu-policy/european-agenda-security\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/eu-policy/european-agenda-security_en)

Komisja Europejska. 2016. Komisja podpisuje porozumienie z przemysłem w sprawie bezpieczeństwa cybernetycznego i wzmaga wysiłki na rzecz zwalczania

zagrożeń cybernetycznych. [online] [cit. 31.1.2022] Dostępne pod adresem: [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-16-2321\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2321_en.htm)

KLIMBURG, A. 2012. *National Cyber Security Framework Manual*. Tallinn: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2012. p. 253. ISBN: 978-9949-9211-1-9.

National Cybersecurity Strategy Guide ITU. 2011. [online] [cit. 26.1.2022] Dostępne pod adresem: <http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/cyb/cybersecurity/docs/ITUNationalCybersecurityStrategyGuide.pdf>

National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies, Glossary Explore Terms: A Glossary of Common Cybersecurity Terminology. 2018. [online] [cit. 22.1.2022] Dostępne pod adresem: <https://niccs.us-cert.gov/about-niccs/glossary>

Narodowe Centrum Cyberbezpieczeństwa. 2016. Na straży cyberbezpieczeństwa. 2016. [online] [cit. 25.1.2022] Dostępne pod adresem: <https://www.gov.pl/web/cyfryzacja/ncc-na-strazy-cyberbezpieczenstwa>

PARP. 2021. Dyrektywa NIS 2: jakie zmiany wprowadzi dla cyberbezpieczeństwa na rynku wewnętrznym UE? 2021. [online] [cit. 20.1.2022] Dostępne pod adresem: <https://www.parp.gov.pl/component/content/article/72054:dyrektywa-nis-2-jakie-zmiany-wprowadzi-dla-cyberbezpieczenstwa-na-rynku-wewnetrznym-ue>

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on ENISA, the ‘EU Cybersecurity Agency’, and repealing Regulation (EU) 526/2013, and on Information and Communication Technology cybersecurity certification („Cybersecurity Act”) (No. COM (2017) 477 final). 2017. [online] [cit. 20.1.2022] Dostępne pod adresem: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52017SC0501>

Publications Office of the European Union. Operational Guidance for the EU’s international cooperation on cyber capacity building European Commission Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace. 2018. [online] [cit. 25.1.2022] Dostępne pod adresem: <https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Operational%20Guidance.pdf>

Rada Unii Europejskiej. 2017. Draft Council Conclusions on a Framework for a Joint EU Diplomatic Response to Malicious Cyber Activities. [online] [cit. 26.1.2022] Dostępne pod adresem: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9916-2017-INIT/en/pdf>

Rozporządzenie (WE) nr 460/2004 Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady z dnia 10 marca 2004 r. ustanawiające Europejską Agencję ds. Bezpieczeństwa Sieci i Informacji. [online] [cit. 26.1.2022] Dostępne pod adresem: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PL/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32004R0460&from=EN>

Strategia Cyberbezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na lata 2017-2022.

Ministerstwo Cyfryzacji. 2017. [online] [cit. 20.1.2022] Dostępne pod adresem: [file:///C:/Users/Krzysiek/AppData/Local/Temp/strategia\\_cyberbezpieczenstwa\\_rzeczypospolitej\\_polskiej\\_na\\_lata\\_2017\\_-\\_2022-1.pdf](file:///C:/Users/Krzysiek/AppData/Local/Temp/strategia_cyberbezpieczenstwa_rzeczypospolitej_polskiej_na_lata_2017_-_2022-1.pdf)

Strategia Cyberbezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na lata 2019-2024.

Ministerstwo Cyfryzacji. 2019. [online] [cit. 20.1.2022] Dostępne pod adresem: <https://www.gov.pl/web/cyfryzacja/strategia-cyberbezpieczenstwa-rzeczypospolitej-polskiej-na-lata-2019-2024>

Uchwała Rady Ministrów z dnia 22 października 2019 r. w sprawie Strategii Cyberbezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na lata 2019–2024

Ustawa z dnia 5 lipca 2018 r. o *Krajowym Systemie Cyberbezpieczeństwa*, Dz.U. 2018 poz. 1560

WARCHOŁ, A. 2019. Pojęcie cyberprzestrzeni w strategiach bezpieczeństwa państw członkowskich Unii Europejskiej. W *Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis Studia de Securitate*, 2019, nr 9(4), ISSN: 2657-854, s. 96-107.



*Title:* **SECURITY FORUM 2022**  
Conference Proceedings

*Editors:* doc. Mgr. Jaroslav Ušiak, PhD.  
Mgr. Dávid Kollár, PhD.

*Number of Pages:* 339 pages  
*Edition:* First  
*Form:* A4 (PDF document)

*Publisher:* Interpolis  
*Place of Issue:* Banská Bystrica  
*Year:* 2022

**ISBN 978-80-973394-7-0**

Conference Partners:



**ISBN 978-80-973394-7-0**